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Abstract 
In this thesis I will revisit debates concerning the use of natural scientific methods in the 
discipline of psychology. I take the position that natural scientific methods are inappropriate 
for investigating human experience. My central aim is to unravel the dilemma embedded in 
psychological  practice.  Psychologists  specifically  investigate  people  but,  by  using  methods 
based on natural science, they are forced to admit that meaningful human experience is either 
irrelevant or inaccessible to their investigations of human behaviour.  
Initially, I take up ethnomethodologically informed discursive psychology (EM-informed DP) as 
an alternative to, and a viable replacement of, the natural scientific methods in the discipline 
of psychology. EM-informed DP proceeds from Harold Garfinkel’s appropriation of Edmund 
Husserl’s critique that natural scientific investigations have lost their life-world foundation. 
Garfinkel  reads  Husserl  as  issuing  a  practical  instruction  to  go  out  and  investigate  lived 
practices, without any specialised theoretical framework. In doing so, one area that we can 
investigate, according to Garfinkel, is the lived practices of natural scientists and how they 
collaboratively produce their research findings. Hence, I proceed by empirically describing how 
clinical psychologists, as trained natural scientists, interpret people’s everyday experience in 
and through their actual practices.  
Following three investigations of clinical psychological interactions, based on three different 
interpretations of Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological (EM) program, I demonstrate that, despite 
claims  to  the  contrary,  EM  in  fact  presupposes  the  same  ground  as  natural  science.  EM-
informed researchers mistakenly conflate the natural scientific attitude with the theoretical 
attitude and, hence, seek to eliminate both in their attempts to clarify the lived practices of 
natural  scientists  or  everyday  people.  By  contrast,  for  phenomenologists,  the  theoretical 
attitude and the natural scientific attitude are distinct, but interrelated, attitudes that we can 
take towards the life-world. According to phenomenologists, the life-world is the starting point 
of any investigation, including all psychological investigations. However, if we forget that our 
investigations are theoretical, we perpetuate the same problem associated with the natural 
scientific method; leading us to replace the meaningful human world in which we live, the life-iv 
world, with the sterile Objective world constructed by the natural scientific observer. As I will 
suggest,  within  the  discipline  of  psychology,  the  substitution  of  one  empirical method  for 
another still leaves us without the world we live in. The challenge in psychology is to reinstate 
the importance of the theoretical attitude and the life-world. 
Through  a  series  of  unsuccessful  attempts  to  replace  natural  scientific  methods  with  an 
alternative empirical method in the discipline of psychology, I propose that the problem with 
the  natural  scientific  method  is  much  larger  than  I  originally  presupposed.  The  natural 
scientific interpretation of human experience is the sedimented interpretation of the life-world 
in our current historical situation. We cannot simply replace the natural scientific method 
because, currently, there is no viable alternative. Instead, in order to reinstate the importance 
of meaningful lived experience, we need to understand the natural scientific attitude in terms 
of  its  historical  development  and  grounding  assumptions,  by  engaging  with  the  life-world 
through the theoretical attitude.  
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Exergue 
 
 
‘What effect did the intoxicating success of this discovery of physical infinity have on the 
scientific mastery of the spiritual sphere? In the attitude directed toward the surrounding 
world, the constantly objectivistic attitude, everything spiritual appeared as if it were [simply] 
spread over [the surface of] physical bodies. Thus the application [to it] of the natural-scientific 
way of thinking seemed the obvious thing to do.’ 
Edmund Husserl (1970 (1935)). ‘The Vienna lecture: Philosophy and the Crisis of European 
Humanity’, p. 293. 
 
 
‘Reason  itself,  the  thinking  ability  which  we  have,  has  a  need  to  actualize  itself.  The 
philosophers and the metaphysicians have monopolized this capability. This has led to very 
great things. It also led to rather unpleasant things – we have forgotten that every human 
being has a need to think, not to think abstractly, not to answer the ultimate questions of God, 
immortality, and freedom, nothing but to think while he [sic] is living. And he [sic] does it 
constantly.  Everybody who tells the story of what happened to him [sic] half an hour ago on 
the street has got to put this story into shape. And this putting the story into shape is a form of 
thought.’ 
Hannah Arendt (1979). ‘On Hannah Arendt: Thinking and Acting’, p. 303
  
1 
Introduction: Psychology and Natural 
Science 
Introducing the Thesis and Method 
In this thesis I argue that psychological methods, despite claims to the contrary, continue to be 
based  upon  methods  adopted  from  the  natural  sciences.  In  particular,  methods  used  in 
psychology are underpinned by the concept that there is an Objective
1 standpoint, outside of 
the world of our living, from which to view human behaviour.
2 Thus, psychological researchers 
assume that through their methods they can establish general unchanging patterns in human 
characteristics that explain and predict the way people act in the world.
3 Through adopting 
methods from natural science, psychology presupposes that the human condition can be 
understood, categorised, explained and predicted in the same way as can rocks and trees. In 
                                                             
1  I  have  adopted  a  translator’s  convention  of  capitalising  the  ‘O’  in  ‘Objective’,  when  referring  to 
Husserl’s use of ‘Objekt’, and a small ‘o’ when referring to Husserl’s use of ‘Gegenstand’. As Dorion 
Cairns  (Husserl,  1973a,  p.  3)  writes  in  his  second  translator’s  note  in  Cartesian  Meditations:  An 
Introduction to Phenomenology, ‘Husserl frequently uses the words Gegenstand and Objekt to express 
importantly different senses. Having found no acceptable alternative to translating them both as object, 
I differentiate by spelling this word with a small letter when it represents Gegenstand and with a capital 
when it represents Objekt. All this applies, mutatis mutandis, in the case of any word derived from 
Gegenstand  or  Objekt’.  Similarly,  for  Husserl,  ‘subject’  also  has  two  senses:  I  will  use  a capitalised 
‘Subject’ to refer to the natural scientific interpretation of ‘subjective’ and will not capitalise ‘subject’ 
when referring to Husserl’s concept of ‘subjectivity’. The two different senses of object and subject, in 
Husserl’s work, only become important in the second part of my thesis, when I discuss Husserl’s (1999 
(1902/03), p. 68) conception of the problem of knowledge – the relation between the objectivity of the 
known and the subjectivity of the knower. However, for the sake of consistency and clarity, I will use 
‘Object/object’ and ‘Subject/subject’ throughout my thesis. 
2 The critique of the assumption of the  Objective standpoint within psychology is not a new critique; 
many other authors from different critical perspectives have made similar arguments to the  one I am 
making here. Some of the most important critical perspectives within the discipline of psychology can be 
found in the critical psychological literature of abnormal psychology that stems from the anti-psychiatry 
movement (for example see McHoul & Rapley, 2001; Newnes, 2004; Newnes , Holmes, & Dunn, 1999; 
Szasz, 1960); the discursive psychological critique of psychological research (for a good example of this 
style  of  critique  see  Potter,  Edwards,  &  Wetherell,  1993) ;  the  social  constructionist  critique  of 
psychological research (for example see K. Gergen, 1985; Prilleltensky, 1994); and the feminist critique 
of psychology (for example see M. Gergen, 2001; Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988). 
3  Predicting  behaviour  is   the  main  aim  of  psychological  investigations  stated  by  mainstream 
psychological literature. For example, Roy Baumeister, Kathleen Vohs and David Funder  (2007) critique 
the main methods used in social psychology – self-report questionnaires and reaction time experiments 
– for falling short of examining and predicting actual behaviour. Another example is Terry Knapp (1986), 
who specifies the goal of cognitive psychology as predicting behavioural responses from environmental 
stimuli through understanding how people process information.  
2 
adopting the methods of natural science, psychology forgets that it is we who divide up nature. 
We turn the method by which we divide nature into categories back upon ourselves and, 
thereby, do not allow consideration of human reasoning and experience, which is presupposed 
by natural scientific reasoning in the first instance.
4 
In my thesis, I am particularly concerned that by assuming the standpoint of the  Objective 
observer within psychological investigations, we do not  pay attention to the theoretical 
framework through which we make judgements about how to categorise people. Adopting the 
framework of natural science within psychology leads psychologists to assume that people are 
unchanging objects that can be classified into natural types. In doing so, the categories that are 
ascribed to people by psychologists are understood as  not dependent on the person making 
those ascriptions. In overlooking that our categorisations of people are made from a particular 
standpoint, psychologists run the risk of missing the harm that such categorisations can, and 
do,  have  upon  people’s  lives.
5  By  not  paying  attention  to  our  theoretical  standpoint, 
judgements made about people, within psychological literature and professional practice, are 
justified through a supposedly Objective method outside of the lived situation, rather than 
paying attention to our own and others actions, in the world in which we live.   
There is a lot of debate about whether psychology is a science or not.
6 Hence, psychologists 
would generally not agree that they necessarily presuppose that people can be classified into 
                                                             
4 The position I am presenting here stems from the phenomenological understanding that lived human 
experience and reason are primary to explicitly understanding, interpreting and categorising the world 
in which we live (for example see Heidegger, 2000a, pp. 21-24, 86-90; Husserl, 1973b, p. 41; Sokolowski, 
2000, pp. 187-197). 
5 My understanding of the problems associated with categorising people from an  Objective standpoint 
and the harm that this can cause stems from my understanding of the anti -psychiatry movement and 
the critical approaches to abnormal psychology within the discipline of psychology   (Healy, 2004; 
Moynihan & Cassels, 2005; Newnes et al., 1999; Newnes, Holmes, & Dunn, 2001; Szasz, 1960). However, 
there are other approaches that critique psychology for its supposedly Objective categorisations on the 
basis that they are exclusionary, most notably feminist critiques (for an overview see M. Gergen, 2001). 
6  Most notably,  Karl Popper  (2002  (1963), pp. 43-77)  in his book  Conjectures  and  Refutations:  The 
Growth of Scientific Knowledge critiques Sigmund Freud and Alfred Adler for not being able to derive 
falsifiable hypotheses from their theories and, hence, argues that they were not scientific theories. 
Criticisms of psychology’s scientific status are linked with criticisms of the Objective standpoint within  
3 
natural types from an Objective position. Instead, the use of statistical methods, for example, 
is seen as a useful means by which to make generalisations about people.
7 However, the 
methods used within psychology would not work without the assumption of the  Objective 
perspective through which people can   be classified into natural type s. Without such an 
assumption, the generalisations made by psychologists would be given no more heed than the 
generalisations I make on the basis of my lived experience. Hence, I argue that, before we can 
decide whether psychology should or should not be a science, we first need to attend to the 
presuppositions upon which psychological methods are based. 
My thesis revisits the ‘methodological’ appropriation of the Objective standpoint by showing 
that psychology continues to rely on the natural scientific attitude. I argue that the problem 
associated  with  the  adoption  of  natural  scientific  method,  either  acknowledged  or 
unacknowledged, cannot be resolved, for example, by replacing quantitative methods with 
qualitative methods in the discipline of psychology. To substantiate this claim, I pay close 
attention to the framework of ethnomethodology (EM) as an exemplar of a self-proclaimed 
‘non-scientific’ qualitative approach to social research and its application to psychology. I also 
pay close attention to the use of psychological testing, by personality psychologists, as a typical 
and  straightforward  example  of  a  natural  scientific  approach  to  research  in  psychology.  I 
demonstrate  that  the  statistical  examinations  of  personality  and  discursive  psychological 
investigations of social interaction, which are often presented as diametrically opposed within 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
psychology and, hence, for examples of the critiques that psychology is not a science also refer to 
footnote 2, page 1. 
7 Usually arguments about whether psychology is a science are either attended to by the mainstream 
literature by advocating a position that psychology, although not a science, is still a useful way of gaining 
knowledge about how people behave in general; or by stating that psychological science, although not 
properly a science in the past, has now resolved the problems associated with bad psychological science 
through becoming more Objective. For an example of these discussions on the status of psychology as a 
science with regard to psychological testing, a particularly controversial area of psychology because of 
its links with what has been called  ‘scientific  racism’  (Williams,  1974);  see  John  Rust  and  Susan 
Golombok’s  (1989,  pp.  22-38)  discussion  on  the  ‘true’  versus  ‘functional’  account  of  psychological 
testing and Gerald Goldstein and Michel Hersen’s (2000) discussion on the scientific progression of 
psychological assessment.  
4 
the psychological literature, in fact both presuppose the natural scientific attitude.
8 Instead of 
seeking an alternative to the use of natu ral scientific method in psychology, I argue that we 
first need to understand the historical development and grounding assumptions of the natural 
scientific attitude. The underlying question throughout the thesis is why and how the adoption 
of the natural scientific attitude leads to the elimination of lived human experience within 
psychological research.
9 
To address these issues, in the thesis, my method employed can best be understood as critical 
and self-reflective analysis. The thesis is composed of two parts: in  part one  I  adopt  an 
apparently non-scientific method and in the second part I critique my adoption of this method. 
Through my empirical investigations of clinical psychological therapy  I come to realise that I 
too assume an Objective position through which to view the social world. My adoption of the 
Objective  standpoint  from  which  to  a nalyse  interaction  is  not  a  result  of  my  ow n 
misunderstanding of the EM method but is rather a result  of ethnomethodologists aim to 
study talk-in-interaction from an atheoretical position. By reflecting upon the  ‘non-scientific’ 
method I used in the first part of the thesis, in the second part, I endeavour to explicate what 
                                                             
8  There  are  largely  considered  to  be  two  strands  of  qualitative  methods  in  psychology;  qualitative 
methods that open up new fields for quantitative psychological research and qualitative methods that 
are incompatible with scientific research. Of the strands of qualitative research that are considered 
incompatible  with  scientific  research,  DP  is  only  one.  For  a  general  discussion  on  the 
qualitative/quantitative divide in psychology see the special issue of The Psychologist, Vol. 18, Issue 9, 
published in 2005 (S. A. Haslam, 2005; Manstead & Wetherell, 2005; Reicher, 2005; Reicher & Taylor, 
2005; Spears, Holloway, & Edwards, 2005). However, in order to keep the thesis manageable I will 
exclusively focus on DP. 
9  Mainstream psychological research approaches state quite clearly that they are not   investigating 
meaningful human experience, but do not understand this as a problem. For example, John Watson 
(2009 (1920), p. 180), the founder of behaviourism, notes, ‘I have no sympathy with those psychologists 
and philosophers who try to introduce a concept of ‘‘meaning’’ (‘‘values’’ is another sacred word) into 
behaviour’.  In  another  example,  George  Mandler,  a leading  spokesperson  for cognitive  psychology, 
states in a conversation with Bernard Baars (1986; emphasis in original), ‘psychology must talk about 
people. Your private experience is a theoretical construct to me. I have no direct access to your private 
experience. I do not have direct access to your behaviour. In that sense I’m a behaviourist. In that sense, 
everybody is a behaviourist’. For similar comments, see Baumeister, Vohs and Funder (2007, p. 339) and 
John Kihlstrom (1987, p. 1445). For an in depth discussion of how the development of psychology as a 
scientific discipline has led to a loss of meaningful human experience see Alan Costall (2006). However, 
to make the claim that DP does not consider meaningful human experience is more controversial; I will 
address this topic specifically in chapter five.  
5 
the natural scientific method is and why, despite my intention to avoid adopting the natural 
scientific  method  for  researching  the  social  world,  I  continued  to  rely  upon  the  natural 
scientific standpoint. In the second part of my thesis, I argue that the natural scientific attitude 
taken towards to the human world, which is presupposed by psychological research including 
my own method for investigating social interaction, points to a more fundamental problem. 
The significant problem indicated by my unwitting adoption of the natural scientific attitude is 
that the natural scientific interpretation has become the only viable method through which, as 
in the case of psychology, we can understand human experience.   
Part One: Analytic Descriptions of Clinical Psychology 
My Research Project 
Initially, I understood Harold Garfinkel’s (1967a, p. 303, 2002) EM program as a viable and 
promising alternative to the use of natural scientific methods in the discipline of psychology. 
Not only are ethnomethodologists avid critics of the use of natural scientific methods in social 
scientific  research,  but  their  work  has  also  exerted an  influence  upon  psychology  through 
Derek Edwards and Jonathan Potter’s (1992) proposal of discursive psychology (DP). Hence, I 
wanted  to  extend  the  DP  insight  that  EM  could  be  used  within  psychology  by  examining 
Garfinkel’s EM program specifically.
10  
Due  to  my  particular  interest  in  investigating  how  judgements  are  made  about  people  in 
professional psychological practice, I wanted to use EM to investigate the actual practices of 
clinical  psychologists.  I  specifically  wanted  to  investigate  whether  the  assumption  of  the 
Objective  standpoint  by  clinical  psychologists  could  be  seen  to  play  a  role  in  therapeutic 
interactions and to examine whether such an assumption had detrimental effects upon clients; 
                                                             
10 DP is influenced by EM, CA and social science studies (Edwards & Potter, 1992; S. Wiggins & Potter, 
2008) but, once again, in order to keep my thesis manageable I will focus solely upon the influence EM 
has on DP.  
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effects that were overlooked by therapists. I thought that through examining the practices of 
clinical psychology I could carefully describe how clinical psychologists are actually informed by 
the  natural  scientific  understandings  that  underpin scientific  psychology,  and illustrate  the 
tangible problems that natural scientific interpretations of clients’ difficulties lead to in the 
clinical psychological setting. EM seemed to be a particularly fruitful way to confront these 
problems because it is a method of investigating the actual practices of any social interaction 
and its proponents claim to avoid the presupposition of the Objective standpoint. In addition, 
ethnomethodologists specifically aim to clarify the lived world practices of natural and social 
scientists. 
I started my project by recording, listening to, replaying and transcribing eighteen therapy 
sessions  as  a  way  of  both  understanding  how  to  apply  EM  research  and  examining  and 
describing  the  actual  practices  of  clinical  psychology.  The  eighteen  therapy  sessions  that 
formed my empirical data corpus were recorded for me by two clinical psychologists. I was 
given thirteen individual sessions from one psychologist and five couples counselling sessions 
from a second psychologist. I refer to the therapists and clients using anonyms for reason of 
confidentiality. I transcribed all eighteen sessions using the Jeffersonian transcription system 
(Jefferson,  1984,  2004).
11  EM-informed  researchers advocate starting with  listening to  and 
transcribing the data as a way of beginning an  analysis of social interaction  (Antaki, Billig, 
Edwards, & Potter, 2003; ten Have, 1997) . Hence, the first part of my  thesis starts with my 
analytic descriptions of clinical psychological therapy as a way of discovering both what clinical 
psychological therapy is and as a way of understanding research approaches that stem from 
Garfinkel’s EM program. 
I never intended to judge the practices of the two clinical psychologists featured in my data. 
My research project is about showing a more general problem with clinical psychology through 
                                                             
11 See Appendix for details.  
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examining particular therapy sessions.  In the extracts I present in chapters one, two and three 
I am presenting very short sections of talk from therapy sessions. Paying attention to anyone’s 
talk to investigate the minutiae of what they are saying and how they are saying it has the 
effect of immortalising problematic fleeting statements. Hence, I would like to clearly state 
that it was not my intention to judge the clinical psychologists in the extracts I present, nor do I 
think it is possible to do so on the basis of the extracts that I have presented. 
Ethnomethodology as Applied Phenomenology 
In  the  first  part  of  my  thesis,  I  uncritically  adopt  ethnomethodology  (EM)  as  an  applied 
phenomenological research approach for investigating and clarifying how clinical psychology 
actually ‘gets done’ within the interactions between therapists and clients. Garfinkel (2007), 
the  founder  of  EM,  claims  to  appropriate  the  phenomenological  critique  that  the  natural 
sciences  have  lost  their  life-world  foundations.  Originally  adopting  Alfred  Schütz’s  social 
phenomenology and his notion of common sense knowledge (Garfinkel, 1967a, pp. 37, 55; 
Garfinkel  &  Sacks,  1970,  pp.  343-344)  and  latter  adopting  Edmund  Husserl’s  life-world 
specifically  (Garfinkel,  2007;  Garfinkel  &  Liberman,  2007),  Garfinkel  proposes  that  social 
science prevalently misses its phenomenon of interest: the social world as it is actually lived. 
Initially, I thought that the phenomenological influence upon EM was what underpinned the 
radical  nature  of  its  project,  which  was  to  study  the  social  world  as  an  already  orderly 
phenomenon from a non-specialist position (Garfinkel, 2007; Livingston, 2006, p. 41, 2008, pp. 
59-63; Lynch, 1993). Due to the nature of my project, which starts out by understanding EM as 
an applied phenomenonology, and then turns to phenomenology to critique EM, I will now 
draw out the similarities that I saw between the two approaches, EM and phenomenology, 
and how I initially understood them to apply to psychology. 
In part one of my thesis, I missed the important distinction between idealisation and indirect 
mathematisation that Husserl makes (1970 (1952), pp. 34-37; Patočka, 1989 (1971), pp. 228- 
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230),  and  understood  Husserl’s  claims  about  how  the  natural  scientific  attitude  indirectly 
mathematises the life-world as commensurate with EM’s claims about how social researchers 
formalise and, thereby, idealise the social world. Garfinkel and Sacks (1970, pp. 443-445) take 
up the problem with the Objectivist standpoint as a problem of incorrectly assuming that there 
is a specialised position through which to view the social world which is gained through the 
application of technical apparatus, and leads to a loss of the social world.
12 As Garfinkel and 
Sacks (1970, p. 339) state, social researchers, using mathematical methods to investigate the 
social world, for example,  Objectify everyday expressions and practices
13 that are inherently 
contingent. In doing so, according to Sacks and Garfinkel  (1970, p. 339), social researchers 
replace actual expressions with ideal expressions without realising this implication of using 
formal  methods  of  investigating  the  social  world.  Drawing  upon  EM  understandings  of 
phenomenology,  I  understood  the  problem  of  quantitative  psychological  methods  as 
presupposing  a  privileged  position,  and  utilising   specialised  technical  apparatus  for 
investigating how the social world actually works that is not available to people in the social 
world in which they live. I understood  that psychological researchers, by adopting technical 
mathematical methods for accessing privileged information about people, in fact  obscured 
people’s actions and, as such, lost sight of the phenomenon they were interested in. In part 
one, I understood psychologists as incorrectly assuming that they have privileged access to a 
people’s  own  understanding  of  themselves  and  I  thought  I  could  use  EM  as  an  applied 
phenomenology  to  show  how  this  assumption  plays  out  in  the  actual  practices  of  clinical 
psychology. In examining the actual practices of clinical psychological therapy I thought I could 
examine whether and how psychologists adopt a privileged position in therapeutic interaction 
and the actual problems this leads to for clients; problems that are missed by therapists. 
                                                             
12 I am drawing upon Garfinkel and Sacks’s article ‘On the formal structures of practical actions’ because 
it is considered to be a seminal text that outlines the EM position. 
13 Practices and expressions are understood in EM to work in the same way (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970, p. 
344).  
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By adopting EM as an applied phenomenology, I took up Garfinkel’s interpretation of Husserl’s 
critique, that the natural sciences have lost their life-world foundation, and assumed I could 
clarify  the  lived  practices  of  clinical  psychologists  within  actual  settings.  For 
ethnomethodologists, social theories retain some plausibility, not because social researchers 
employ technical apparatus or the specialised position that they adopt, but because they draw 
upon their own practical knowledge of the social world (Garfinkel, 1967a; Garfinkel & Sacks, 
1970; Lynch & Bogen, 1994; McHoul, 2001). Garfinkel and Sacks (1970, pp. 341-345) make the 
claim that specialised sociological techniques used by investigators are, in fact, based upon 
practical  common  sense  methods  that  everyday  people  use  to  make  sense  of  the  social 
situation that they are involved in. Garfinkel and Sacks (1970, pp. 341-345) maintain that not 
only do sociological technical methods of investigation obscure the common sense methods by 
which actual social order is produced and maintained in social situations, but also that social 
researchers  rely  upon  their  own  unacknowledged  common  sense  methods  to  make  their 
findings about the social world. According to ethnomethodologists, it is the commonsense 
methods  used,  and  not  the  named  methodological  technique,  that  enables  sociological 
theories to remain plausible explanations of the social world (Garfinkel, 1967a; Garfinkel & 
Sacks, 1970; Lynch & Bogen, 1994; McHoul, 2001). Particularly for Garfinkel (Garfinkel, 2007; 
Garfinkel & Liberman, 2007), but also for Sacks (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970, pp. 341-345), social 
and natural scientific research is in need of an ethnomethodological clarification by examining 
the lived practices through which researchers collaboratively produce their findings; rather 
than uncritical acceptance that natural and social scientists clarify how the social world works 
(Lynch & Bogen, 1994, p. 84). From my understanding of EM as an applied phenomenology, I 
assumed I could investigate clinical psychological practice to see how therapists actually rely 
upon  common  sense  methods  to  interpret  people’s  difficulties;  and  not  specialised 
psychological understandings of people, or therapeutic techniques. 
14 
                                                             
14 The position I am stating here is controversial because the role of clinical psychology is defined as a  
10 
In  part  one,  I  understood,  in  line  with  Garfinkel’s  (1967b)  interpretation  of  Husserlian 
phenomenology, that Garfinkel’s claim that the social world is co-produced through members’ 
actions  as  compatible  with  Husserl’s  (1970  (1952),  p.  108)  claim  that  the  life-world  is 
intersubjectively constituted by us.
15  For Garfinkel (1967b), we do not require a specialised 
position through which to investigate the social world because we can examine the social 
world from the perspective of being members of the social world  (Maynard & Clayman, 2003, 
p. 223). EM-informed researchers assume that we can investigate the  world because we are 
also members of the social world  (Garfinkel, 1967a, p. 31; Lynch & Bogen, 1994, pp. 90 -93; 
Maynard & Clayman, 2003, p. 173) . We can understand and describe the orderliness of the 
social world because we, too, participate in the co-production of its orderliness, whether we 
are social analysts or everyday people. Following from an  EM reading of phenomenology, I 
understood that I could investigate and comprehend the world in which I live because I  am 
part of the human world. Hence, I set out to clarify the actual practices of clinical psychology 
by which psychologists interpret people ’s problems within actual clinical settings, from my 
own understanding of common sense methods.
16 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
position  in  which  clinicians  bring  the  accumulated  knowledge  of  scientific  psychology  to  bear  on 
individual problems (Zeldow, 2009). Clinical psychology is based upon the scientist-practitioner model 
proposed  at  the  Boulder  conference  in  1949,  see  Victor  Raimy  (1950)  for  the  original  conference 
proceedings. For particularly pertinent, more recent discussions on the scientist-practitioner model see 
the special section dedicated to Boulder at 50 in Volume 55, Issue 2 of American Psychologist (Albee, 
2000; D. B. Baker & Benjamin, 2000; Benjamin & Baker, 2000; Nathan, 2000; Peterson, 2000; Routh, 
2000; Stricker, 2000) and Timothy Baker, Richard McFall and Varda Shoham’s (in press) article Current 
Status and Future Prospects of Clinical Psychology. However, following from EM, in starting my analysis 
my  original  presupposition  was  that  I  could  reveal  that  there  could  be  no  expertise  on  human 
experience. I now understand that my claim is not, nor could it be, substantiated by analyses of clinical 
psychological interaction. 
15 I will address why they are not compatible in chapter six. 
16 Garfinkel (1967b) calls his program ‘ethnomethodology’, meaning the study of members’ methods. In 
Garfinkel’s (1967b, p. 11) own terms: ‘I use “ethnomethodology” to refer to the investigation of the 
rational  properties  of  indexical  expressions  and  other  practical  actions  as  contingent  ongoing 
accomplishments  of  organized  artful  practices  of  everyday  life’.  ‘Members’  is  used  by  Garfinkel  to 
denote that he does not start out from a predefined model of the human actor (Sharrock & Button, 
1991). ‘Method’ is used by Garfinkel to denote the methodical way in which we do things in the social 
world. However, because of Garfinkel’s wish to avoid predefined models of the human actor his focus is 
on publicly shared methods through which people display their own understanding of themselves and  
11 
Ethnomethodology and Theory 
The  distinction  that  Garfinkel  (2007)  makes  between  his  EM  program  and  Husserlian 
phenomenology  is  that  he  wishes  to  avoid  theoretical  engagement  with  the  social  world 
altogether (Lynch, 1993). In the first part of my thesis, I did not understand the important and 
crucial  difference  that  Husserl  makes  between  the  natural  scientific  attitude  and  the 
theoretical attitude and, hence, uncritically accept Garfinkel’s critique that the problem with 
Husserl is that he stays within the theoretical attitude.
17 Garfinkel (2007) advocates reading 
Husserl through an EM lens, and suggests that Husserl’s argument that the natural sciences 
have lost their life-world foundations can be read as never quite getting to the investigation of 
actual practices that Husserl advocates in his writings. As Garfinkel and Kenneth Liberman 
(2007, p. 4) write: 
Regrettably, as a certainty, both Husserl’s treatises
18 lose the phenomenon they were written 
carefully to describe. That is, they lose the phenomenon of the actual work-sites of any science. 
And there they also lose the instructed actions of the scientists, i.e. their actual world-generating 
collaborations. 
For Garfinkel (2007), the life-world foundations of natural science can only be examined by 
paying  close  attention  to  the  actual  practices  through  which  natural  and  social  scientists 
collaboratively  produce  their  findings  within  actual  settings.  In  keeping  with  Garfinkel’s 
understanding of theory, Husserl’s writings are considered to only point toward the possibility 
of  analysing  the  life-world,  because  Husserl  presents  theoretical  arguments,  rather  than 
descriptions of actual practices. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
others, and not on the members themselves (Sharrock & Button, 1991; R. Watson, 1998). I will discuss 
the problems associated with EM informed researchers’ focus on methods in chapter five. 
17 For Husserl (1970 (1935), pp. 93-99) any investigation is theoretical and must proceed from the life-
world; the problem with the natural scientific attitude is that it forgets its life -world foundations. I will 
discuss  Husserl’s  important  distinction  between  the  natural  scientific  attitude  and  the  theoretical 
attitude in chapter four. 
18  According to Garfinkel and Liberman  (2007, p. 4),  ‘The  Göttingen  Lectures’  and  ‘The  Crisis’  are 
Husserl’s two treatises on the life-world. Garfinkel (2007) provides references to two of Husserl’s (1970 
(1952),  1999  (1902/03))  works  at  the  end  of  his  article:  The  Crisis  of  European  Sciences  and 
Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy (The Crisis) and The 
Idea of Phenomenology. The Idea of Phenomenology was written while Husserl was in Göttingen (Hardy, 
1999), which is presumably what Garfinkel is referring to by ‘The Göttingen Lectures’. I do not want to 
assess the correctness of Garfinkel and Liberman’s claim that the ‘The Göttingen Lectures’ and The Crisis 
are Husserl’s only two treatises on the life-world because it is beyond the limits of my thesis.  
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Garfinkel  and  Sacks  (1970,  p.  345)  propose  that  in  order  to  avoid  adopting  a  specialised 
theoretical position vis-a-vis social world, and to stay within the members’ orientation to the 
social situation, an ‘indifference’ towards the theoretical literature is required.
19 As Garfinkel 
(1967a, p. viii) instructs, ethnomethodologists should not pay special attention to ‘constructive 
analytic theorizing, mock ups, or book reviews’, because studies of members’ methods can 
only be done ‘“from within” actual settings’. As Livingston (2006, p. 41) notes: 
Standing within the ethnomethodological tradition also means standing somewhat apart from it: 
in  ethnomethodology,  emphasis  is  placed  on  descriptive  terminology; moreover,  rather  than 
focusing on the concerns of a professional literature (including that of ethnomethodology itself), 
the  motives  for  a  study  are  sought  in  the  real-worldly  matters  made  witnessably  available 
through it. 
Within  the  EM  research  tradition,  engaging  with  theoretical  literature  is  discouraged;  this 
stems from ethnomethodologists’ distrust of theoretical models which are understood to be 
misleading and to obscure the social order observable in and through actual practical action 
that  occurs  within  local  settings.  For  ethnomethodologists  the  theoretical  literature  is 
unimportant because it does not provide accurate descriptions of the social world; and should 
be avoided because it leads the analyst to only view the social world through the theoretical 
standpoint adopted in the literature (Garfinkel, 1967a, pp. vi-vii; Lynch & Bogen, 1994, pp. 90-
93).  
Garfinkel  (1967b)  seeks  to  avoid  any  specialised  theoretical  position  through  which  to 
investigate the actual practices of the lived social world and, instead, proposes that we can 
only study the social world from a perspective of being a member of the social world, using 
common sense methods (Maynard & Clayman, 2003, p. 173). The understanding that common 
                                                             
19 Garfinkel and Sacks’ (1970, pp. 345-348) notion of ‘ethnomethodological indifference’ extends to all 
members’  methods.  For  Garfinkel  and  Sacks  (1970,  pp.  345-348),  members’  methods  are  not 
questionable because they are just the methods that everybody knows and uses. Garfinkel and Sacks’s 
(1970, pp. 345-348) notion that members’ methods are not questionable extends to social and natural 
scientific researchers as well, because they are only using the common sense methods that everybody 
knows and uses. As Garfinkel (1967a, p. vi) notes, there is nothing to ‘quarrel about’ in the academic 
literature, it is just that the theoretical literature does not describe  the social world in detail. I will 
address the problems with Garfinkel’s notion that there is nothing outside of common sense methods in 
chapter six.  
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sense  methods  are  the  basis  of  the  order  found  in  both  everyday  social  situations  and 
sociological research findings leads Garfinkel (1967a, p. 31) to claim that ethnomethodologists’ 
topic and resource is common sense knowledge. According to Garfinkel (1967a, pp. vii-viii), 
while  formal  sociological  investigations  do  not  acknowledge  that  they  use  common  sense 
methods  to  make  their  claims,  ethnomethodologists  explicitly  acknowledge  that  their 
observations and descriptions are made on the basis of common sense methods. In addition, 
Garfinkel  (1967a,  p.  31)  states  that  ethnomethodologists  explicitly  acknowledge  that  the 
adequacy of their descriptions is derived from common sense methods used in everyday social 
situations (Lynch & Bogen, 1994, pp. 90-93). Hence, EM-informed researchers’ aim is twofold: 
they  attempt  to  illuminate  the  common  sense  understandings  of  the  social  world  that 
underpin  scientific  investigations,  as  well  as  describe  everyday  interactions  through  the 
common sense practices that members use within that setting (Garfinkel, 1967a; Garfinkel & 
Sacks, 1970; Lynch & Bogen, 1994). 
EM-informed research claims to give an alternative conception of the social world that leads to 
an  understanding  that  we  can  investigate  the  social  world  without  assuming  any  kind  of 
specialised theoretical position (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Maynard & Clayman, 2003, p. 173). 
Garfinkel and Sacks (Garfinkel, 1967a, p. 17; Garfinkel & Sacks, p. 348) avows that they do not 
wish to give any programmatic statements that would suggest their research follows a strict 
methodological procedure; instead the methods that EM-informed researchers use are seen to 
be  contingent  to  the  situation  they  are  investigating,  because  they  are  using  whatever 
methods the members use within that setting.
20 EM researchers are members of the social 
world first and foremost and are only social analysts in the sense that they pay close attention 
to the production of social order that every member already knows and uses (Garfinkel, 1967a, 
                                                             
20 I will continue to refer to refer to EM as a method of inquiry throughout the thesis, because it is a 
distinctive way of investigating the social world proposed by Garfinkel. For EM everything is a method 
and theory should be avoided. So, apart from Garfinkel’s own term, ‘program’, method seems the most 
appropriate term.  
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pp.  36-38).  To  use  a  social  analyst’s  orientation  in  order  to  examine  social  order,  i.e.  a 
specialised theoretical position, is to go beyond the bounds of Garfinkel’s EM program: it is to 
miss the point of EM research. For EM, a member’s orientation, i.e. using common sense 
knowledge of shared methods for doing things, is considered to be the only genuine position 
through which to understand the social world. 
Three Investigations into Clinical Psychological Interaction  
There are many different positions within the EM-informed literature;
21 in this thesis I will pay 
particular  attention  to  conversation  analysis  (C A)  since  my  empirical  data  is  recorded 
conversations and DP because I am researching within the discipline of psychology. I  conduct 
three  investigations  into  clinical  psychological  therapy,  which  examine  three  different 
interpretations  of  Garfinkel’s  EM  program.  Each  investigation  into  clinical  psychological 
therapy can be understood as a separate attempt to take up the EM understanding that the 
social world is orderly and can be studied from the perspective of being a member of society 
and not by relying upon specialised theoretical techniques (Maynard & Clayman, 2003, p. 173). 
In chapter one, I adopt a CA approach to investigating clinical psychological interactions. I use 
the established findings of CA to suggest that the therapy session is defined by an asymmetry 
between  different  speakers’  rights  and  obligations,  in  which  therapists  have  rights  and 
obligations to talk for another whereas clients only have rights and obligations to  talk for 
themselves.
22  In concluding my chapter, I suggest that the  asymmetry  between clinical 
psychologists and clients, with respect to the  speaking positions they hold within therapeutic 
                                                             
21 For a detailed discussion on the diversity in ethnomethodology see Douglas Maynard’s (1991a) article 
‘The  diversity  of  ethnomethodology’  and  Maynard  and  Steven  Clayman’s  (2003)  article 
‘Ethnomethodology and conversation analysis’. 
22 I draw heavily upon Gene Lerner’s (1996) statement that there is a conversational maxim to talk for 
oneself.  
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interaction,  illustrates  that  the  Objective  perspective,  adopted  by  psychologists  from  the 
natural sciences, informs the actual practices of clinical psychological therapy.
23  
Drawing  out  the  wider implications   of  my  analyses  in  cha pter  two  highlights   my  own 
assumption of an Objective position vis-a-vis the social world; a position that I was claiming to 
be  a managed speaking position  that was, in fact, impossible . I  follow  Lynch  and Bogen’s 
(1994)  argument  that  suggests  the  problem  with CA  is  that  it  has  become  an  established 
systematic  discipline  of  research  in  its  own  right.
24  Lynch and Bogen  (1994)  suggest that 
systematic conversation analysts do not, in fact, rely  upon members’ methods for analysing 
and substantiating descriptions of actual practices;  rather, conversation analysts often use 
their  own  technical  methods  and  academic  literature  to  substantiate  their  descriptions  of 
members’ methods. According to Lynch and Bogen (1994), conversation analysts, themselves, 
have lost their foundation in the lived social world and  their field has become a scientific 
discipline.  Hence,  following  Lynch  and  Bogen’s  suggestion,  I  go  to  Garfinkel’s  and  Sacks’s 
original writings in order to recover Garfinkel’s EM program and show that Garfinkel’s aim is 
precisely to go against the natural scientific method and its underlying assumption of the 
Objective perspective.  
Lynch and Bogen (1994) state that although Sacks did suggest that he wished to build CA into a 
natural science of the social world, because of Garfinkel’s influence upon Sacks it is possible to 
read Sacks in light of Garfinkel’s EM program and, hence, avoid the scientistic tendencies in 
Sacks’s own writings. In chapter two, I take up Sacks’s (1984b, 1995a, pp. 215-221) notion of 
‘doing  being  ordinary’  as  a  useful  way  of  understanding  how  clients  talk  about  their 
                                                             
23 The claim I am making here is unsubstantiated, but as I demonstrate in chapter one two and three, it 
is only through extending my claims beyond what can be substantiated by my analytic description and 
my methodological position that I realise the problem with the methodological position I adopt in each 
chapter. 
24 I draw heavily upon Lynch and Bogen’s article because it is considered a seminal paper within the 
EM/CA literature. In addition, it is a clear exposition of the argument that EM and CA are importantly 
different.  
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experiences and therapists interpret those experiences. Sacks’s (1984b, p. 417) notion of doing 
being ordinary is that we monitor situations we are in for ‘storyable possibilities’ so that we 
can describe our experiences in an ordinary manner. I understand Sacks’s (1984b, 1995a, pp. 
215-221) notion of doing being ordinary as referring to the same thing as Garfinkel’s (1967a, 
pp. 36-38) notion of common sense knowledge, but in a way that is more applicable to the 
conversational data that I am analysing.
25 Drawing upon Sacks’s (1984b, 1995a, pp. 215-221) 
notion of doing being ordinary, I suggest that therapists can proceed by asking questions about 
what is likely to be linked to clients’ tellings of their experiences and what is hearably missed 
from their descriptions of their experiences, as well as formulate those experiences for the 
client on the basis of how stories are ordinarily told. Drawing out the wider implications of my 
analytic descriptions I suggest that clinical psychological therapy is not a specifically technical 
domain of talk-in-interaction,
26 as the clinical psychological literature suggests, but is largely 
composed of everyday common sense reasoning. 
The combination of my analytic findings in chapters one and two, taken together, suggests that 
I have found exactly wh at I originally set out to find:   clinical psychologists manage their 
speaking position as Objective, but they interpret clients’ problems using completely ordinary 
conversational  methods.  However,  this  particular  implication  of  my  analytic  descriptions, 
although in line with my own descriptions of therapy and EM research, leads me to another 
problem. If clinical psychological practice is based upon ‘doing being ordinary’, or on common 
sense methods for doing things, there is actually nothing to critique, or indeed clarify, about 
clinical psychological practice because therapists’ methods are common methods for doing 
                                                             
25 EM does not necessarily study recorded data; CA exclusively focuses on recorded social interactions 
for their investigations (ten Have, 1997). EM investigations are often conducted through participation in 
the actual setting being investigated (for example see Garfinkel & Livingston, 2003; Livingston, 2006). 
26 The role of the clinical psychologist is defined in the literature as bringing the findings of scientific 
psychology  to  bare  upon  individual  client’s  problems  (Raimy,  1950;  Shakow,  1939).  Also  refer  to 
footnote  14,  on  page  9,  for  the  relevant  literature  on  the  scientist-practitioner  model  of  clinical 
psychological training and the professional role of clinical psychologists. The scientist-practitioner model 
of clinical psychology is not without its critics (for example see Albee, 2000; Newnes, 2004; Rowe, 1988).  
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being ordinary and are just what everyone knows and does. In chapters one and two, through 
my analytic descriptions and methodological orientation, I have turned clinical psychological 
interaction into a completely ordinary site of conversation.
27 
In addition, the notion that it is everybody and anybody’s job to do being ordinary seems to 
suggest that critique or clarification is unnecessary, not just in clinical psychological therapy, 
but in all domains of human action. If anybody and everybody already knows and uses the 
common sense knowledge that I describe, the point of an ethnomethodological description 
seems to be lost. As such, the approach of looking for the ordinariness in everyday interaction, 
although respectful of people’s practices and can be made observable when looked for, seems 
to put psychological understandings of self beyond question in all domains. 
In chapter three, I investigate the use of a particular psychological concept that is understood 
in natural scientific terms. I argue that the concept of personality is generally understood, both 
within academic psychology and in the popular media, as a category of individual difference 
that  can  be  Objectively  assessed  through  the  use  of  psychological  tests  that  establish  a 
person’s character in terms of underlying Objective dimensions. Drawing upon DP, I investigate 
how  the  term  ‘personality’  is  used  in  clinical  psychological  therapy.  I  adopt  DP  as  a 
methodology that utilises EM as a critical approach to scientific psychology (Edwards & Potter, 
1992; Potter et al., 1993). I suggest from my analyses of the categorical term ‘personality’, that 
the term ‘personality’ is a useful device for a therapist to employ in managing an ongoing 
dispute between a couple in a therapeutic interaction. 
Once again, I draw out the larger implications of my analytic descriptions to suggest that the 
term ‘personality’ is used because it is understood as an Objective natural category by the 
                                                             
27 My claim here is not that clinical psychological interactions are the same as ordinary conversations, 
but rather that, using the method of EM/CA, I can only attend to the ordinary aspects of the interaction. 
My empirical chapters display my theoretical understandings and not the ‘factual’ inner workings of 
clinical  psychology.  Therefore,  I  am  claiming  only  that  if  you  start  from  an  assumption  that  the 
interaction is ordinary, then all you ‘see’ in the empirical data is ordinariness.  
18 
participants  in  the  therapy  session.  Understanding  the  term  ‘personality’  as  an  Objective 
scientific  psychological  type  provides  a  means  by  which  clinical  psychologists  can  claim 
knowledge and insight about clients, which they may not know about themselves or each 
other. This larger implication goes beyond what I can substantiate using descriptions from my 
DP  perspective;  but  it  nevertheless  highlights  that  I  am  using  a  different  theoretical 
understanding of personality to the participants in the therapy session. In chapter three, I 
realise that I too have a theoretical orientation to social interaction, because DP and EM are 
theories. 
If I continue to assume that a theoretical lens distorts social practices, I am presented with two 
equally unsatisfactory positions; objectivism and relativism. On the one hand, I can maintain 
that the empirical data does speak for itself. On the other hand, I seem to be stuck within my 
own theoretical understandings, which have no relation to the social world. I could continue 
empirical research, in order to substantiate one interpretation of clinical psychological therapy 
with more empirical data. Alternatively, I could state that anything can be said of the empirical 
data – it just depends upon your particular interests or concerns – which leaves me with no 
way of substantiating my claims.
28 When the empiricist assumption upon which my project is 
based, following from EM, is pushed to its limits, I can either adopt an Objectivist position that 
one action, in one setting, at one time ,  can be understood in one way, or I can adopt a 
relativist position which suggests that anything can be said, but nothing can be substantiated.
29  
Hence, my adoption of EM, with its stated avoidance of theory as part of its aim to investigate 
actual practice, leaves me with two equally problematic positions, leading me to underst and 
                                                             
28 For a similar claim see Martyn Hammersley’s (2003a, pp. 764-765) article ‘Conversation analysis and 
discourse analysis: Methods or paradigms?’. 
29 I am not saying that  either of these  positions are held by  EM informed researchers; rather I am 
showing the position of EM when take to its reduction ad absurdum. Here, I am drawing upon Husserl’s 
reflections upon the problem of knowledge in ‘Lecture I’ of The Idea of Phenomenology here. Husserl 
(1999 (1902/03), p. 16) writes, ‘once reflection on the relation between knowledge and the object is 
awakened,  abysmal  difficulties  open  up.  Knowledge,  the  thing  taken  most  for  granted  in  natural 
thinking, suddenly stands before us as a mystery’.  
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that the natural scientific interpretation of human experience is not limited to quantitative 
psychological  methods  of  investigation.  The  divide  between  qualitative  and  quantitative 
methods in the discipline of psychology does not seem to present an option between non-
scientific  and  scientific  methods  respectively;  rather,  both  qualitative  and  quantitative 
methods seem to presuppose the Objective natural scientific observer and the importance of 
empirical  data.
30  In addition, examining the practices of n atural science  informed clinical 
psychologists does not allow me to investigate the actual problems with the natural scientific 
interpretation of human experience, as I had presupposed. The problem with natural science 
cannot be addressed through an empiri cal approach because it is the exclusive focus upon 
empirical data that leads me to perpetuate the problems associated with the natural scientific 
attitude. It is not enough to go back to Garfinkel and Sacks’s original writings, as Lynch and 
Bogen (1994) suggest, to address the problem with natural scientific methods of investigation, 
because  EM  presupposes  the  same  Objective  standpoint  for  which  I  have  criticised 
quantitative  psychological  methods.  Rather,  it  is  necessary  to  look  at  Husserl’s 
phenomenological writings in order to rethink the relation between the theoretical attitude 
and the life-world, because bracketing out the theoretical attitude in our investigations of 
social interaction is not possible and, in fact,  the atheoretical perspective is the Objective 
standpoint.
31  In the second part of  my  thesis,  then,  I move away from examining clinical 
psychology,  and  I  trace  EM  back  to  Husserl’s  phenomenology  in  order  to  address  and 
understand the problems I have encountered with the EM-informed approach to research I 
have adopted. 
                                                             
30 As mentioned in footnote 8, page 4, there are different approaches to qualitative methods with 
different understandings of how to examine empirical data. Although I do not claim that all qualitative 
methods have the same problems that I am pointing to in EM informed DP, I do wish to bring into 
question the widespread reliance upon empirical data in all forms of qualitative methodology in the 
discipline of psychology. However, throughout my thesis I will continue to specifically talk about EM 
informed DP. 
31 For a discussion on the atheoretical perspective and the Objectivist standpoint see John Shand’s 
(2009) article ‘Limits, perspectives and thought’.  
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Part Two: A Phenomenological Critique of EM-informed Discursive 
Psychology 
Science has become the authority in every realm; we could no longer exist without it. Yet reason, 
its foundation, no longer attracts us, no longer appears to us as the key to the cosmos. Men are 
turning to something different, to action which casts off reason’s yoke (Patočka, 1976, p. 224). 
In the second part of my thesis, I argue that Husserl’s historical analyses of the problem of 
knowledge in the natural sciences are relevant to my analyses of clinical psychological therapy, 
because  Husserl’s  work  applies  to  EM-informed  DP.  Garfinkel’s  appropriation  of  Husserl’s 
critique  of  science  overlooks  the  most  significant  contribution  that  Husserl  made  in  his 
analyses of the life-world. Husserl’s analyses of the life-world require the theoretical attitude, 
so that we  can critique the natural scientific interpretation of human experience  that has 
become the sedimented interpretation of the life-world in our historical situation. For Husserl 
(1970 (1935), 2001 (1913), 2008 (1906/07)), there is an important distinction to be made 
between the natural scientific attitude, which is a particular theoretical framework, and the 
theoretical attitude, which underpins all theoretical frameworks. According to Husserl (1970 
(1935)), it is only through analysing the historical life-world through the theoretical attitude 
that we can begin to understand the natural scientific interpretation of human experience. 
In  chapter  four,  I  outline  how  DP,  which  draws  upon  EM,  conflates  the  pure  theoretical 
attitude  with  the  normative  natural  scientific  attitude  and,  hence,  seeks  to  avoid  the 
theoretical  attitude  altogether.  I  argue  that  the  theoretical  attitude  is  necessary  in  any 
investigation into the life-world, because otherwise we do not question the assumptions that 
underpin our theoretical approach and, hence, lose sight of the life-world once again. My 
central aim in chapter four is to argue for the importance of the theoretical attitude as a mode 
of critique through which we can bring into question the natural scientific attitude.
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32 I mainly draw upon Husserl’s arguments presented in the  ‘Prolegomena to Pure Logic’ in Logical 
Investigations  (2001  (1913))  to  make  my  argument in  this  chapter,  as  well  as  ‘The  Vienna  lecture: 
Philosophy and the crisis of European humanity’ (‘The Vienna lecture’), (1970 (1935)).  
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In chapter five, I proceed by adopting the  theoretical attitude as a mode of bringing into 
question the natural scientific attitude through historical analyses and argue for a difference 
between  empirical  data  and  lived  experience.  In  this  chapter,  I  broadly  trace  Husserl’s 
understanding  of  the  historical  development  of  the  natural  scientific  attitude  and  the 
theoretical attitude.
33 Following from this, I argue that both statistical personality psychology 
and DP, following the adoption of the CA method of transcription, proceed from empirical data 
that is indirectly mathematised (Husserl, 1970 (1952), p. 34), and not simply generalised from, 
lived experience. Hence, both statistical personality psychology and CA informed DP lose sight 
of the life-world and instead  study human experience  as  if  it  can  be  explained  through 
Objective formal properties of mind or language respectively.
34 
In chapter six, I attend specifically to the  life-world as an intersubjectively constituted human 
world of shared meaning, following Husserlian phenomenological philosophy. I argue that an 
important reason why EM cannot be a critical approach, and cannot clarify the use of natural 
scientific methods in psychology, is  that  Garfinkel empiricises the life -world. I explore an 
important difference between Garfinkel’s and Schütz’s notion of common sense knowledge. 
While  for  Garfinkel  (1967a,  p.  31)  commonsense  knowledge  is  only  the  unquestioned 
background to everyday affairs, for Schütz (1970, p. 271; emphasis added) common sense 
knowledge  is  the  ‘unquestioned  but  always  questionable  background’  to  everyday  affairs. 
Drawing upon Husserl’s writings, Schütz (1970, pp. 53-56) argues that analyses of the life-
world require the theoretical attitude. Therefore, I argue that EM does not offer an alternative 
to the use of natural scientific methods within the discipline of psychology, nor allow for a 
critique of the natural scientific interpretation of human experience, because it is based upon 
the unquestioned sedimented natural scientific attitude. 
                                                             
33 In this chapter, I draw heavily upon Husserl’s (1970 (1952), pp. 23-59) discussion of Galileo in The 
Crisis. 
34 See Husserl (1970 (1935), p. 271) for a similar claim.  
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The Problem with the Natural Scientific Interpretation of the Life-
World: The Crisis of Meaning 
We  all  start  out as  dogmatists in  one way  or  the  other;  ….  One’s first  reaction  against  this, 
triggered off by inescapable experience of many dogmas, all of which claim to possess the truth, 
is scepticism: the conclusion that there is no such a thing as truth ... The critical position stands 
against both of these. It recommends itself by its modesty. It would say: ‘Perhaps men *sic+, 
though  they  have  a  notion,  an  idea,  of  truth  for  regulating  their  mental  processes,  are  not 
capable, as finite beings, of the truth. … Meanwhile, they are quite able to inquire into such 
human faculties as they have been given—we do not know by whom or how, but we have to live 
with them. Let us analyse what we can know and what we cannot’ (Arendt, 1989, pp. 33, italics in 
original). 
In concluding my thesis, I suggest one key problem with the natural scientific interpretation of 
human experience: it leads us to a crisis of meaning in our current historical situation (Husserl, 
1970 (1952), pp. 5-7). The natural scientific method, with its ideal of the Objective observer 
and  the  ideal  aim  of  establishing  a  universal  understanding  of  nature  –  including  human 
nature, in the case of psychology – empties the life-world of the meaning it has for us. The 
meaning of the life-world cannot be established through an Objective standpoint: the meaning 
of the life-world is intersubjectively constituted by us (Husserl, 1970 (1952), p. 108; Patočka, 
1989 (1971), p. 223). We can know the world in which we live because it is our world, but we 
cannot  establish,  Objectively,  certain  knowledge  about  the  world  in  which  we live  from  a 
singular perspective, because we are finite human beings (Arendt, 1978, p. 38; Husserl, 2001 
(1913), p. 120). Our ability to meaningfully talk about things is based upon our lived experience 
of the world in which we live and the idea of theory (Husserl, 2008 (1906/07), p. 46). In order 
to bring into question the natural scientific interpretation that strips our lives of meaning, we 
require the theoretical attitude to appreciate and grasp the historical character of the life-
world (Husserl, 1970 (1935)). 
Through a failed attempt to replace the adoption of natural scientific methods by psychology 
with  an  alternative  ‘non-scientific’  method,  I  have  realised  that  the  natural  scientific 
interpretation of human experience is a much larger problem than scientific psychology. We 
cannot find an alternative to the natural scientific interpretation in our historical situation, 
because there is currently no alternative available (Husserl, 1970 (1935), p. 272). Instead, we  
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need  to  regain  the importance  of  our  reasoning  capacity  and  our  lived  experience,  which 
grounds the natural scientific attitude but has been destroyed by it (Adorno, 2001 (1965), p. 3; 
Husserl, 1970 (1935), pp. 294-295).  Thinking is founded upon our meaningful dialogue with 
others.  Hence,  to  bring  into  question  the  natural  scientific  attitude  is  to  think  about  the 
historical life-world; a world of shared meaning that is passed down to us, and shared with 
others like ourselves. 
Limitations to My Research Project 
In  the  first  part  of  my  research  project  I  uncritically  adopted  ethnomethodology  as  an 
alternative to, and critique of, quantitative research methods used in psychology. My uncritical 
adoption of ethnomethodology led to two main problems; one of which I address in my thesis 
and  one  of  which  I  do  not.  Firstly,  in  understanding  ethnomethodology  as  an  applied 
phenomenology,  I  misinterpreted  Husserl’s  phenomenological  project  which  becomes  the 
subject  of  the  second  part  of  my  research  project.  Secondly,  through  conducting  an 
ethnomethodological investigation of clinical psychology in order to understand the practices 
of clinical psychology more concretely as they happen rather than how they are theoretically 
described, I simplify the theoretical discussions of clinical psychology and reinstate my original 
prejudices  about  clinical  psychology  in  my  description  of  the  actual  practices  of  therapy. 
Correcting my simplified discussion of clinical psychology would require a separate research 
project because it would require an investigation of the history of clinical psychology and the 
nuances in the arguments presented concerning clinical psychological therapy by practitioners. 
Due to my struggle with the methodological orientation to research, my thesis became a thesis 
on method and my investigations of clinical psychology became a working example of my 
methodological approach. My thesis does not engage with the nature, definition, practice or 
theory of clinical psychology; clinical psychology as it is discussed in this thesis is no more than 
the  example  of  my  failed  methodological  approach.  My  methodological  approach  to  
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researching clinical psychology fell short of actually talking about clinical psychology because 
my  question  concerning  clinical  psychology  could  not  be  answered  by  adopting  an 
ethnomethodological  approach.  However,  I  do  continue  to  talk  about  clinical  psychology 
throughout  the  first  part  of  the  thesis  and,  hence,  before  introducing  my  empirical 
investigations I would like to clarify the definition of clinical psychology that I adopt. 
Throughout the first part of my thesis, I adopt the  definition of clinical psychology as the 
scientist-practitioner model because it is the definition that was agreed upon at the inception 
of  clinical  psychology  as  a  professional  title.
35  The scientist-practitioner model of clinical 
psychology is that a clinical psychologist should be both a scientist, in that they draw upon the 
results of psychology, and a practitioner, in that they are engaged in working with people.
36 
The  definition of the model of clinical psychology as the  scientist -practitioner model is 
incredibly broad and, hence, ever since this model was proposed at the Boulder conference in 
1949, how the scientist-practitioner model should actually be applied in clinical settings has 
been hotly debated.
37  
In addition to debates within clinical psychology about exactly what constitutes the scientist -
practitioner model, some clinical psychologists argue against the scientist-practitioner model 
being the most appropriate model for clinical psychology. Clinical psychologists, such as Craig 
Newnes (2004), Dorothy Rowe (1988), George Albee (2000) and Jeffrey Masson (1988), argue 
that clinical psychology should not be based upon the model of science. While Masson  (1988) 
famously argues against clinical therapy  per se, Newnes, Rowe and Albee argue that clinical 
psychology  should  be  based  upon  a  different  model.  Newnes  (2004)  argues  that  clinical 
                                                             
35 See Raimy (1950) for the proceedings of this conference. 
36 See Raimy (1950) for this definition. See Shakow (1939, 1942) for the original version of this definition. 
See Shapiro (1967) for an updated version of this definition. 
37 For example see the special issue on the Boulder Conference  (Albee, 2000; D. B. Baker & Benjamin, 
2000; Benjamin & Baker, 2000; Nathan, 2000; Peterson, 2000; Routh, 2000;  Stricker, 2000). Also see 
O’Sullivan and Quevillon (1992). For a more recent discussion see Baker, McFall and Shoham (in press). 
For a discussion of the scientist-practitioner model in the Australian context see Martin (1996).   
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psychology  could  be  a  place  in  which  we  could  counteract  the  medicalisation  of  human 
emotions. Rowe (1988) argues that clinical psychologists can provide a promising alternative to 
psychiatry that relies upon talking to people rather than prescribing medications. Albee (2000) 
argues that clinical psychologists should adopt a social model that addresses people as social 
beings rather than as people with diagnosed problems. However, in the first part of my thesis I 
do not attend to the arguments presented by these authors as I am interested in the literature 
that  argues  for  clinical  psychological  therapy  being  a  place  where  people  can  receive 
scientifically researched treatments for their ills. I am interested in the scientist-practitioner 
model precisely because I am concerned with investigating whether there is evidence of this 
model of clinical psychology being used within the actual practices. I do indeed find that the 
scientist-practitioner model, at least in regards to finding evidence for the natural scientific 
attitude being adopted within clinical psychological therapy, but, as I acknowledge, my findings 
do not justify my view of clinical psychology they only reveal my original prejudice towards 
clinical psychology.  
Hence, before I commence my discussion of my empirical findings, I would like to state that my 
adoption of the scientist-practitioner model as the only model of clinical psychology that I 
discuss  runs  the  risk  of  running  together  several  heterogeneous  approaches  into  one 
seemingly  homogenous  group.  In  addition,  only  discussing  a  theoretical  model  of  clinical 
psychology does not give due credit to, or acknowledgment of, the way individual therapists 
work with particular clients. However, such a simplification of clinical psychology to one model 
is  inevitable  given  the  concern  in  my  thesis  is  psychological  methods  and  not  clinical 
psychological therapy.   
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In Summary 
In moving from the introduction of the thesis to my empirical chapters I would like to quote a 
passage from Albert Einstein (2009, p. 300), because the sentiment of the quote captures the 
experience of doing empirical research: 
If you wish to learn from the theoretical physicist anything about the methods which he [sic] 
uses, I would give you the following piece of advice: Don’t listen to his *sic] words, examine his 
[sic] achievements. For the discoverer in that field, the constructions of  his [sic] imagination 
appear so necessary and so natural that he [sic] is apt to treat them not as the creation of his [sic] 
thoughts but as given realities. 
In my experience of conducting empirical investigations of clinical psychology, I did not attend 
to the theoretical basis of my own methodological practices – how I arrived at the claims I 
make about the empirical data or my own interests in examining therapy – because I was so 
focused  on  getting  the  description  ‘right’.  It  was  only  in  reflecting  upon  the  analytic 
descriptions given in each of the chapters that I began to grasp the problems with EM, CA and 
DP, which I attend to at the conclusion of each chapter. In doing the actual analysis, I was 
treating the recorded therapy sessions as a ‘given realities’ that I was closely and painstakingly, 
‘factually’ describing. By way of introducing my analytic chapters: in my empirical descriptions 
of clinical psychological interactions, which I present in chapters one, two and three, I want to 
give the reader an insight into how EM descriptions are produced, through showing what I 
have ‘achieved’ through adopting this approach.  
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PART ONE: Analytic Descriptions of 
Clinical Psychology 
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Chapter One: A Conversation Analytic 
Investigation of the Unique Context of 
Clinical Psychological Talk-In-
Interaction 
Overview  
As I have outlined in my introduction, in this chapter I will draw upon ethnomethodologically 
(EM)  informed  research  to  examine  clinical  psychological  interactions.  However,  before 
proceeding to introduce the conversation analytic (CA) approach to research that I adopt in 
this chapter, which stems from the EM tradition, I will first address the central problem that 
my three analytic chapters  present. Due  to my empiricist approach to research,
38 and my 
avoidance of theory, in many of the claims that I make in the first part of my thesis there is an 
unavoidable circularity. For example, in this chapter, I simultaneously assert that the breaking 
of the conversational maxim to  ‘talk  for  oneself’  by  therapists
39  is  a recurrent observable 
occurrence in  therapeutic interaction and that this  maxim explains the observations that I 
make about the empirical data. However, the analytic descriptions of clinical psychological 
data presented in this chapter, and chapters two and three, are crucial for demonstrating the 
method of conversation analysis (CA), ethnomethodology (EM) and discursive psychology (DP). 
It is only through engaging with the CA, EM and DP literature and conducting an investigation 
based  upon  these  three  approaches  to  research  that  I  can  illustrate  that   I  have  not 
misunderstood the method. Instead,  there is a much   deeper problem  with the  empirical 
                                                             
38 I am using Elliot Sober’s (2008, p. 130) definition of empiricism. The claim that EM, CA and DP are an 
empirical approach to research is not particularly contentious (Edwards & Potter, 1993; Maynard & 
Clayman, 2003; Schegloff, 1996; ten Have, 1997). What is contentious is what sort of empirical approach 
CA,  EM  and  DP  can  be  considered  to  be.  As  Michael  Lynch  and  David  Bogen  (1994)  note  of  CA, 
‘conversation analysis is not garden-variety empiricism, nor should its atheoretical posture simply be 
written-off as naive realism’.  
39 This draws upon Gene Lerner’s (1996) notion that there is a conversational maxim to ‘talk for oneself’ 
in everyday conversation. I will discuss Lerner’s conversational maxim to talk for oneself in detail once I 
have introduced the CA literature.   
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methods; which highlights that the natural scientific interpretation of the human world is the 
Objectified interpretation of the life-world in our current historical period. I will develop this 
argument in the second part of my thesis on the basis of my three empirical chapters.   
The Asymmetry in Therapists’ and Clients’ Speaking Positions 
Within Clinical Psychological Interaction 
In this chapter, I will use conversation analysis (CA) as a form of EM research that is suited to 
the conversational data that I am analysing. Whereas EM does not necessarily use recorded 
conversational data or focus upon talk-in-interaction alone, conversation analysts exclusively 
focus upon talk-in-interaction and use video or tape recordings of social interaction for their 
investigations (Maynard & Clayman, 2003, p. 176). For my analyses of clinical psychological 
interaction, I start from tape recordings of therapeutic talk-in-interaction. Hence, I am focusing 
exclusively  upon  the  conversational  methods  that  occur  within  the  setting  of  clinical 
psychology.  CA  and  EM  are  intertwined  forms  of  research  and  have  a  shared  intellectual 
history, but  there is a lot of debate between and  within the two different approaches to 
research (Maynard & Clayman, 2003). At the end of the chapter, I will address some important 
differences between CA and EM as they pertain to my research project.  
I will argue that the therapists break the conversational maxim to talk for oneself, as their role 
requires  them  to  talk  about  the  client  and  not  themselves. However,  in  order  to  achieve 
entitlement to talk about a co-present other, therapists largely draw upon the same methods 
found in mundane conversation. The purpose of this chapter is to reveal that therapists do 
manage  their  right  to  talk  on  behalf  of  a  client,  and  to  show  how  therapists  and  clients 
collaboratively accomplish this task, in order to demonstrate that breaking the conversational 
maxim to talk for oneself is an organisational feature of therapeutic conversation.   
30 
According  to  the  ethnomethodological  conversation  analytic  (EM/CA)  tradition,  the  social 
world is best studied by being a member of the social world and social order is understood as 
being co-produced, through members accountably displaying the order by which their actions 
can  be  recognised  by  other  members  (Maynard  &  Clayman,  2003,  p.  173).  An  action’s 
accountability is not merely produced in isolation from other members’ accountable actions; 
rather,  accountability  is  also  always  reflexive
40  to what has come before in the talk and 
foreshadows some relevant next action (Garfinkel, 1967b; Schegloff, 2007a, pp. 1-3). As such, 
the formulation of another member’s action – where one member gives a description of what 
another member has just said or done – is a mundane and prevalent part of how members 
order the social interaction of which they are a part (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970). In simpler terms, 
in social interaction we are constantly describing our own and others’ actions, and in the 
descriptions  we  give  of  others’  actions  we  are  also  displaying  our  interpretation  of  those 
actions.  To  state  that  clinical  psychological  interaction  is  a  place  in  which  participants
41 
                                                             
40  ‘Reflexivity’  is  one  of  the  defining  features  of  members’  actions  according  to  Garfinkel  (1967b). 
‘Reflexivity’  refers  to  the  fact  that members’  methods  are  always  contingent,  as  does  ‘indexicality’ 
(Garfinkel, 1967b). More specifically, ‘reflexivity’ refers to the linking of one member’s account with 
another member’s account, where the second members’ account displays this members’ understanding 
of the first member’s account. Lynch (2000, p. 33) defines the EM notion of reflexivity as; ‘the reflexivity 
of accounts implies interpretation – expressing, indicating or recognizing meaning – but, more than that, 
it alludes to the embodied practices through which persons singly and together, retrospectively and 
prospectively, produce account-able states of affairs’. The indexical feature of members’ actions refers 
to the fact that they are always indexed to the context in which they occur and, more specifically, 
actions cannot be substituted for ‘objective expressions’ and, if members’ ‘indexical expressions’ are 
substituted  for  ‘objective  expressions’  it  ‘is  always  accomplished  only  for  all  practical  purposes’ 
(Garfinkel, 1967a, pp. 4-5; emphasis in original). The ‘accountable’ feature of actions is another central 
notion in EM (Garfinkel,  1967b).  The  ‘accountability’  of an  action  refers  to  the  fact  that members’ 
methods display the order by which an action can be made sense of by other members. Garfinkel 
(1967a, p. 1) states; ‘when I speak of accountable my interests are directed towards matters as the 
following. I mean observable-and-reportable, i.e. available to members as situated practices of looking-
and-telling’.  According  to  Garfinkel  (1967b),  the  ‘accountability’,  ‘reflexivity’  and  ‘indexicality’  of 
members’ actions indicate that members’ methods are observable to all, because the order is displayed 
in the practices themselves. These three EM concepts are also central to CA and DP. However, often the 
debates between Garfinkelian EM and other research approaches that adopt EM, centre around the 
misinterpretation  of  the concepts  of  ‘accountability’,  ‘reflexivity’  and  ‘indexicality’  (for example  see 
Pollner, 1991).    
41 Conversation analysts’ usually use the term ‘participants’ to refer to the people who are interacting in 
talk-in-interaction (Schegloff, 1984, p. 37), whereas ethnomethodologists generally refer to people in 
social interactions as ‘members’ (Garfinkel, 1967b). ‘Participants’ and ‘members’ both refer to the same 
notion – that people can be investigated without invoking mental states or theoretical concepts – and, 
hence,  I  use  the  terms  interchangeably  (Maynard  &  Clayman,  2003,  p.  173).  Not  all  conversation  
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interpret, or give accounts of, each other’s descriptions is not a contentious claim within the 
EM/CA tradition, because this is a prevalent feature of all talk-in-interaction (Sacks, 1995b, pp. 
72-80; Schegloff, 1995, p. xlix, 2007a, pp. 1-3). Hence, to claim that there is something specific 
about how interpretations are made in clinical psychological therapy, I first need to show that 
there is something unique about the social interaction that occurs in a clinical psychological 
setting; and that it is oriented to as relevant by the participants themselves.   
In the CA literature – similar to the EM understandings of social order that I have outlined in 
my introduction – in order to investigate the precise details of talk-in-interaction, analysts
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must not draw upon their own unexamined theoretical concepts  (Schegloff, 1995, pp. xlix-l). 
Theoretical concepts are seen by conversation analysts to gloss over the actual details that are 
available  in the  talk  its elf  (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970) . For my investigations into clinical 
psychological interaction, the CA notion of putting aside one’s own theoretical orientations 
applies equally to my own understandings of the clinical psychological setting, the literature on 
therapeutic models and the critical literature on clinical psychology. For example, I could not 
draw upon my theoretical understandings of cognitive behavioural therapy, any more than I 
could draw upon the notion of psychological expertise, to make sense of the interaction prior 
to my empirical investigations. It is not that cognitive behavioural techniques or psychological 
expertise are not relevant to the interaction, but rather that the relevance of either of these 
theoretical concepts to ‘members’ in the interaction needs to be demonstrated in the data 
itself (Schegloff, 1984, p. 37, 2006, pp. 70-71; ten Have, 1997).
43 Hence, the purpose of this 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
analysts would agree that the terms are interchangeable: for example see Celia Kitzinger’s (2008, pp. 
198-203) article ‘Developing feminist  conversation analysis: A response to Wowk’.   
42 ‘Analyst’ is frequently used within the clinical psychological literature to refer to the psychoanalyst, 
i.e. the therapist. To avoid confusion, when I am referring to the analyst I am always referring to the 
social researcher and not the therapist who I am analysing.  
43  My understandings of CA  as presented here are, in a certain respect, at odds with the CA and 
psychotherapeutic literature. For example, Anssi Peräkylä and Sanna Vehviläinen (2003, 2007), a key 
figures in the CA and psychotherapy literature, states that psychoanalytic talk-in-interaction cannot be 
understood without understanding the psychoanalytic approach to therapy. However, even in the CA 
and psychotherapeutic literature, the onus is on the conversation analyst to demonstrate the relevance  
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chapter is to investigate whether there are certain structures of clinical psychological talk-in-
interaction observable in the talk itself that mark this institutional setting as different from 
ordinary conversation.  
According to the CA literature, in the case of examining clinical psychological talk-in-interaction 
there are special difficulties that I face in attempting to avoid theoretical constructions of the 
clinical psychological interaction prior to investigation. Namely, by choosing a particular setting 
of talk-in-interaction to investigate, I have already defined my interest prior to proceeding with 
my investigations. The choice to investigate clinical psychological interaction means, according 
to CA, that the empirical data is already affected by my analytic interests (ten Have, 1999, p. 
133).
44 My analytic influence upon the choice of empirical data does not necessarily  result in 
the consequence that my theoretical understandings of clinical psychology affect the empirical 
data I am analysing (ten Have, 1999, pp. 131-135). However, it does mean that I need to be  
especially attentive to choosing and describing the  data according to what is relevant to the 
participants in the interaction and not my own interests  (Schegloff, 1997, p. 167; ten Have, 
1999, pp. 131-135). In this chapter, I will address the concern that I have chosen and described 
the interaction on the basis of my own interests in two ways.  
Firstly, I will draw upon the broad CA literature, rather than the more specific a pplied CA 
literature. In applied CA, an analyst, like myself, wants to investigate how  a particular site of 
institutional talk-in-interaction works (ten Have, 1999, pp. 131-135).
45 There is also an applied 
CA  field  that   specifically  investigates  psychotherapeutic  interactions   (Peräkylä,  Antaki, 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
of certain therapeutic techniques for the participants in the therapeutic interaction (Peräkylä, Antaki, 
Vehviläinen, & Leudar, 2008a).    
44 The claim here refers to the CA concept of ‘unmotivated looking’ (Sacks, 1995a, p. 175) which ten 
Have (1999, p. 120) notes is generally regarded with some suspicion in CA because of the contradiction 
inherent  in  the  term.  However,  ‘“unmotivated”  examination  of  naturally  occurring  interactional 
materials’, as Schegloff calls it (1996, p. 172), is important to CA investigations. As Schegloff (1996, p. 
172) notes, a CA investigation should ‘not *be+ prompted by prespecified analytic goals (not even that it 
be the characterization of an action), but by “noticings” of initially unremarkable features of the talk or 
of other conduct’.     
45 For an anthology of applied CA investigations see  Talk at Work: Interaction in Institutional Settings 
(Paul Drew & Heritage, 1992b).  
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Vehviläinen,  &  Leudar,  2008b;  Peräkylä  &  Vehviläinen,  2007).  Hence,  my  analyses  in  this 
chapter  fall  within  the  field  of  applied  CA  and,  more  specifically,  within  the  CA  and 
psychotherapeutic literature. However, I will not draw upon the applied CA or the CA and 
psychotherapeutic  literature,  because  to  choose  the  specific  site  of  clinical  psychological 
interactions and the literature that attends solely to this site of interaction does not allow me 
to attend to context as a participant’s concern. To choose the site of clinical psychological 
interaction and then the matching literature for this institutional setting assumes, prior to 
investigating, that this is a unique site of talk-in-interaction. Yet, what I wish to show in this 
chapter is that the context of the clinical psychological setting can be shown in the interaction 
itself  to  be  of  concern  to  the  participants  themselves.  Hence,  I  will  investigate  clinical 
psychological  interaction  by  drawing  upon  the wider  CA literature,  or  what  has  also  been 
called by Paul ten Have (1999, p. 133) the ‘pure’ CA literature, which investigates structures in 
talk-in-interaction wherever they occur.  
Secondly, I will provide an analysis of deviant case in order to demonstrate that I am not 
attending to my own analytic concerns, but rather to the participants’ concerns and how they 
co-produce the setting of clinical psychological interaction. Deviant case analysis is central to 
CA  (Maynard  &  Clayman,  2003,  p.  179;  Schegloff,  1968,  1984,  p.  172).  It  stems  from  
Garfinkel’s (1967a, pp. 36-38) early breaching experiments, in which he set out to disrupt 
mundane practices within local settings to make visible the taken for granted, common sense 
backdrop to everyday affairs (Maynard & Clayman, 2003, pp. 177-182). Deviant case analysis
46 
                                                             
46 According to Maynard and Clayman (2003, pp. 180-181), deviant cases are generally attended to in 
three different ways: they are either explained through the same general pattern originally proposed by 
the researcher; the general pattern is expanded to fit both the normal and the deviant case; or the 
deviant case is explained as a break from the general structure of conversation. However, the important 
aspect of deviant case analysis is that the analyst should aim to account for the deviant case in their 
analysis and, in doing so should illustrate that they are accounting for the structures in conversation in 
the participants’ own terms and not through their own analytic framework (Schegloff, 1996, p. 172). For 
a detailed description of deviant case analysis and its similarities to Garfinkel’s breach experiments see 
Maynard and Clayman’s (2003, pp. 177-182) article ‘Ethnomethodology and conversation analysis’.  
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is the analysis of naturally occurring breaches
47 in the conversation to see how they can be 
understood  through  the  same  general  structure  of  conversation  that  the  researcher  is 
proposing (Maynard & Clayman, 2003, p. 179) . Analysing deviant cases in the interactional 
data demonstrates that the analyst is not accounting for the structures of conversation in their 
own terms, but is a ttentive  to  the  participants’  own  orientations  to  structures  of  talk-in-
interaction (Schegloff, 1996, p. 172; ten Have, 1999, pp. 130-131). Ten Have (1999, pp. 130-
134) advocates deviant case analysis as one way to overcome the criticism that applied CA 
analysts  only  attend  to  their  own  interests  and  not  the  interests  of  participants  in  the 
interaction.  
Conversation analysts understand context in the same way as theoretical models, unless they 
are observable in the talk-interaction itself, context and theoretical models cannot be used to 
make sense of the data. CA does not assume that the institutional setting is always relevant to 
the  interaction  that  takes  place  within  that  setting  (Schegloff,  1995,  pp.  xlvii-li,  1997). 
According  to  CA,  both  institutional  and  non-institutional  talk  can  take  place  within  an 
institutional setting. Hence, the institutional context is occasioned and accomplished within 
the interaction (Schegloff, 1991, p. 51). As such, the relevance of the institutional setting to 
talk-in-interaction  within  that  setting  cannot  simply  be  assumed  by  the  analyst.  The 
institutional setting must be oriented to as pertinent by the participants in the interaction in 
order for the analyst to demonstrate  the relevance of the institutional setting to the talk 
                                                             
47 Naturally occurring talk, or naturalistic talk, as it has more recently been called by Potter and Alexa 
Hepburn (2007, pp. 277-278), is the preferred form of empirical data from CA and DP investigations. 
Naturally occurring talk, according to CA, is talk that would happen whether the social researcher was 
present  or  not  (Heritage  &  Atkinson,  1984,  pp.  2-4).  Hence,  my recordings  of clinical  psychological 
interaction  are  naturally  occurring  talk because  I was  not  a participant in  the interactions  that  the 
therapists recorded for me. The preference for naturally occurring talk for CA investigations stems from 
the requirement that the conversation analyst must not let their own theoretical understandings affect 
their analytic descriptions of the empirical data (Heritage & Atkinson, 1984, pp. 2-4). If I were apart of 
the  talk-in-interaction  that  I  was  analysing,  my  analytic  orientations  would  be  understood  to  be 
embedded within the interaction I am analysing. A naturally occurring breach in a conversation is a 
section of talk-in-interaction that does not seem to follow the general structures found in conversation 
(Maynard & Clayman, 2003, p. 179). I will come back to the problems with the concept of deviant case 
analysis in the conclusion of this chapter.   
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(Schegloff, 1992). In this chapter, I will demonstrate that the institutional context of clinical 
psychology can be seen in the talk-in-interaction, and is relevant and consequential for the 
participants in this setting, because there is an asymmetry between the therapist’s and client’s 
speaking positions that is observable in the therapeutic talk-in-interaction. 
In demonstrating that there is an asymmetry between the therapist’s and the client’s speaking 
positions in clinical psychological interaction, I will argue that the  therapist has the role of 
formulating the client’s problems, whereas the client is not in a position to formulate either 
the therapist’s or their own problems. The CA notion of formulation is that when a person 
gives an account, their interlocutor can provide their own summary, explanation or description 
of what they are doing as one possible response to the first speaker’s action (Garfinkel & 
Sacks, 1970; Maynard & Clayman, 2003, p. 183; Schegloff, 1995, p. xlix, 1996, p. 172).  Hence, I 
will put forward that the clinical psychological setting is a unique setting because the therapist 
is allowed to interpret the client’s problems, whereas the client is not allowed to interpret the 
therapist’s accounts.
48 Drawing out the wider implications of the observed asymmetry in  the 
speaker’s rights and obligations in clinical psychological interactions, I will attempt to argue 
that the conversational maxim to talk for oneself can be understood as a preference for a first 
person speaking position in conversation and that breaking the conversational maxim can be 
                                                             
48 In this sentence I am conflating the CA notion of ‘formulation’ with the concept of interpretation. In 
CA  and  EM,  ‘formulations’  are  understood  as  a  member  providing  an  explicit  description  of  what 
another member is doing (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970, pp. 353-355). Interpretation is not generally used in 
CA because it is understood as a psychological explanation of social order (Wowk, 2007, pp. 136-137). I 
am using interpretation and formulation interchangeably in the sense that a summary or description of 
what another person is doing in conversation could be seen as an interpretation of another’s actions. 
There are other EM authors who understand formulation and interpretation as interchangeable (for 
example see Lynch, 2000; McHoul, 1998; McHoul & Rapley, 2001). However, to understand formulation 
as interpretation is a problem because it is a very narrow sense of the concept of interpretation. The 
only interpretation that is seen as relevant, in the sense that I am using interpretation here, is the 
interpretation  made  by  one  member  of  another  member’s  action  in  the  social  interaction  I  am 
analysing.  My  description  of  clinical  psychological  practices  is  not  understood  as  an  interpretation 
because it is analytic description of the actual accounting practices of the members. To understand my 
analytic description of members’ practices as an interpretation of clinical psychological interactions was 
understood by me, at this point in my empirical investigations, as letting my analytic understandings 
obscure what was actually happening in the talk-in-interaction itself.  
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understood as relating to the practices of managing a speaking position as Objective.
49 I will 
extend my argument to claim  that, by  demonstrating that the  therapist manages their 
accounts as Objective, at least in this respect,  the appropriation of the  Objective standpoint 
from the natural sciences by psychologists does play a role in the actual practices of clinical 
psychology.  
I will discuss my contentious claim that I am examining the actual practices through which 
formulations  are managed as  Objective  in light of the dif ficulties I have encountered in 
enacting a CA investigation of clinical psychological interaction. One main concern with the 
analytic approach taken in this  chapter  is that  conversation analysts, like myself,   seem to 
assume the same  Objective standpoint that I am attempting to critique and illustrate in my 
analysis of the  empirical data. As discussed in  my introduction,  the  assumption of the 
Objective  standpoint,  in  scientific  psychological  methodology   and  clinical  psychological 
practice, leads psychologists to understand their judgements as unquestionable, because their 
assessments  of  empirical  data  and  client’s  difficulties,  respectively,  are  understood  to  be 
conducted Objectively. Hence, in assuming an Objective perspective through which to examine 
clinical psychological interaction, I am putting my own analysis beyond question because I 
assume  that  I  have  no  impact  upon  the  observations  and  descriptions  that  I  make.  I  will 
address this concern by drawing upon Lynch and Bogen’s (1994) argument as presented in 
‘Harvey Sack’s primitive natural science’.  
Conversation Analysis: A Relevant Review 
Conversation  analysis  (CA)  is  a  systematic  way  of  investigating  talk-in-interaction,  and 
originates  in  the  work  of  Harvey  Sacks.  Sacks,  much  like  Garfinkel,  was  interested  in  the 
problem of social order, or more precisely, in Sacks’s (1995b, p. 113) own terms, ‘to construct 
a machinery that would produce ... occurrences’ found in conversation, in such a way that 
                                                             
49 Refer to footnote 1, page 1 for an explanation of why I have capitalised the ‘O’ in Objective.  
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social analysts could describe how utterances in conversation are heard and listened to by 
participants. Importantly for Sacks (1995b, pp. 113-125), explication of the ‘inference making 
machine’ used by people to hear and understand utterances needs to be derived from the 
interactional data. Sacks (1995b, p. 622) states, when describing his approach to research: ‘I 
have a bunch of stuff and I want to try to see whether an order for it exists. Not that I want to 
order it, but I want to try to see whether there’s an order to it.’ Hence, CA is the resultant 
method by which to investigate the order found in everyday talk-in-interaction.  
Turn Taking Allocation 
Emanuel Schegloff (2007a, p. 1) states, when introducing CA, that turn-taking is one of the 
fundamental organisational features of talk-in-interaction. Sacks, Schegloff and Gail Jefferson 
(1974)  wrote  a  paper  outlining  the  orderly  structure  of  turn-taking  in  everyday  talk-in-
interaction. They demonstrated that there are three normative rules for turn allocation. At the 
end  of  a  turn-transition  relevance  place  (TRP),
50  the current speaker can select the next 
speaker, the next speaker can self-select or the current speaker can self-select. If the current 
speaker opts to continue their turn at talk, at the next TRP the three options for turn allocation 
are made available again.  According to Sacks and c olleagues (Sacks et al., 1974) , the turn 
taking allocation system demonstrates that a small number of normative rules can explain the 
complex phenomenon of how people organise turns at talk . The sequence of turn  taking is 
seen as central in understanding how utterances are heard and understood by members 
participating in the conversation. 
                                                             
50 A turn constructional unit (TCU) is simply a unit of language that makes up a turn at talk. TCUs do not 
have a particular structure and their length can vary from a word to a sentence. A turn can be made up 
of one or more TCUs. A TRP occurs at the hearable end of a TCU and is the place at which another 
speaker may opt to take a turn at talk (Sacks et al., 1974). The rules for turn taking are a good example 
of the circularity that results from the empiricist assumption of CA, which I have pointed to at the 
beginning of this chapter.   
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Adjacency Pairs 
Another aspect of the order found in everyday conversation is adjacency pairs. Adjacency pairs 
are two turns at talk, where the first turn is completed by one speaker and produces a relevant 
next turn for the following speaker (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). The pairing of utterances does 
not happen in a mechanical fashion, such that the first turn causes the second turn to happen; 
rather the first turn at talk establishes an expected or relevant next turn at talk (Schegloff, 
1968). Hence, the sequence of two turns at talk is ordered in such a way that one turn at talk 
can only be understood in relation to the previous and subsequent turns in a conversation.  
One  example  of  an  adjacency  pair  is  the  summons-answer  (S-A)  pair.  Schegloff  (1968) 
explicates the S-A adjacency pair in his paper on telephone conversation openings. Schegloff 
demonstrates that the first turn in a telephone conversation is the ringing phone, because it 
acts as a summons and establishes the relevant next action, which is to answer the phone call. 
We can see from this example that the first part of an adjacency pair, the summons, makes 
answering the summons the relevant next action in a conversation. 
Although the S-A adjacency pair establishes a normative pattern in conversation, an answer to 
a summons cannot be predicted from the occurrence of a summons in conversation. Schegloff 
(1968) explicates in detail why the S-A adjacency pair does not work in a mechanical fashion, 
such that we can predict the next action from the first action. Usually when the summons is 
not answered, in the case of telephone conversations, we take the non-response as the non-
presence of the call taker. However, if we cannot explain the missing answer to our summons 
through the call taker not being home, we can then draw upon other resources to make sense 
of the non-response. For example, we may explain the call taker’s missing answer as a result of 
them ignoring us or as evidence that they are busy. Consequently, although we can expect a 
certain next action – an answer to our summons – we cannot predict that an answer will follow 
in each case of a summons.   
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Even though adjacency pairs cannot lead to prediction, they are a useful resource for making 
sense of conversational actions, both for members in the conversation and for the analyst of 
conversation. The reason that adjacency pairs are useful for making sense of conversational 
actions  is  that  the  missing  or  unexpected  next  action  can  be  understood  through  the 
normative adjacency pair structure (Schegloff, 1968). In the case of face to face conversations, 
the S-A adjacency pair has the same normative structure. For example, a child’s not answering 
the summons of the parent can be accounted for either by the non-presence of the child or, 
when the child is known to be present, by the child ignoring the parent’s summons. Both the 
lack of answer from the call taker and by the child to a summons, when they are present, can 
be understood as ways of avoiding the indication of their presence which, would implicate 
them in a next action. For example, in the case of the child, the child may deliberately ignore 
the parent as they are not ready to stop playing and come in for dinner (Schegloff, 1968). In 
any case, the lack of response to the summons is understood as deficient precisely because the 
summons  establishes  the  relevant  next  action  as  an  answer.  Therefore,  the  first  part  of 
adjacency pairs creates a normatively expected next action which can be used to make sense 
of both the expected next action and the unexpected or missing next action.  
Preference Structures 
The preference structure in conversation is another orderly feature of talk-in-interaction that 
is of importance to CA researchers. There are three important preference structures that have 
been  established  in  the  CA  literature.  Firstly,  and  most  importantly,  Sacks  and  colleagues 
(1974)  have  shown,  from  investigations  into  turn  taking  in  conversation,  that  there  is  a 
preference  for  the  minimisation  of  gaps  and  overlaps  between  speakers  in  conversation. 
Secondly,  Schegloff,  Jefferson  and  Sacks  (1977)  have  argued,  from  investigations  into 
correction in conversation, that there is a preference for self-correction over other correction 
in talk. Thirdly, Anita Pomerantz (1984) has argued, from investigations into adjacency pairs,  
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that  agreement  is  preferenced  over  disagreement  in  conversation.  Taken  together,  for 
conversation  analysts,  these  findings  show  the  importance  of  preference  structures  in 
describing the order found in everyday conversation. 
In Sacks and colleagues’ (1974) paper on the allocation of turns in conversation it has been 
demonstrated that there is a preference for the minimisation of gaps and overlaps between 
speakers turns at talk. Sacks and colleagues (1974) noticed that, overwhelmingly, one speaker 
talks at a time, such that long pauses and long overlapping utterances are rare in mundane 
conversations. They propose that the three normative rules for turn allocation in conversation, 
previously described, enable speakers to maintain the minimisation of pauses and overlaps 
between  speakers’  turns  at  talk.  In  addition,  they  claim  that  there  is  also  an  observable 
preferred order to the three normative rules for turn allocation in conversation. The ‘current 
speaker selects next speaker’ rule is the most common form of turn allocation, followed by the 
next speaker self-selecting to talk next and, finally, the current speaker self-selecting to talk 
next (Sacks et al., 1974). Hence, the available methods for turn allocation, and the preferred 
order of each of the methods, allow speakers in conversation to maintain the preference for 
minimisation of gaps and overlaps, such that only one speaker talks at time  (2007a, p. 1; 
Schegloff et al., 1977).  
Schegloff and colleagues (1977) have demonstrated that there is a preference for a speaker 
correcting  their  own  utterance  over  another  speaker  correcting  their  utterance  for  them. 
When a speaker makes a mistake in a turn at talk – for example, they use the wrong name to 
refer to someone – more often than not, the speaker who made the error corrects the error in 
the same turn at talk. If the speaker does not correct the utterance, the next speaker often 
offers the first speaker a chance to correct their own utterance. If the speaker who made the 
error does not take up the other initiated correction then the other speaker may correct the  
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first speaker’s mistake. Schegloff and colleagues (1977) show that there is a preference for 
self-correcting your own mistakes in conversation over others correcting your mistakes.  
Pomerantz (1984) has shown that there is a preference for agreement over disagreement in 
conversation. According to Pomerantz, the preference for agreement can be seen through 
looking at the structure of the assessment/second assessment adjacency pair.
51 Pomerantz 
(1984) shows that assessments are generally followed by agreeing second assessments rather 
than disagreeing second assessments. She substantiates her claim by showing that a  second 
assessment, that is in agreement with the first assessment generally happens immediately and 
without pause; whereas a disagreeing second assessment, generally occurs after a pause, uses 
a  formulation  marker
52  and  includes  an  account  for  the  disagreeing  assessment  given. 
Pomerantz (1984), from her observations on assessment, puts forward the claim that there is a 
general preference for agreement over disagreement in talk-in-interaction. 
The immediate answer in response to an utterance in a conversation is now generally referred 
to as a  ‘preferred  turn  shape’  and  a  delayed  or  hesitant  response  to  an  utterance  in  a 
conversation is now generally referred to as a ‘dispreferred turn shape’. The dispreferred and 
preferred turn shapes have been further established by others, for example in Judy Davidson’s 
(1984)  and  Paul  Drew’s  (1984)  work  on  the  invitation/refusal  adjacency  pair.  Like  the 
assessment/second assessment adjacency pair, an acceptance of an invitation has been shown 
by both Davidson (1984) and Drew (1984) to occur immediately without pause, and a refusal 
of  an  invitation  has  been  shown  to  be  delayed  and  hesitant.  From  these  observations, 
according to conversation analysts, we can see that there are preferred and dispreferred next 
                                                             
51 Pomerantz (1984) uses the term ‘assessment’ to refer to participants assessing the event that they are 
participating  in.  Pomerantz  (1984,  p.  57)  gives  the  example  of  the  assessment/second  assessment 
adjacency pair; a participant noting that ‘let’s feel the water. Oh, it…’ is referred to by Pomerantz as the 
first assessment, and their interlocutor noting in reply ‘it’s wonderful. It’s just right. It’s like a bathtub’, 
which Pomerantz calls the second assessment.   
52 Formulation markers are when an utterance is prefaced with words such as ‘well’, ‘um’, etc.  (for 
example see Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro, 2008).  
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actions to the first part of the adjacency pair, which lends further support to the preference for 
agreement  over  disagreement  because  the  preferred  next  action  is  generally  an  agreeing 
second part of an adjacency pair. 
On  the  basis  of  the  established  findings  of  the  general  preference  for  agreement  in 
conversation, and the corresponding finding of preferred and dispreferred turn shapes, other 
conversation analysts have extended these findings to make broader claims. For example, on 
the strength of the findings that there is a preference for agreement over disagreement, Celia 
Kitzinger and Hannah Frith (1999) have claimed that people generally understand a ‘non-verbal 
no’ as part of their common sense knowledge. Kitzinger and Frith (1999)  have demonstrated 
that participants’ knowledge of preferred and dispreferred turn shapes indicates that people 
can  understand  a  no,  when  a  no  is  not  said,  because  they  orient  to  the  delay  in  their 
interlocutors’ response as a no. From their analytic descriptions, Kitzinger and Frith (1999)  
have  argued  that  the  notion  that  men  do  not  know  when  sex  is  being  refused,  and  that 
therefore women need to state a clear ‘no’ in order to avoid unwanted sex, is a myth. Once 
the preference structures have been demonstrated and generally accepted, claims are made 
on the basis of these findings, rather than seeking to demonstrate the relevance of these 
preference  structures  to  the  talk-in-interaction.  However,  in  keeping  with  the  ‘pure’  CA 
approach to investigating talk-in-interaction, I will avoid building upon other’s findings in CA 
and, instead, show how the ‘context-free’ findings of CA are ‘context-sensitive’ and relevant to 
the specific clinical psychological interactions I am describing (Lerner, 2003).    
Turn  allocation,  adjacency  pairs and  preference  structures  found  in  everyday  conversation 
indicate the importance of sequence in analysing and understanding talk-in-interaction. The 
allocation of turns at talk and the normative next actions made relevant by adjacency pairs 
indicate that any conversational action can only be understood in terms of the sequence in 
which  it  happens.  Furthermore,  the  preference  structures  indicate  that  turn  allocation  
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methods  and  adjacency  pairs  have  a  preferred  order  to  them.  One  utterance  cannot  be 
removed from a conversation and still be understood in the same way as the participants in 
the conversation understand that utterance, as the context of the utterance has been lost. 
Each turn in a conversation can only be made sense of in terms of the previous and next turns 
at talk (H. H. Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Schegloff, 2007a). The conversational context must 
be intact for an analyst to be able to rigorously examine the methods used by participants in 
interaction in order to make sense of that interaction.  
Talking for Oneself 
Gene Lerner (1996) draws upon work done in the area of CA to argue that talking for oneself is 
a  conversational  maxim.  Several  papers  within  the  CA  literature  have  demonstrated  that 
participants have epistemic rights and obligations to know their own ‘thoughts’, ‘opinions’, 
‘feelings’ and ‘experiences’ (Heritage & Raymond, 2005; Lerner, 1996; Sacks, 1984b). Sacks 
(1984b) suggested in his paper ‘On doing “being ordinary”’ that speakers have asymmetrical 
rights in terms of describing their experiences versus others’ experiences in conversations. 
According to Sacks (1984b), speakers have more rights to talk about their own experiences 
than they have rights to talk about others’ experiences. Pomerantz (1980) discusses the notion 
that ‘subject-actors’ have rights and obligations to know what they are discussing. Lerner’s 
(1992) study on collaboratively told stories between two or more co-participants showed that 
not currently talking co-tellers have rights in conversation to intervene and add detail to the 
presently  speaking  co-teller  in  order  to  animate  what  they  did  and  said.  Accordingly, 
Pomerantz’s (1980), Sacks’s (1984b) and Lerner’s (1992) investigations of conversation have 
demonstrated that speakers have rights to talk about their own experiences and obligations to 
know about their experiences in talk-in-interaction. Hence, Lerner (1996) has extended these 
investigations to argue that talking for oneself is generally preferenced over talking about a co-
present other in conversation.  
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The  rights  and  obligations  for  knowledge  within  conversation  are  consequential  to  the 
structure of conversation. Pomerantz (1980) has shown that participants who have a limited 
base  of  knowledge  about  a  topic  being  discussed  will  generally  present  this  knowledge 
hesitantly  in  the  form  of  a  ‘fishing  device’  that  encourages  confirmation  by  the  more 
knowledgeable other. Schegloff (1988) has shown that topic ownership and authoritativeness 
is a phenomenon that often requires careful management within a sequence of talk. Lerner 
(1996) draws on studies of epistemic rights and obligations to argue that ‘talking for oneself’ is 
a  conversational  maxim,  as  overwhelmingly  people  talk  about  themselves  rather  than  co-
present others. 
Talking for Oneself and Talking for Another 
Extending  Lerner’s  (1996)  work  on  the  conversational  maxim  to  talk  for  oneself,  I  will 
demonstrate  that  the  therapist’s  role  in  therapy  entails  that  the  therapist  break  the 
conversational maxim to talk for themself, as they are required to talk about a co-present 
other.  As I will demonstrate in the analytic section of this chapter, the therapist needs to 
carefully manage their right to speak on behalf of the client. Although the therapist rarely talks 
about themself within a therapy session, they still orient to the conversational maxim to talk 
for oneself. Throughout the therapy session the therapist uses a variety of methods to package 
their formulations of the client, so that their claims about the client come across as relevant 
and legitimate. When the therapist fails to establish their right to talk about the client, this 
becomes a trouble source, as the client is able to directly disagree with the therapist. Hence, 
from  the  careful  management  of  their  formulations  about  their  clients,  we  can  see  that 
therapists have a unique role in therapy because they are in an interaction that requires them 
to talk about another, while clients talk about themselves.   
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Analytic Materials 
The extracts presented in this chapter are taken from a corpus of data that contains eighteen 
therapy sessions, as described in my introduction. I draw upon my transcription of all the 
therapy sessions to choose the data extracts that I present and the analytic observations I 
make.  However,  due  to  limited  space  I  will  only  present  three  examples  of  each  of  the 
methods clinical psychologists use to manage their break from the conversational maxim. All 
extracts  have  been  transcribed  according  to  the  Jeffersonian  system  for  transcription 
(Jefferson, 1984, 2004). 
Analysis 
Method One: Drawing Upon the Institutional Role and Expert 
Knowledge 
The most obvious way that the psychologist can manage their rights to speak on a client’s 
behalf is through explicitly referring to their role as a psychologist or to the psychological 
literature. Referring to their role as a psychologist, or to the psychological literature, is one 
way that the therapist can explicitly invoke the relevance of the institutional setting to the 
interaction that is taking place. However, therapists rarely explicitly reference the institutional 
context in therapeutic interactions. Therapists mainly make explicit the institutional context in 
the interaction that is occurring when their formulations of the client are controversial or 
confronting; suggesting that explicitly referencing the institutional context is a last resort. In 
the  first  section  of  my  analysis,  I  will examine  three  extracts  in  which  the  therapist  does 
explicitly reference the institutional context of talk-in-interaction, in order to demonstrate that 
such a method is generally used when the therapist is providing a controversial formulation of 
the client.  
In the first extract, John, the therapist, and Judy, the client, are discussing Judy’s difficulty with 
losing weight:  
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Extract 1: John and Judy Session 1: 15:30-16:00  
1.  →  John:  so: in ↑fact your WEIGHT. (1.0) .h psychological↑ly 
2.       >one psychological explanation< for your weight.= 
3.     Judy:   =mm: 
4.        (0.6) 
5.     John:  is that ↑it‟s actually safe.  
6.         (0.4) 
7.     Judy:  ˚↑yeah˚ 
8.     John:  that it ↑actually protects you from, (0.6) ↑well: 
9.       (1.0) almost ↑wanted advances. (0.6) .h  >↑but you 
10.       can‟t have< the wanted ↑advances. >because< ↑there 
11.       were >such things in your< ↑environment the 
12.       ↑temptation would ↑be the*re. 
13.       (0.2)  
14.     Judy:  ↑m↓m:  
15.     John:  >to meet a< an e↑motional need that‟s not being 
16.           met. .h >but then< ↑that would destabilise the 
17.       ↑family which you cannot do. .h so you‟re: caught. 
18.       (1.0) 
19.     Judy:  ↑m:↓m:= 
20.  →  John:  =psychologically, (0.4) how ↑trapped do you feel?  
21.         (1.8) 
22.     Judy:  ˚<ve:↑ry ↑trapped.>˚ 
John’s explicit invocation of the institutional context in the interaction that is taking place is 
interesting, as it allows John to legitimately produce a formulation of Judy’s difficulties with 
her weight (line 1). Although Judy has suggested in her account that being slimmer leads her to 
more ‘temptations’ earlier in the interaction, the formulation that John provides – that she is 
trapped because of a dilemma between ‘well almost wanted advances’ and ‘*destabilising+ the 
family’ – could still be seen as controversial (lines 8-17). Introducing the formulation as ‘one 
psychological explanation’ wards off an uptake of the formulation as controversial as it places 
the  description  within  an  institutional  frame  of  reference  and  thereby  presents  the 
formulation  as  reasonable  and  justifiable  rather  than  controversial  or  illegitimate.  Hence,  
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invoking the institutional context of therapeutic conversation can be useful to therapists in 
framing a controversial formulation of the client.  
In the following extract, John and Judy are discussing her problems in communicating with her 
partner Adam: 
Extract 2: John and Judy Session 2: 39:30-40:15 
1.    John:  >↑why do you go.< ((hand clap))  
2.       (8.8)  
3.     John:  ↑tell me >what you want me to do.< 
4.       (1.8)  
5.     Judy:  ˚↑well I think you should˚ kn:ow:. (1.0) I think  
6.       you be:, >if your< partner‟s done something. he  
7.       should ↑know. 
8.       (1.8) 
9.     John:  ˚okay˚ 
10.     Judy:  ˚hh. ha ha˚  
11.  →  John:  me (0.4) me the psychologist. >wants to say,<= 
12.     Judy:  =˚↑yeah˚= 
13.     John:  „↑oh where‟s that rule written.‟= 
14.     Judy:  =heh ha ha ha ha   
In the beginning of this extract, Judy is reluctant to answer John’s question (posed earlier in 
the therapy session) about why she does not like her partner’s question about what he can do 
to fix the relationship. When Judy does reply she provides an account that John does not want 
to take up (lines 1-9). Judy proffers her reason for disliking her partner’s question about what 
he should do to fix the relationship, as a general statement that ‘partners’ should ‘know’ what 
they have ‘done’ (lines 5-7). John responds to Judy by introducing a “fake”
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53 Double quotes, throughout all three analytic chapters, indicate that I am providing an analysts’ gloss 
of what the participants are doing. For EM/CA, glossing over what a participant is saying is acceptable, 
as long as you acknowledge that this is what you are doing, because you cannot capture all the details 
available in the talk in a description. See Garfinkel and Sacks’s (1970) paper ‘On formal structures of 
practical actions’ for a discussion on glossing practices. The notion that the analyst can indicate when 
they are glossing, as opposed to carefully describing the actual practices, assumes that it is possible for 
the analyst to provide descriptions of the empirical data that do not rely upon theoretical concepts. I will  
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through framing his response in terms of how he would like to respond as a ‘psychologist’ (line 
11), which is ‘oh where’s that rule written’ (line 13). Judy responds with laughter (line 14). 
Hence,  we  see  John  manage  a  delicate  disagreement  with  Judy’s  hesitant  reply,  through 
invoking his institutional identity.  
In the following extract, John and Di are discussing a pattern in Di’s romantic relationships: 
Extract 3: John and Di Session 1: 43:30-44:30 
1.    John:  =an‟ that‟s what I think clinging is about. (0.6) 
2.       .h if you CLING on tightly enough the person can‟t 
3.       turn round to ↑see you‟re unloveable.  
4.       (1.4)  
5.  →  John:  I think it‟s=a ↑psychological ↑position (1.0)  
6.  →    >↓and<↑it‟s=actually in the ↑attachment  
7.  →    <literature.> 
8.       (0.4) 
9.     Di:  ˚↑ye:a(h.)h˚ 
Immediately prior to this extract, John is pursuing an answer from Di as to why she is a ‘clinger’ 
in relationships. Up until this point in the interaction, Di has resisted John’s formulation of her 
as a ‘clinger’. Due to the lack of agreement, in this extract John adds to his formulation that he 
thinks ‘clinging’ is a ‘psychological position’ (line 5) and that his thoughts are supported by the 
‘attachment literature’ (line 6). Following John’s explicit reference to his institutional role and 
knowledge,  we  see  Di  move  towards  agreement  (line  9).  Here  we  see  the  usefulness  of 
drawing explicit reference to an institutional role, as for the first time John starts to acquire 
Di’s agreement with his controversial formulation of her as a ‘clinger’.  
Drawing upon the institutional role of ‘psychologist’, ‘psychological positions’ or ‘psychological 
literature’ is a method of managing the psychologist’s knowledge that is used infrequently. The 
infrequency with which this method is employed may be due to the delicate manner with 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
discuss the assumption, by ethnomethodologically informed researchers, of an atheoretical standpoint 
through which to describe the social world in the second part of my thesis.   
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which authority needs to be managed interactionally (Schegloff, 1988)
54. John, the therapist, 
generally  draws  upon  ‘psychological’  knowledge  directly  in  presenting  a  reasonably 
provocative formulation of the client’s actions. The way in which ‘psychological’ is used within 
the data reveals that this is a powerful method by which to talk about the client’s experiences 
because  it  positions  the  therapist  as  a  representative  spokesperson  for  psychological 
knowledge. Drawing on institutional identity and knowledge enables a therapist to produce a 
controversial formulation of the client’s action in a way that is hard to disagree with directly 
because, by rights, the therapist is more knowledgeable about psychological topics than the 
client. However, the explicit use of institutional expertise to manage their right to talk about a 
co-present  other  is  rare  in  the  therapy  sessions  I  have  analysed.  More  delicate  means  of 
managing their right to talk about a client are much more frequently used. One of the most 
common ways for therapists to manage their institutional identity is through claiming their 
formulation of clients’ difficulties as merely their own opinion. 
Method Two: Presenting Formulations in Terms of ‘My View’ 
The most common method that therapists use to manage their claims about a co-present 
other is through hedging their formulation with something along the lines of ‘in my view’ or 
‘from  my  perspective’.  While  prefacing  formulations  of  clients’  troubles  by  invoking  their 
                                                             
54 This is only one explanation; another explanation could be that the role of therapist is ‘omnirelevant’ 
to the interaction (Sacks, 1995b, pp. 515-522). Invocations of the other methods I investigate, such as 
‘my perspective’, ‘we’, ‘story-telling’, etc., could be understood as more subtle or implicit means by 
which  the  therapist  invokes  their  institutional  identity.  The  infrequency  of  the  therapist’s  explicitly 
referring to their institutional role may be because it is unnecessary in most cases, but this does not 
change the claim I am making here. The notion of omnirelevance of the institutional context is one that 
is controversial within the CA literature, because it can be used to gloss over the detail in the talk-in-
interaction,  rather  than  provide  a  description  of  the  institutional  character  of  talk-in-interaction 
(Schegloff, 1995, pp. xlvii-xlviii). In this chapter, I am attempting to demonstrate that the roles of the 
therapist and client are omnirelevant to the talk-in-interaction, through careful description of the detail 
found in therapeutic interaction. Hence, to jump ahead and suggest that all the methods implicitly 
invoke institutional context would disallow the careful description of the therapeutic talk-in-interaction. 
I will avoid suggesting that the therapist is subtly invoking the institutional role in the extracts, in favour 
of carefully describing how the roles of the therapist and client can be demonstrated as relevant to talk-
in-interaction,  through  the  methods  by  which  therapists  manage  their  rights  and  obligations  to 
formulate clients’ difficulties.        
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institutional  role  or  knowledge  helps  to  present  controversial  formulations  of  clients’ 
difficulties, hedging their account as merely their own ‘opinion’ or ‘view’ helps to accomplish 
agreement in delicate interactions where the client displays previous disagreement, or obvious 
distress, or where a new formulation of the client is being made by the therapist. Hedging their 
formulations with something like ‘in my view’ works to soften the therapist’s formulation of 
the problem as it presents the account of the problem as one view among many. As such, the 
therapist is not claiming to ‘know’ the client’s problem, but only to have an ‘opinion’ on the 
matter (Lerner, 1996).  
In  the  following  extract,  John  and  Anna  are  discussing  the  possibility  of  Anna leaving  her 
partner: 
Extract 4: John and Anna Session 1: 52:00-52:30 
1.   → John:  ↑my view=of (0.6) ↑making (1.0) ↑a statement like 
2.      ↑that >is< (1.2) >if you‟re gonna ↑say it. you‟re 
3.       gonna have to be prepared to do it.< 
4.     Anna:  ↑yeah I know:. hh  
5.     John:  >it its< ↑not one you can do as a, ˚>you know<˚ in 
6.       poker you bluff:. hh .hh to ↑see what >their gonna< 
7.       (.) do. >and then you can always< FOLD. 
8.     Anna:  ↑ye:a*h: hhh 
9.     John:  >but you can‟t< FOLD on this one. 
10.     Anna:  ˚↑no:˚ hhh  
At  the  beginning  of  this extract,  John  hedges  his  account  in  order  to  present  his  delicate 
suggestion about what it means for Anna to say to her partner that if he wants to leave he can 
(lines 1-3). In addition, ‘a statement like that’ (lines 1-2) packages his view as not directly 
relevant  to  Anna’s  statement,  but  to  statements  of  the  type  that  Anna  has  presented. 
Prefacing his account with ‘my view’ and generalising to refer to a type of statement enables 
John to delicately package his advice that Anna should not state that she is happy for her  
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partner to leave, if she does not feel that way. In doing so, John softens his advice to Anna, and 
is successful in garnering her agreement (line 8). 
In  the  next  extract,  the  therapist,  Bell,  presents  her  formulation  of  Sue’s  problem  in  her 
relationship with Carl: 
Extract 5: Bell and Sue Session 1: 26:30-27:30 
1.  →  Bell:  ↑u::m >but< what I: see as be:ing, (0.6) the 
2.       big:gest:  (0.2) ˚>er< u::m:˚ (0.6) .pst (0.4) the 
3.       biggest hur:dle ˚>an‟ an‟< you: ↑just said it. is˚ 
4.       .h you ↑are (0.4) S:O: ↑awa*re:,  
5.       (0.6)   
6.     Sue:  ˚↑ye:[ah:˚ 
7.     Bell:       [˚>you know<˚ you are SO: responsible. ↑so e*r 
8.       ↑u*:m:, <↑involved.> (0.4) .h an‟ ↑Carls: no:t 
9.       >↑anywhere< ↑ne:ar: that. (0.2) .h ↑u::m, ˚>you 
10.       know<˚ he‟s very ˚<laid back.>˚ very relaxed, very 
11.       ↑u:m, (1.4) ˚me*r˚  i*nto himSELF.  
12.       (0.2)  
13.     Sue:  ˚↑ye[ah (cos)˚  
14.     Bell:      [˚(I guess)˚ 
15.     Sue:  ˚ye:ah:˚= 
16.     Bell:  .hhh (0.4) UM: hhh >you know< if we can get him to 
17.       come ↑up a bit. ↑you al:so need to,= 
18.     Sue:  =˚I know:˚= 
19.     Bell:  =to to step ↓down a bit.  
Bell, Sue and Carl have attended at least three therapy sessions
55 together prior to this session, 
where only Bell and Sue are present. Sue has persistently disagreed with Bell’s formulation of 
the problems in her relationship with Carl. Here Bell prefaces her formulation of the problem 
with ‘what I see’ (line 1). By doing so, Bell delicately hedges her formulation as only one way of 
viewing  the  problem.  In  addition,  Bell  is  careful  to  frame  the  account  in  terms  that  are 
                                                             
55 I have recordings of the three previous sessions with Bell, Sue and Carl.  However, it is evident that 
there have been previous sessions before Bell started recording the sessions for me.  
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amenable to Sue: Sue is ‘so aware’ (line 4) and ‘so responsible’ (line 7), whereas Carl is ‘very 
laid back’, ‘very relaxed’ (line 10) ‘very ... into himself’ (lines 11-12). Bell goes on to state that 
Carl needs to ‘come up a bit’ (line 17) before formulating what Sue needs to do, which is to 
‘step down a bit’ (line 19). Bell’s careful packaging of her formulation of Sue’s difficulties with 
Carl and her advice to Sue is successful in accomplishing shared agreement, as can be seen 
from Sue’s indication of agreement in lines 13, 15, and 18. 
The subsequent extract occurs at the beginning of a session in which the therapist, John, and 
Ali are discussing how Ali has been attempting to attend to what underlies her feeling of anger: 
Extract 6: John and Ali Session 1: 1:30-2:00 
1.     Ali:  ˚>well it‟s it‟s<˚ tryna think of well: ↑what am I 
2.       angry about.  
3.     John:  ↑yes. >so so< ↑what has, triggered the .hh sense of 
4.       anger. and ↑what is it us:ually¿ 
5.            (1.4) 
6.     Ali:  ↑hurt. 
7.   → John:  ↑yes: ↑good. (0.2) ↑good. (0.4) cos ↑that‟s my  
8.       take. (0.2) .hh >is that when you< ↓get ↑h:ur:t:.  
In the extract above, John uses ‘my take’ to preface his agreement with Ali’s account of her 
anger. Ali explains that she is trying to think through what her ‘anger’ is ‘about’ (lines 1-2), 
which she thinks is a feeling of being ‘hurt’ (line 6). John agrees with Ali stating ‘yes good good’ 
(line 7). John follows up his agreement with Ali by extending her explanation with his own 
formulation of her anger (lines 7-8). John uses ‘my take’ to introduce his formulation in order 
to demonstrate that it is merely a continuation of Ali’s own account of her anger.  
The previous three extracts show that therapists often preface their comments about clients’ 
accounts with words such as ‘view’, ‘take’ or ‘see’, which makes explicit that their comments 
are from their own perspective. Therapists are able to manage their rights to speak about 
clients  in  this  way,  as  people  are  entitled  to  their  ‘opinions’  about  others  (Lerner,  1996).  
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Importantly, presenting formulations and assessments in this way enables the therapist to 
garner agreement from the client on delicate matters.  
When Therapists Do Not Preface Their Account with ‘In My View’ 
The  following  extract  demonstrates  what  happens  when  therapists  do  not  hedge  their 
formulations of the client with something like ‘in my view’, nor in any way attend to managing 
their break from the conversational maxim to talk for oneself. When therapists do not hedge 
their formulations in delicate interactions, this provides a place where clients can legitimately 
disagree with the therapist, because they have rights to know their own experience better 
than the therapist. The following extract presents a deviant case where the therapist does not 
hedge their formulation of the client, and demonstrates the need for therapists to carefully 
manage their rights to speak about clients. 
In extract seven, the therapist is attempting to formulate Sue and Carl’s relationship troubles 
in terms of difference, through asking them about their different personalities: 
Extract 7: Bell, Sue and Carl Session 1:  23:00-23:45 
1.    Bell:  so::, (.) <i:n: one sentence> (1.8) >some up< ↑your 
2.       <personality>.  
3.     Sue:  u::m: .pt hhh. ˚one sentence˚ (0.8) u::m: (0.6) I 
4.        ↑like t‟ be around lots- I re- I: like to be around 
5.        a lot of people. an::d:, (0.6) I:: ↑enjoy↓ (1.3) I 
6.        ↑enjoy↓ (.) having >a lot of< (.) communication 
7.       with lots-, lots of people. ˚like I˚ (.) is that 
8.       (.) what you mean?=  
9.   →   Bell:  =yep, .hhh an::d you‟re a planner. you fit in as 
10.       many tas:ks: (0.2) or as many en↓gagements (0.2) as 
11.       possible.  
12.   →  Sue:  >yeah but< I: don‟t >like< I don‟t really think I 
13.       do that >but< it‟s funny that Carl‟s picking that 
14.       out „cause I: I really (.) DON‟T plan ↑any:↓more::  
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In this extract, Bell does not preface her extension of Sue’s description of her ‘personality’ with 
any type of hedge. Bell asks a question about ‘personality’ (lines 1-2) and Sue answers the 
question (lines 3-8). Bell responds to Sue by adding directly to Sue’s list of her own attributes. 
Bell adds that Sue is ‘a planner’ (line 9). Sue immediately and directly disagrees with Bell’s 
additional  attributes,  stating  that  she  does  not  ‘plan  anymore’  (line  14).  Additionally,  Sue 
brings Carl into the dispute stating ‘it’s funny that Carl’s picking that out’ (lines 13-14). In this 
extract, we see that when therapists do not carefully manage their rights to speak about a 
client it can lead to a direct disagreement between the therapist and the client.  A lack of 
careful management of rights to speak on behalf of the client by the therapist works against 
accomplishing agreement.  
Method Three: Presenting Comments About Clients in The Form of a 
‘Fishing Device’ 
I shall now attend to other regularly used methods that therapists use to manage their rights 
and obligations to speak about a client. Therapists can frame their claims about the client as 
suggestions in order to manage their conversational rights to talk about the client. Pomerantz 
(1980)  demonstrated  that  in  situations  where  one  co-participant  has  a  lesser  claim  to 
knowledge about a topic than another co-participant, they often present their knowledge in 
the form of a question or a suggestion that can be confirmed by the more knowledgeable co-
conversationalist. Pomerantz (1980) named these questions/suggestions of knowledge ‘fishing 
devices’. Presenting new formulations in terms of tentative fishing devices allows the therapist 
to accomplish a pre-formulation in order to check whether a formulation along the lines they 
are suggesting would be amenable to the client.  Therapists make use of fishing devices in 
presenting their claims about a client in a way that enables the client to affirm or deny what 
the therapist is saying about them.  
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In the following extract, John, the therapist, and Judy are discussing a common basis to Judy’s 
dual problems of not feeling good about herself and not being able to lose weight: 
Extract 8: John and Judy Session 1: 9:10-9:30 
1.  →  John:  >↑how‟d you know? you‟re good.< 
2.             (1.6) 
3.     Judy:  °cos I get ↑positive feedback.° 
4.     John:  °↑ye:s:°  
5.       (1.0)  
6.  →  John:  .h >and< one ↑the issues, ↑about your weight is 
7.       what. 
8.              (4.6) 
9.     Judy:  °I >↑don‟t get< any positive feedback.° 
10.       (0.6)  
11.     John:  >well ↑I‟m sure you< do. .↑but >you you<  
12.       [(not as positive)]  
13.     Judy:  [well I DO. ] but not as posi[tive=as] 
14.     John:                               [er it  ] (0.2) 
15.       per↑haps could be. 
16.     Judy:  ↑yeah: 
John, in this extract, uses a fishing device in order to highlight a connection between two of 
Judy’s troubles (lines 1 and 6). John asks Judy, ‘how do you know you’re good’ (line 1), to 
which Judy answers, ‘cos I get positive feedback’ (lines 3). John follows up with a second 
question, ‘and one the issues with your weight is what’ (lines 6-7), to which Judy answers, ‘I 
don’t get any positive feedback’ (line 9). In packaging his “insight”, that there is a common link 
between Judy not feeling good about herself and her weight issues, with two fishing devices, 
John is able to collaboratively build the account of the link which establishes an agreed upon 
common ground for two of Judy’s voiced troubles. Here, John uses a fishing device in order to 
encourage  Judy  to  establish  for  herself  the  link  between  her  two  difficulties,  before  John 
presents his formulation that Judy’s two problems are connected to the same problem of 
needing positive feedback.  
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In the following extract, Bell, the therapist, employs a fishing device to put forward her first 
formulation of Sue’s voiced difficulties in her relationship with Carl, in a tentative way: 
Extract 9: Bell, Sue and Carl Session 1: 16:00-16:30 
1.     Sue:  >there was just this< one moment >where I just  
2.       went< “oh no” >this just reminds me< o(h)f  
3.       la(h)tel(h)y .h ↑what happens with us.  
4.   → Bell:  >↑okay< .h so ↑what I‟m <hearing> (0.4) .h ↓is  
5.       >that it‟s< ↑very ea:sy: <for you> t‟ (0.2) .pt  
6.       (0.2)pa:ss ↑off: (0.6) >some↑thing< that you: ↑want  
7.       to do:. (0.4) >because< er er ↑Carl might, (0.6)  
8.       say something ↑that you take as being, (1.2) 
9.      °u(hh)m: e*r: we*ll° either ↑critical or::, (0.6)  
10.       that ↑he‟s not <interested.> (0.4) ↑so you‟ll BLOW  
11.       off what you want to do. an‟ (0.9) ↑make ALLOWANCES  
12.       for that. >↑but< (.) ↑a ↑bit ↑of ↑resentment ↑in  
13.   →   ↑the ↑background? ↑am [↑I right? am I ↑hearing that 
14.   →   right? 
15.     Sue:             [yeah ↑that‟s yea:h  
16.       >probably< ↑yes: cos I TEND to do: ↑what I thinks  
17.       better for ↑everybody fir:st:=  
18.     Bell:  =m::[↑m::↓m: 
19.     Sue:      [°ye:ah:° hh. 
In this extract, Bell packages her formulation of Sue between ‘what I’m hearing is’ (line 4) and 
a fishing device (lines 13-14),
56 in order to delicately proffer her first formulation of the trouble 
that Sue has just voiced. In line 4 of this extract, Bell begins her formulation with ‘okay so what 
                                                             
56 Bell’s turn at talk that starts with ‘okay so what I’m hearing’ and ends with ‘am I hearing that right’ can 
be seen to clearly reference what is discussed in the clinical literature as  ‘reflective listening skills’. 
However, knowing that these utterances are part of the utterances taught to counsellors under the 
banner of reflective listening skills does not help me describe what is happening in the interaction. As 
such, I have provided a description of how the utterances are used in this section of the extract. For a CA 
of active listening skills, which reflective listening skills are part of, and how they are used by therapists 
to  manage  their  formulations  as  delicate,  see  Ian  Hutchby’s  (2005)  article  ‘“Active  listening”: 
Formulations and elicitation of feelings-talk in child counselling’. For a discussion of reflective listening in 
the  clinical  psychological  literature  see  Christine  Fuller  and  Phil  Taylor’s  (2008)  ‘Summarising  and 
reflective listening’.  
57 
I’m hearing is’, which works to pre-emptively package her utterance as merely her ‘hearing’ of 
what  Sue  has  said.  After  presenting  her  delicately  produced  formulation  (lines  4-14),  Bell 
finishes her turn by stating ‘am I right? Am I hearing you right?’ (lines 13-14). By finishing her 
formulation in this way, Bell allows Sue to confirm or deny whether Bell’s summary is correct. 
As such, Bell successfully manages her claim to know Sue’s troubles, as can be seen by Sue’s 
agreement with Bell’s formulation (lines 15-19).  
In extract 10, the therapist, John, and Anna, the client, are discussing the similarities between 
her own romantic relationships and her parents’ romantic relationship: 
Extract 10: John and Anna Session 1: 18:00-18:15 
1.     John:  >see=I‟m< ↑intrigued by the fact that °it-° (0.2) 
2.  →    >it- in< some ways. >how how much have< you: 
3.  →    replicated your parents‟ relationship? 
4.     Anna:  well ↑I know, ↑I know all about that. (.) 
5.       [pat]terns 
6.     John:  [I- ]  
7.     Anna:  .h FOLLOWING [of ] 
8.     John:               [yep]= 
9.     Anna:  =patterns=  
10.     John:  =>o↑kay<=  
11.     Anna:  =BLAH blah BLAH blah BLAH 
In  the  above  extract,  John  uses  a  fishing  device  to  frame  a  suggestion  that  Anna  has 
‘replicated’ (line 3) her parents’ relationship. In lines 1 to 3, John corrects ‘I’m intrigued by the 
fact that’ (line 1) to ‘in some ways’ (lines 2) and, finally, to ‘how much have you replicated you 
parents’  relationship?’  (lines  2-3).  In  the  corrections  John  downgrades  his  utterance  from 
asserting that Anna has replicated her parents’ relationship, to asking Anna a question as to 
whether this is the case or not. We can observe – from Anna’s response to John – that she 
does not like the suggestion that she is like her parents. Framing a suggestion about Anna in 
the form of a question does not succeed in warding off a disagreement in this case.  We can  
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see that in cases where the client is likely to disagree with the therapist’s claim about them, 
putting the claim in the form of a question allows a turn for disagreement.  
In the three extracts presented above, I have shown that the therapist can manage their rights 
to talk about the client through packaging the utterance in the form of a question which awaits 
confirmation from the client. The use of fishing devices, as demonstrated above, can be used 
in  situations  where  the  therapist  is  building  a  new  formulation  of  the  problem  or  where 
disagreement is likely to occur; as it is a delicate and tentative method that therapists can use 
to manage epistemic rights to talk about the client. 
Method Four: Employing Relational and General Uses of the Pronoun 
‘We’ 
Another means for therapists to accomplish entitlement to talk about clients is through the 
use of ‘we’ in formulating clients’ troubles. Lerner and Kitzinger (2007) outline three uses of 
‘we’  in  conversation.  Firstly,  ‘we’  can  be  used  to  invoke  a  particular  institution  or  group. 
Secondly, ‘we’ can be used in a relational sense to invoke the relevance of a relationship 
between two people and produce them as in agreement. Thirdly, ‘we’ can be used in the 
general sense to present an account as commonsensical or widely agreed upon. Within the 
therapeutic setting, therapists often draw upon the second and third uses of ‘we’ to manage 
their  epistemic  rights  to  talk  on  behalf  of  their  clients,  just  prior  to  formulating  clients’ 
problems. 
Relational Uses of ‘We’ 
In therapy, the relational use of ‘we’ is often used to present formulations as agreed upon by 
all  parties  present  in  the  session.  In  extract  eleven,  John  and  Judy  are  discussing  Judy’s 
relationship with her father:   
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Extract 11: John and Judy Session 1:19:00-19:30 
1.    John:  >and your< ↑father was?  
2.       (3.2) 
3.     John:  ↑three words for dad.  
4.       (4.0) 
5.     John:   >↑don‟t censor yourself ↑just let it come to mind.<  
6.     Judy:  <↑controlling.> 
7.     John:  >↑yeah<  
8.       (0.8) 
9.     Judy:  ↑u:m:: (2.8) >he< ↑was fun me dad.(0.2) he was 
10.       ↑controlling, and he was ↑funny, (1.2) ↑but >he  
11.       was< °oppressive.° 
12.     John:  ↑yes.  
13.       (1.0) 
14.     John:  >so he was a bit< dangerous.  
15.       (0.4) 
16.     Judy:  ↑yea:h 
17.     John:  >is that fair?<  
18.     Judy:  ↑yea:h. (.) °probably yeah° 
19.     John:   or difficult. 
20.     Judy:  difficult. [↑more than]= 
21.     John:              [difficult ] 
22.     Judy:  =dangerous. [°yeah°] 
23.  →  John:              [↑okay ] difficult. (.) so ↑we‟ve got 
24.  →    for dad we‟ve got, ((note taking)) diffi↑cult  
25.      (1.2) controlling (1.2) and fun. 
At the beginning of this extract, John initiates an interactional course of action to choose three 
words to describe Judy’s father (lines 1-3). From lines 4 to 22, John and Judy collaboratively 
work up a description of Judy’s father as being ‘controlling’, ‘difficult’ and ‘funny’. In lines 23 to 
25,  John  presents  the  formulation  of  Judy’s  father  that  they  have  co-produced.  In  this 
formulation John uses a relational ‘we’ to emphasise the co-produced nature of the list of 
descriptors, because ‘we’ works to produce John and Judy as aligned.  
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The next extract occurs towards the end of a session where Bell, the therapist, is formulating 
the main topics of the current therapy session with Sue and Carl: 
Extract 12: Bell, Sue and Carl Session 3: 39:30-40:30 
1.     Bell:  °okay° .h so, ↑I think >it it it‟s< effort >that 
2.  →    that< (0.8) °that we‟re talking° a↑bout an‟ n=no 
3.       sometimes there‟s not going to be ↑anything on that 
4.       you both wanna go and ↑see: or:, [.h  ]  
5.     Sue:                                   [°m:°] 
6.  →  Bell:  its ↑just not going to work. .h >↑but< what we‟re 
7.       try:ing: to do he:re: is increase (0.4)    
8.     Carl:  ↑m[↓hm 
9.     Bell:    [↑com:munication. .h >at er< >at er< ↓um focused 
10.       level >and then< HOPEfully increase the incidental. 
11.       (.) <communication> >that can come out of< good 
12.       will. (1.2) °okay° >but it‟s< a case of ↓building 
13.       ↑up that <good will>. (0.6) ↑and to do that you  
14.       need some °time°.  
15.     Sue:  °yep (.) yep° 
16.       (1.0)  
17.  →  Bell:  °okay° .hh so ↑we:‟re: ↑actually >we‟re we‟ve< 
18.       talked ↑about a couple of things here. >one- ↑one< 
19.       ↑is >the- the< taking it in turns. 
20.       (2.8) 
In the above extract, Bell uses the relational ‘we’ to start to close the therapy session. Bell uses 
a relational ‘we’ (line 2) to frame ‘effort’ (line 1) as the topic of the therapy session. Bell uses a 
second relational ‘we’, in line 6, to produce all co-participants as aligned in understanding that 
they are attempting to ‘increase communication’ (lines 7-9). Bell then uses a third relational 
‘we’ (line 17) to present the agreed upon action to be taken as a result of the therapy session, 
which is to ‘take turns’ in organising time together (line 19). Carl and Sue demonstrate that 
they are onboard with the course of action that Bell is producing (lines 5, 8, and 15). In this 
extract, we see Bell make use of the relational ‘we’ to present a closing formulation of the  
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therapy  session  which  presents  the  topic,  the  aim  and  the  suggested  course  of  action  as 
agreed upon by all three co-participants.  
In the two extracts just presented, we see that the use of a relational ‘we’ works to present the 
therapist and client as aligned in the course of action that is being pursued within the therapy 
session. John uses the relational ‘we’ to co-produce an account of Judy’s father. Bell uses a 
relational ‘we’ to close the therapy session in a way that presents the aims of the therapy 
session as clear and agreed upon by all members present. As such, the use of a relational ‘we’ 
is a useful device for making explicit the shared agreement between therapists and clients, 
that enables the therapist to talk about a client, because it presents all parties as in agreement 
on the topic being discussed. 
The Use of ‘We’ as in Everyone 
In extracts thirteen and fourteen the therapist uses a general ‘we’, meaning all people, to 
produce  a  formulation  of  why  the  clients  do  what  they  do.  The  use  of  the  general  ‘we’ 
produces the formulation of the client’s problem as a common predicament and explicitly 
invokes common sense knowledge
57 as the warrant for the therapist’s right to talk about the 
client.  
In the following extract, John and Judy are discussing why Judy does not feel valuable unless 
other people value her: 
                                                             
57 I am specifically using the EM notion of common sense knowledge as a backdrop to everyday affairs. 
In this case, I am suggesting that therapists can explicitly invoke common sense reasoning to produce 
their claims as legitimate. I am not putting forward that therapists’ claims would be generally agreed 
upon by all people; but in instances where therapists use the general sense of ‘we’ they are making 
explicit the taken for granted assumption upon which their claim rests as a way of positioning their claim 
as widely agreed upon. In a way, what the therapist can be understood to be doing, following from EM 
understandings of the documentary method (Garfinkel, 1967a, pp. 77-79), is making explicit the general 
underlying pattern that they are using to make sense of the client’s claims. EM is not committed to the 
claim that these general patterns are ‘real’, only that members orient to them as if they exist. I will 
address the problems with Garfinkel’s notion of common sense, and my own adoption of this notion, in 
chapter six.     
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Extract 13: John and Judy Session 1: 5:45-6:30 
1.    John:  ↑yes:. so, ↑where‟s the value located?     
2.       (1.6) 
3.     Judy:  ↑from others. (0.8)  °>it‟s not about<° ↑me:.  
4.     John:  °↑m:↓m:° 
5.       (0.8) 
6.     Judy:  °↑I don‟t know why I do that?°  
7.     John:  well- >I- I-<=  
8.     Judy:  =I DO know why I DO it. >but,< ↑I know where it‟s 
9.       coming from. >but,< .h ↑why do I still do that? 
10.    John:  >↑because it‟s just< been, ↑ingrained into you. And 
11.  →    ↑I think we do ↓do: (0.2) .h as an automatic 
12.  →     position. ↑unconsciously, ↑I think we do do, .h 
13.       those behaviours an‟ tactics, that kept ↑us safe as 
14.       children. (0.8)  an‟ ↑also got us [valued.] 
15.     Judy:                                    [↑m:::↓m] (0.6) 
16.       °↑yea:h.° 
John, in this extract, uses the general ‘we’ in order to present a formulation of why Judy seeks 
value from other people, rather than herself. Judy confirms that she seeks ‘value from others’ 
(line 3). Once Judy and John have agreed upon the problem, Judy then asks a question about 
why she seeks value from others (line 6), in the form of a question to herself and, incidentally, 
to the therapist who is listening. Before John can answer, Judy rephrases the question to 
emphasise that she does know ‘where it’s coming from’ (lines 8-9), but that she is unsure why 
she still seeks value from others (line 9). In line 10, John successfully gains the floor to answer 
Judy’s “vexations” about herself. John carefully manages his epistemic rights – to answer a 
question about why Judy does what she does on her behalf – by using the general sense of 
‘we’ (lines 11 and 12). John frames his answer to Judy as something that could possibly be 
missed by her as it is a position which is ‘ingrained’ (line 10) in her and is ‘automatic’ (line 11). 
John’s use of ‘we do do’ (line 12) things that ‘kept us safe as children’ (lines 13-14) offers an 
account  that  defuses  Judy’s  obligation  to  know  why  she  seeks  value  from  others,  as  not 
noticing ‘automatic’ behaviours is produced as a general pattern within people. In addition,  
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John’s explanation that ‘we do do those behaviours and tactics that kept us safe as children 
and also got us valued’ (lines 12-14) is sufficiently vague to feasibly be relevant to all people. 
Hence, John successfully manages his right to speak about Judy through drawing upon his 
common sense knowledge.
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In extract fourteen, the therapist, Bell, and Carl are discussing the difference between him and 
his partner: 
Extract 14: Bell and Carl Session 1: 43:45-44:15 
1.     Carl:  so, ↑we probably, >you know< she doesn‟t °>sort  
2.       of<° ↑think that way.  
3.       (4.8) 
4.     Bell:   >but then she also hasn‟t had< (.) >↑you know< 
5.       perhaps hasn‟t had any experience of see:ing people 
6.       operate that way. (0.6) >you know< ↑so much of how 
7.   →   we:: are:: in a relation[ship.]  
8.     Carl:                          [↑m↓m:]= 
9.     Bell:  =↑comes from our family of origin. >an‟ [and<]  
10.     Carl:                                          [yeah]= 
11.   → Bell:  =what we had role modelled an‟,  
12.     Carl:  yeah  
Bell uses the general sense of ‘we’ to produce an account of why Sue, Carl’s partner, might 
think differently to him. Carl states that Sue does not think the same way that he does (lines 1-
2). In Bell’s turn at talk, she wards off an undermining account of Sue, on Sue’s behalf, as she is 
not  present  in  the  session,  by  presenting  an  account  of  why  Sue  ‘thinks’  differently.  Bell 
manages  her  epistemic  rights  to  present  Sue’s  view  by  building  an  explanation  of  Sue’s 
thinking as a result of her different experiences with people. Bell states that ‘so much of how 
we are in relationships’ (lines 6-7) is a result of ‘our family of origin’ (line 9) and what ‘we had 
                                                             
58 I will return to the use of common sense knowledge in clinical psychological therapy and discuss how 
this notion applies to therapists’ practices of formulation in detail in chapter two. Invoking childhood 
explanations  of  people’s  actions  could  also  be  understood  as  subtly  invoking  expert  psychological 
understandings. Refer to footnote 54, page 49 for a discussion on expertise, and refer to footnote 57, 
page 61 for a discussion of common sense knowledge.  
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role modelled’ (line 11). Hence, Bell manages her right to speak on behalf of Carl’s partner by 
using the general sense of ‘we’ to position her account as shared members’ knowledge.  
In the above two extracts, the therapists use ‘we’ to warrant their rights to talk about the 
client by invoking common sense knowledge: knowledge that “we all know”. Both Bell and 
John draw upon the general idea that the way people think or act is a result of their (family) 
experiences, which is vague enough to be made relevant to any person and, as such, to be 
successfully produced as shared members’ knowledge. The general sense of ‘we’ is a useful 
device for therapists to frame their right to talk about an individual client in terms of shared 
common sense knowledge of general patterns in the way people act.  
Method Five: Using Stories to Package an Assessment of the Client 
Stories are another nuanced way in which therapists can manage their conversational rights to 
talk about the client. Sacks (Sacks, 1972, 1995b, pp. 764-772) first talked about stories in his 
lectures, suggesting a story told in a conversation is generally followed by a second story. 
According to Sacks (Sacks, 1995a, pp. 3-16, 1995b, pp. 764-772), the second story told relates 
back to the co-conversationalist’s first story.
59 Investigations of  using stories in therapeutic 
interaction  have  also been undertaken within   the  field of   CA,  which have  shown how 
therapists design their utterances as  ‘self-disclosure’  (Antaki,  Barnes,  &  Leudar,  2005).  In 
drawing on stories of their own experiences, which shadow clients’ stories, therapists can 
manage their right to talk about the client.  
In extract fifteen, John is suggests to Judy that she needs to put herself first by using a story: 
                                                             
59 Following Garfinkel and Sacks (1970), I am referring to the ‘reflexivity’ of stories. Refer to footnote 40, 
page 30 for my discussion of the EM notion of ‘reflexivity’.    
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Extract 15a: John and Judy Session 3: 11:30-15:00 
1.    John:  =↑I: think >the< ↑I: matter most. .hh is an 
2.       important logo. >and I think< ↑I matter most:, 
3.       plu:s: .hh DO I real:ly: ↑want to do this. (0.2) do 
4.       I:: really want to do this.=  
5.     Judy:  =↑yeah:  
6.     John:  .h >is ↑a< really important question.  
7.              (0.6) 
8.     Judy:  ↑ye:ah:. (0.4) I guess >↑I mean< by:, (0.2) °what 
9.       am I getting out of  
10.       [this.° >is it< for me. or:,     ] 
11.     John:  [>yeah yeah<  >is it for me. or,<]=  
12.     Judy:  =>is it<   
13.   → John:  >I- I-< >I had an< interesting, (0.2) be↑cause my 
14.       Mother-in-law‟s been here. >an‟ it‟s been< ↑fairly 
15.       full on::, and also my, (0.2) >one of my<  
16.       ↓daughters is quite ↑ill at the moment. so, ↑it‟s 
17.       been quite ↑tricky.  
18.     Judy:  ˚mhm˚= 
19.     John:  =.hh ˚and on ↑Saturday afternoon::,˚ >well Saturday 
20.       lunchtime.< (0.2) my ↑partner and her ↓mum drove 
21.       down t‟ (.) ↑Dover. and they said >”look go on go  
22.       on yeah yeah”< and I said “↑nup I don‟t want to do 
23.       it.”  
John, in the above extract, introduces a story about his weekend (line 13) in order to illustrate 
the importance of the question ‘do I really want to do this?’ (line 3). In lines 1 to 6, John 
formulates his advice directly. Judy indicates agreement with ‘yeah’ (lines 5 and 8) and then 
demonstrates her agreement through formulating an account of John’s advice in her own 
terms (lines 8-10). As Judy has clearly understood the advice, yet is still struggling with putting 
herself first, John introduces a story to illustrate the difficulty of putting oneself first and the 
benefit of doing so (lines 13-23).  
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Extract 15b:  
24.   → John:  “↑do ↑I ↑want to ↑do this? (0.6) or do ↑I rather  
25.       ↑sit at home an‟, (0.4) watch sports on on tv.”˚ 
26.       .hh in ↑the END I went. (0.2) [>and I was<]  
27.     Judy:                                [↑m:m       ]=  
28.     John:  =really pleased I did >because we had a great 
29.       time.< .hh >but it was< (.) >but the< (.) the 
30.       ˚re:↑cep:tion:˚ I got was ↑very different. because  
31.       I had gone,  
32.              (0.4) 
33.     Judy:  YE:AH:: >yeah.< (0.6) ˚yeah˚  
34.             (2.2) 
35.   → John:  ↑SO >s- [s- s-<  
36.     Judy:          [>it‟s< 
37.       (0.2)  
38.     John:  >↑go on.<  
39.     Judy:  .hh it‟s ↑just DOING that for you. isn‟t it?  
40.     John:  ↑mm:  
At the end of John’s story he draws out the positive consequences of putting yourself first. 
John explains that once the decision was his to make, he decided to go and join his partner for 
the  weekend  but,  importantly,  this  was  only  after careful  consideration  of  what  he  really 
wanted to do (lines 24-31). In John’s account of the benefits of deciding what you ‘really’ want 
to do we see a kind of “moral to the story”. In line 91, John starts to present his “moral” 
directly. However, Judy overlaps John’s speech and is given the floor by John with ‘go on’ (lines 
38-39). It is in this turn that Judy formulates the “moral” for herself, which, interestingly, she 
puts in the form of a fishing device for John to confirm (line 39). In formulating the “moral of 
the story” for herself, Judy demonstrates strong agreement with John’s therapeutic advice. 
John gains his epistemic rights through illustrating that he has had direct experience with both 
the difficulty of putting oneself first and the benefits of doing so.  
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During the therapy session from which the next extract was taken, Carl has been describing his 
difficulties with supporting Sue in looking after their children when he gets home from work; in 
particular, helping Sue discipline the children. Bell, the therapist, uses a story from her own life 
to suggest an alternative account of the difficulty Carl is having, and to reveal what Carl’s 
partner’s perception might be:
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Extract 16a: Bell and Carl Session 1: 26:15-27:30 
1.    Carl:  so: ↑I >you know< ↑I don‟t want to coming in ↑being 
2.       the big (0.8) bad guy dad ↑tell „em off every time 
3.       ↑I- (.) come home. (1.6) every ↑night. >but maybe<  
4.       I need to. ↑for a while.  
5.       (1.6)   
6.     Bell:  ↑we:ll:, (0.4) h er er (0.4) YEAH >↑I- ↑I- ↓I-< ↑I 
7.       ↓I fully understand where you‟re coming from. >you< 
8.       ↑don‟t want to set ↑that (.) ↑that (0.2) <role 
9.       modeling> either. [where] 
10.     Carl:                     [↑mm::]= 
11.     Bell:  where you know: (.) “oh ↑god here comes dad. ↑lets 
12.       behave ourselves.  
13.     Carl:  ↑ye:ah: 
14.     Bell:  ↑u:m: (0.4) >BUT< I- I THINK (1.3) > y- you know< 
15.       ↑mo:re than, setting THAT in mind maybe it‟s about, 
16.       (1.0) ↑being present and ↑being available. ↑which 
17.       is: HARD ↑I mean you‟ve just come from a day  
18.       [at the] 
19.     Carl:  [↑yes: ]= 
20.     Bell:  =office, an‟ you ↑just want, (0.2) a >little bit  
21.       of< ↑wind down time. 
22.     Carl:  ↑ye:ah: 
23.       (0.6)  
In the beginning lines of this extract, Carl presents his account of the problem he has helping 
Sue with the disciplining of their children when he gets home from work, which is that he 
                                                             
60  Sue is not present at the therapy session from which this extract is taken.  
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comes home each night to be ‘big bad guy dad’  (lines 1-4). In lines 6 to 12, Bell formulates 
Carl’s problem in terms of ‘modelling’, demonstrating that she agrees with Carl and that she 
‘fully understands’ where he is ‘coming from’, aligning herself strongly with Carl. In lines 14 to 
16, Bell produces an alternative way of ‘supporting’ Sue which is to be ‘present and available’. 
Bell encompasses a concession in her account as she acknowledges that ‘being present and 
available’ is ‘hard’ after coming home from a day at the ‘office’ when ‘you just want a bit of 
wind down time’ (lines 17-21). Bell’s formulation of the difficulties in ‘being present’ is met 
with agreement from Carl (line 22). 
Extract 16b:  
24.   → Bell:  >BUT< I can ONLY tell you ↑what (.) ↑what (.) ↑I:: 
25.       was like as a, as a ↑mother of young kids. and ↑I‟d 
26.       be seeing my husband, come in the door and ↑I‟d be 
27.       saying “here beauty ↑I can have [m:y::]  
28.     Carl:                                  [yeah ]= 
29.     Bell:  =wi:nd down time.  
30.     Carl:  yeah.  
31.     Bell:  >you know< so ↑there‟s (.) ↑there‟s two: <people> 
32.       with the ↑same ↑ne:ed::=   
33.     Carl:  =↑ye:ah.  
34.     Bell:  >BUT< there‟s (0.4) four people. >that that< 
35.       (0.4) [>that are<]  
36.     Carl:        [↑yeah:    ]= 
37.     Bell:  =needing attention. .h who are needing you know? 
38.       they‟ve have ↑got, <requirements.>  
39.     Carl:  ↑ye:ah: 
In line 24, Bell introduces a story about her being ‘a mother of young kids’ in order to shed 
light on what it might be like for Sue after a day with the kids. Bell mirrors Carl’s need for ‘wind 
down time’ with her own need for ‘wind down time’ when her husband came home from work 
(lines 24-29). Bell then presents the “moral of the story” which is that ‘there are two people 
with the same need’ but that there are ‘four people’ who have ‘requirements’ (lines 31-38).  
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That is, the “moral” in this case is to illustrate the similarities between Carl’s and Sue’s end to 
the day. Producing an account of her own experiences as ‘a mother of young kids’ allows Bell 
to  represent  Carl’s  partner’s  view  legitimately  by  pointing  to  what  Sue  and  Bell  have  in 
common, which Carl is not privy to.  
In the two extracts presented in this section, we can observe that a therapist’s story about 
their own experience can be used to legitimately assert knowledge about a situation that is 
similar  to  the  client’s  own  experiences.  Through  drawing  upon  their  own  experience,  and 
extracting a “moral” that is relevant to the client, the therapist can legitimately talk on the 
client’s behalf. 
Discussion 
Analytic Summary 
In the analysis presented in this chapter, I have attempted to illustrate that therapists break 
the conversational maxim to talk for oneself. However, they orient to the maxim to ‘talk for 
oneself’ because therapists carefully manage their right to talk about the client. The therapists 
in these recorded therapy sessions use several methods for managing their rights to speak on 
behalf of a client.  The methods that therapists use to manage their break from the preference 
for talking for oneself in conversation are largely the same methods other CA researchers have 
found occur within mundane talk-in-interaction. As such, a unique aspect of therapy is that the 
therapist does break the conversational maxim to talk for oneself, but they manage this break 
through the use of everyday conversational methods. 
I have presented five main methods by which therapists manage their rights to talk about a 
client in clinical psychological interaction. The five methods presented are not necessarily an 
exhaustive list of all the methods by which therapists manage their rights to talk about clients, 
but they are the most common methods used in the therapy sessions I have on tape. The first  
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method – the explicit noting of their role as a psychologist or the psychological literature by 
therapists – is used to preface controversial therapeutic formulations of the client’s troubles. 
The second method – the therapists prefacing their formulation with an indication that it is 
only their opinion or point of view – is used to introduce formulations in a delicate way. The 
third method – using fishing devices to suggest ways of understanding the client’s problems 
before an actual formulation is given – is used by therapists in interactions where the client is 
likely to disagree with the therapist, or prior to therapeutic formulations being made for the 
first time. The fourth method – using the relational or the general sense of ‘we’ – is used to 
emphasise  that  the  formulation  of  the  client’s  problems  has  been  agreed  upon  by  the 
participants in the therapy session, or to produce a formulation of why clients do certain things 
in terms of what people generally do respectively. The fifth method –  therapists’ telling their 
own stories that mirror the client’s stories - is often used by therapists to manage their right to 
talk about a client through talking about their own experience and relating their story back to 
the client’s story through a “moral” that is used to formulate the client’s own account. The 
uses of these five methods indicate that therapists carefully attend to their right and obligation 
to talk about clients, which in turn demonstrates that therapists orient to the conversational 
maxim to talk for oneself.  
In this chapter, I am proposing that a unique feature of clinical psychological interaction is an 
asymmetry in therapists’ and clients’ speaking positions: therapists are required to talk about 
the client and clients are required to talk about themselves in the clinical psychological setting. 
The implication of my claims about the clinical psychological setting is that there is a disparity 
between  who  speaks  for  whom in  the  clinical  psychological interaction.  The  therapist  can 
legitimately  speak  about  the  client  and  ask  the  client  questions  about  their  experiences, 
whereas the client cannot legitimately speak about the therapist or ask the therapist questions 
about the therapist’s experience. The setting of clinical psychological therapy, although not  
71 
necessarily different from other institutional settings,
61 is different from ordinary conversation, 
in which each speaker has a right and obligation to talk about themselves (Lerner, 1996). 
Implications of My Analytic Descriptions  
In  light  of  my  interest  in  understanding  how  the  Objective  position  appropriated  by 
psychologists from natural science plays a role in clinical psychological interaction, I will now 
draw  out  the  larger  implications  of  analytic  descriptions. The  therapist  is  in  a  position  to 
interpret the client’s descriptions of their experiences, while the client is not in a position to 
interpret the therapist’s descriptions of  their experiences. I could argue, from my analytic 
descriptions, that the client is confined to speaking about their own Subjective
62 experience, 
while the therapist is required to talk Objectively about the clients’ experience in this setting. I 
have,  arguably,  demonstrated  empirically  that  the  Objective  position,  appropriated  from 
natural science by psychologists, is relevant to the actual practices of clinical psychological 
interactions.
63  
In addition, through showing that th e  Objective  standpoint  of the therapist is a managed 
speaking position in clinical psychological talk-in-interaction, I have demonstrated empirically 
that the Objective standpoint cannot hold in an interactional setting.
64 The therapist is in a 
position of managing their right to talk Objectively about the client; it is not simply that they 
are legitimately speaking from an Objective standpoint. The therapist’s careful management of 
their speaking position as Objective is evidence that they orient to the necessity to talk for 
                                                             
61 As Douglas Maynard (1991b, p. 448) notes, ‘studies of doctor-patient relationships uniformly describe 
an asymmetry of knowledge and authority’. 
62 Refer to footnote 1, page 1 for an explanation of why I have capitalised the ‘S’ in Subjective. 
63 A similar claim is made by Maynard  (1991b, p. 483) and Karen Lutfey  (2004) about doctor-patient 
interactions made on the basis of CA. 
64 Similar claims have been made by conversation analysts about the management of neutrality within 
institutional settings (for example see Antaki, Young, & Finlay, 2002; Atkinson, 1992; Clayman, 1992; 
Heisterkamp, 2006). For a similar claim made by discursive psychologists, that ‘orthodox’ psychologists  
assume neutral descriptions are possible, see Potter, Edwards and Margaret Wetherell’s  (1993) paper 
‘A model of discourse in action’. I wish to indicate in this and the previous footnote that it is not 
uncommon to draw out the wider implications of CA descriptions in the way that I have here. However, 
the claims I am making here remain contentious with regard to the CA literature.   
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oneself in interactional settings. Hence, in analytically describing the structures of therapy I 
have demonstrated both that the Objective standpoint of the scientific observer is relevant to 
the  practices  of  therapy  and  shown  that  the  Objective  standpoint  cannot  hold  in  an 
interactional setting because it is a speaking position that is managed as Objective. However, 
such a claim highlights a major problem in my own approach to research. 
I am effectively claiming from an assumed Objective position that it can be Objectively seen 
that the clinical psychologist is managing their speaking position as Objective; in which case I 
am either assuming that I have a specialised view of the clinical psychological interaction, 
which is unavailable to the participants in the interaction, or I am highlighting that my own 
descriptions are managed as Objective. To assume that I have a specialised analytic standpoint 
through which to view the clinical psychological interaction contradicts the central claim of an 
EM  approach  to  research  that  I  have  adopted,  because  I  am  required  to  avoid  specialist 
analytic  understandings  of  social  order  (Garfinkel,  1967a,  pp.  vii-viii;  Maynard  &  Clayman, 
2003,  p.  173;  Sacks,  1995b,  p.  622;  Schegloff,  1997).  To  assume  that  my  descriptions  of 
therapeutic  interaction  are  managed  as  Objective  is  to  leave  myself  with  no  way  of 
substantiating the adequacy of my descriptions. My claim to have empirically demonstrated 
that the Objective position adopted by psychologists from the natural sciences can be seen in 
the practices of clinical psychology is extending past what can be empirically substantiated by 
my data and the CA literature that I am drawing upon. However, to make the more banal claim 
that there is an observable asymmetry between therapists’ and clients’ speaking positions in  
clinical psychological interaction does not solve the predicament that I have pointed out here, 
because I am still assuming that I am describing the clinical psychological interaction from an 
Objective standpoint.   
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Natural Scientific Psychology and Conversation Analysis 
As  I  have  argued in  my introduction,  my  main  difficulty  with  the  adoption  of  the  natural 
scientific Objective standpoint by psychologists is that the  theoretical position from which 
judgements and claims are made about people is overlooked. In assuming there is an Objective 
standpoint outside of the social world, from which to make judgements and claims about 
people that are supposedly unaffected by the psychologist’s theoretical framework, places the 
psychologist’s observations, interpretations and descriptions of people beyond question. In so 
doing, the detrimental effects that a psychologist’s actions, descriptions, interpretations and 
judgements  can  have  upon  people  cannot  be  seen  because  their  actions  are  justified  by 
Objective research outside of the lived situation.
65 However, it is now apparent that my own 
critique of psychological research applies equally  to the CA approach that I have adopted in 
this chapter.  
In my analyses as presented in this chapter, I am making judgements about the normality or 
abnormality of social practices from the specialised theoretical framework of CA. Deviant case 
analysis highlights the point I am making here. For  CA, deviant case analysis is an important 
part of analysing social interaction. If a case does not fit within the CA analyst’s understanding 
of the social interaction they are analysing, then a CA analyst must account for the deviant 
case. For CA, deviant case analysis is part of ensuring that the analyst is describing the order to 
be found in social interaction rather than fitting social interaction to their predefined model of 
social interaction (Schegloff, 1996, p. 172; ten Have, 1999, pp. 131-135). However, the analysis 
of a deviant case requires an understanding of the specialised theoretical framework of CA 
prior to identifying naturally occurring deviant cases. I will take my own deviant case analysis 
as an example; extract seven. In order to understand this extract as a deviant case I needed to 
                                                             
65 The claims that I am making here are derived from the critical literature on abnormal psychology (for 
example see Healy, 2004; Moynihan & Cassels, 2005; Newnes et al., 1999, 2001; Szasz, 1960). However, 
I realise they are similar to claims made by feminist psychologists (for example see M. Gergen, 2001; 
Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988) as well as scholars in other critical fields within psychology (for example 
see Prilleltensky, 1994).  
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understand  that  there  is  a  preference  for  minimisation  of  gaps  and  overlaps  and  the 
preference  for  agreement,  in  order  see  that  immediate  and  direct  disagreement  with  the 
therapist  was  a  break  in  the  normative  conversational  structure.  Hence,  my  analysis  of  a 
deviant case is informed by judgements about normality and abnormality of social interaction 
made on the basis of my specialised CA framework. 
Furthermore, I am not attending to the judgements I am making about the normality and 
abnormality of social interaction while analysing my recorded therapy sessions. I am making 
the judgements about deviant and non-deviant cases as if they are made on the basis of what 
is observable in the talk-in-interaction itself. My claim is not that this is one way of looking at 
how  therapeutic  interaction  works;  I  am  claiming  that  my  analytic  descriptions  are 
substantiated by direct observations of the clinical psychological sessions that form my data 
corpus.  Hence,  I  am  overlooking  that  the  judgements  and  claims  I  make  about  clinical 
psychological  interactions  are  made  from  a  specialised  theoretical  framework  and 
substantiated by reference to the CA literature and not the members’ own orientations to the 
social situation they are involved in.  
I  have  removed  the  members’  orientations  to  the  social  situation  and  replaced  their 
orientation  with  my  own  orientation.  I  have  not  differentiated  my  orientations  from  the 
orientations of participants in the clinical psychological interaction and, hence, I understand 
myself  to  be  describing  their  orientations  when  I  am  in  fact  describing  my  own  analytic 
conceptions of the clinical psychological interaction (Sharrock & Button, 1991, pp. 148-149). In 
understanding that I have an analytic orientation through which to describe and judge the 
practices of therapy, I also understand that I have displaced the participants’ orientation, as I 
have read their orientation for my own.   
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Sacks, Garfinkel and Natural Science  
In an article called ‘Harvey Sacks’s primitive natural science, Lynch and Bogen (1994) point to 
very similar problems with CA that I have found in my own adoption of the CA approach to 
research. Lynch and Bogen (1994, p. 90) argue that the conversation analysts have lost sight of 
their  ground  in  the  practices  of  the  social  world  because  they  no  longer  rely  upon  the 
intelligible order observable in the social world for the adequacy of their research claims. 
Instead, according to Lynch and Bogen (1994, p. 83), conversation analysts tend to rely upon 
other researchers in the CA field to substantiate their specialised intuitions. Lynch and Bogen 
(1994) are arguing that CA, like other social science disciplines that no longer attend to the 
actual practices of the social world, has become a scientific discipline, because it has become a 
technique through which to find order rather than an investigation of the order to be found in 
the social world. One of Lynch and Bogen’s (1994, p. 90) central claims is that the structures of 
conversation  cannot  be  investigated  as  if  they  are  context-free  findings,  because  these 
context-free findings of conversational structures then obscure the actual social situation that 
is being observed.  
According to Lynch and Bogen (1994), through investigating any and every social situation as if 
the same rules for turn taking apply in every case, conversation analysts miss the inherent 
context dependence of people’s practices. In Lynch and Bogen’s (1994, p. 92) own words: 
What we find problematic is that the findings of conversation analysis tend to be presented as 
formal  accounts  of  conversationalists’  naively  adequate  methods  for  making  ordinary 
interactional  phenomena  observable,  reportable  and  reproducible.  In  our  view,  the  naive 
adequacy of ordinary practices is not grounded in context-free descriptions of ordinary methods, 
any  more  than  the  stable  reproducibility  of  scientific  activities  is  grounded  in  context-free 
descriptions of scientific methods. 
Following from Lynch and Bogen’s understanding of the CA tradition, my observation that 
there are certain similarities between CA and natural scientific methods may be largely a result 
of encountering CA as an already formed discipline of investigation. Hence, CA may be in need  
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of  the  same  ethnomethodological  clarification  that  I  am  suggesting  is  necessary  for 
psychological practitioners. 
Lynch and Bogen (1994, pp. 83-84) suggest that it is important for conversation analysts to pay 
attention  to  Garfinkel’s  EM  writings  in  order  to  understand  the  problems  with  formalised 
accounts of social order. Lynch and Bogen (1994, pp. 66-69) suggest that although Sacks had 
some stated aspirations to build a natural science of the social, the basis for social scientific 
research for Sacks was understood very differently to the usual adoption of natural scientific 
methods and findings by social (and psychological) researchers. Lynch and Bogen (1994, p. 67) 
argue that Sacks wanted to establish a research approach that did not rely upon the ultimate 
possibility of physio-chemical explanations of the human actor; rather Sacks sought to examine 
the social world as an already orderly phenomenon. Lynch and Bogen (1994, p. 75) state that 
Sacks’s aspirations to establish a natural science of the social were at odds with Garfinkel’s EM 
program, because Garfinkel specifically wanted to avoid establishing a natural science and, 
instead,  sought  to  clarify  the  actual  practices  by  which  natural  scientists  collaboratively 
achieve their results as well as the way members co-produce order within everyday settings. 
However, according to Lynch and Bogen (1994, p. 83), because of Garfinkel’s strong influence 
upon  Sacks’s  conception  of  social  order,  Sacks’s  work  can  be  read  through  an 
ethnomethodological  lens  which  avoids  the  scientistic  tendencies  in  Sacks’s  own  work. 
Following Lynch and Bogen’s lead, in the next chapter I shall draw upon Garfinkel’s original 
work,  to  show  that  Garfinkel  proposed  EM  as  an  alternative  to  natural scientific  research 
methods used within the field of sociology. In addition, I will draw upon Sacks’s work and read 
through the Garfinkelian understanding of social order, in order to find a way of applying EM 
research to my conversational data.  
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Chapter Two: Making Use of ‘Doing 
Being Ordinary’ in Clinical 
Psychological Interaction 
The Adequacy of Descriptions 
As I have argued in the previous chapter, conversation analysts, like myself, overlook that they 
are making judgements about people and their actions from a particular specialised theoretical 
framework. Conversation analysts, like scientific psychologists, obscure the social world by 
replacing what actually happens in social situations with inaccurate theoretical constructions. 
According to Lynch and Bogen (1994), the problems I have noted with conversation analysis 
(CA), result from the fact that CA has developed into a formal discipline. CA has become a 
specialised procedure through which to substantiate the claims conversation analysts make 
about the social world; rather than investigating the practices by which members and social 
researchers alike produce orderly accounts of things in and through their actual practices.    
Lynch and Bogen (1994, pp. 90-93) suggest that the central problem in CA is the formality with 
which conversation analysts describe the informal practical activities of everyday members.
 66 
In  order  to  understand  the  difference  between  CA  as  a  discipline  of  investigation  and 
Garfinkel’s  EM  program,  in  this  chapter,  I  will  draw  upon  Garfinkel’s  work  specifically  to 
examine the practices of clinical psychological therapy. In addition, I will draw upon Sacks’s 
original  work  in  order  to  demonstrate  that  his  work  does  not  need  to  be  interpreted  as 
indicating a formalised method of social inquiry, but rather can be read as being in line with 
                                                             
66 I am drawing heavily upon Lynch and Bogen’s (1994) article ‘Harvey Sacks’s primitive natural science’ 
because  it  is  a  seminal  paper  that  coherently  expresses  the  argument  that  there  is  an  important 
difference between CA and EM. There are other articles that argue CA is another formal method of 
investigation which misses the radical insight of Garfinkel’s EM program, which is that the social world 
cannot be formalised and, hence, cannot be studied by using a formal method of investigation (refer to 
the  introduction  for  my  own  interpretation  of  this  argument).  For  similar  criticisms  of  CA  see  D. 
Lawrence Wieder (1988), Eric Livingston (1987) and Melvin Pollner (1991).  
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Garfinkel’s EM program. In doing so, I aim to show that Garfinkel’s and Sacks’s original work 
can offer an alternative to natural scientific methods of investigation found in psychology, 
because it does not presuppose an Objective
67 specialised standpoint.  
By drawing upon Garfinkel’s and Sacks’s approach to researching social situations I endeavour 
to  further  my  investigations  into  clinical  psychological  research  by  looking  at  how  clinical 
psychological  interactions  actually  unfold.  By  doing  so,  my  aim  is  to  provide  adequate 
descriptions of clinical psychology on the basis of the lived situation of clinical psychological 
interactions rather than on the basis of the technical CA literature. 
Sacks and Garfinkel on Social Order  
According to Lynch and Bogen (1994, pp. 66-69, 84), there is some evidence in Sacks’s own 
writing that Sacks wished to propose a formal natural scientific method for investigating the 
social world and, hence, the problem associated with systematic CA does not entirely stem 
from the disciplinary development of CA inquiries. Lynch and Bogen (1994) suggest that the 
difference between Sacks and Garfinkel, who worked closely together, is their understanding 
of social order. Sacks and Garfinkel shared a similar understanding that investigations into the 
social world were possible on the basis of the stability of human action or the order already 
apparent in the social world, rather than on the basis of biology or physiology (1994, p. 68). 
However, Sacks and Garfinkel differ in the way they understand the basis of social order (1994, 
p.  89). Lynch  and  Bogen  (1994,  p.  66)  state  that  Sacks  understands  the  ‘very  fact  of  the 
existence of science’ to be evidence that human action is orderly. For Sacks, the way scientists 
describe how they discover their results so that others can repeat their findings indicates that 
it is possible to describe human action in such a way that it can be repeated by others (Lynch & 
Bogen, 1994, pp. 66-69). As Sacks (1995b, p. 27) writes: 
                                                             
67 Refer to footnote 1, page 1 for an explanation of why I have capitalised the ‘O’ in Objective.  
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The difference between that work *older ethnographic work in sociology+ and what I’m trying to 
do is, I’m trying to develop a sociology where the reader has as much information as the author, 
and can reproduce the analysis. If you read a biological paper it will say, for example, ‘I used 
such-and-such which I bought at Joe’s drugstore.’ And they tell you just what they do, and you 
can pick it up and see whether it holds. You can re-do the observations. 
For Sacks (1995b, p. 28) the very possibility that scientists can describe their methods for 
finding  results  such  that  another  person  could  reproduce  the  findings  means  that  human 
action  is  done  in  ways  that  are  observable,  reportable  and  repeatable,  and  this  can  be 
observed in any and every human action, which makes possible an observational natural study 
of social activities. For Lynch and Bogen (1994, p. 85), the problem with Sacks’s notion of social 
order is that it lends itself to formalist accounts, because it suggests that a social activity can 
be described in a way that ‘“anyone” can re-do them’. Lynch and Bogen (1994, p. 85) suggest 
that the notion that scientific reports of how to do experiments can be written in a way that 
‘“anyone” can re-do them was more of a mythology of science than an account of what early 
scientists did’. Garfinkel’s understanding of social order, according to Lynch and Bogen (1994, 
p. 90), does not rely upon a notion that social activities can be described in ways that could be 
re-done by anybody. 
Instead,  Lynch  and  Bogen  (1994,  p.  90)  suggest  that  Garfinkel  understands  that  scientific 
reports of how to repeat scientific experiments are good enough for the practical purposes of 
re-doing the experiments relative to the local context in which they are produced and the 
community of researchers doing those experiments. Garfinkel (1967a, p. 8) states that: 
Members take for granted that a member must at the outset “know” the settings in which he 
[sic]  is  to  operate  if  his  [sic]  practices  are  to  serve  as measures  to  bring  particular,  located 
features of these settings to recognizable account. ... Members know, require, count on, and 
make  use  of  this  reflexivity  to  produce,  accomplish,  recognize,  or  demonstrate  rational-
adequacy-for-all-practical-purposes of their procedures and findings.    
Hence, for Garfinkel, to be a member means to have members’ knowledge of the setting in 
which one is acting and, to analyse and describe members’ methods, one must have members’  
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knowledge of that setting.
68 For Garfinkel (1967b), members’ methods are observable because 
they are produced in such a way that they can be recognised by other members, and it is on 
this basis that ethnomethodologists can provide adequate descriptions of members’ methods. 
However,  the  most  important  feature  of  Garfinkel’s  (1967b,  pp.  4-6)  EM  program  is  that 
members’  methods  are  produced  in  local  settings  in  ways  that  are  good  enough  for  ‘all-
practical-purposes’ and, hence, members’ methods can only be described in ways that are 
adequate for ‘all-practical-purposes’. According to Lynch and Bogen (1994, p. 90), Garfinkel’s 
notion of social order implies that descriptions of social action cannot be generalised from the 
local situation in which they are produced.   
For Lynch and Bogen (1994, p. 90) the difference between Sacks’s and Garfinkel’s account of 
social  order  is  that  Sacks’s  notion  lends  itself  to  formalisation  of  practical  actions,  while 
Garfinkel’s notion does not allow members’ practices to be formalised in anyway. While for 
Sacks  (1984b,  p.  413,  1995b,  pp.  115-116)  context-free  findings
69  –  findings  that  can  be 
generalised from one situational context to another – are considered possible, for Garfinkel 
(1967b, pp. 4-9) EM descriptions are always contingent upon the context. However, for Lynch 
and  Bogen  (1994,  p.  94),  nothing  crucial  in  Sacks’s  writings  hangs  on  his  descriptions  of 
conversational structures as being ‘context-free’.
70 While for conversation analysts, the turn 
taking system is understood as the basis of understanding talk-in-interaction (Schegloff, 2007a, 
                                                             
68 I am referring to Garfinkel and D. Lawrence Wieder’s (1992) notion of ‘unique adequacy’. The notion 
of ‘unique adequacy’ is that ethnomethodologists are required to have members’ knowledge of the 
setting they are investigating. For example, I am uniquely adequate to investigate clinical psychology 
because I have knowledge of psychology and some training in clinical psychology.  
69 For a specific reference to ‘context-free’ findings refer to Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson’s (1974, p. 
699) article ‘A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking in conversation’. 
70  Lynch and Bogen are drawing upon Eric Livingston ’s  work  here.  Livingston  (1987,  p.  76)  writes, 
‘nothing critical depended on his *Sacks’s+ analysis being absolutely correct in this one instance. The 
phenomenon that he had begun to elucidate is that the analyzability, or story-ability, or hear-ability, or 
objectivity of the sequence is part of the sequence itself. The “mommy” is the mommy of the “baby,” 
and she picked her baby up. That analyzability, is part of the way the story was told and heard.’ ‘The 
baby cried. The mommy picked it up’ is a famous analysis of two lines of talk from a children’s story by 
Sacks. Sacks wanted to point out how most people heard the mommy as the mommy of the baby even 
though this was not explicitly said in the two lines of talk. Sacks (1972, 1995b, pp. 135, 223-265) devotes 
several lectures to analysing these two lines and then writes a paper on it.   
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pp. 1-3), Lynch and Bogen (1994, pp. 90-93) suggest that Sacks’s work can be read through an 
EM lens that preferences the local production of social order. Lynch and Bogen (1994, p. 83) 
suggest that Garfinkel’s notion of the accountability of social action – that action is performed 
in such a way that it is recognisable to other members – had an important influence upon 
Sacks. Hence, according to Lynch and Bogen (1994, pp. 90-93), both Sacks’s and Garfinkel’s 
findings can be read as suggesting a notion that social order is produced completely internally 
to the sites in which actions are performed accountably.  
However,  for  both  Sacks
71  (1995b, pp. 483-488)  and Garfinkel
72  (1967a, pp. 104-115)  the 
contingency  of  members’  methods  does  not  imply  members’  methods  are  solely  and 
particularly used within only one setting, because order is evident in all sites and in all sites 
members depend upon assuming shared members’ knowledge (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970). For 
Garfinkel and Sacks (1970, pp. 355-358), members produce their actions in ways that other 
members recognise those actions and, hence, in each and every social situation the order by 
which members make sense of the situation is made available by the members in that social 
situation.  Hence,  for  Garfinkel  and  Sacks  (1970,  pp.  345-347),  shared  common  sense 
knowledge of members’ methods for producing social order is part of each and every social 
situation. According to Garfinkel and Sacks’s (1970),  the important aspect of social activities is 
that, while they may happen in more than one social setting, the activities cannot be removed 
from  the  ongoing  social  interaction  in  which  they  happen  and  posited  as  an  overarching 
feature of all social action.   
                                                             
71 I am referring to Sacks’s (1995b, p. 484) notion of ‘order at all points’. See Alec McHoul (2001) for a 
detailed discussion of ‘order at all points’. 
72 Garfinkel (2002, p. 92) later comes to refer to this notion of members’ methods being evident in more 
than one site as the ‘immortal’ ongoing society. To explain his term ‘immortal’, Garfinkel (2002) writes, 
‘think of freeway traffic flow in Los Angeles. For the cohort of drivers there, just this gang of them, 
driving, making traffic together, are somehow, smoothly and unremarkably, concerting the driving to be 
at the lived production of the flow’s just thisness: familiar, ordinary, uninterestingly, observably-in-an-
as-of-observances, doable and done again, and always, only, entirely in detail for everything that detail 
could be.’   
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Investigations of Clinical Psychological Interaction and ‘Doing 
Being Ordinary’ 
In this chapter, I will draw upon Sacks’s (1984b) notion of ‘doing being ordinary’ in order to 
describe the way in which therapists and clients collaboratively produce  interpretations of 
problems that clients raise in therapy sessions.
73  Garfinkel’s (1967b) notion of common sense 
knowledge can be understood as important to what Sacks (1984b) is claiming in his suggestion 
that  people  do  being  ordinary,  because  both  common  sense  knowledge  and  doing  being 
ordinary refer to the notion that actions are accountable. However, for my investigations of 
clinical psychological interactions, Sacks’s notion of doing being ordinary is particularly suitable 
because his notion is specifically linked to the way people tell stories about their experiences. 
Sacks (1984b) argues that we tell stories in ordinary ways. He links his claims about doing being 
ordinary with epistemic rights and obligations to talk for oneself, as he states that we gain 
entitlement  to  experience  through  being involved in  an  event in  some  way.  For  example, 
stopping  on  the  side  of  the  freeway  to  help  people  in  a  car  accident  entitles  us  to  an 
experience of this event which qualifies us to tell a story about it, with more rights than if we 
had merely driven past the accident. The experience of stopping at the side of the road also 
means that we are obligated to know the event in more detail in subsequent retellings of the 
event  to  other  people  (Sacks,  1984b).  Sacks  (1984b,  p.  417)  argues  that  we  monitor 
experiences for ‘storyable possibilities’ and then tell our stories in a way that is recognisable as 
a story about that event to other people. According to Sacks (1984b, p. 418), this is not to say 
that we do not have extraordinary experiences, rather it is that we tell extraordinary stories in 
an ‘utterly unexceptional’ way. Sacks (1984b) points out that if we came home and described 
                                                             
73 ‘On doing “being ordinary”’ is considered a seminal article in which Sacks (1984b) outlines his notion 
of social order. The article is compiled and edited by Gail Jefferson from Sacks’s (1995a, pp. 215-221) 
first lecture in the spring of 1970, which goes by the same title, and additional materials taken from 
another four of Sacks’s lectures: lecture two, given in the winter of 1970 (1995a, pp. 175-187), lecture 
four, given in the spring of 1970 (1995a, pp. 242-248) and lecture one, given in the spring of 1971 
(1995a, pp. 335-339). Gail Jefferson also transcribed most of Sacks’s (Sacks, 1995a, 1995b) lectures and 
collected them into an edited two volume collection (Schegloff, 1995, p. ix).     
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the shades of green on the trees by the side of the freeway on a regular basis, we would be 
considered  odd.  From  this  Sacks  (1984b)  argues  that  our  ‘daily  business’  is  to  ‘do  being 
ordinary’ and part of doing being ordinary is telling stories in ordinary ways.  
As such, in this chapter I will show that therapists use the ordinary way in which people tell 
stories to draw out ‘insights’ about what clients should know; to ask relevant questions; and to 
formulate  clients’  troubles.  I  will  show  that  clients  tell  stories  about  their  experiences  in 
ordinary ways and therapists use their common sense knowledge of how stories are told in 
ordinary  ways  to  interpret  and  add  detail  to  clients’  descriptions  of  themselves  and  their 
problems. I will show that therapists ask relevant questions by suggesting things that might 
have feasibly been missed from clients’ stories; and pursue lines of questioning on the basis of 
what clients are obligated to know about their own experiences.  
Proceeding from my analysis in the previous chapter, I will continue to consider the methods I 
have put forward in chapter one as ways that therapists manage their rights to talk about 
client, but will examine these methods in terms of one extended course of action in which a 
therapist and client produce a collaborative account of the problem that the client has raised. 
In light of the problems I encountered in my investigations in the  previous chapter, I will 
demonstrate  two  points  in  this  analytic  chapter.  Firstly,  I  will  demonstrate  that  the 
conversational methods I have highlighted in the previous chapter are context dependent and 
cannot be understood outside of an ongoing course of action. Secondly, I will demonstrate 
that therapists’ formulate clients’ problems by drawing upon their common sense knowledge 
of how people tell stories in ordinary ways.   
In  concluding  the  chapter,  I  will  put  forward  that my  descriptions  of  clinical  psychological 
therapy suggest that there is nothing particularly technical about the interactions that occur 
within  this  setting.  I  will  propose  that  my  analytic  descriptions  suggest  that  clinical 
psychologists  do  not  draw  upon  a  specialised  position  or  specialised  knowledge,  as  the  
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descriptions  of  clinical  psychology  in  the  literature  suggest,  but  instead  draw  upon  their 
members’ knowledge of shared methods for doing things or ordinary ways of telling stories. 
The role of clinical psychology is defined in the literature by its being in a position to offer 
research based assessments and therapeutic techniques to address an individual’s difficulties 
(T. Baker et al., in press; Raimy, 1950; Shakow, 1939; D. Shapiro, 2002; M. Shapiro,  1967; 
Zeldow, 2009).
74 The descriptions of clinical psychological therapy in this chapter suggest a lack 
of such specialised, researched, techniques in the actual practices of therapy. However, I will 
discuss my findings in light of the  consequence of understanding therapists’ and members’ 
practices  as  ordinary;  which  is  that  it  does  not  leave  an  opportunity  to  critique  clinical 
psychological therapy or the current prevalence of psychologistic interpretations of human 
experience.   
Analysis 
In  this  chapter,  I  will  analyse  one  extended  extract  in  which  a  therapist  and  a  client  are 
engaged in an ongoing course of action to provide an adequate formulation of the client’s 
difficulty. Instead of looking for overarching features of clinical psychological interaction that 
lose the specificity of the context in which they happen, as I did in the previous chapter, I will 
focus on the detail present in one extract from a therapy session. In my analysis, I will not draw 
upon any specialised theoretical literature, because I am focusing on what is happening in the 
actual situation. My aim in this chapter is  to provide an adequate account of  therapeutic 
interaction on the basis of the lived situation of clinical psychological interaction, rather than 
                                                             
74 Although the role of the clinical psychologist was originally proposed for the purpose of assisting 
people diagnosed with ‘mental illness’ (Shakow, 1939), it has now extended its practices to everyday 
problems.  In  the  literature  it  is  proposed  that  every  problem  can  be  identified  using  Objective 
assessment measures and treated using ‘empirically supported treatments’ (ESTs) or ‘evidence-based 
treatments’ (EBTs) (Chambless & Ollendick, 2001; Doss, Simpson, & Christensen, 2004; Kazdin, 2008). 
However, the notion that clinical psychologists can address every problem using Objective methods of 
assessment and treatment is not without controversy (Kazdin, 2008, 2009; Newnes, 2004; Raps, 2009; 
Silverstein & Auerbach, 2009; Tryon, 2009). For a further discussion of the scientist-practitioner model 
of clinical psychology, refer to footnote 14, page 9 and footnote 26, page 16.  
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covering over the actual practices by relying upon theoretical accounts of therapy (Garfinkel, 
1967a, pp. vi-vii; Livingston, 2006, p. 41; Lynch & Bogen, 1994, pp. 90-93; Sacks, 1995b, pp. 81-
94). 
In the extract I am analysing, John, the therapist, and Judy, the client, are recognisably trying 
to produce an agreed upon account of Judy’s weight issues. The extract is drawn from the 
second recorded therapy session between John and Judy. John and Judy are discussing the 
emotions that lead Judy to ‘emotionally eat’. The suggestion that Judy emotionally eats starts 
earlier in the session when Judy states what she has learned from the weight control program 
she has been attending: ‘so I’m just going to identify when I’m emotionally hungry and when 
I’m physically hungry’. In this extract we see John start to pursue a more detailed account of 
Judy’s emotional eating:  
Extract 1a: John and Judy Session 2: 21:45-26:30 
1.     John:   mhmm and what‟s the feeling that‟s the response but 
2.       what‟s the feeling  
3.     Judy:  (let me think about it) um it‟s hard I‟m not very 
4.       good at ↑feelings. ˚am I?˚ hh heh  
5.       [heh .hh        ] 
6.     John:  [(that‟s how it)]= 
7.     Judy:  =and you >↑keep< (.) ↑bringing th(h)is u(h)p ↑every 
8.       w(h)ee(h)k hh heh heh [ha ha] 
9.     John:                        [↑m::m]= 
10.     Judy:   .hhh a(h)nd I k(h)now th(h)is i(h)s i(h)s .h I  
11.       never ↑think about me.  
12.     John:  you ↑see (.) >but if< you DON‟T know  
13.       [the feeling >you can<] 
14.     Judy:  [I don‟t (.) no::     ]=    
15.     John:  =>YOU CAN< ↑very likely say THAT is emotional 
16.       eating. >but if< you DON‟T know what the feeling 
17.       is:. (.) >you‟re not going to be able to do  
18.       anything about it.<  
19.       (1.2)   
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The beginning section of this extract establishes the problem with Judy’s ‘emotional eating’. 
Judy starts by stating that she is ‘not very good at feelings’ (line 3-4). John generalises the 
problem in terms of Judy’s need to be able to identify what the feeling is, rather than just 
identifying when she ‘emotionally eats’, because unless she can identify what the ‘feeling is’ 
she will not ‘be able to do anything about’ her ‘emotional eating’ (lines 15-18). Hence, John 
pulls  out  what  is  missed  from  Judy’s  account  of  how  she  is  attempting  to  overcome  her 
‘emotional eating’, which is what she is feeling when she ‘eats emotionally’. 
Extract 1b:  
20.     John:  cos you‟ve gotta deal, with EMOTIONS, EMOTIONally. 
21.       (0.2) you ↑can‟t deal with emotions LOGICally. 
22.       because ah [they‟re] 
23.     Judy:             [↑no::  ]= 
24.     John:  =different SYSTEMS.  
25.       (2.0) 
26.     John:  ↑that‟s like SAYing that‟s like saying ↑in order t‟ 
27.       (.) in order t‟ brake this car ↑I‟ll take my foot 
28.       off the accelerator. >but< (0.4) sorry ↑that  
29.       doesn‟t work.  
30.       (0.6) 
31.     Judy:  ↑m::m:  
32.       (0.8) 
33.     John:  BRAKES and accelerators are different systems. 
34.       (0.4) 
35.     Judy:  ↑ye:ah: 
In this section of the extract, John establishes the problem of dealing with ‘emotional’ eating 
‘logically’ (lines 20-22). John draws upon the mechanical metaphor of a car to establish the 
difference between ‘logical’ and ‘emotional’ systems (lines 26-33). Establishing the problem as 
Judy trying to deal with her ‘emotional eating’ with ‘logic’, allows John to formulate why Judy 
may have feasibly missed considering the actual feelings that underlie her ‘emotional eating’.   
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Extract 1c:  
36.     John:  ↑one does not control the other. (0.6) .h so ↑when 
37.       you get. >into that< ↑I‟m gonna stuff myself, full 
38.       of food. ↑because I‟m fee::ling:, (1.6) feeling 
39.       what? 
40.       (2.5) 
41.     Judy:  >I just< (0.2) ˚I don‟t˚ 
42.       (0.4) 
43.     John:  ↑m::m:. .h 
44.       (1.0) 
45.     Judy:  FED UP. 
46.       (1.0) 
John starts to pursue a line of questioning in the above section of the extract (lines 36-39). The 
common  sense  analogy  between  the  “mind”  and  “machines”,
75  works  to  position  the 
logic/emotion dichotomy as an obvious state of affairs  that is often missed by people, which 
accounts for John pursuing a line of questioning about how Judy feels when she wants to eat. 
Although Judy is hesitant to answer John’s questions, John continues his course of action (lines 
40-44). Judy eventually gives the answer ‘fed up’ (line 45). Judy’s own feelings are something 
that Judy is obliged to know about in conversation, which establishes the legitimacy of John’s 
pursuit of an answer from Judy about how she feels when she ‘emotionally eats’.  
Extract 1d:  
47.     John:  >give me a bit more< 
48.       (2.4)  
49.  →  John:  is it [↑fed up         ] 
50.     Judy:        [˚(I don‟t know)˚]= 
51.  →  John:  =SA:D. (.) is it ↑fed up an:gry? 
52.       (1.4)  
53.     Judy:    probably ↑angry. [↑angry]  
54.     John:                   [˚okay˚]=  
55.     Judy:  =and frus:trated. ↑usually. 
56.       (0.6) 
                                                             
75 The double quotes indicate that I am providing an analytic gloss of the extract. Refer to 50, page 45 
for a discussion about the EM/CA notion of ‘glossing’.  
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Once John has received an answer from Judy, he pursues her for more details about the feeling 
of being ‘fed up’. John draws out the feelings that are most likely to be associated with feeling 
‘fed up’, which are ‘sadness’ and ‘anger’ (lines 49-51). As John is tentatively associating feelings 
on the basis of common sense knowledge, he packages his question in a ‘fishing device’
76 that 
can be affirmed or denied by Judy, in order to check that his common understanding applies to 
Judy also (line 49-51). Judy responds by stating that she ‘usually’ feels ‘angry and frustrated’ 
(lines 53-55). Now that John has established some more detail about the feelings associated 
with Judy’s ‘emotional eating’, he can pursue a course of action to establish the “cause” of 
those emotions, which we see in the next extract.  
Extract 1e: 
57.     John:  frusTRATED with? 
58.       (2.0)  
59.     Judy:  ˚depends what the situation˚=with AH .hh (1.8) 
60.       >probably< ↑frustrated AT (0.2) my:self:.    
61.       (0.8) 
62.     John:  ↑m:hm. 
63.       (0.4) 
64.     Judy:  >but I‟ve just got this particular situation.< if 
65.       >just thinking if the,< .hh (0.8) ↑u::m the 
66.       kid‟s=are (0.6) not doing, (1.0) ↑what I wanting  
67.       them to do. [↑or:  ] 
68.     John:              [↑m:hm.]= 
69.     Judy:  =they‟re AVOIDING ↑what I‟m wanting them to do. 
70.     John:  ↑m:hm. 
71.     Judy:  I ↑get <frustrated> with myself for not being 
72.       consistent. (.) >in< (.) ↑asking them.  
73.       (0.6)  
John asks ‘frustrated with?’ (line 57), in order to open a discussion on the reason for Judy’s 
frustration. Judy states, ‘depends what the situation’ (line 59). Although John and Judy are 
                                                             
76 For a discussion of Pomerantz’s (1980) notion of ‘fishing device’ refer to pages 62 to 66 in chapter 
one.  
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pursuing a general explanation of Judy’s ‘emotional eating’, it is easier to produce a general 
‘feeling’ than it is to produce a general account for the “cause” of that feeling. Judy manages 
this difficulty by offering a tentative explanation, ‘probably frustrated at myself’ (line 60), and 
then  provides  a  description  of  a  particular  situation.  Judy  produces  an  account  of  her 
‘frustration at herself’ as resulting from when the ‘kids’ do not do what she wants them to, and 
her frustration because of her lack of consistency in ‘asking them’ to help her (lines 69-72). The 
description of a particular situation is produced as an event that recurs, which generalises the 
particular situation to a type of situation and, thereby, generalises Judy’s account of why she 
feels  frustrated.  The  generalisation  of  the  account  enables  John  to  continue  pursuing  an 
‘emotional’ explanation for Judy’s ‘emotional eating’. 
Extract 1f: 
74.     John:  ↑so how do you feel? 
75.       (1.0)    
76.     Judy:  ↑mad with ˚mese(h)lf heh˚ ↑usually. 
77.     John:  >o↓kay ↑so you‟re feeling?< (0.2) [an- 
78.     Judy:                                    [↓angry with 
79.       ↑myself:, an:d:  
80.       (0.4) 
81.     John:  ↑o[kay: 
82.     Judy:    [<↑critical> of myself [really. 
83.     John:                           [↑ye*ah:. ↑ye*ah:. 
84.       (0.6) 
85.     John:  >↑and what do you need?< (0.6) when you‟re angry  
86.       and critical with yourself. 
87.       (0.4) 
88.     Judy:  >↑what do I< nee:d. 
89.     John:  m:m.  
90.       (3.6) 
91.     Judy:  ˚I don‟t know.˚ (2.0) ˚I don‟t know.˚= 
92.     John:  =>well< one ↑answer is food. 
93.     Judy:  ↑oh YEAH. heh heh hhh ↑solves the problem.  
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John attempts to prompt Judy to provide more detail about how she feels in situations when 
her children are not doing what she has asked them to, with two questions in lines 74 and 77. 
Judy responds to both questions with her original feeling; ‘mad with myself’ and ‘angry with 
myself’ (lines 76 and 78-79). Just as John is about to re-formulate the question again (line 81), 
Judy supplies a new ‘feeling’; ‘critical with myself’ (line 82). John makes use of the new ‘feeling’ 
to pursue a question about what Judy ‘needs’ when she feels ‘angry and critical’ (lines 85-86). 
Judy reports that she ‘doesn’t know’ (line 91). John is able to justifiably pursue this line of 
questioning further, because Judy is obligated to know what she needs ‘emotionally’. Before 
re-formulating the question about what Judy needs when she feels ‘angry and critical’, John 
supplies  one  answer:  ‘food’  (line  92).  Neatly,  John’s  answer  both  provides  an  “example 
answer” that orients Judy to the type of utterance that would count as an answer; and ties the 
sequence back to the started course of action, which is to find an alternative to food as a way 
of dealing with emotions. Judy takes up John’s answer, which enables John to re-formulate his 
question, as we see in the next extract.  
Extract 1g 
94.    Judy:  [ha ha ha        ] 
95.     John:  [>yeah yeah yeah<] [.hhh 
96.     Judy:                     [it gives= 
97.     John:  =BUT >another answer is< ↑what DO you nee:d. (0.2) 
98.       ↑e:motionally. 
99.       (4.4) 
100.    Judy:  ↑probably some support::. and I don‟t ↑get that. 
101.    John:  ↑mm:: SUPPORT as in? 
102.      (3.0) 
103.    Judy:  I ↑think it comes down to the (0.6) ↑crun:ch:=of 
104.      (0.2) ↑I feel it‟s:, (0.2) ↑my <responsibility> ↑t‟ 
105.      do ↑it all:, (0.4) an:d: ↑Adam:, ↑just lets me. 
106.      cos he‟s ˚passive.˚ 
107.      (0.6) 
108.    John:  m: m: (1.0).h >so< IS (0.8) ↑you‟re doing ↑it  
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109.  →   a*:l*l:¿ (1.0) ˚now˚ is. that. (.) ↓begrud:↑ging: 
110.  →   it? 
111.      (1.2) 
112.    Judy:  ↑sometime:s:. 
113.  → John:  ˚m:: m:˚ .h an:d ↑so how much of this feeling being 
114.  →   ↑taken for granted? 
115.    Judy:  ↑oh: big style. 
116.      (0.6) 
117.  → John:  ↓m:=˚↑now we‟re getting [there.˚ (.) okay.] 
118.    Judy:                          [↑m::↓m  (.) ↑m:↓m]= 
John re-formulates the question in lines 97 to 98. Judy answers by stating that she needs 
‘some  support’,  which  ‘I  don’t  get’  (line  100).  Judy  then  expands  her  account  of  needing 
support – in response to John’s prompt (line 101) – by saying that she feels ‘responsibility’ to 
‘do it all’ and Adam ‘lets [her+ cos he’s passive’ (lines 103-106). John uses a fishing device to 
suggest a feeling that is commonly associated with ‘doing it all’ in order to check whether this 
common understanding holds in Judy’s case; ‘now is that begrudging it?’ (lines 109-110). Judy 
answers  ‘sometimes’  (line  112).  John  follows  up  with  a  second  fishing  device  to  suggest 
another alternative that is commonly associated with ‘doing it all’ to see whether this is a more 
appropriate  understanding in  Judy’s  case:  ‘so  how much  of  this  feeling  is  being  taken  for 
granted?’ (lines 113-114). Judy answers ‘oh big style’ (line 115), which demonstrates strong 
agreement and illustrates that John has hit the mark with his second suggestion. John, in the 
next turn at talk, orients to this agreement with the remark, ‘now we’re getting there’ (line 
117), making use of the relational ‘we’ to highlight that they are building an agreed upon 
account of the problem.  
Extract 1h: 
119.    John:  =.h >so ah< ↑you‟re feeling TAKEN for granted.  
120.      (0.4) .h you‟re BEGRUDGING <doing it.> (1.6)  so 
121.      ↑what‟s=the:=fee:ling:. 
122.      (2.2) 
123.    Judy:  ˚the feeling¿˚=  
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124.    John:  =˚mm˚ ↑you‟re being taken for granted. 
125.      (2.5) 
126.    Judy:  ↑u::m:, (7.3) ˚˚I don‟t really know.˚˚ (1.2) ↑the 
127.      ↑fee::lings:: are pissed. off. (.) [but     ] 
128.    John:                                     [˚(well)˚]= 
129.    Judy:  =I don‟t know ↑what the feeling is:.= 
130.  → John:  =.hh well I ↑think the feeling is pissed off. cos 
131.      you ARE being ↑taken for granted. [an::d 
132.    Judy:                                     [yep 
133.      (2.6) 
In this section of the extract, John reiterates the feelings that he and Judy have agreed upon, 
and uses the agreement to pursue more detail about Judy’s feelings (lines 119-21). After a 
prompt by John (line 124), Judy responds that she feels ‘pissed off’ (line 124), but is unsure 
‘what the feeling is’ (line 129). John takes up Judy’s stated feeling, ‘pissed off’, as a feeling, by 
producing ‘pissed off’ as an obvious outcome of being taken for granted (lines 130-131). He 
prefaces his account with ‘I think’ (line 130), so as to not to overstep his knowledge of Judy’s 
own  feelings,  which  she  has  both  a  right  and  an  obligation  to  know.  Judy  accepts  this 
assessment with ‘yep’ (line 132).  
Extract 1i 
134.    John:  ↑are you being? hear::d:. 
135.      (3.6) 
136.    Judy:  I ↑think I‟m hear- (.) ↑being er ↑no: (.) ↑no: I 
137.      ↑think I am. to ↑some degree ↑I am. but am I ↑being 
138.      ignored. 
139.      (0.6) 
140.    John:  .h ↑well are you being silent. 
141.       (3.3)  
142.    Judy:  so ↑am I not ↑asking. ˚>you mean?<˚ (.) or am I? 
143.    John:  well- uh uh uh er ↑sorry that‟s the question.  
144.      (0.6)  
145.  → John:  >I mean< er er er ye- ye- ye- ↑you might not=you 
146.  →   might be ↑being ignored, ↑because: (0.7) ↑you‟re  
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147.  →   SILENT. 
148.      (2.3) 
149.    Judy:  ˚>↑what do you mean by that.< >I don‟t know what  
150.      you mean by that.<˚ 
151.      (0.6) 
In order to pursue the explanation of Judy’s emotional eating further, in the beginning lines of 
this section of extract, John asks ‘are you being heard’ (line 134), orienting the interaction 
towards establishing why Judy is  feeling taken for granted. Judy answers this question by 
making a distinction between ‘being heard’ and ‘being ignored’; stating that she is heard ‘to 
some degree’ but that she is ‘ignored’ (lines 136-138). John deduces from this that if one is 
being heard, but ignored, that this may feasibly be because she is ‘being silent’, and asks Judy 
‘are you being silent’ (line 140). Judy responds with a request for clarification (line 142). John 
then explicitly draws together the relation between ‘being ignored’ and ‘being silent’ through 
using a fishing device, so that Judy can affirm or deny this explanation of why feels she is taken 
for granted (line 145-147). Judy responds to John’s turn with a further request for clarification 
(line 149-150).  
Extract 1j 
152.  → John:  >well< (.) I of↑ten: h (0.6) ha- (.) ↑wives: 
153.      particularly ↑spouses or partners say: (.) female 
154.      partners say:, (0.4) ↑he doesn‟t hear me. (1.2) and 
155.      I hear the bloke going >“I‟m listening as hard as I 
156.      fucking can<” 
157.      (1.6) 
158.    Judy:  ↑m::m: 
159.      (0.4) 
160.    John:  BU::T:, (0.6) the ↑woman often feels as though  
161.      she‟s not being heard, e::MOTIONally. 
162.      (2.5) 
163.    Judy:  ↑probab- (.) er ↑ye:ah: I‟d probably ↑a:gree: with  
164.      that. >but< I ↑thin-=↑I don‟t >know whether  
165.      because< I‟ve, (0.5) de↑tached meself.   
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166.      (0.4) 
167.    John:  m::m:¿  
168.      (1.3) 
It is in this section of the extract that John provides the grounds for the connection he is 
making  between  ‘being  ignored’  and  ‘being  silent’.  In  order  to  do  so,  John  draws  on  the 
categories of ‘female partners’ and ‘blokes’ as a way of accounting for a “general pattern” in 
heterosexual  relationships  (line  152-156).  After  many  corrections  about  how  to  refer  to 
women correctly, John states that in his experience women often say they are not ‘being 
heard’ and their male partners state that they are ‘listening as hard as’ they can (lines 155-
156). Here, John makes use of his own experience and subtly invokes his institutional identity 
through drawing attention to his experience with other couples (lines 152-156). Using his own 
experience as a therapist provides the justification for asking whether Judy is ‘being silent’ as 
well as providing a clarification of the question. Judy takes up John’s account tentatively, but in 
a way that illustrates that she takes the general account of “gender interactions” as directly 
relevant to her (lines 163-165). Judy then adds her own explanation – that she might not be 
heard because she ‘detaches’ herself (lines 164-165) – which John takes up (line 167).  
Extract 1k 
169.   John:  >so ARE [you not.<]  
170.    Judy:          [it is    ] ↑it is because I‟ve:, I‟ve  
171.      ↑just (0.2) OH::: (0.2) ↑I‟ll get on  with it and  
172.      do my own thing. an‟ when ↑it‟s not <happening.>  
173.      .hh and it‟s going. wrong. .h (0.8) then ↑I‟m  
174.      blaming Adam cos he‟s never ↑there for me. >but  
175.      then< (.) ˚some˚ (.) ↑I don‟t always let ↑him be 
176.      there. 
177.    John:   ˚no::˚= 
178. 0    Judy:  =cos  ↑I‟ve g-=GOT that used to doing it meself.= 
In this section, John attempts to follow on from Judy’s assertion that she may be ‘detaching’ 
herself (line 169). However, Judy takes the floor to provide her own account that she ‘just …  
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*gets+ on with it’ (lines 170-171). Judy explains that it is only when something goes wrong that 
she ‘blames Adam’, yet she admits that she does not ‘always let him be there’ (lines 173-176). 
Hence, Judy provides an account of her actions that places her in the position of needing to 
change. It is at this point that John puts forward a formulation of Judy’s emotional eating. 
Extract 1l 
179.   John:  =˚I ↑know:˚ (0.2) so ↑you‟ve taken this (0.2) role 
180.      on:,= 
181.    Judy:  =↑yeah:= 
182.    John:  =.hh and then you begrudge it.  
183.      (1.0) 
184.    Judy:  [↑yeah:   ] 
185.    John:  [fee:l:   ] you‟ve been taken for granted. (0.2)  
186.      get ANGRY and cross. (0.2) and FEED yourself. 
187.      (0.4) 
188.    Judy:  ↑yeah. (0.2) cos I ↑get tired an‟= 
189.    John:  =↑mm.= 
190.    Judy:  =can‟t do ↑it.  
191.      (0.2)  
192.    John:  ↑mm.= 
193.    Judy:  ↑a:ll:: of the time. 
194.    John:  ↑mm. 
John demonstrates his understanding with ‘I know’ and adds to Judy’s account by stating ‘so 
you’ve taken this role on and then you begrudge it, feel you’ve been taken for granted, get 
angry and cross and feed yourself’ (lines 179-186). John is able to extend Judy’s account on her 
behalf  by  drawing  on  the  agreed  upon  terms,  which  have  resulted  from  the  interactional 
course of action that has been underway, to formulate an account of her emotional eating. 
Judy demonstrates agreement with repeated use of agreement tokens (lines 181, 184 and 188) 
and extends her account from John’s formulation with ‘cos I get tired an’ can’t do it all of the 
time’ (lines 188-193), to which John demonstrates agreement with repeated agreement tokens 
(lines 189, 192 and 199). At the end of this extract, we see Judy and John build a collaborative  
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formulation of Judy’s emotional eating, which demonstrates that both co-conversationalists 
are aligned in their understanding of this problem.  
Discussion 
Analytic Summary 
In the analysis just presented, we see that Judy gives a common account of her difficulties with 
her weight, which is that she ‘emotionally eats’ rather than eats when she is hungry. In the 
extract, we see that John focuses on what Judy is feeling when she emotionally eats, because it 
is something that she expressly states that she does not attend to. John pursues a line of 
questioning to elucidate Judy’s feelings on the basis that it is something that she is obligated to 
know about her own experience. To follow up Judy’s feelings, and reasons for her feelings, in 
order to add detail to Judy’s account of herself, John suggests feelings that are likely to be 
associated  with  Judy’s  description  of  her  situation,  on  the  basis  of  common  sense 
understandings  of  how  people  feel  in  similar  situations.  Through  common  sense 
understandings of how people ordinarily tell stories, John and Judy are able to co-produce an 
agreed  upon  formulation  of  Judy’s  difficulties  with her  weight.  John  and  Judy  end  with  a 
formulation of Judy’s emotional eating that adds detail to Judy’s original suggestion that she 
eats when she is emotional, in a way that provides an account of why she eats emotionally; 
which, in turn, provides her with a strategy for overcoming her emotional eating.  
Implications  
In one way the analyses in this chapter and the last run along the same lines. The therapists 
and  the  clients  have  asymmetrical  speaking  positions  within  the  clinical  psychological 
interaction, because therapists are in a position to formulate clients’ problems, whereas clients 
are not in a position to formulate therapists’ problems. However, the therapists manage their 
speaking  position  and  formulate  clients’  problems  using  ordinary  conversational  methods.  
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Hence,  the  only  difference  between  clinical  psychological  interaction  and  ordinary 
conversational contexts is the privileged speaking position that the therapist holds within the 
therapeutic interaction. 
Drawing  out  the  larger  implications  of  my  findings,  my  analyses  in  this  and  the  previous 
chapter suggest that the EM account that specialised knowledge is actually grounded upon 
common sense knowledge is correct. My analyses show that the assumption of a specialised 
speaking position plays a role in therapy, but that, contrary to the literature describing the role 
of  the  clinical  psychologist,
77  clinical  psychologists’  specialised  position  and  specialised 
knowledge are actually grounded upon common sense knowledge. To draw upon my findings 
in chapter one to support the claim I am making here does not necessarily mean that I am 
relying on the established, ‘context free’ findings of the technical CA literature.  
Instead, in line with EM, I could suggest that my description of the therapy as an interaction in 
which therapists use common sense knowledge, even though they are generally understood to 
use specialised techniques, is adequate, because it is grounded on the practices of members in 
the actual setting I am analysing, and on my own common sense knowledge. I could suggest 
that my detailed description of one sequence of therapy, in this chapter, demonstrates the 
‘context sensitive’ character of members’ practices and does not remove them from the actual 
setting  in  which  they  occur  to  posit  an  overarching  feature  of  all  social  interaction.  This 
however,  would  contradict  my  aim  to  establish  an  overarching  feature  of  all  therapeutic 
interaction. Instead, I could draw upon my common sense members’ knowledge to suggest 
that  clinical  psychologists  are  generally  considered  to  be  in  a  specialised  position  when it 
comes to understanding people’s problems. I could then extend my claim by suggesting that I 
‘know’  that  therapists  –  although  they  are  generally  understood  as  being  in  a  privileged 
position with respect to clients – are actually using common sense knowledge to interpret 
                                                             
77 Refer to footnote 14, page 9, footnote 26, page 16 and footnote 74, page 84.  
98 
clients’ problems, because I have ‘uniquely adequate members’’ knowledge of the setting.
78 
However, to rely purely on my members’ knowledge to support my claim leaves me with an 
assertion that is unsubstantiated by my analytic descriptions or the interactions between the 
members in the actual setting I am analysing.  
‘Doing Being Ordinary’ and Common Sense Knowledge: The 
Ordinariness of Social Interaction 
There  is  another  important  problem  with  my  EM-informed  approach  to  research  and  my 
analytic descriptions in this chapter, which is my focus on ordinariness. In this chapter and, to a 
certain extent, the previous chapter, I have in effect, reduced the clinical psychological setting 
to a  completely ordinary and mundane site of interaction. I have substantially limited my 
ability to critique, and am left with little more to say on the matter than to state that clinical 
psychologists do not have specialised knowledge of peoples’ problems, even though they say 
they do. Indeed, I can say little more than clinical psychological therapy is an ordinary site in 
which members use methods that they already know and use prior to my descriptions of them, 
and leave clinical psychologists and clients to the business that they know far more about than 
myself.  The  argument  that  clinical  psychological  therapy  is  a  completely  ordinary  and 
unexceptional site of social interaction would seem to leave me in a very limited position to 
question the appropriateness of this accepted solution to all problems in living.
79 
My claim that clinical psychological therapy is an ordinary site of social interaction may be all 
that I can say, and it is in line with Garfinkel and Sacks’s (1970) work. However, the claim that 
clinical psychological therapy is completely ordinary also extends to all other sites of social 
interaction. Garfinkel and Sacks (1970, p. 345)   state that: 
                                                             
78 The EM notion of ‘unique adequacy’, in this context, means that I have members’ knowledge of the 
setting  of  clinical  psychology.  For  a  discussion  about  the  ‘unique  adequacy  requirement’  and  my 
fulfilment of this EM requirement, refer to footnote 68, page 80. 
79 I have adopted Thomas Szasz’s (1960) term ‘problems in living’ because it is a term that implies the 
normalcy of encountering problems in one’s life.  
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Ethnomethodological studies of formal structures are directed to the study of such phenomena, 
seeking to describe members’ accounts of formal structures wherever and by whomever they are 
done,  while  abstaining  from  all  judgements  of  their  adequacy,  value,  importance,  necessity, 
practicality,  success,  or  consequentiality.  We  refer  to  this  procedural  policy  as 
“ethnomethodological indifference”. 
In the quote above, it is not just clinical psychologists’ practices that are completely ordinary 
and unquestionable parts of ongoing social life, but anybody and everybody’s practices.  If we 
understand all social interaction as ordinary and commonplace there seems little space to 
critique or ask questions about the way we understand things. In fact, there seems little point 
in analytically describing the practices that clinical psychologists - as everyday members –  
already know and use.
80 
In Summary 
I am not willing, however, to accept the position that clinical psychological interaction as well 
as all everyday practical action cannot be questioned. I started my investigations into clinical 
psychological interaction in order to clarify and critique the practices of clinical psychology, 
and not to close down the possibility of critique altogether. Hence, I will suggest that we need 
to amend the method rather than close down the possibility of critique altogether.  
In the next chapter, I will employ a discursive psychological (DP) approach to research, which 
adopts EM/CA as a critical approach, in a renewed attempt to illustrate the problems with 
natural science informed psychological understandings of the social world. I will suggest that 
the concept of personality is largely understood as a way of categorising people into natural 
types according to Objective criteria, using Objective assessment techniques, both inside and 
                                                             
80 The argument I am pointing to here is not new; in fact, I am addressing one of the core debates in EM 
informed research. EM’s relation to all other forms of social research and, in particular, whether EM can 
be  considered  as  a critical  approach  or  a corrective to  other  forms  of  social research,  is  discussed 
throughout the literature. The debate about whether EM is a critical account centrally revolves around 
two of Garfinkel’s (1967a, pp. vi-vii) claims: that there is nothing to ‘quarrel about’ in the academic 
literature, and that theoretical constructions cover over actual practices. For a comprehensive coverage 
of this debate see Alex Dennis’s (2003) article Skepticist Philosophy as Ethnomethodology and Lynch’s 
(2000) article Against Reflexivity as an Academic Virtue and Source of Privileged Knowledge. For related 
debate  about  the  relationship  between  discursive  psychology,  CA  and  psychology  see  the  debate 
between Hammersley (2003a, 2003b, 2003c) and Potter (2003a, 2003b). I will address why EM cannot 
be a critical approach because of its avoidance of theory, in chapter six.    
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outside  the  academic  discipline  of  psychology.  I  will  attempt  to  show  the  problems  with 
categorising  people  according  to  natural  types  through  showing  the  practices  by  which  a 
person  is  categorised  as  a  particular  type  of  person,  in  the  actual  practices  of  clinical 
psychology.  In  showing  how  people  are  placed  into  categories  that  are  understood  as 
Objective in the practices of clinical psychology, I hope to draw out the concrete consequences 
of such practices for clients in the therapy session, which may be overlooked by therapists. In 
doing so, I will also endeavour to show that EM can be adapted to allow for critique and, in 
particular, can be used to bring into question understandings of ourselves that are considered 
to be factual within clinical psychology.
81 
                                                             
81 I am drawing upon Potter, Edwards and Wetherell’s (1993) article, ‘A model of discourse in action’.  
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Chapter Three: On the Usefulness of 
the term ‘Personality’ in Clinical 
Psychological Interaction 
Overview  
This chapter presents a substantive change from the last two chapters. In chapters one and 
two,  I  have  investigated  the  conversational  structures  of  therapeutic  interaction;  in  this 
chapter I turn to a particular topic of talk: namely the concept of personality. When conducting 
the analyses for this chapter, I thought that the chapter would play a central role in showing 
that  we  could  investigate  psychological  categories  of  self  differently  by  adopting  an  EM-
informed  discursive  psychological  (DP)  approach  to  research.  I  thought  that  through 
investigating how categories are actually used in social interaction, following the EM insight 
that categories are social practices (Edwards, 1991; Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Hester & Eglin, 
1997),  I  could  show  how  categories  of  people  that  are  understood  as  Objective
82  within 
mainstream psychological research actually work in particular settings. Through showing how  
the psychological categories of personality actually work in clinical psychological interaction, I 
hoped  to  highlight  the  concrete  problems  associated  with  u nderstanding  psychological 
categories  as  Objective  in  more general  social interaction.
83  However, in the process of 
analysing clinical psychological interactions, wri ting the  chapter and reflecting upon my 
theoretical approach to research, I have come to realise that DP cannot help us understand the 
problems associated with scientific psychological conception of a human subject who can be 
categorised into  natural types. The reason that DP cannot offer an alternative to scientific 
psychological conceptions of the human condition is  that discursive psychologists, along with 
                                                             
82 Refer to footnote 1, page 1 for an explanation of why I have capitalised the ‘O’ in Objective. 
83 For a similar argument that DP can highlight the impossibilit y of neutral descriptions that ‘orthodox 
psychology’ uses and how the neutrality of descriptions is actually managed in interaction see Potter, 
Edwards and Wetherell’s (1993) article. See Charles Antaki, Susan Condor and Mark Levine (1996) and 
Edwards (1998) for examples of discursive psychological investigations of social identities.  
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scientific psychologists, cannot account for a personal human agent who speaks and acts. I will 
address this particular problem briefly in chapter four and in detail in chapter six. However, I 
want to briefly point to the problem with my DP informed understanding of personality prior 
to introducing my DP approach to research in this chapter.  
In this chapter, I am explicitly focusing upon the concept of personality which is one of the 
most contentious concepts within the psychological literature (for example see Mischel, 1968, 
2004; Swann Jr. & Seyle, 2005). Exactly what ‘personality’ refers to and what is measured by 
Objective personality tests is debated throughout the  literature on psychological testing and 
personality psychology (for example see Nezami & Butcher, 2000; Rust & Golombok, 1989, pp. 
22-38). The well known ‘personality paradox’ suggests that personality theory struggles with 
the dilemma that while ‘intuition’ seems to suggest that there are stable patterns in a person’s 
behaviour across different situations, the ‘empirical evidence’ suggests that there is variability 
in a person’s behaviour across different situations (for example see Alison, Bennell, Mokros, & 
Ormerod, 2002; Bem & Allen, 1974; Mischel, 1968, 2004). I assumed DP provided a different 
way of looking at the concept of personality as a psychological category that is made available 
for  investigation  in  and  through  the  way  people  talk  about  personality.  In  this  chapter,  I 
homogenise  the  psychological  concept  of  personality  as  being generally  understood  as  an 
‘internal’ mental entity and, using a DP approach, simply respecify personality as an ‘external’ 
category used in talk, in line with EM and DP understandings of social identities, cognitive 
activities and psychological topics (Antaki et al., 1996; Edwards & Potter, in press, pp. 1-2; 
Lynch, 2006).
84 My simplification of differing conceptions of personality as either an ‘internal’ 
entity  or  an  ‘external’  term  used  in  talk  leads  me  to  conflate  psychological  terms  and 
categories of self.  
                                                             
84 I am referring to the DP notion of respecification, which is central to this chapter (Edwards & Potter, in 
press, p. 1).  
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However, my simplification of the differing theories of personality as either proposing that 
personality is ‘internal’ or that it is ‘external’ leads me to acknowledge that I presuppose a 
particular theoretical standpoint prior to my investigations. This chapter highlights that it is not 
just that CA assumes a specialised standpoint through which to view social interaction, or that 
EM does not allow critique, but that EM-informed approaches proceed from taken for granted 
presuppositions about the nature of the human world. It was only through trying to show the 
problems with understanding personality as Objective category within clinical psychological 
interactions, using a DP approach to researching social interactions, that I understood that I 
too had a particular theoretical approach that informed my understandings of psychological 
concepts  prior  to  my  investigations.  In  understanding  that  I  proceed  from  theoretical 
definitions of psychological concepts prior to investigating actual practice, I could start to bring 
into question the presuppositions upon which my research rests.   
A Practical Description of the Term ‘Personality’ in Clinical 
Psychological Therapy 
In the previous chapter, I have used EM/CA, drawing specifically upon Garfinkel’s and Sacks’s 
original work. Following from my EM/CA approach to research, I discussed the completely 
ordinary practices of clinical psychological therapy. My approach to research in the previous 
chapter led to a focus upon the ordinariness of clinical psychological interaction as well as all 
social interaction. Such a focus on the ordinariness of social interaction, or on common sense 
knowledge, leads to a position that does not allow critique. In addition, the focus on common 
sense knowledge seems to suggest that there is little point in analysing practices that members 
already know and use if we cannot highlight the problematic aspects of these practices.   
In this chapter, I wish to show that EM-informed approaches to research can provide a way of 
critiquing psychological categories, following on from the adoption of EM by DP (Edwards & 
Potter, 1992). In particular, EM-informed DP can be used to critique the psychological concept  
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of personality as it is used within clinical psychological therapy.
85  I will demonstrate through 
my DP investigations of clinical psychological therapy that categorisation is a social practice  
that can only be investigated through paying close a ttention to how categories are produced 
and made relevant to the participants in interaction (Antaki et al., 1996; Antaki & Widdicombe, 
1998). In doing so, I will attempt to  show the consequences of using categories as if they are 
Objective categories in the practices of clinical psychology.  
DP  stems  from  adopting  EM/CA  to  study  psychological  topics  in  talk-in-interaction.
86  DP’s 
project  is  to  respecify  psychological  categories  from  cognitive  resources  to  topics  of 
conversation  (Edwards  &  Potter,  in  press,  p.  1).  Edwards  and  Potter  (in  press,  p.  2),  the 
founders  of  DP,  write,  ‘psychological  categories  are  analysed  as  matters  being  handled, 
managed, produced, made relevant (etc.) in the talk, rather than as something sitting outside 
the talk, for analysts to use in explaining it’. For discursive psychologists, the notion of re-
specification is central to their investigations and to their notion of critique (Edwards & Potter, 
in press, p. 1). As Edwards and Potter (in press, p. 1) state, in DP, ‘standard psychological topics 
are respecified as discourse practices...which often generates a critical  stance on cognitive 
psychology’. I understand the DP concept of re-specification of psychological categories to 
terms  used  in  talk-in-interaction  as  being  in  line  with  the  EM  literature,  because  both 
approaches understand cognitive concepts as theoretical concepts which gloss over the actual 
activities through which members produce ‘thoughts’, ‘feelings’ and ‘memory’ as relevant and 
purposeful in a social interaction.
87 Hence in this chapter, I will follow DP’s lead and respecify 
                                                             
85 For examples of how DP has been adopted to critique psychological categories see Antaki (1996), 
Mark Rapley and Antaki (1996) and Potter, Edwards and Wetherell (1993). 
86 DP has other influences (for example see S. Wiggins & Potter, 2008 discussion). However, I shall focus 
upon the EM and CA influences upon DP.  
87 For a discussion of the EM and DP critique of cognitive psychology see the special edition of  Theory, 
Culture and Society, Volume 25, Issue 2, published in 2008 (Armand, 2008; Button, 2008; Coulter, 2008; 
Hamilton, 2008; Read, 2008; Sharrock & Dennis, 2008; R. Watson & Coulter, 2008). Also see Lynch 
(2006) and Edwards (1997).    
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personality as a topic of conversation, rather than an analyst resource to draw upon to explain 
social interaction. 
The  concept  of  personality  is  largely  understood  as  an  Objective  categorisation  of  people 
within both academic literature and the popular media. The concept of personality has been a 
reasonably contentious concept in the psychological literature, but is regaining popularity in 
both social and clinical psychology (Swann Jr. & Seyle, 2005).
88 The psychological concept of 
personality is also widely adopted throughout popular media.
89 In this chapter, I want to show 
how the category of personality, understood as an Objective categorisation of people by both 
the public and academic psychologists,   works  to present a  stable  conception  of  clients’ 
behaviours across different situations within therapy. 
Hence, in this chapter I will respecify personality from an Objective category that explains 
people’s behaviour to a members’ category that is used by participants to perform certain 
tasks within interaction. The notion of membership categories stems from the work of Harvey 
Sacks (1995b). Sacks (1995b, p. 238) states: 
                                                             
88  Personality  research,  in  particular  dimensional models  of  personality  which  seek  to  describe  and 
explain people’s actions through Objective dimensions of the underlying construct of personality, has 
gained popularity through the discussion on moving from a category based approach to diagnosis to a 
dimensional model of diagnosis in the next Diagnostic and Statistical Model of Mental Disorder – Fifth 
Edition (DSM-V). For the a discussion on the benefits and pitfalls of moving to a dimensional model of 
diagnosis in DSM-V see the special section in the Journal of Abnormal Psychology published in 2005 
(Brown & Barlow, 2005; L. A.  Clark, 2005; Cuthbert, 2005; First, 2005; Krueger, Markon, Patrick, & 
Iacono, 2005a; Krueger, Watson, & Barlow, 2005b; Kupfer, 2005; D. Watson, 2005; Widiger & Samuel, 
2005). For discussions on the benefits of the dimensional model of personality in particular refer to Lee 
Clark’s (2005) article, Robert Krueger, Kristian Markon, Christopher Patrick and William Iacono’s (2005a) 
article and Thomas Widiger and Samuel Douglas’s (2005) article in the same issue. Also see Clark’s 
(2007) paper in the Annual Review of Psychology, Timothy Trull and Christine Durrett’s (2005) article in 
the  Annual  Review  of  Clinical  Psychology  and  Samuel’s  and  Widiger’s  (2008)  article  in  the  Clinical 
Psychology Review.  
89 For articles about ‘personality’ in the popular media see the following examples. For examples from 
the see the web sites associated with The Personality Project (Revelle, 2009), The Big Five Personality 
Test (John, 2000, 2009) and Signal Patterns: Discover the Real Me (Zilca, Naor, Iyengar, & Markowitz, 
2008-2009). For examples from magazines see Nicholas Westerhoff’s (2008) article ‘Set in our ways; 
Nancy  Gibbs’s  (2008)  article  ‘Does  temperament  matter?’  and  Johanna  Fernihough’s  (2009)  article 
‘Discover your secret strengths’.  
106 
The first term is ‘membership categorization device.’ ... That’s the basic thing I’m interested in ... 
and  those  things  are  collections  of  categories  for  referring  to  persons  ...  there  are  rules  of 
application where  these devices  can  be  applied  to  populations  and members  apply them  to 
populations to say things about them, like that that’s ‘a baby.’  
Membership categorisation analysis (MCA) is a method for investigating how categories are 
invoked  by,  made  sense  of  and  used  in  talk  by  participants,  through  examining  the 
membership  categorisation  devices  (MCDs)  used  by  participants  and  the  category  bound 
activities (CBAs) invoked by and inferred from each of the categories used (Hester & Eglin, 
1997).
90 In this chapter  I will draw upon Sacks’s work on MCDs and  the DP notion of re-
specifying psychological categories in order to examine how the categories of personality are 
used in clinical psychological interaction. 
Personality and the Clinical Psychological Setting 
In the following analysis I am concerned with the way in which participants make sense of the 
category of personality, in one extended sequence of interaction from one therapy session, 
which is presented in two parts. Through examining one part of one therapy session closely, I 
aim to capture the way the term ‘personality’ is understood by the participants in detail; rather 
than analytically glossing over many interactions that use the term.
91 According to Schegloff 
(1995, p. xxxviii), Sacks finds that a useful way of dealing with practices  is to treat them as 
specific solutions to particular interactional problems. In the case of each practice that is used 
in a situation, there may be other solutions, but on this occasion in this situation it is this 
practice that is used as a solution to this particular situation. As such, in investigating practices 
                                                             
90 Although MCA and CA were both proposed by Sacks, there is a lot of debate about the relationship 
between MCA and CA. Schegloff (2007b) posits that Sacks moved on from MCA in his later work because 
the notion of CBAs or predicates were too vague for analytic purposes. However, Maria Wowk, Andrew 
Carlin (Carlin, 2009; Wowk & Carlin, 2004) and George Psathas (1999) have stated that Schegloff has 
focused too much on sequence at the expense of membership categorisation. On both sides of the 
debate, it is agreed that membership categories, devices and predicates must be oriented to as relevant 
for the participants in the interaction, in order to have analytic significance.  There is a debate between 
Wowk (2007) and Kitzinger (2000, 2008) that nicely illustrates that the issue is about what counts as a 
‘member’s’ or ‘participant’s’ orientation. 
91 See Schegloff (1987) for a discussion of single case analysis in CA.     
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we can examine how practices fit together as a solutions to particular and specific interactional 
problems (Plunkett, 2005, p. 52). 
My  focus  is  on  how  the  term  ‘personality’  becomes  relevant  for  the  participants  in  the 
interaction; how the term is used by the participants in and through the situational detail of 
social  interaction;  and  what  is  accomplished  by  the  use  of  the  term  ‘personality’  in  the 
interaction.  My  analysis  is  broken  into  four  sections.  In  the  first  section  I  analyse  the 
introduction  of  a  problem  within  the  therapy  session  and  how  it  is  generalised  from  a 
particular problem to a general problem in the interaction; which makes relevant a solution 
such as ‘personality differences’, because a general problem requires a general solution. In the 
second section I analyse how the dispute between the  couple is produced in the therapy 
session in a way that disables an agreed upon account of the problem. In the case of a dispute 
a formulation of the competing accounts becomes the task of the therapist, and a term like 
‘personality differences’ is one way of accomplishing this task. In the third section, I analyse 
how the term ‘personality’ is introduced and oriented to by all participants in the interaction. 
In the fourth section, I analyse what the term ‘personality’ works to achieve in the interaction 
once it has been oriented to as relevant by all participants. Hence, I will propose that one way 
that ‘personality’ is used by participants in the interaction is as a mediating device.  
In concluding the chapter, I draw out the wider implications of my analysis of the therapy 
session in order to show that the term ‘personality’ works in the therapy session because of 
the widely agreed upon meaning of the term in public and academic discourse.
92 The term 
‘personality’ is generally understood as a stable feature of a person that accounts for the way 
they act in situations; and, hence, it is the very notion of stability that enables the term to be 
used  to  explain  the  ongoing  dispute  between  the  couple  through  enduring  individual 
differences  in  characteristics  between  the  couple.  In  addition,  an  understanding  of 
                                                             
92 See page footnotes 88 and 89, page 105 for evidence of this claim.   
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‘personality’ is generally seen as something that psychologists have privileged access to and, 
hence, the therapist can use the term to negotiate the differing accounts that each member of 
the couple gives, of situations in which they experience conflict. The therapist can draw upon 
personality characteristics which they have access to, rather than the situation in which the 
couple  experiences  difficulty,  which  they  do  not  have  access  to,  in  order  to  manage  the 
couple’s competing accounts. However, I will also discuss the wider implications of my analytic 
descriptions  in  terms  of  how  drawing  out  the  meaning  of  the  term  for  the  participants 
highlights the fact that I proceed from my own theoretical definition of personality prior to 
investigating therapy. As such, in concluding this chapter I will suggest that DP, EM and CA 
proceed from theoretical assumptions about the human world prior to investigating the social 
world.     
Analysis 
The Problem 
In this chapter, as previously noted, I will investigate one interactional sequence, presented in 
two parts. The first part of the first extract is where the problem is introduced and is oriented 
to as a relevant therapeutic problem by all participants in the therapy session. As such, the 
extract can be understood as the official start of this therapy session, because prior to the 
extract the talk has centred around ordinary topics, namely how the couple’s recent holiday 
was. In introducing a problem, the next course of action made relevant to the therapy session 
is to find an agreed upon account of the voiced problem. As a useful heuristic for examining 
therapeutic conversation, I would suggest that finding an agreed upon problem is an essential 
part  of  the  therapeutic  interaction.
93  This task becomes more difficult when a couple is 
                                                             
93 Couples therapy has been noted as a particularly difficult form of therapy precisely because it is hard 
to identify what the problem is through assessment measures, self-reports and therapist formulations 
(Doss et al., 2004).  
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involved as there are three participants, rather than two, that need to achieve agreement 
about the best account of the problem that the couple is experiencing.  
Extract 1a: Bell, Sue and Carl Session 1: 15:00-21:0094 
1.     Sue:  and >that‟s the< ↑only time I >gotta bit< an:gry: 
2.       when. hh. I wan(h)ted t(h)o d(h)o ↑some(h)↓thi(h)ng 
3.       an‟ .hh (0.2) Carl then says, .h „oh: ↑we gonna 
4.       ↑>fit it<‟ (.) l↑i:ke (.) >sorta said< something t‟ 
5.       ↑me of the effect of: (0.4) „↓well, (.) do ↑we have 
6.       ti:me to ↑do that?‟ >an‟ I jist<  (0.3) that (.)  
7.       >jist< (0.3) set off my [button.] 
8.     Carl:                          [↑N↓o:: ] 
9.     Sue:  b‟cause (0.5) that‟s what hap:pens: a lot (.) with 
10.       us, I think is that, .hh (0.2) >everytime< I: wanna 
11.       ↓do something, (0.7) ↑that‟s ↓mo:re fr- (0.2) for 
12.       me: or more orientated ↑t‟ me::*: .hh (0.5) um we 
13.       never have ti:me, >or we< ↑get there la::te (.) you 
14.       know and even when we‟re agreeing I‟d say >we  
15.       didn‟t get to the< suns- ↑you ↓know: .hh (0.5) THAT  
16.       upsets me. >and it was like< that >when we wen- 
17.       <(.)wanted were gonna to the see< Buddha (0.2)  
18.       ˚>and you were just like<˚ (.) “↓well >we haven‟t<  
19.       ↑got ti:me” o(h)h (0.2)˚>(come on)<˚ (.) it‟s >jist  
20.       the< o:ne ↑thing I‟ve (.) as:ked ↑to ↓do a:ll 
21.       ↑we:ek.  
22.       (0.8)  
23.     Sue:  >does that make< sense?  
24.       (0.3) 
25.     Carl:  ↑o:[↓h ye:ah:] 
26.     Sue:     [˚you know] what (we‟re talking about.)˚ 
27.     Carl:  (sur-) >yeah yeah< 
                                                             
94 The section I am analysing in this chapter starts 15 minutes into the therapy session between Bell (the 
therapist) and Carl and Sue (the couple) and ends 27 minutes into the therapy session. I use two extracts 
of therapeutic interaction: extract 1 runs from 15 minutes to 21 minutes and extract 2 runs from 22 
minutes to 27 minutes.  
110 
At line 1, we see Sue introduce a problem with ‘and that’s the only time I gotta bit angry’. Sue 
follows her utterance with an account of the particular instance on their holiday where this 
occured (lines 2-6). At the end of Sue’s account we see Sue extend the singular occurrence of a 
problem on holiday into a general problem in the relationship, with the statement ‘and that 
just...set my off button because that’s what happens a lot with us’ (lines 6-10). Here we see 
Sue upgrade her anger from ‘a bit angry’ to ‘set off my button’ and produce her anger as a 
reaction to a general problem in the relationship, rather than a response to the particular 
situation on their holiday.
95 Sue then gives an account of the general problem, which is that 
there is never time for her to do what she wants to do including ‘the one thing’ she wanted to 
do  while  they  were  on  holiday  (lines  10-21).  Sue  finishes  her  account  with  a  request  for 
acknowledgement of her account by asking ‘does that make sense?’ (line 23).  
In response to Sue’s question, Carl demonstrates that he is familiar with the problem. Early in 
the  extract,  Carl’s  hearably  dismissive  ‘no’  (line  8)  suggests  that  he  is  familiar  with  Sue’s 
complaint. However, in Carl’s response to Sue’s request, we are left with no doubt that Carl 
recognises  the  problem,  with  his  emphatic  agreement  tokens  in  lines  5  and  7.  Carl’s 
resounding agreement, and possibly his ‘no’, are hearable as Carl agreeing that it is a general 
problem in the relationship, or at least a regular complaint made by Sue.  
The important point that we can see in this extract is that the problem is established by Sue 
and  acknowledged  by  Carl  as  a  general  problem  in  the  relationship.  It  is  clear  from  the 
interactional sequence that it is a problem that warrants intervention as it is not a momentary 
concern, but is established as an ongoing problem that has not been resolved by the couple.  
In the next extract, immediately following extract 1a we see Bell provide a formulation of the 
problem which subtly shifts who is accountable for the problem. 
                                                             
95  See  Schegloff’s  (2005)  article  ‘On  complainability’  for  a  detailed  discussion  of  how  people  raise 
complaints.   
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Extract 1b 
28.       (1.2) 
29.     Sue:  not that I was: ↑you ↓know: >it wasn‟t t-< >↑I  
30.       mean< I ↑was >quite happy to go with the flow< and  
31.       jist do::, >whatever< ˚an‟ >go to the beach< an‟˚  
32.       (0.8) >so, ↑we pretty ↑much did<(0.2) ↑what ↓we  
33.       ↑wanted ↓to ↑do.  
34.       (0.9) 
35.    Sue:  >but it was jis‟ this< ↑one ↑mo:↓ment where I jis‟ 
36.       went  ↑oh: ↓no: >this jis‟< reminds me o(h)f i(h)t 
37.       lat(h)ely .hh ↑what ↓happens ↑with ↓us.  
38.       (0.2) 
39.     Bell:  mkay .hh so:, what I:‟m: ↑hea↓ring, .hh ↑is ↑that 
40.       it‟s very ea::sy: <for you> t‟ .ptf:: ↑pass. ↓off:. 
41.       (0.4) ↑some↓thing that, you: want, t‟ do:. ˚.hh˚ 
42.       b‟cause, >me*r me*r< Carl ↓might (0.4) ↑say: 
43.       ↑some↓thing that, you: <take as being> (0.9) 
44.       u(h)::m*:: we*ll ei*ther <critical> or:: (0.5) that 
45.       he‟s ↑not <interested>. .h so you‟ll blow off what  
46.       you want to do an‟ (1.1) make allow:ances for that. 
47.       >but< ˚↑>bita< resentment? in the background. >am I 
48.       [right?< am I˚ ↑hea:ring ˚that right?˚] 
49.     Sue:  [yeah ↑that- ↓yeah: >probably<        ] ↓yes: cos 
50.       I ↑tend to ↓do: what ↑I thinks better for everybody  
51.       f:ir:s:[t 
52.     Bell:         [↑mm:↓[m:: 
53.     Sue:                [˚yeah˚ he hhh.  
At the beginning of this extract, we see Sue contextualise her account to suggest that she was 
‘happy  to  go  with  the  flow’  (line  30)  most  of  the  time  (lines  29-37).  Bell’s  account 
demonstrates noticeable delicacy as it is marked by hesitations and a careful phrasing of the 
problem (lines 39-48). Drew and Heritage (1992a) have noted the doing of delicacy in therapy 
is  used  to  promote  agreement  from  the  participants  in  the  therapy  session.  In  addition, 
packaging the utterance between two repetitive reflective listening devices ‘what I’m hearing’  
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(line 39) and ‘am I right, am I hearing you right?’ (lines 47-48) locates the production of the 
account with Sue and thereby neutralises Bell’s stake in the account given.  
Of most interest in Bell’s reformulation is the way in which she subtly shifts who is accountably 
responsible for the problem. In the terms of Sue’s account of the problem, it is Carl who is 
hearable as the person who needs to “fix”
96 the problem as he is the one who is not allowing 
time for what Sue wants to  do (lines 1-21). Bell shifts who is accountably responsible for 
“fixing” the problem to include Sue through the repetitive use of ‘you’ in lines 41, 43 and 45. 
Bell’s use of ‘you’ works to produce Sue as having an active role in allowing Carl to ‘pass off’ 
what she wants to do. In addition, it is in this extract that we first see the subtle shift from 
actions  to  ‘perceptions’  of  actions  that  Bell  continues  to  pursue  throughout  the  analysed 
section. The problem becomes how Sue ‘takes’ the situation rather than what Carl actually 
does in the situation (line 43). The use of ‘you’ and the subtle shift to ‘perception’ allows Bell 
to present the problem as needing a solution that requires both members of the couple to 
change: one feasible solution would be for Sue not to ‘pass off’ what she wants to do and for 
Carl to not allow Sue to ‘pass off’ what she wants to do. 
Sue  takes  up  Bell’s  formulation  with  a  strong  agreement  which  can  be  seen  both  by  the 
overlap at line 49 and by the repetition of agreement tokens that Sue uses to begin her turn; 
‘yeah  that  yeah  probably  yes’  (line  49).  In  addition,  Sue  demonstrates  her  agreement  by 
providing an account in terms of the formulation Bell has just provided (lines 49-51). Sue’s 
agreement, in turn, elicits agreement from Bell with ‘mhmm’ (line 52). Hence, at the end of 
Bell’s formulation of the problem we see a typical agreement sequence which demonstrates 
that Bell and Sue have established an agreed upon account of the problem. 
                                                             
96 Double quotes indicate that I am providing and analytic gloss of the extract. Refer to 50, page 45.  
113 
Extract 1c 
54.       (0.78) 
55.     Sue:  ↑like going to the ↓beach (.) ˚and all that˚ ↑and 
56.       that‟s ↑why ˚I think I˚ didn‟t go: and I >should‟ve 
57.       jist< (.) gone .h (1.0) ↑I >should‟ve of jist< (.) 
58.       like (0.2) gone. ↑I ↑don‟t ↑even ↑know ↑why I 
59.       >↓didn‟t even< ↓think ↑of >that< (0.5) >but< I 
60.       thought I had to be there >looking after the<  
61.       ↓kids, but >I should have just said< nah I‟ll go:. 
62.       (0.2)˚.hhh. he heh .hh oh I‟ll ↓go˚ go:= 
63.    Bell:  =↑are you dri:ving yourself ma::d.= 
64.     Sue:  =yea(h)h h. [he he he (.) .h*h he he]   
65.     Bell:              [he he he .h he h*e     ] [.hh ] 
66.     Sue:                                        [yeah] I 
67.       should have just gone. >but< anyway >it doesn‟t 
68.       matter<. ha ha .hh= 
69.     Bell:  =i*t ↑does matter.= 
70.     Sue:  =ye:[ah:] 
71.     Carl:      [it ] ↓does matter. ye:[ah    ] 
72.     Bell:                             [>yeah<] ↑don‟t- ↑t*h 
73.       ↑>this ↑is:< .hh e*r this is ↓some↑thing::, that 
74.       <probably> [↑hap↓pens:, quite a [lot ] 
75.                  [((click click)) 
76.     Sue:                                   [˚reg]ular[ly˚] 
77.     Carl:                                             [it ] 
78.       does ↑ye:[ah 
79.     Bell:           [↓doesn‟t matter. ↓doesn‟t matter.  
80.       ↓doesn‟t matter.= 
81.     Sue:  ye:ah: 
82.     Bell:  it does mat:ter:. 
83.       (0.2) 
At the beginning of this extract we see a continuation of Sue’s account of the problem in Bell’s 
terms: Sue repetitively admits that she ‘should have just gone’ (lines 56-62). Sue ends her new 
account of the problem with laughter. Bell responds to Sue’s laughter by posing the “light- 
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hearted” question ‘are you driving yourself mad?’ (line 63). Sue takes up the question as “light-
hearted”  through  agreement  and  continued  laughter,  laughter  that  is  accepted  by  Bell’s 
laughter (lines 63-65).
97  
In lines 66 to 68, Sue concludes the laughing sequence with ‘it doesn’t matter’. Possibly due to 
the “light-hearted” response from Bell, Sue downgrades the importance of the problem she 
has voiced. Bell responds quickly with ‘it does matter’ (line 69), which Sue answers with an 
agreement token (line 70). It is at this point in the interaction that Carl joins the conversation 
with  ‘it  does  matter  yeah’  (line  71)  and,  hence,  we  have  agreement  between  all  three 
participants. 
Bell  takes  the  opportunity  of  the  shared  agreement  to  suggest  that  the  problem  being 
described  ‘probably  happens  quite  a  lot’  (lines  72-74).  Here  again  we  see  an  extended 
agreement  sequence  between  all  three  participants.  At  this  point  in  the  therapeutic 
interaction  the  participants  have  established  a  general  and  agreed  upon  account  of  the 
couple’s relationship trouble. 
As we might expect from the heuristic that therapy is a process of finding the problem and 
then presenting the solution, after the problem has been established as agreed upon, Bell 
takes the conversational floor to present a question that orientates the therapeutic interaction 
to finding a solution.  
Extract 1d 
84.     Carl:  kerHHH. (0.2) [hh.]   
85.     Bell:           how  [are] you:: going to make Carl 
86.       rea:lise: (0.3) that it does <matter>. .hh you:r 
87.       piggy ↓bank: (0.6) is: as <important> as ↑Carls,  
88.     Sue:  ˚>yep<˚  
                                                             
97 Laughter is both the invitation for another to laugh and the acceptance of the invitation to laugh 
according to Jefferson (1979).  
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89.     Bell:  if you: don‟t have any money in your piggy bank, 
90.       (0.7) ↑how are you:: going t‟ (.) 
In lines 84 to 86, Bell formulates a question that incorporates the agreed upon term ‘it does 
matter’,  which  orients  the  conversation  towards  a  solution.  If  the  problem  is  that  Sue 
considers what she wants to do as not important, then the solution is for her to ‘make Carl 
realise that it does matter’ (lines 85-6). Sue offers the acknowledgement token ‘yep’ at line 88, 
which enables Bell to continue to move towards a solution (lines 89-90). However, Bell is not 
able to end her question, as Carl interrupts, which we see in the next extract. 
The Dispute 
In the next extract, we see the introduction of a dispute between the couple about the ground 
upon which to understand the problem they are experiencing. Carl and Sue disagree about the 
reasons for the relationship problem, which derails Bell’s efforts to move towards a solution as 
the solution would look different depending upon whose account of the problem is taken up. 
Hence,  agreement  about  the  problem  in  couples  counselling  is  consequential  for  the 
interaction as it establishes ground for the solution to be found, in terms of who is required to 
do what to “fix” the relationship. 
Extract 1e 
91.     Carl:  ↑that‟s ↓right. wel- (.) th- (0.4) n- ye:ah: >and  
92.       I< (.) >bin-< (.) it is a ve:ry:, for us it‟s a  
93.       very important point. because a*n‟ the:, (0.3)  
94.       ↓normally for ↑me, (0.4) >I mean it‟s< (0.3) ↓I  
95.       ↑feel, (2.0) ↓these sorta situations, ↓I get ↑I get  
96.       frustrated ↑like ↓you: say, you wanna to go to your 
97.       <grandmothers> an‟ you wanna go to a garden show, 
98.       and you wanna do:, (0.2) ↑three or four ↑things: in 
99.       a day. (0.4) and then, (0.4) it‟s ↑like (.) ↑three 
100.      o‟clock in the af‟:noon: and we‟re still ↑at number 
101.      ↑one (0.3) which is your ↓grandmothers:.  
102.      (0.2)  
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103.    Bell:  ye[:ap 
104.    Carl:    [↓how: we gonna >fit< i:n, 
105.    Bell:  ˚mm::˚ 
106.      (2.4) 
107.    Carl:  and ge- and get the kids ho:me at a reasonable time 
108.      >blah blah blah.<  
109.      (0.2)  
110.    Carl:  that‟s when I- that‟s why I: get frustrated.  
111.      (1.8) 
112.    Carl:  ah: khh. 
113.      (0.2) 
At the beginning of this extract, we see Carl’s interruption of Sue’s turn. Carl’s turn is hearable 
as an interruption as he does not orient to Bell’s turn being recipient designed
98 for Sue and 
starts in the middle, rather than the end, of Bell’s turn construction unit (TCU)
99. Carl starts his 
turn  with  a  token  agreement  (lines  91-93).  After  a  series  of  formulation  markers  and 
hesitations, Carl warrants his interruption through using a prospective indexical phrase, ‘these 
sorta situations’,
100 as the source of his ‘frustration’ (lines 95-96). Carl’s account is given in lines 
96 to 110, and could be glossed as ‘these sorta situations’ arise because Sue wants to do too 
many things in a day; rather than the current shared account of Sue being too easily swayed by 
Carl’s lack of interest in what she wants to do (or Sue’s original account that Carl does not 
allow time for things that she wants to do). Carl uses a hypothetical example of a list of things 
that Sue might want to do in a day, which is hearable as an unreasonable number of activities 
                                                             
98 The term ‘recipient designed’ is introduced by Harvey Sacks, Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson to 
denote that a turn can be produced in such a way that it is hearably designed for a particular participant 
to answer the question. Or in other words, when the first speaker selects the next speaker to talk, this 
can be done through designing the utterance for a particular speaker rather than referring to them by 
name (Sacks et al., 1974; Sacks & Schegloff, 1979). For more detail on the structure of turn taking refer 
to page 47 in chapter two. 
99 A TCU is a single unit of talk (Sacks et al., 1974). Refer to footnote 50, page 37 for a full definition. 
100  The term  ‘prospective  indexicals’  comes  out  of  Sacks’s  work  (Sacks,  1974,  1995b).  ‘Prospective 
indexicals’ are words that do not yet indicate the topic of the talk, but indicate that the topic will be 
subsequently revealed. ‘Prospective indexicals’ are usually used to introduce a story and give some 
frame of reference as to how to interpret the story (Goodwin, 1996). In this extract I am calling ‘these 
sorta situations’ a ‘prospective indexical’ because they work to indicate that something will be brought 
up by Carl, but the topic has not yet been named. However, in therapy, ‘prospective indexicals’ do not 
work as a frame of reference so much as they work to cover over what will be said until such time as 
there is a chance in the conversation to provide an account.  
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for anyone to accomplish in one day (lines 91-101). Interestingly, Carl ends his account by 
using the membership categorisation device (MCD) ‘kids’ to position his frustration as resulting 
from a concern for the ‘family’, rather than merely his personal dislike of too many activities 
(lines 107-110).  
Extract 1f 
114.    Sue:  >only when it‟s what I wanna< do: (0.2) ˚>if it‟s<˚ 
115.      what you: wanna do you‟ll sit there >and have 
116.      another< bee:r: >↑you know what I me:an l↑ike, 
117.      (0.2) Carl seems to forgets ti:me >when it-< (0.3)  
118.      he‟s doing something he wants, [>to do<  
119.    Carl:                                 [ye:ah but you: >do  
120.      that< as well:  (0.4) >that‟s:<  
121.      [the ↓point I‟m tryna‟ make.] 
122.    Sue:  [um::::: hhhhhh. ] 
In lines 114 to 116, following Carl’s explanation, Sue re-instates her original explanation, as she 
puts forward that Carl only complains of ‘running out of time’ when avoiding what she wants 
to do. Carl responds in lines 119 to 120 with ‘yeah, but you do that as well’ and then, after a 
pause, re-presents his account (lines 119-20), to which Sue responds with an exasperated out 
breath (line 122). At this point, there are two explanations of the problem back on the table, 
which halts any move towards a solution at this point in the interaction. 
In  the  next  extract,  we  see  Bell  drop  her  explanation  of  the  problem  and  attempt  to 
reformulate the trouble in terms of difference. This is the first time that Bell attempts to co-
formulate the couple’s differing accounts.  
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Extract 1g 
123.    Bell:  >oka-< what I‟m:: wou:ndering↓::: is .h >whether 
124.      it‟s because< you: like t‟ pack lots in↓:::  
125.      (1.4) 
126.    Bell:  and Carl likes to do one thing and a slow:::  
127.      pa:↓ce: (0.3) de*r (0.2) is that (.) is that when 
128.      the diffe[rence       happen]s:: 
At the beginning of this extract, Bell attempts to mediate the preceding disagreement between 
Sue and Carl through presenting a co-formulation of the couple’s differing accounts (lines 123-
128).  Bell  presents  her  formulation  in  terms  of  a  ‘fishing  device’,
101  to suggest what the 
difference might be so that it can be confirmed or  denied  by the couple. Bell delicately 
prefaces the suggestion with ‘I’m wondering’. Although, through the use of difference, Bell 
presents the formulation as neutral, Sue’s account of the trouble is noticeably dropped in 
favour of a formulation more oriented to Carl’s account of Sue wanting to do too much in a 
day.  
Extract 1h 
129.    Sue:       [˚˚>don‟t know<˚˚  ] 
130.      (1.6) 
131.    Sue:  don‟t know [>cos it‟s just<,] I ↑mean [>we‟re 
132.      pretty]= 
133.    Carl:             [.hhh KHH. ]                  [hhhh. ] 
134.    Sue:  =biz↓< ↑like, (0.3) >you know< on the weekend we 
135.      do:: do a lot↓ >like we‟re not the sort of people 
136.      that< stay at ↑ho:me ↓an‟, >do gardening< (.) >you 
137.      know< we‟re hh. .hh .hh >sort of< out there from 
138.      >the minute we can be ↑aren‟t ↓we:? (0.2) >and 
139.      then↓< 
Sue overlaps the end of Bell’s turn with ‘don’t know’ (line 129) and then after a substantial 
pause reiterates ‘I don’t know’ (line 131). Sue’s repeated use of ‘I don’t know’ and the pause 
                                                             
101 Refer to pages 62 to 66, in chapter two for a discussion of Pomerantz’s notion of ‘fishing devices’.  
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indicate that she does not agree with Bell. Sue presents the ground for her disagreement 
through producing a contrast between the “type of people Sue and Carl are” and the “type of 
people they are not” (lines 134-139), placing herself and Carl in the same category rather than 
opposing categories as Bell has done. Sue draws upon the relational ‘we’ to present Carl and 
herself as aligned in their views. Sue presents Carl and herself as a couple who like to do lots of 
activities in a day; which shows Bell’s formulation to be incorrect, as ‘doing a lot’ is presented 
as a similarity rather than a difference. To end her disagreement, Sue attempts to validate her 
account as shared by asking Carl, ‘aren’t we?’ (line 138). After a pause, that noticeably lacks an 
agreement token from Carl, Sue attempts to expand her account, in the next extract, but it is 
halted by overlapping speech from Carl and Bell (lines 138-139). 
Extract 1i 
140.    Carl:  [>↑yeah ↓but<] 
141.    Bell:  [>but< who:se] choice is that.  
142.     (0.8) 
143.    Bell:  .hhh 
144.    Carl:  u::h: yeah I‟d- well yeah >I feel that< ˚>you 
145.      know<˚ you ↓try an‟ pack too much in: 
146.      (1.4) 
147.    Carl:  and then (0.2) and then (0.2) >you know< inevitably 
148.      ↓some↓thing ↑goes ↓wrong >you know< the ca:r won‟t 
149.      start ˚or the˚ (0.7) u::m: (1.2) >you‟re jist about 
150.      t‟< lea::ve: and somebody and the an‟: uncle (0.5) 
151.      uncle leo <arrives> >and there‟s another< ↓hour (.) 
152.      ↑oh hello every:body: >hello an‟ goodbye< an‟ (1.0) 
153.      hel:lo::? (1.2) ˚>you know<˚ >and now (we‟re st- 
154.      still) got an hour we‟re yeah we‟re< down to two  
155.      fit the next four things in.  
156.      (1.3)  
157.    Carl:  so that, (1.1) and that‟s: s: was the ↑same ↓thing 
158.      that af:‟noon in ↑broo:me. ˚>you know<˚  
159.      (0.4)  
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160.    Carl:  I ↑kne:w, you ↑want‟d >to go to< the ↑bu↓dhah >an‟- 
161.      an‟< <there we are> at (0.2) four o‟clock ↓an‟: go 
162.      t‟ the sunset (.) at ↓fou:r o‟clock (0.8) we‟re 
163.      ↓still at the ↑café 
164.      (1.6) 
165.    Carl:  >at four=t-< now it did work out (.) >but<  
166.      (1.2)  
167.    Carl:  >it< [>wouldn‟t „ve< taken mu:↓ch:  
168.    Bell:       [mm:,  
169.      (1.2)  
Carl utters ‘yeah but’ (line 140), which displays his intent to disagree with Sue, but it is Bell 
who takes the floor. Bell’s utterance ‘but whose choice is that’ (line 141) is ‘retrospectively-
prospectively’
102 packaged as a rhetorical question because Carl takes the floor next to proffer 
his  agreement  with  Bell’s  formulation  of  Sue  and,  in  turn,  his  disagreement  with  Sue.  If, 
alternatively, Sue had taken the next turn at talk, then it is likely that Bell’s utterance would 
have been taken up as a question. In its current form, however, Bell’s utterance works to 
bolster Carl’s account of the situation and to challenge Sue’s account.  
In Carl’s agreement with Bell’s formulation of Sue he repeats Bell’s wording by stating ‘yeah I 
feel that…you try an pack too much in’ (lines 144-145), which works to align himself with Bell. 
Carl’s  utterance,  here,  is  softened  through  the  use  of  the  phrase  ‘I  feel’.  However,  in 
combination with Bell’s rhetorical question, ‘but whose choice is that’, the ‘I feel’ works to 
present Carl’s utterance as possibly something that he may not have been able to admit before 
                                                             
102  The  term  retrospective  and  prospective  was  introduced  by  Garfinkel  in  his  book  Studies  in 
Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967a, p. 41). The term refers to the sequentially organised nature of talk 
and the indexicality of language, such that ambiguous words or phrases can be left for the hearer to 
interpret the meaning is from the next speaker’s utterance and the next speakers’ utterance establishes 
the  meaning  of  the  term.  The  notion  of  ‘retrospective-prospective’  relates  to  Garfinkel’s  notion  of 
‘indexicality’; refer to footnote 40, page 30, for a discussion of this concept. So here the question ‘but 
whose choice is that’ is a hearably ambiguous phrase because it could be taken up as a rhetorical or 
answerable question. That is, ‘retrospective-prospective’ refers to the dual character of social order 
characterised as accountability-reflexivity previously discussed in chapter one. However, the meaning is 
clear  from  the  next  turn  at  talk.  Hence,  retrospectively-prospectively  indicates  that  each  utterance 
needs  to  be  examined  in  terms  of  the  context  in  order  to  see  what  made  the  utterance  relevant 
(prospectively  available)  and how  the utterance  was  taken  up by  the  next  speaker  (retrospectively 
positioned).  
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and that definitely has the effect of positioning Sue as the decision maker in terms of how they 
spend their days. Subtly, this undermines Sue’s account of the trouble as, in this sequence, she 
is produced as the person who contributes actively, not just passively, to the trouble they are 
experiencing.  Carl  gives  an  extended  explanation  of  the  trouble,  in  the  terms  of  Bell’s 
formulation, through presenting another typical example of how they run out of time in the 
day and then brings this example back to his original explanation for the incident that occurred 
on their holiday (lines 147-168). 
Personality as a Mediating Device 
The First Introduction of the Term ‘Personality’ 
Bell’s first attempt to formulate the couple’s difference does not accomplish any agreement 
between Carl and Sue about the problem that they are having. In fact, Bell’s formulation of the 
difference between Sue and Carl leads to further disagreement. This failure may be due to 
Bell’s formulation being retrospectively-prospectively produced as siding with Carl over Sue. 
However, it  could  also  be  due  to  the  structure  of  disagreement,  which generally  leads  to 
further disagreement once it has begun (Garcia, 1991). Either way, Bell takes the floor to move 
toward another attempt at reformulating the couple’s disagreement in terms of difference.  
In  the  next  extract,  we  see  Bell  introduce  the  term  ‘personality’  into  the  interactional 
sequence. As we have seen from the previously analysed section of the extract, the ground for 
a term like ‘personality’ has been set up; as the relationship problem has been identified as a 
general problem, there is a clear difference in accounts between Sue and Carl and Sue has 
introduced  the  idea  of  different  ‘types’  of  people.  In  addition,  ‘personality’  may  be 
advantageous for Bell to use because it is a term that specifies a difference without naming 
what  the  difference  is.  Bell  may  opt  for  such  a  term  because  her  attempt  to  name  the 
difference  specifically  has  been  unsuccessful.  That  is,  the  challenge  in  this  interactional  
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sequence is to stop the dispute and acknowledge the difference between Sue and Carl in a 
non- specific way. 
Extract 1j 
170.    Bell:  .hhh so, ↑tell >me „bout< perso↓nality styles here.  
171.     (0.3)  
172.    Carl:   >woul[dn‟t „ve<]= 
173.    Bell:       [tell me, ] 
174.    Carl:  ↓taken MUCH and that plan >wouldn‟t „ve< come off.= 
175.    Sue:  =o:h >we‟re< completely [different     ]= 
176.    Carl:                          [>that< that‟s:] 
177.    Sue:  =in ↓that (.) ↑you‟re right, I mean >in th-< 
178.      >in↓the< ↓workpla:ce:: (.) we‟re completely 
179.      different. (0.2) ↓animals >in that< I was >an< 
180.      e↓vent organi:ser: .h >fifty thousand things in my< 
181.      ↑he::ad:, I never .hh >(that‟s my de-) < you know 
182.      >daderderder::< >hundred and one< things: on >the 
183.      go< Carl >jis< >wouldn‟t be able to< ↓co:pe,  
184.      [with ]= 
185.   Bell:  [>↓mm<]  
186.    Sue:  =that >sort of< work, ↑and I >wouldn‟t be able t-< 
187.      (.) ↓work, the way he ↓does:. 
188.      (0.2) 
189.    Bell:  ˚˚mm˚˚ 
190.     (0.2) 
191.    Sue:  ↑we ar:e, very different in that, aren‟t we?  
192.     (0.5) 
193.    Carl:  ↑mm↓h[mm. 
194.    Sue:       [>i‟ve always got like< .h I(h): >al(h)ways 
195.      h(h)ave li(h)ke fi(h)fty ↓thou(h)sand< ↓things on 
196.      the go:.  
197.    Bell:  ˚˚mhm˚˚= 
198.    Sue:  =at once. >that was in-< .hh that‟s why I was good 
199.      at that jo:b. 
200.    Bell:  ˚mmm˚=  
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201.    Carl:  =↓mm but I always feel, you set yourself up for  
202.      that ↑fai↓lure >and th< and then I: cop the 
203.      bl↑ame:.  
After a lengthy pause in Carl’s account of the problem, Bell re-enters the interaction by asking 
an open question about ‘personality styles’ (line 170). Bell’s question is not recipient designed 
for either member of the couple, which enables Bell to avoid orienting to Carl’s account of the 
problem or negotiating between the two candidate accounts. The term ‘personality styles’, at 
this point, is empty and therefore provides a way for Bell to re-introduce difference into the 
interaction without naming the difference specifically. Through the open ended question Bell 
uses here, Bell demonstrates an understanding that her last question, which did name the 
difference specifically, misfired, as it did not help to resolve the disagreement.  
After a brief pause, Carl and Bell compete for the floor (lines 172-173). Bell utters ‘tell me’ (line 
173),  which  shows  an  attempt  to  expand  her  previous  question.  However,  it  is  Carl  who 
obtains the floor. Carl opts to continue his previous account with ‘wouldn’t have taken much 
and that plan wouldn’t have come off’ (lines 172-174) rather than orienting to Bell’s question.  
Sue’s next turn, which is latched to the end of Carl’s turn, provides an answer to Bell’s question 
(line 175). Carl attempts to interrupt Sue’s turn but is unable to regain the floor (line 176). Sue 
orients to Bell’s question as pertaining to differences between her and Carl, as shown in her 
statement,  ‘oh  we  are  completely  different  in  that’  (lines  175-176).  Attending  to  Bell’s 
question,  enables  Sue  to  ignore  Carl’s  continuation  of  his  (disagreeing)  account.  Sue  then 
states, ‘you’re right’ (line 177), which demonstrates alignment with Bell; and then corrects her 
previous utterance to ‘in the workplace we’re completely different’ (line 177-179).  
Discussing their difference in terms of how they work has distinct advantages for Sue at this 
point in the conversation. Firstly, talking about their differences in terms of the workplace 
enables Sue to hold to her previous account of their similarity at home, as it is understandable  
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that they may be different at work while still liking to do the same things at home on the 
weekend.  That  is,  the  workplace  provides  a  way  in  which  Sue  can  safely  discuss  their 
differences as it represents a space in which they can be unproblematically different because 
they are not negotiating shared activities in this setting. Secondly, it enables Sue to present 
their differences as reasonably equal with the statement, ‘Carl just wouldn’t cope with that 
sort of work and I wouldn’t be able to work the way he does’ (line 183-187). Presenting Carl 
and herself as “equal but different” enables Sue to attempt to garner agreement from Carl, 
which she does with the phrase ‘we are different, in that, aren’t we?’ (line 191) to which Carl 
proffers  a  receipt  token  (line  193)  (although  this  may  not  demonstrate  agreement  as  he 
attempts a continuation of his account of the problem shortly afterwards). Thirdly, as we see 
with the continuation of her turn after Carl’s receipt token, Sue is able, to present her ‘packing 
lots in’ as a distinct advantage in her working, environment with ‘that’s why I was good at that 
job’ (lines 198-199); which turns Carl’s accusatory account of her “characteristic” of ‘packing 
lots in’ into a positive attribute. 
Carl re-enters the conversation at this point, stating ‘but I always feel, you set yourself up for 
failure and…then I cop the blame’ (lines 201-203). Carl’s utterance here demonstrates that Carl 
has not oriented to either Bell’s question or Sue’s answer a strong and direct continuation of 
his previous account. Carl’s short, direct and accusatory finish to his account suggests that he is 
orienting to his own account of the problem which is not being attended to by either Bell or 
Sue. Carl’s refusal to attend to Bell’s question and Sue’s answer illustrates that he is not on 
board with the interactional project of introducing difference as a way of resolving or moving 
the dispute forward. Therefore, Bell’s second attempt to mediate the disagreement through 
difference does not succeed.  
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In response to the strong accusatory tone of Carl’s last utterance, Bell, as mediator in this 
setting,
103 responds to Carl by momentarily aligning herself with Sue before introducing  the 
notion of difference again. 
Extract 1k 
204.    Bell:  pt. o↓kay well- let‟s have a er let‟s, (0.2) u:m::, 
205.      (0.4) .pt .h re re think this. .hh because on (0.2) 
206.      her own::, on Sue‟s (.) own, she could probably (.) 
207.      fit >all those things< in [quite ]=  
208.    Carl:                            [↑yeah.]     
209.    Bell:  =nicely [and ]=  
210.    Carl:          [yes:] 
211.    Bell:  =↑has ↓done. 
212.    Carl:  yes: 
213.    Bell:  >but< does that mean, it suits the way <you:: l↑ike 
214.      to do life?>  
215.      (2.2) 
216.    Carl:  not really I- ↑I (0.5) ↓I l↑ike to „ave a li:ttle 
217.      >bit< mo:re ↑up my sleeve.  
218.    Bell:  ↑o↓kay:  
219.      (1.6) 
220.    Bell:  ˚okay˚ .hhh >↑so this is a really< ↑big  
221.      ↑diffe↓rence >that< e*r a*nd ↓one that cau:ses  
222.      conflict. (0.4) you: can fit in fifty thousands 
223.      things: you like to do a ↑cou↓ple. 
224.      (2.0) 
225.    Carl:  no I like to do a ↑few things, >but< I ↓like >t‟ 
226.      have a< (.) ↑li:ttle ↑bita ↑slack ↑up ↑my ↑sleeve 
227.      you know? ↓in ca:se: the car doesn‟t start. ↓in 
228.      ca:se: >one of the< ↓kids: throws a ↑tan↓trum.  
229.      (0.7) >it< doesn‟t rui:n the who:le da:y. 
                                                             
103 Here I am drawing attention to the similarities between the structure of disagreement in mediation 
presented in Angela Garcia’s (1991) work and the disagreement structure in this clinical psychological 
interaction.   
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In  this  extract,  Bell  enters  with  a  positive  formulation  of  Sue’s  character,  which  could  be 
glossed as “she can probably fit a lot in her day when she’s by herself” (lines 204-211). At the 
end of Bell’s formulation Carl offers three overlapping agreement tokens indicating strong 
agreement with Bell (lines 208, 210 & 212).  
In lines 213 to 214, Bell re-introduces the notion of difference to formulate an account of the 
conflict between Sue and Carl, by asking Carl, ‘but does that mean it suits the way you like to 
do life?’ (lines 213-214). In Bell’s question ‘but’ is used as a disclaimer to indicate that, despite 
Sue’s preferences suiting her, it does not mean it ‘suits’ him. The ‘but’ combined with the 
emphasised ‘you’ encourages Carl to see himself, and his preferences, as separate from Sue’s 
in a way that is neither right or wrong.  
After a lengthy pause, Carl takes up Bell’s suggestion that it is, indeed, not the way that he 
‘likes to do life’. Carl then gives the ground for his preference in terms of the commonsensical 
practical reason, ‘I like to have a little bit more up my sleeve’ (lines 216-217). At line 216, Bell 
takes up Carl’s acceptance of the suggestion that they might ‘like to do life’ differently with the 
acknowledgement token ‘okay’.  
After another long pause at line 219, Bell presents an upgraded formulation of the difference. 
Bell  emphasises  the  difference  through  using  the  extreme  case  formulation
104  ‘really  big 
difference’ (lines 220-221) and through contrast pairing two extreme cases: ‘you can fit in fifty 
thousand things; you like to do a couple’ (lines 222-223). In the contrast pair, Bell makes use of 
Sue’s  previously  uttered  phrase  ‘fifty  thousand  things’  in  order  to  align  herself  with  Sue. 
However,  this  also  instates  Sue’s  carefully  managed  “work  identity”  as  a  “general 
characteristic” of her. 
                                                             
104 The term ‘extreme case formulation’ is introduced by Pomerantz (1986) to describe turns at talk that 
use extreme terms in order to legitimate claims in interaction. Here, the extreme case contrast is not so 
much being used to legitimate Bell’s claim as it is to emphasis the difference in order to make relevant 
another attempt to formulate the difference between the couple.   
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After another drawn out pause, Carl directly disagrees with Bell using a forthright ‘no’ (line 
225). Carl states the ground for his disagreement as ‘I like to do a few things’ (line 225) and 
then repeats his practical reason for this, ‘I like to have a little bit of slack up my sleeve’ (lines 
225-226), which he extends and bolsters through the use of typical examples of things that can 
go wrong in a day (lines 227-228). Carl’s response to Bell’s question seems to orient to warding 
off the accusation that Carl’s preference for a ‘couple of things’ may be taken up as lazy, as it 
works  to  reinstate  his  preference  for  fewer  tasks  in  a  day  as  “practical”.  However,  his 
utterance could also be a disagreement with the size of the difference between himself and 
Sue that Bell has presented. Either way the most important point in this extract is once again 
that Bell’s co-formulation of the problem does not accomplish alignment with Carl and leads to 
an extended account, from him, giving the ground for why he likes ‘a little bit of slack up his 
sleeve’; which leads to the dispute between Carl and Sue reigniting. 
Second Introduction of the Term ‘Personality’ 
At this point, I am going to skip over the disagreement between Sue and Carl and move to the 
next attempt by Bell to co-formulate Sue and Carl’s difficulties in terms of difference. (There is 
a minute of the conversational sequence missing from the  transcript.) At this point in the 
interactional sequence Bell has attempted to formulate Sue and Carl’s difficulties in terms of 
difference  three  times;  all  of  her  attempts  have  been  unsuccessful  in  halting  the  ongoing 
dispute in the therapy session. In the following extract, Sue draws upon the term ‘personality’ 
to reinstate difference as important in accounting for Sue and Carl’s trouble. Bell picks up on 
Sue’s use of the term ‘personality’ in order to ignore the specifics of the disagreement and 
attempt to formulate the clients’ relationship problems in terms of difference once more:  
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Extract 2a: Bell, Sue and Carl Session 1: 22:00-27:00 
1.     Sue:  =.hh I think I:‟ve changed a lot, (0.8) t‟ suit  
2.       him. ↑like I used to go out with ↓lots of peo:ple:  
3.       an‟ I used to do ↑lots: of things: and I‟ve >jist< 
4.       ↑drop↓ped all that. I don‟t even recognise mys‟, 
5.       >like I said< I don‟t .h so, your righ‟, I don‟t do 
6.       >a lot of the stuff< that I: need to do for me::, 
7.       for my: type of personality. 
8.     Bell:  yeah, so >what< >what< (.) >what< (.) I:‟d like  
9.       ter- to look at here, a- (0.5) >I know we‟ve got 
10.       these questionnaires and I wanted to talk about 
11.       them which we< ma- (0.6) we may or may not today. 
12.       >but< .hh ↑what we nee:d to look at he::re:. (0.2) 
13.       .hh is:↑ (0.2) personality styles. (0.5) with↑OUT 
14.       looking at what the other one‟s: (0.4) do:ing or 
15.       no*t do*ing (0.6) <we need t‟ thi:nk abou:t: 
16.     Carl:  ((cough)) 
17.     Bell:   your ow::n: perso↑nality ↑styles. and what that is 
18.      brI:NG:ing:> (0.8) t‟ th:is: situat:ion:. (0.7) 
19.      °okay° (0.2) .hh so::↓ (0.3) <i:n: ↑one: sentence:> 
20.       (1.8) >sum ↑up< your social personality. 
At the beginning of this extract, we see the end of Sue’s explanation of her disagreement with 
Carl’s (and Bell’s) account of her liking to ‘pack too much into the day’ (lines 1-7). Here, Sue 
provides the ground of the disagreement in terms that suggest that she, in the past, preferred 
to do lots of activities and see lots of people, but that she has changed and, more to the point, 
that she has changed for Carl; thus presenting herself in a positive and active light with respect 
to the relationship. By implication, as she has already changed, it is now up to Carl to change 
this time. At the end of her account, Sue states, ‘so, you’re right, I don’t do a lot of stuff that I 
need  to  do  for  my  type  of  personality’  (lines  5-7).  Noticeably,  Sue  returns  to  her  first 
formulation of the problem in the relationship, that she does not do; what she wants to do, 
uses Bell’s introduced ‘type of personality’; and states ‘you’re right’ to strongly align herself 
with Bell (and away from Carl’s account).   
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Bell takes the floor after Sue’s formulation of the problem. She ignores to the highly moral way 
in which Sue has presented the problem and instead draws upon Sue’s re-introduction of the 
term  ‘personality’  to  formulate  a  question.  In  addition  to  the  introduction  of  ‘personality 
styles’, the therapist provides an account of what the introduction of this term is doing (lines 
8-20). In lines 13 to 15, Bell states, ‘without looking at what the other one’s doing or not 
doing’; indexing both the dispute that is up and running and the nature of that dispute, which 
has been framed in terms of the different actions that each partner has done to “cause” the 
problem at hand. In so doing, Bell makes explicit the type of action that she is attempting to 
accomplish; which is, to stop the ongoing dispute.  
Bell then states, ‘we need to think about your own personality styles and what that is bringing 
to this situation’ (lines 15-18). Framing ‘personality’ in these terms specifically attends to the 
type of response Bell is pursuing. The noticeable emphasis on ‘your own’ by Bell in line 17 
strongly  suggests  that  an  answer  to  the  question  should  entail  talking  about  oneself  as 
opposed to what the other is ‘doing or not doing’; which shifts the conversation away from 
blaming each other for the problem to speaking about oneself. Adding to her explanation of 
the question about ‘personality styles’ Bell states, ‘and what that is bringing to this situation’ 
places importance on describing how ‘your own personality’ affects the situation. Bell carefully 
avoids naming the difference or any specifics of the dispute with the use of the prospective 
indexical  ‘this’  (line  18),  which  allows  her  to  reference  the  ‘problem-at-hand’  without 
negotiating the differing accounts, because ‘this’ does not reference either one specifically.  
In  Bell’s  emphasis  on  ‘own  personality  styles’  (line  17)  and  ‘what  that  is  bringing  to  this 
situation’  (lines  17-18)  she  produces  an  account  of  ‘personality  styles’  as  underlying  and 
preceding interactional troubles. Drawing attention to ‘personality styles’ establishes the basis 
upon  which  the  negotiation  of  the  solution  can  happen,  i.e.  on  the  ground  of  different  
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personality styles as an explanation for interactional troubles, rather than in terms of the 
actions of each other.  
Noticeably,  after  invoking  the  term  ‘personality  styles’,  but  before  a  question  is  directly 
formulated, the therapist gives the ground upon which the question makes sense. The first 
introduction of ‘personality styles’ did not provide a clear ground for the term being used and 
did not work as a way of resolving or moving the dispute forward. Hence, the explanation 
provided, enables the term ‘personality styles’ to be used in a fresh way to manage the dispute 
by making explicit the reason for introduction of this term. 
In lines 19 to 20, Bell formulates the question about ‘personality styles’ directly. ‘Okay so’, 
after a brief pause, separates the explanation of ‘personality styles’ from the question about 
‘personality styles’; displaying that the actual question is now being asked. ‘In one sentence 
sum up’ adds to the list of instructions a time specification, which, overall, leaves little leeway 
for  the  dispute  to  re-enter  the  conversation  at  this  point.  The  use  of  the  term  ‘social 
personality’  gives  additional  information  as  to  the  sorts  of  things  that  would  count  as  an 
answer, by orienting to the ongoing dispute between Sue and Carl, which has been discussed 
in terms of social activities. 
Extract 2b 
21.     Sue:  ˚↑u::m:˚ .pt (0.6) hh (0.4) ˚one sentence˚ (1.0) 
22.       u::m:: (0.8) I ↑like >t‟ be around lots< (0.2) I: 
23.       ↑re- like >to be round lot of< ↑people↓ (.) an::d:, 
24.       (0.7) <I:: ↑enjoy↓> (1.3) I ↑enjoy↓ (0.3) having >a 
25.       lot of< (.) communication with lots- (0.3) lots of 
26.       people. ˚like (0.2) I˚ (0.4) >is that< (0.3) ˚what 
27.       you me:an? ˚= 
28.     Bell:  =yep, (0.2) .hh an:::d: you‟re a plan↑ner. you ↑fit 
29.       ↓in as many tas:ks: (0.2) >↑or as< many: 
30.       e*nga*gements: (0.3) ˚as possible.˚  
31.     Sue:  ˚>yep<˚ >but< I: ↑don‟t (.) >like< I ↑don‟t really  
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32.       think I do that. >but< it‟s funny that Carl‟s 
33.       picking that out. >cos< I: (0.2) really↓ (0.2) 
34.       DON‟T plan: ↑any↓more:: >like< what‟s gonna happen 
35.       on the weekend, we jist sa:y >like< we just toss 
36.       around and say it‟d be good to do (0.3) a few of 
37.       these ↑th:ings:. (0.5) a lot >of its not< (0.2) you 
38.       know ↓do or die:, >its jist if we< have ti:me: lets 
39.       ↑do it. 
40.       (0.8)  
41.     Sue:  does that makes sense↓ [>↑that<  ]  
Sue prefaces her answer with ‘um one sentence um’ (lines 21-22), packaging her answer as a 
considered response to Bell’s question. The answer given by Sue addresses the requirements 
produced by Bell: it is succinct, talks about herself and does this in terms of social activities 
(lines  22-26).  Sue  ends  her  account  by  checking  that  she  has  produced  an  appropriate 
response (lines 26-27). In Sue’s answer we see that Bell’s invocation of ‘personality styles’, 
with an account that makes explicit the ground for its introduction, is a useful device. Such a 
device can move the conversation on to a new topic that orients the accounts given by the co-
participants towards descriptions of themselves and, therefore, provides a way of halting an 
ongoing dispute about ‘what each other is doing or not doing’.  
Bell takes up Sue’s account with ‘yep’, but adds her own contribution to the list of attributes 
that Sue has given about herself (lines 28-30). Bell’s response can, in a way, be seen to violate 
the rules of the question that she has set up, on two counts. Firstly, Bell adds to Sue’s account 
of herself, which is an account produced in this context as a description of herself by herself; 
therefore,  Bell’s  additions  do  not  orient  to  the  specification  that  she  has  laid  out  in  her 
explanation of the question. Secondly, Bell adds to Sue’s list of attributes characteristics that 
do not specifically reference ‘social activities’. This violation is oriented to in Bell’s repair of 
‘tasks’ to ‘engagements’ in lines 29 to 30. Importantly, as Bell has added to Sue’s account, this 
leads to Sue disagreeing with the therapist’s additions in the next turn at talk.   
132 
Sue accomplishes this by stating, ‘yep but I don’t really think I do that’ (lines 31-32), which 
produces Bell’s additions as not feasibly attributes of her. ‘But it’s funny that Carl’s picking that 
out’  places  the  production  of  the  account  of  her  as  a  ‘planner’  with  Carl  rather  than  the 
therapist;  in  so  doing,  she  positions  her  account  as  not  directly  in  opposition  with  the 
therapist,  but  with  Carl  and  hence,  implicitly  rather  than  explicitly,  disagrees  with  the 
therapist. Sue provides further ground for her disagreement by reinstating Bell’s suggested 
difference  as  a  similarity,  describing  Carl  and  herself  as  both  liking  to  do  things  on  the 
weekend;  and  presenting  the weekend  activities  as  not  being  planned  or  required  by  her 
unilaterally but agreed upon in a casual way (lines 33-39).  
Bell’s  additions  to  Sue’s  account  of  herself  lead  to  Sue  re-introducing  a  discussion  about 
situations in which Sue and Carl experiences trouble; and moving the focus back towards the 
couple talking about each other rather than themselves. Crucially, this threatens to undermine 
Bell’s dispute management in interaction, in two ways. Firstly, by Sue’s positioning her account 
as being in opposition to Carl, her turn provides a possibility for the dispute between Sue and 
Carl to escalate again. Secondly, Sue’s disagreement with Bell’s assessment of her disposition 
indicates that she does not completely agree with Bell’s interactional work.  
In the next extract, Bell moves the conversation away from Sue’s disagreement by directing 
the question about ‘personality styles’ to Carl.  
Extract 2c 
42.    Bell :                         [yea:h:↓  ] (.) .hh (0.4) 
43.       okay:, >so< [I‟ll   ]= 
44.     Sue:              [˚>yep<˚] 
45.    Bell:  =come back to that. Carl describe your::: (0.5) 
46.       social. (0.6) person↑ality 
47.       (0.4) 
48.     Carl:  ↑uh::m:::↓  (6.9) ˚er:::m:˚ (1.4) very SHY (0.6) in 
49.       big groups. (1.0) uh::m:: (2.4) ˚˚uh˚˚ ˚nah˚ don‟t  
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50.       LIKE (0.9) don‟t like big groups. (0.4) u::m: (1.7) 
51.       I prefer ↓small groups of people. hh an‟: (0.3)  
52.       jist interacting with a few people >not<  
53.       (2.1)  
At the beginning of this extract, Bell displays an acknowledgement of Sue’s account while 
moving on to other business, namely, providing a turn at talk for Carl to answer the question 
about  his  social  personality  (lines  42-46).  The  allocation  of  Carl’s  turn  works  to  delay  the 
continuation of any dispute (for the moment). The use of ‘um erm’ by Carl (line 48) is enough 
for  him  to  demonstrate  his  uptake  of  the  question,  allowing  him  to  hold  the  floor;  and 
packages  his  response  as  a  considered  answer  to  the  question.  Like  Sue’s  answer,  Carl’s 
answer demonstrates all the requirements produced by Bell for answering the question; it is 
short, describes himself and does this in terms of social activities. Noticeably, Carl’s account of 
his ‘social personality’ is in direct contrast with Sue’s account of her ‘social personality’. Sue 
likes to ‘be around a lot of people’ (line 23), whereas Carl prefers ‘small groups of people’ (line 
51).  Sue  likes  ‘communication  with  lots  of  people’  (lines  25-26);  in  contrast,  Carl  likes 
‘interacting with a few people’ (line 52).  
The Work Done by the Term ‘Personality’ 
The contrastive account produced by Carl of his ‘social personality’ establishes a definitive 
difference between the ‘personality styles’ of the two members of Sue and Carl, which can 
then be brought in as an explanation for the disagreement between Sue and Carl. Although 
‘personality’ is not mentioned in the next two extracts, what is evident is that the category 
bound activities of a person who is characteristically ‘shy’ are drawn out by Bell and Carl.  
Extract 2d 
54.     Bell:  .hhh and if ↑you ha:d <several engagements in one 
55.       d↑ay::> (1.0) >↓that< (0.5) ↑hadn‟t ↓been (0.7) 
56.       <necessarily plan↓n*ed> >but< (1.2) ˚y*ou˚ could  
57.       see they were <rol*ling in*to each other> how would  
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58.       that affect you? 
59.       (1.8)  
60.     Carl:  ((throat clear)) (1.2) u::m: (0.9) >↑yeah I‟m< 
61.       starting to feel a bit anxious.  
62.       (0.2) 
Bell takes the floor following Carl’s answer to formulate a question in lines 54 to 58. The 
question presents a therapist’s ‘gloss’ of the type of person Sue is, identifying her through the 
types of activities that might be associated with a person who ‘likes to be around lots of 
people’; while orienting to Sue’s disagreement that she is not someone who ‘plans’, without 
naming her directly. Advantageously, using the activities to identify Sue positions the question 
as orientated to the category of people who ‘like to be around lots of people’ in general, of 
which Sue is a member; generalising the particular situation that Sue and Carl find themselves 
in.  Bell’s  end  to  the  question,  ‘how  would  that  affect  you?’  (lines  57-58),  encourages  a 
response from Carl in terms of an internal affective state that results from these types of 
situations.  Generalising  the  situation  orients  the  question  presented  to  Carl  towards  an 
account of how he ‘feels’ in a particular type of situation, rather than an account in terms of 
Sue’s actions; which works to depersonalise the dispute taking place.  
Carl’s answer displays responsiveness to the phrasing of Bell’s question, as he obliges with an 
answer in terms of the internal affective state of feeling ‘a bit anxious’ (line 61) in reaction to 
the types of situations Bell has outlined. In Carl’s response we see him draw out a feeling that 
is a predicate of being a ‘shy’ person, which is ‘anxiety’. Carl’s appropriate answer to Bell’s 
question allows Bell to pursue an account of the situation in terms of the dispositional, as we 
see in the next extract.  
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Extract 2e 
63.     Bell:  ˚okay˚ (0.3) .h what happens when you get anxious? 
64.       (1.4) 
65.     Carl:  uh::m: (5.7) ˚I guess::˚ ah::: >e*r e*r< (1.0) 
66.       (yeah I) get- (.) I get anxious >cos I think< (.) 
67.       oh::(1.3) time‟s slipping back wh*en (0.5) >gonna 
68.       get< ho::me: (1.2) >gonna get< home late. (0.4) 
69.       ↑even last night. (0.7) ↑felt >it a little bit< 
70.       (1.5) uh::m: (2.7) cos I*- (.) I* (wa*nt-) I did 
71.       (1.6) >and it wasn‟t< ↑ti:ll, (0.7) >like< I‟m 
72.       ↓flying on the plane home. ↑that I allowed myself 
73.       to ↑start thinking about, (0.7) (ki*nda) (.) ↑start 
74.       the new >↑job<. (0.2) .hhhh hm: hhHH. and ↑one 
75.       ↓thing ↑I thought ab↑out: (0.2) ˚on the˚ pl:ane: 
76.       (0.3) ↓was: ↑thinking oh:*: (0.2) be good t‟, (0.2) 
77.       ↑get ho:me:. 
78.       (2.0) 
79.     Carl:  u*h:m: (0.2) ↑Sun↓day ↑night, (0.8) ˚you know˚ get 
80.       home Sunday aft- (.) ↓be ho:me Sunday afternoon  
81.       an‟, (0.8) after be:ing away: an‟ (.) ˚jist get  
82.       myself (resettling)˚ (.) ˚a-˚ (.) at ho::me (.)  
83.       ˚an‟ the kids in be:d an‟˚ (1.0) ↓normal ↑ti:me 
84.       >blah blah blah< .hh (0.2) >and we were still< out 
85.       >at< (0.6) >what was it< (.) 6 o‟clock. ˚>down at 
86.       the<˚ (0.7) ↑thi:ng. >so, I was< starting >to get a 
87.       little bit< anxious then. (0.2) 
88.     Bell:  ˚mm˚ 
89.       (1.8) 
Bell’s next question, ‘what happens when you get anxious’ (line 63), orients Carl’s answer 
towards what his shy and anxious character ‘brings to the situation’; which could be seen as a 
gloss of the earlier question about ‘social personality’. That is, it encourages a response from 
Carl in terms of what he does in situations where he feels anxious. Carl states, ‘I get anxious 
cos’ (line 66), in situations where ‘time’s slipping back’ (line  67), producing the anxiety as 
“caused” by the situation; rather than addressing Bell’s question, which is oriented toward  
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what  actions  result  from  his  anxiety.  Carl  then  extends  his  general  answer  about  getting 
anxious in situations where ‘time’s slipping back’ by providing a specific example of a situation 
in which he felt anxious (lines 69-77). While he orients his account to ‘feeling anxious’, his 
specific example re-states his formulation of the problem as he locates the anxiety as resultant 
from busy situations and again bolsters his account through using the MCD ‘kids’ in order to 
present his concern as a “family’s concern”. Importantly, his answer opens up the possibility of 
further dispute, as he locates his anxiety externally, in terms of the relationship, as opposed to 
internally. Hence, Bell’s question has misfired, as it has failed to elicit a response in terms of 
internally driven actions. This is confirmed by her re-formulation of the question after Carl’s 
extended account of the situations in which he ‘gets anxious’. 
Extract 2f 
90.     Bell:  .pt .hh so, how:: does your <anxiety> come across? 
91.       (1.0)  
92.     Carl:  er::m (3.8) ˚we*ll˚ I start getting more agitated I 
93.       ↑think. (0.2) an‟ I‟ll try ta, (1.0) DEAL with it. 
94.       >but< >↑then eventually it-< (1.0) it builds up to  
95.       a certain enough level (of:) (0.5) snap Sue‟s head 
96.       off. [>or  ]= 
97.     Bell:       [˚mhm˚]  
98.     Carl:  =something like that< 
99.       (0.3) 
100.    Bell:  mhmm  
101.      (0.5) 
In line 90, Bell produces a re-formulation of her question to Carl. ‘Your anxiety’ locates the 
anxiety as a possession of Carl and ‘come across’ locates the anxiety as prior to action. Re-
phrasing the question from ‘what happens when you get anxious’ to the current form, ‘how 
does  your  anxiety  come  across,  emphasises  the  direction  of  anxiety  –  through  action,  to 
situation – in contrast to Carl’s account of situations causing his anxiety.   
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In response to Bell’s question Carl states, ‘well I start getting more agitated I think and I try to 
deal with it’ (lines 92-93). Prefacing his account in this way enables Carl to present himself as 
taking responsibility in ‘dealing’ with his anxiety. Carl then states, ‘but then eventually it builds 
up to a certain enough level of’ (lines 92-95), and produces his reported action, ‘snap Sue’s 
head off’ (lines 95-96), as beyond his control. Carl uses the softener
105 ‘or something like that’ 
(lines 96-98) to end his account.  
Carl’s answer to the question demonstrates responsiveness to the re-formulation of Bell’s 
question, as it gives an account of the type of action he might take if he is feeling anxious. 
When ‘anxiety’ is invoked as a characteristic of a type of person who ‘prefers small groups of 
people’, for the first time we see an account produced by Carl of a problematic action that he 
has taken in situations where there is conflict. While Carl’s account of his anxiety is carefully 
managed,  his  acknowledgement  that  he  ‘snaps’,  reveals  the  usefulness  of  the  therapist 
introducing the term ‘personality styles’ into the therapeutic interaction as a way of managing 
a  dispute  in  a  couples  counselling  session.  Introducing  the  term  ‘personality  styles’,  as  a 
category of individual difference, encourages the clients to talk about their own actions rather 
than their partner’s actions.  
Discussion 
Analytic Summary 
The term ‘personality styles’ in this interaction is used as a method by which disagreement can 
be managed within a couples counselling session. In the extract, presented in this chapter, the  
members of the couple are unable to agree upon an account of the ongoing problem that they 
                                                             
105  Edwards  (2000)  uses  the  term  ‘softener’  to  indicate  how  people  can  manage  extreme  case 
formulations (ECFs) in ways that are less open to refutation. Edwards (2000, p. 359) states that ECFs are 
easily refuted by a single case. Hence, for Edwards (2000, p. 359), softeners work as a response to the 
challenge and present the participant as reasonable, while maintaining the generality of the ECF. Here, 
Carl  states  an  extreme  action  taken  towards  Sue,  which  he  softens  in  order  to  downgrade  the 
seriousness of his stated action.  
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are experiencing. Each member is working up an account of the problem in terms of what their 
partner is doing to contribute to the problem. Early in the extract, Sue introduces the general 
problem, Bell, the therapist formulates the problem, and both Sue and Carl agree with the 
problem. On the basis of the agreement Bell attempts to move toward a solution, and Carl 
disagrees with the solution and offers an alternative account of the problem. After several 
unsuccessful attempts to co-formulate the problem by naming the difference that contributes 
to  the  couple’s  ongoing  problem,  Bell  introduces  the  term  ‘personality’  in  the  form  of  a 
question about the differences between the couple, without specifying what the difference is, 
in an attempt to solicit the difference from the clients themselves. The question is picked up by 
Sue as referring to difference, but Carl continues with his own account of the problem in terms 
of what he thinks Sue does to contribute to it.  
Bell then introduces the term ‘personality’ for the second time. This time she includes an 
account of her reason for using the term ‘personality’, which is to encourage the clients to talk 
about themselves and what they contribute to the situations where there is conflict between 
the  couple,  rather  than  continuing  to  talk  about  what  their  partner is  contributing  to  the 
conflict. Following this second invocation of the term ‘personality’ by Bell, which includes an 
account of what the term is doing, we see Carl, for the first time, mention something he has 
done to contribute to a situation where the couple have experienced conflict.  As such, when 
the members of a couple  are trying to build opposing accounts of what actually happens and 
why  it  happens,  the  invocation  of  personality  styles  is  a  useful  mediating  device  for  the 
therapist. Invoking the term ‘personality’ is useful for the therapist because it provides a way 
of formulating the couple’s differing accounts as arising from distinct but equally legitimate 
individual differences rather than from the illegitimate actions of one of the partners.   
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Personality as a Members’ Category of Stable Individual Difference 
The  category  of  ‘personality’  in  the  extract  presented,  in  line  with  the  generally  accepted 
understanding  of  the  psychological  category  of  personality,
106  is  co-produced  by  the 
participants in the interaction as a set of general and stable characteristics that a person brings 
with them to each situation, and  that explains the way in which they conduct themselves in 
the world. It is the very stability of the psychological category of personality used by the 
participants in the clinical  psychological interaction that enables  the term ‘personality’ to do 
the work of mediating the dispute. In the case of this sequence of therapeutic interaction, we 
see that the category of personality is co-produced by the participants in the interaction as 
mediating the relationship between the individual self and their conduct in the situation. It is 
the  unseen,  but  mediating  factor  in  the  interactions  between  Sue  and  Carl,  as  their 
personalities determine the way in which they perceive the actions of each other and the way 
in which they act towards each other. Bell’s invocation of the term ‘personality’ enables her to 
manage the dispute.  
In  line  with  general  understandings  of  the  psychological  category  of  personality,  Bell  as  a 
psychologist  is  understood  to  have  access  to  this  ‘unseen’  factor  of  personality,  which 
mediates the relationship between Sue and Carl. For Bell, as a psychologist, the psychological 
category of personality is tied to her expertise. As Sacks (1995b, pp. 169-174, 396-403) and 
Schegloff  (2007b,  p.  481)  state,  some  categories  are  administered  by  different  groups  of 
people. Sacks (1995b, p. 172) puts forward that ‘to some extent “hotrodders” is a category 
that is by and large employed by kids to characterize themselves’, in contrast with the category 
of ‘teenager’, which ‘is a category adults administer’ (Sacks, 1995b, p. 399). According to Sacks 
(1995b, p. 399), the ‘big difference between “teenager” and “hotrodder” is that ... What’s 
known  about  those  things,  “teenagers”,  is  enforced  by  adults’.  Sacks’s  discussion  of  the 
                                                             
106 For the evidence for this claim see footnotes 88 and 89, page 105. I will attend to the problems with 
my claim shortly.  
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category ‘hotrodder’ is in the context of a group therapy session for teenagers. Sacks (1995b, 
p. 398) extends his claim to suggest that therapists use categories like  ‘teenager’ that are 
administered by adults to enforce the ‘adults [sic] own reality’ in the therapy session. Hence, I 
could draw from Sacks’s work and my own analytic descriptions and suggest that the category 
of personality is administered by psychologists and, as such, allows Bell the right to both know 
something about the clients’ personalities that they might not know about themselves or each 
other  and  to  manage  the  therapeutic  interaction.  Bell,  lacking  experience  of  the  couple’s 
behaviour in the actual situations where they experience conflict and difficulty, can draw upon 
what she does know about the psychological category of personality and how it affects the 
way people perceive and act in situations, to manage the different accounts given by Sue and 
Carl. 
Implications 
From my analytic descriptions about how the psychological category of personality is used in 
clinical psychological therapy I could argue that I have shown that the category of personality 
is  a  useful  social  categorisation  practice.
107  The category of personality is co -produced by 
participants in the interaction as a psychological category for the practical purposes   of 
managing a dispute between the members of a  couple in a therapy session. Hence, I could 
draw the conclusion that the category of personality is not an  Objective category that is, in 
Edwards and Potter’s (in press, p. 2) words, as I have previously noted, ‘sitting outside of talk’ 
for psychologists to use to explain the social situation but is rather a ‘psychological category’ 
that is ‘handled, managed, produced, made relevant (etc.) in the talk’.  
I  could  draw  out  the  further  implication  that  the  consequence  of  understanding  a 
psychological category, such as personality as an Objective category that ‘sits outside the social 
situation’ is that only when it is understood as such can the category be used to administer the 
                                                             
107 See Antaki, Condor and Levine (1996) for a similar comment.  
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psychologist’s Objective knowledge. Along similar lines to the last two chapters, I could then 
suggest  a  larger  critique  of  psychology  from  my  analytic  descriptions,  and  state  that 
psychologists do not have privileged or specialised knowledge because they are drawing upon 
common sense methods of social categorisation. Psychologists manage their knowledge as 
specialised through drawing upon categories that are generally understood to be part of their 
specialised knowledge, rather than legitimate aspects of their expertise and training.  
Pointing to the larger implications of my analytic descriptions to put forward a critique of 
psychological understandings of personality largely leaves me with the same problem that I 
addressed  in  the  conclusion  of  the  previous  chapter.  Namely,  suggesting  that  Objective 
categories of personality are not, in fact, Objective because they are the same as any other 
social  category  –  i.e.  they  are  produced  by  participants  as  relevant  to  the  interaction  for 
practical purposes – seemingly leaves me with little space for critique. I am left with merely 
specifying that personality categories are employed in talk for practical purposes and this is 
how clinical psychologists use them. However, my critique seems unconvincing. My description 
of  personality  as  a  social  category  used  in  talk,  rather  than  an  Objective  psychological 
categorisation of people made outside of social situations, suggests  that I have a different 
definition of personality to the one shared by the members in the therapeutic interaction.  
Limitations 
Extending my analytic descriptions to talk about the meaning of the term ‘personality’ that the 
therapist  and  clients  are  using  in  the  therapy  session  described,  highlights  that  I  have  a 
different  definition  of  personality  to  the  participants  I  am  describing.  However,  it  also 
highlights that I could not proceed to describe the interaction without first ‘re-specifying’ the 
psychological  category  of  personality  from  a  ‘standard  psychological  topic’  to  a  ‘discourse 
practice’ (Edwards & Potter, in press). For therapists to use the category of personality in the 
way that I have described it being used by therapists relies upon the psychological category of  
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personality being understood as external to the talk happening in the therapeutic interaction. 
Only if personality is understood as a set of enduring traits that a person brings with them to 
each situation, by my own description, can the term ‘personality’ work as a mediating device 
for a dispute between the members of a couple in the therapy session. I cannot adopt the 
psychological understanding of personality because I am claiming that how the category of 
personality actually works can be described by looking at the talk itself. My methodological 
standpoint  starts  from  understanding  the  concept  of  personality  as  a  social  interactional 
category that is ‘handled, managed’ and ‘made relevant’ to the talk by participants (Edwards & 
Potter, in press). I cannot accept the psychological definition of personality, as I have defined 
it, because I start by re-specifying it from an ‘internal’ mental concept to an ‘external’ category 
used in talk. Hence, it follows that my analytic description will not convince other psychological 
researchers if they do not first accept my re-specification of the term ‘personality’.  
My discursive psychological (DP) ‘re-specification’ of the term ‘personality’ is a definition of a 
psychological concept and my analysis does not work without defining the term ‘personality’ 
as a useful categorical term that is used in social interaction. Contrary to Sally Wiggins and 
Potter’s (2008) claim that a central tenet of DP is that ‘it avoids imposing the researchers’ own 
categories or assumptions onto the data’, discursive psychologists, such as myself, start from 
an avowedly ‘non-psychological’ and useful definition of psychological concepts, which they 
use to collect and read the empirical data.
108 Discursive psychologists would disagree with my 
claim  and  state  that  they  are  indifferent  t o  the  psychological  or  non -psychological 
understanding of ‘psychological categories’ and only interested in how they are actually used 
in talk by participants (Edwards & Potter, in press, p. 3; Potter, 1996, p. 110, 2003a, p. 798). 
However,  this  cannot  be  the  case,  because  unless  they  define  psychological  categories  as 
                                                             
108 I will provide a detailed argument for why the empirical data is not simply a collection of instances of 
naturally occurring talk, despite EM informed DP’s claim to the contrary (Lynch, 2002; Potter, 2002), in 
chapter five.  
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useful, indexical and contingent terms used in talk in the first place, discursive psychologists 
cannot proceed in their investigations in the way that they do, as I could not.  
In addition, unless discursive psychologists understand psychological concepts as not ‘internal’ 
and not ‘mental’, i.e. avowedly not psychological, their approach will not be different from 
other psychological understandings of  psychological terms. Other psychological researchers 
from different traditions debate whether psychological concepts such as personality are best 
understood as a part of the individual or influenced by social situations;
109 DP responds by 
severing the relation between the individual and the social situation by placing everything 
‘psychological’ into social interaction (Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, in press; Potter & 
Edwards, 1999). Studying psychological concepts as discourse practices, and not as standard 
psychological terms, is the defining feature of discursive psychology.
110  
The critique of psychological categories that I have put forward, following other discursive 
psychologists, is not convincing because other psychological researchers would need to accept 
my a priori theoretical assumption that psychological categories are discursive categorisation 
practices and not ‘internal’ mental states; particularly as I have defined the term ‘personality’ 
as specifically non-psychological. The empirical evidence that I present in support of my claim 
can only be understood as valid if and only if there is an acceptance of my definition of the 
concept of ‘personality’ as a useful term in the first instance. The DP re-specification cannot 
work as a critique of cognitive psychological understandings of people, despite Edwards and 
Potter’s claim (in press, p. 1), because the critique of cognitive psychological understandings is 
not simply ‘generated’ by paying attention to and analytically describing the practices. I cannot 
                                                             
109  For  discussions  on  the  individual  and  social  influences  on  personality  see,  for  example,  Walter 
Mischel  (1968,  2004),  Funder  (2001),  John Johnson  (1997),  Laurence  Alison,  Craig  Bennell,  Andreas 
Mokros and David Ormerod  (2002) and Nick Haslam (2007). 
110 Edwards and Potter  (in press, p. 3 emphasis in original)  state that it is a misunderstanding that 
discursive  psychologists  are  only  concerned  with  ‘overt  talk  about  mental  states’;  and  claim  that 
‘exploring uses of the psychological thesaurus is only part of DP. DP also explores how mental states 
feature as talk’s business, rather in the same way that CA deals with the relevance of institutional 
settings and social structures’. However, this does not affect the claim that I am making.    
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simply present the empirical data and my analytic descriptions of that data as if they are self-
evident proof of the position I have adopted, because the empirical evidence is only evidence 
if you accept my theoretical standpoint in the first place.  
The argument that the DP theoretical presupposition that the social world is a set of useful 
discursive practices, some of which are psychological terms, cannot proceed from the same 
ground  as  DP.    Discursive  psychologists  understand  reason  is  only  one  type  of  rhetorical 
practice  (Edwards  &  Potter,  1992,  p.  16)  and  that  theoretical  concepts  are  merely  terms 
deployed in talk (Edwards & Potter, in press, p. 3). For discursive psychologists, the assumption 
that  all  actions  are  preformed  for  practical  purposes  leads  them  into  a  contradiction.  If 
discursive psychologists hold to the claim that all  practices – which must include research 
practices that are held to be a part of the social world – are purely for practical purposes 
relevant to the situation in which they occur, then we have no reason to believe their claim 
that this is the case. Martyn Hammersley (2003a, p. 765) points to a similar problem: 
The central message of DA
111 is that phenomena could always be constructed differently; and 
that how they are constructed has consequences, or fulfils certain social functions. But this raises 
questions about the appeal to data, and to consistency of  argument, which discourse analysts 
make in supporting their own analyses. Why is their analysis itself not to be treated simply as a 
series of rhetorical moves designed to have particular effects on readers?  
Potter (2003a, pp. 791-792) responds by claiming that Hammersley is providing a ‘conceptual 
approach  to  DA.  It  is  attempting  to  identify  coherence  from  a  perspective  that  is  itself 
untroubled  by  the  messy  business  of  doing  research’.  However,  what  I  am  attempting  to 
highlight in concluding this chapter is that DP is not and cannot be indifferent to conceptual 
analyses or theoretical arguments. Discursive psychologists proceed from a priori theoretical 
assumptions and a particular theoretical standpoint through which they interpret empirical 
data as evidence for their approach, yet they cannot account for the basis upon which they 
make their claims.  
                                                             
111 DA stands for Discourse Analysis. DA and DP can essentially be read as referring to the same method 
within the context I am describing it here.   
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Discursive Psychology and Human Experience 
The important reason why discursive psychologists cannot account for the basis upon which 
they make their claims is that they cannot account for human experience and reason. What 
discursive  psychologists,  like  myself,  lose  in  the  re-specification  of  psychological  concepts, 
which include thinking (Edwards, 2006), is a personal human agent who speaks, thinks and 
acts. As Raymond Tallis (2005, p. 27) notes in the context of the anti-psychologism of Frege, 
but equally relevant here, ‘while psychologism is clearly wrong, an extreme anti-psychologism, 
which deletes the conscious subject in pursuit of a  ‘depsychologised’ account of meaning, 
truth, knowledge and, indeed, of consciousness, is equally so’. Discursive psychologists, like 
myself, are pursuing a ‘depsychologised’ account of human action and, in doing so, lose the 
human  experience  and  reason  altogether.  Scientific  psychological  accounts  of  human 
behaviour and thoughts lose sight of an aware human agent who thinks, speaks and acts, 
because,  as  Tallis  (2005,  pp.  4-5)  notes,  ‘what  people  think  they  think,  what  they  believe 
motivates them, is to be discarded as being of little scientific relevance’.
112   However, the DP 
move  to  re-specify  psychological  concepts  as  useful  categorical  terms  does  not  recover  a 
personal human agent who thinks, speaks and acts; it simply positions the human actor as a 
‘member’  who  is  a  purely  competent  deployer  of  members’  methods.
113  Discursive 
psychologists, despite their (and my own) claims to the contrary (see for example Spears et al., 
2005, pp. 546-547), do not recover a human actor who knows what they are doing. Discursive 
psychologists (Edwards, 1991), following the EM tradition (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; ten Have, 
                                                             
112 For a discussion on how mainstream psychologists speak about human experience refer to footnote 
9, page 4. 
113 It is very rare for the EM, CA  or DP literature to  address the understanding of the human actor 
specifically. For the key examples in which the EM literature talks about the human actor specifically see 
Alec McHoul and  Rapley  (2001), Wes Sharrock and  Graeme Button  (1991),  Lerner  (1996)  and Rod 
Watson (1998). Garfinkel and Sacks (1970, p. 344 emphasis in original) state, ‘“members” are “mastery 
of natural language,” are “talking reasonably,” are “plain speech,” are “speaking English” (or French, or 
whatever), are “clear, consistent, cogent, rational speech”’. As I shall outline shortly, it is my contention 
that EM, CA and DP all adopt the same understanding of the human actor, with the same problems I am 
suggesting here. McHoul and Rapley citation suggest that the notion of the self-interpreting being is 
compatible with the EM approach, but this is a very contentious claim within the literature and leads to 
a narrow definition of ‘interpretation’. See footnote 48, page 35 for a discussion of the narrow definition 
of interpretation.      
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2002a),  account  for  members’  ‘knowledge’  of  their  own  methods  by  suggesting  that  one 
action, in one context, at one time, means the same for everybody and loses the personal 
meaning that it has for the person speaking.
114 
Potter (2003a), in response to a criticism made by Hammersley that DA proceeds from a model 
of the human actor,
115 states that ‘DA is itself dependent on neither a developed notion of 
society  nor  of  human  beings’.  However,  here  I  agree  with  Hammersley  (2003a,  p.  763):  
discursive psychologists’ analytic descriptions could not proceed without assuming the world 
to  be  a  set  of  discursive  practices,  where  members  are  understood  as  simply  deploying 
discursive  actions,  in  the  first  place,  and  discursive  psychologists  take  this  position  as  an 
exhaustive definition of the social world.   
Summary of Part One 
Ethnomethodologists, conversation analysts and discursive psychologists all proceed from the 
same assumption: that the social world is a set of orderly methods that can be described from 
a member’s own perspective outside of theoretical concerns (Maynard & Clayman, 2003, p. 
173). Contrary to Maynard and Clayman’s (2003, p. 175) assertion, the claim that the social 
world is a set of orderly methods that can be investigated through a members’, and not a 
theorist’s, perspective is a theoretical presupposition of EM, CA and DP, and is simply not 
                                                             
114 Tallis (2005, p. 128 emphasis in original) makes a similar point about language and the human agent, 
stating, ‘an individual receiving a piece of information does so through the receipt of acoustic or visual 
tokens. He [sic] has to be placed in such a (physical) position as to be able to experience them. The 
informational core of communication may be impersonal and decentred, or centreless, but the recipient 
will have his own angle upon, his [sic] own realisation of it. What is more, he [sic] will be in the centre of 
a field of indexical awareness and will be so located through the preindexical hum of sentience that 
makes him [sic] explicitly in that field.’  
115 Hammersley, (2003a, p. 763) critique is that ‘at the same time, the intended product of DA does not 
seem to be simply explications of what is going on in particular texts. Rather, discourse analysts make 
claims  on  the  basis  of  such  explications  about  discursive  practices  that  are  available  to  various 
categories of actor in particular societies, and about the functions and effects of specific discursive 
strategies. There are several problems with this rationale. One is that a particular theoretical model of 
the actor is treated as if it were exhaustive, or sufficient for all purposes. In the case of DA, this is what 
we might call Homo rhetoricus – where the actor is primarily concerned with formulating accounts that 
are as persuasive as possible, in order to serve his or her interests’.  
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supported  by  the  empirical  descriptions  they  provide.  The  analytic  descriptions  of  the 
empirical data I have provided in chapters one, two and three do not provide support for the 
claim that the social world is orderly and observable by anyone and everyone, because I have 
to first accept the claim, in order to conduct my investigations. Collecting recordings of clinical 
psychological interactions, transcribing the recordings into written documents and giving the 
descriptions  as  I  have  only  makes  sense  if  one  accepts  the  central  claim  of  EM-informed 
approaches: that it is possible to describe social practices from a member’s own perspective, 
outside of theoretical concerns. Furthermore, the central claim of EM that the social world is 
co-produced as orderly through members’ interactions remains a hypothesis unable to be 
argued for from the grounds of EM, and unable to be proved by EM investigations. 
In my investigations of clinical psychological interaction, following from the central EM claims, I 
proceeded from four important assumptions, which inform my descriptions. Firstly, the social 
world is orderly at the level of observation and, hence, investigations of actual practices are 
possible; this assumption led me to collect the recordings of therapy sessions, in order to 
understand how clinical psychology actually works. Secondly, the social world can be analysed 
through  a  member’s  own  perspective,  outside  of  theoretical  concerns;  this  led  me  to 
empirically  describe  actual  practices  of  clinical  psychological  therapy,  attempting  to  do  so 
without drawing upon findings from the literature.
116 Thirdly, to describe member’s methods 
for common sense reasoning one can use common sense methods; this informed my analytic 
descriptions  of  clinical  psychological  therapy  and,  hence,  I  described  clinical  psychological 
interaction as a set of common sense methods. Fourthly, those who claim to view the social 
world from a specialised position using technical apparatus are, in fact, only using common 
sense methods; this informed my analytic descriptions and, hence, I found that the privileged 
                                                             
116 I was clearly drawing upon the EM, CA and DP literature to support my claims that I was making 
about the clinical psychological literature, but while analysing the data I was attempting to substantiate 
the claims on the basis of the empirical data and not the theoretical literature, as I have explained, 
following EM’s requirement (Garfinkel, 1967a, pp. vi-vii; Livingston, 2006, p. 41).   
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position of the clinical psychologist in therapy, and their expert knowledge, was managed 
through common sense methods. At the end of my three investigations, what I have described 
in chapters one, two and three are not the actual practices of clinical psychology but my own 
theoretical standpoint.  
EM, CA and DP all share the same problem. All three methods of investigation assume that it is 
possible to describe what happens in the social world from an atheoretical perspective and, in 
doing  so,  as  I  have  done,  only  find  their  own  theoretical  standpoint.  In  addition,  the 
assumption  of  an  atheoretical  perspective  is  the  assumption  of  the  Objective  observer; 
because  both  ethnomethodology  and  psychological investigations  assume  that  there  is  an 
aperspectival view, somehow outside of the different perspectives through which we engage 
with the world (Shand, 2009). In the final analysis it is not enough to go to Garfinkel’s and 
Sacks’s  work  to  understand  the  problem  of  why  I  am  still  proceeding  from  an  Objective 
standpoint or to understand the problems associated with the natural scientific method, as 
Lynch and Bogen (1994) suggest. Garfinkel’s and Sacks’s (Garfinkel, 1967b; Garfinkel & Sacks, 
1970; Sacks, 1995b, p. 622) method to overcome the Objective standpoint is to move further 
away from theory and, in fact, leads them to overlook their own theoretical presuppositions. 
Instead,  it  seems  necessary  to  look  at  Husserl’s  work  –  the  claimed  starting  point  for 
Garfinkel’s (2007) understanding that the social world is an orderly phenomenon and for his 
critique of other social researchers – 
117 to understand what Husserl’s critique that the natural 
sciences have lost their life-world foundation means in Husserl’s own writings. Otherwise I 
seem to be limited by my own ethnomethodological theoretical standpoint, with no way of 
understanding the problems associated with the natural scientific method as it is applied to 
study human experience or understand the social world differently. As it turns out, the relation 
                                                             
117 As already mentioned, Garfinkel’s original proposal of EM adopted Schütz’s notion of common sense 
knowledge (Garfinkel, 1967a, p. 37). However, more recently, Garfinkel (2007) has adopted Husserl 
specifically. In addition, Lynch (1993) has suggested that Garfinkel’s EM program is more in line with 
Husserl than Schütz. Most importantly though, I am returning to Husserl’s work in order to understand 
Schütz, from a non-EM interpretation, as well as Garfinkel. I will discuss Schütz specifically in chapter six.   
149 
between natural science and human experience does not seem to be an empirical question; 
rather, the focus upon empirical data seems to be  part of a fundamental problem of the 
natural scientific attitude. 
Introducing Part Two 
The fundamental problem that I am gesturing towards in this chapter is that, statistical and 
EM-informed approaches proceed from the presupposition of an Objective human world that 
is outside of human experience and that operates without human agency.
118 In forgetting that 
they start from a theoretical standpoint, both statisti cal and discursive psychologists obscure 
lived human experience. Human  experience and reasoning enable investigations in the first 
instance and, hence, neither statistical nor discursive psychologists can account for either their 
own observations or the mea ning that actions and speech have   for the people they are 
investigating.
119  
In the second part of my thesis I will examine Husserl’s (1970 (1952), 1999 (1902/03)) critique 
of natural science with specific reference to the two works that Garfinkel refers to: The Crisis 
of  European  Sciences  and  Transcendental  Phenomenology  (The  Crisis)  and  The  Idea  of 
Phenomenology. In introducing Husserl, I would, preliminarily, like to suggest that Garfinkel’s 
EM program – as well as CA and DP which stem from this approach to research – shares two 
central problems (that Husserl points to) with the natural scientific attitude taken towards the 
world. Firstly, EM-informed researchers obscure the life-world by replacing lived experience 
                                                             
118 I am drawing upon Husserl’s (1970 (1952), pp. 44-47) argument here; in particular his discussions on 
the difference between idealisation and indirect mathematisation (Patočka, 1989 (1971), p. 229). EM 
researchers would make a similar claim about natural scientific approaches to research, because these 
approaches do not distinguish between the theoretical and the natural scientific attitude and, hence, 
seek to avoid theory altogether; which reinstates the problems associated with the natural scientific 
attitude. I will discuss the difference between Husserl’s understanding of the natural scientific attitude 
and the theoretical attitude in detail in chapter four and five.  
119 I am drawing upon the phenomenological understanding that human reason enables natural science 
and then is destroyed by it (for example see Heidegger, 2000a, pp. 21-24, 86-90; Husserl, 1973b, p. 41; 
Sokolowski, 2000, pp. 187-197). For a similar comment see Theodor Adorno (2001 (1965), p. 3).  
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with  their  method  of  describing  experience  (Husserl,  1970  (1952),  p.  51).  Secondly,  EM 
assumes the natural scientific understanding of the relation between the objectivity of the 
known and the subjectivity of the knower because EM-informed researchers assume that the 
objectivity of what is known is not dependent upon the perspective from which it is viewed.
120 
In  understanding  their  descriptions  as  not  dependent  upon  their  perspective, 
ethnomethodologists, like natural scientists, lose   a self-responsible ground for knowledge  
(Husserl, 1973a, p. 6). Hence, EM-informed approaches to research do not offer an alternative 
to natural scientific methods used in psychology becaus e they assume the same ground of  
natural science.  
In the following part of my thesis, through three chapters, I will provide a phenomenologica l 
critique of ethnomethodology. I will pay particular attention to Husserl’s (1970 (1952)) critique 
that natural science has lost their life-world foundation as presented in The Crisis
121 and The 
‘Vienna lecture: Philosophy and the crisis of European humanity’ (‘The Vienna Lecture’). In 
chapter four, I will argue that EM-informed approaches to research conflate the theoretical 
attitude and the natural scientific attitude and, hence, lose the importance of the theoretical 
                                                             
120 I am drawing upon Husserl’s (1999 (1902/03), pp. 15-21) ‘Lecture I’ in the Idea of Phenomenology. 
Husserl is specifically referencing the ‘natural attitude’. The relation between the natural attitude and 
the natural scientific attitude in Husserl’s work is complex and not something that I will address in my 
thesis. However, there is an important similarity between the natural attitude and the natural scientific 
attitude, which is that they are both one-sided attitudes that we take for granted and do not recognise 
as attitudes. As Dermot Moran (2008, p. 403) writes, ‘Husserl’s point is that ‘nature’ itself rather than 
being a brute given must rather be understood as itself the correlate of a specific attitude – the natural 
attitude. The natural attitude...despite its indispensability in everyday human life, is essentially ‘one-
sided’ and ‘closed’...because it fails to recognise its own nature as an attitude...which is much more than 
one  psychological  state  among  others’.  For  Husserl,  the  natural  attitude  and  the  natural  scientific 
attitude can only be brought into question through philosophical reflection. Husserl (1999 (1902/03), p. 
19)  writes,  ‘only  epistemological  reflection  yields  the  distinction  between  positive  science  and 
philosophy. Only through such reflection does it become clear that the positive sciences are not the 
ultimate sciences of being. What is required is a science of what exists in the absolute sense. This 
science, which we call metaphysics, grows out of the ‘critique’ of positive knowledge in the particular 
sciences’.  Hence,  in  the  second part  of my thesis I  will address  the  difference  between  philosophy 
(which I will refer to as the theoretical attitude) and positive science (which I will refer to as the natural 
scientific attitude). 
121 The Crisis is also the work where Husserl introduces the concept of the life-world. However, it is not 
the only work that can be seen as relevant to Husserl’s understanding of life-world (d'Ippolito).  
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attitude for understanding the world in which we live.
122 In chapter five, I will argue for a 
distinction between generalisation, idealisation and indirect mathematisation in order to put 
forward that empirical data is not simply generalised from lived experience, but is  indirectly 
mathematised from experience.
123 In chapter six, I will  argue that Garfinkel’s notion of the 
social world as a set of shared methods empiricises the life-world and obscures its historical 
character and, therefore does not allow an avenue for critiquing the historically sedimented 
and Objectified natural scientific attitude. In concluding the second part of my thesis, I will 
suggest that both EM and natural scientific approaches to researching the human world strip 
our world of meaning by replacing the life-world with formal structures which supposedly have 
the same meaning for everybody and anybody. 
                                                             
122 I draw heavily upon Husserl’s (1970 (1935), 2001 (1913)) work in the ‘The Vienna lecture’ and the 
‘Prolegomena to pure logic’ in Logical Investigations. 
123 I draw heavily upon Husserl’s (1970 (1952), pp. 21-59, 2008 (1906/07)) analyses of Galileo presented 
in The Crisis  and ‘Part I’ of Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge.  
152 
PART TWO: A Phenomenological 
Critique of Ethnomethodologically 
Informed Discursive Psychology 
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Chapter Four: The Theoretical 
Attitude and the Natural Scientific 
Attitude 
Husserl’s Continued Relevance to the Field of Psychology 
What effect did the intoxicating success of this discovery of physical infinity have on the scientific 
mastery  of  the  spiritual  sphere?  In  the  attitude  directed  toward  the  surrounding  world,  the 
constantly objectivistic attitude, everything spiritual appeared as if it were [simply] spread over 
[the  surface  of]  physical  bodies.  Thus  the  application  [to  it]  of  the  natural-scientific  way  of 
thinking  seemed  the  obvious  thing  to  do  (Husserl,  1970  (1935),  p.  293  square  brackets  in 
original). 
Following on from the previous chapter, in this chapter I will argue that there is an important 
distinction to be made between the natural scientific attitude and the theoretical attitude in 
order to regain the importance of the theoretical attitude in investigations of the life-world. In 
1935, in his ‘The Vienna lecture’, Husserl (1970 (1935), p. 272) said that Europe was sick, and 
there was no possibility to find a cure for its sickness, because the only model available for 
finding a cure was natural science. According to Husserl, due to the success of the sciences in 
human  mastery  over  nature,  the  natural  scientific method  came  to  be  understood  as  the 
superior  method  for  any  investigation,  including  investigations  of  human  experience.  Yet 
Husserl asserted that the natural scientific model was not appropriate for investigations of 
human experience (Husserl, 1970 (1935), 1970 (1952)). 
Husserl questions the appropriateness of the scientific method for two main reasons. Firstly, 
the human world must ground natural scientific investigations, because natural science is a 
cultural accomplishment (Husserl, 1970 (1928), p. 305, 1970 (1935), p. 272 & 295). Secondly, 
human experience cannot be converted into a repeatable pattern (Husserl, 1970 (1935), p. 
275). Using the method of natural science, human experience is reduced to a ‘thing’ which we 
can investigate according to predictable and probabilistic patterns (Husserl, 1970 (1935), p. 
278, 1970 (1952), p. 4). Under the model of natural science, we cannot ask questions about the  
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meaningfulness  of  human  experience,  as  our  experience  loses  its  defining  qualities  when 
conceived of as a measurable entity. It is this loss of meaning that Husserl (1970 (1952), pp. 5-
7) refers to when he speaks of the crisis of the European sciences. Despite Husserl’s insight, 
the  use  of  the  natural  scientific  method  of  investigation  is  still  commonplace  within 
psychology. Hence, Husserl’s words still ring true today. 
Husserl’s critique of the use of natural scientific method to investigate spiritual matters leads 
to two important insights. Firstly, when we rely upon formal descriptions of human existence 
we overlook the importance of our own lived experience (Husserl, 1970 (1928), p. 305, 1970 
(1935),  p.  293,  1970  (1952),  p.  9).  Rather  than  investigating  human  experience,  formal 
description Objectifies our lived experience. Formal description does so because it reduces the 
meaningful quality of our lived experiences to predictable and probabilistic patterns (Husserl, 
1970 (1935), p. 278, 1970 (1952), p. 4). Secondly, theory is important for investigations of our 
lived experiences, but theory does not make sense in the absence of a concern for the life-
world (Husserl, 1970 (1935), p. 284; Patočka, 1989 (1936), p. 148). According to Husserl (1970 
(1928), p. 301), it is important to realise that lived experience is contingent, changing and 
finite. Hence, Husserl’s (1970 (1935), pp. 278-279) objection to tying our investigations solely 
to  the  contingency  of  human  existence is  that  we  end  up  with  merely  relative  and  finite 
knowledge. For Husserl (1970 (1935), p. 286), the importance of the theoretical attitude is 
that, through making the life-world thematic and investigating the structures that pertain to 
all, we can clarify our experience. To reiterate, as Husserl notes, lived experience needs to 
ground our theoretical investigations in order for our investigations to be able to clarify our 
experience. 
Husserl’s notion of life-world is the claimed starting point for Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology 
(EM) program (Garfinkel, 2007; Garfinkel & Liberman, 2007; Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Lynch, 
1993), which in turn informs the proposal of discursive psychology (DP) which draws upon EM  
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and conversation analysis (CA) (Edwards, 1995; Potter, 2003a; S. Wiggins & Potter, 2008). As I 
have explained in the previous chapter, EM, CA and DP proceed from the same assumption; as 
Douglas Maynard and Steven Clayman (2003, p. 173) state ‘we characterize the congruence 
between  EM/CA  ...  as  deriving  from  the  impulse  to  study  social  life  in  situ  and  from  the 
standpoint of societal members themselves’.
124  Garfinkel’s (2007) insight that the social world 
can be investigated as an orderly phenomenon from a member’s own perspective is attributed 
by him to Husserl’s concept of life-world (Garfinkel & Liberman, 2007; Lynch, 1993).
125 DP, 
through the adoption of EM, is one field in psychology whose practitioners claim to draw upon 
Husserl’s critique that using the natural scientific method is inappropriate for investigating the 
social world. In particular, DP critiques quantitative psychology
126 for studying Objectively
127 
                                                             
124  Maynard  and  Clayman  (2003)  are  arguing  for  congruence  between  EM,  CA  and  symbolic 
interactionism. However, their comments on symbolic interactionism are outside the boundaries of my 
thesis. I am arguing for a congruence between DP, EM and CA, at least in terms of their grounding 
assumption, which Maynard and Clayman (2003, p. 173) summarise nicely. There is much debate about 
the relation between EM, CA and DP, some of which I have touched upon, but my claim is that they are 
similar in what they aim to investigate and in their critique of other approaches to researching the 
human world, as I have explained in chapter three. In this chapter, I am interested in explicating EM’s 
relevance to psychology in particular; the main approach that has picked up EM is DP. Hence, when 
referring to DP I am always referring to the EM influence upon DP, which is the basic assumption and 
the basic critique of other social science approaches to research that I am highlighting here.    
125 As I have explained, Garfinkel (1967a, pp. 36-38, 76-37) originally picks up Alfred Schütz’s notion of 
common sense knowledge. However, Schütz’s (Schütz, 1953, p. 5, 1970, pp. 55-56) notion of common 
sense  knowledge  is  attributed,  by  Schütz,  to  Husserl’s  concept  of  life-world.  Although  there  are 
important differences between Schütz’s social phenomenology and Husserl’s phenomenology, I will not 
discuss them in this thesis because I am interested in what Husserl’s concept of life-world means in his 
own  work.  In  addition,  there  is  an  important  similarity  between  Husserl’s  life-world  and  Schütz’s 
common sense knowledge, which Schütz (1970, pp. 56, 271-272) himself notes, which is that analyses of 
the life-world (or common sense knowledge) require the philosophical attitude; what I am referring to 
as the theoretical attitude. I will discuss this further in chapter six.    
126 Discursive Psychologists would specifically reference  ‘cognitivism’ as the subject of their critique 
(Edwards, 1991, 1997, 2006; Edwards & Potter, 1992, pp. 13-15; McLaughlin, 2009; Potter, 2000, 2006). 
Also see the special edition of Theory, Culture and Society, Volume 25, Issue 2, published in 2008, for a 
EM critique of ‘cognitivism’ (Armand, 2008; Button, 2008; Coulter, 2008; Hamilton, 2008; Read, 2008; 
Sharrock & Dennis, 2008; R. Watson & Coulter, 2008). However, as I have explained in the previous 
chapter, the most basic concept behind a DP critique of mainstream psychology is to take ‘standard 
psychological topics’ and re-specify them as ‘discourse practices’: through investigating what people 
actually do we can bring into question ‘standard’ psychological explications for these ‘standard’ topics 
(Edwards, 2005, pp. 260-261; Edwards & Potter, in press, pp. 1-2). I will further elaborate upon the DP 
critique  in  this  chapter.  Hence,  as  I  have  shown  in  the  last  chapter,  DP  can  be  used  to  critique 
psychological  domains  that  do  not  specifically  call  themselves  ‘cognitive’  approaches,  such  as 
personality psychology. Due to the broad nature of DP’s critique of mainstream psychology I have opted 
to  refer  to  the  broader  and  more  widely  used  division  between  quantitative  and  qualitative  
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defined social action and, in so doing, misses social action as it is actually enacted within the 
social world (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Garfinkel & Sacks, p. 339). In order to propose a way of 
studying social action as it actually unfolds within the lived social world, DP, through adopting 
EM, draws upon the phenomenological insight that the life-world is meaningfully constituted 
by us (Edwards & Potter, 1992, pp. 18-19; Garfinkel, 2007, p. 10). However, DP practitioners do 
not do justice to Husserl’s critique of the use of natural science within psychology because 
they focus on lived experience without understanding the importance of theory and, as  a 
result, obscure lived experience. 
EM-informed DP’s difficulty in understanding the necessary role that the theoretical attitude 
plays  in  investigations  of  the  life-world  is  symptomatic  of  a  fundamental  problem  in  EM-
informed  approaches  to  research.  EM-informed  discursive  psychologists  misplace  the 
importance of theory stemming from their conflation of the natural scientific attitude with the 
theoretical  attitude.  EM-informed  DP  practitioners,  rather  than  understanding  that 
quantitative psychology misses the life-world because of its adoption of the natural scientific 
attitude, claim that the problem with quantitative psychology is its theoretical engagement 
with the lived social world. According to EM-informed DP, quantitative psychology reduces 
social action to theoretical concepts, instead of studying the actual practices of the social 
world. Hence, the solution provided by  EM-informed discursive psychologists is to eschew 
theory and study the social world atheoretically (Edwards & Potter, 1992, pp. 18-19; Garfinkel 
&  Sacks,  pp.  345-347;  Hutchison,  Read,  &  Sharrock,  2008,  pp.  91-94).
128  In doing so, DP 
assumes that there is an uncomplicated distinction to be made between theory and practice. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
psychological methods; see the special issue of The Psychologist for a discussion of this divide (S. A. 
Haslam, 2005; Manstead & Wetherell, 2005; Reicher, 2005; Reicher & Taylor, 2005; Spears et al., 2005).   
127 Refer to footnote 1, page 1 for an explanation of why I have capitalised the ‘O’ in ‘Objectively’. 
128 Although sometimes EM, CA and DP are referred to as theories by practitioners within these domains 
of research, this is qualified by suggesting that they are empirically driven theories (Edwards, 2005, pp. 
259-260; Maynard & Clayman, 2003, p. 175; Potter & Wetherell, 1987, pp. 785-786). It is the notion that 
we can investigate social actions from an atheoretical perspecti ve, and then propose a theory on the 
basis of our observation, that I am critiquing, because, as I have highlighted in chapter three, studying 
the social world without a prior theory is not possible.   
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According  to  this  approach,  discursive  psychologists  can  uncover  the  actual  practices  by 
eliminating theory.  
However, this assumed simple division between theory and practice is problematic. To show 
the problematic nature of this division, I will provide an alternative critique of the use of 
natural scientific method in psychological research. Drawing upon Husserl’s critique – that the 
natural scientific approach to investigating human existence is inappropriate – I will attempt to 
show that the difference between theory and practice is more complicated than DP assumes. 
The theoretical attitude cannot be reduced to the natural scientific attitude nor can practice be 
purely separated from theory (Husserl, 1970 (1935), pp. 282-283). 
Understanding  the  problem  with  quantitative  psychology  to  be  a  result  of  the  theoretical 
attitude rather than the natural scientific attitude leads discursive psychologists to consider 
the problem of quantitative psychology’s missing the life-world as being a product of theory 
per se. By contrast, if we look at this problem using the model of indirect mathematisation of 
lived experience, then we can understand that quantitative psychology changes the nature of 
the  life-world  through  reducing  lived  experience  to  mathematical  data  (Husserl,  1970 
(1928)).
129 Quantitative psychology loses sight of lived experience because its practitioners 
                                                             
129 Indirect mathematisation is a concept introduced by Husserl (1970 (1952), pp. 34-37) in his book The 
Crisis.  For  Husserl  (1970  (1952),  p.  37),  indirect  mathematisation  is  the  hypothesis  that  for  every 
qualitative variation there has an exact and determinable quantitative index. According to Husserl (1970 
(1952), pp. 33-34), the length, breath and height of an object can be measured by using a standard 
measuring instrument: these aspects of an object can be directly measured. Husserl (1970 (1952), p. 34) 
argues that, on the other hand, qualitative aspects of an object, such as warmth, cannot be directly 
measured. Husserl (1970 (1952), pp. 34-37) states that, while qualities appear in gradations, for example 
cooler and warmer weather, qualities do not appear as exact and measurable. In order to ‘measure’ a 
quality such as warmth, Husserl (1970 (1952), p. 37) puts forward that we first need to correlate a 
qualitative aspect with a quantitative aspect of the phenomenon. For example, through correlating 
warmth with the level of mercury in a tube we indirectly measure warmth. For a further discussion of 
the example of warmth see footnote 154, page 174. Hence, indirect mathematisation is the concept 
that  we  can  indirectly  measure  qualitative  phenomenon  through  directly  measuring  quantitative 
correlates. For Husserl (1970 (1952), p. 34), the idea that qualities can be measured exactly comes from 
the  measurement  technique  rather  than  the  experiencing  gradations  in  qualities.  Indirect 
mathematisation is an essential part of the method of natural science according to Husserl (1970 (1952), 
pp. 23-59). There are different methods of measuring qualities, but they are all similar in that each 
method is used to measure a qualitative phenomenon by correlating it to a quantitative phenomenon.  
158 
consider human beings and the social world to be a complex mathematical distribution. Hence, 
by  understanding  the  problem  of  quantitative  psychology  as  indirect  mathematisation  of 
experience  proceeding  from  the  natural  scientific  method,  I  can  show  the  importance  of 
theorising and recover the role that it needs to play in investigations of the life-world (Husserl, 
1970 (1935)). The problem is not theory: the problem is the natural scientific method, which 
abstracts from the life-world and forgets that the method of abstraction has replaced the life-
world. 
Likewise, EM-informed DP replaces the life-world with its method of investigation by assuming 
the possibility of an atheoretical approach. EM-informed discursive psychologists attempt to 
introduce the notion of the social world as a human world in which we constitute meaning 
through social actions (Edwards & Potter, 1992, pp. 14-29; Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970), but by 
overlooking that their method of investigation abstracts from the life-world, they eliminate the 
human  agent  from  their  understanding  of  the  social  world.  Discursive  psychologists,  in 
asserting that its theoretical assumptions are empirically substantiated claims (Antaki et al., 
2003; Maynard & Clayman, 2003, p. 175), replace the differing perspectives through which to 
view the social world with a singular perspective. If we fail to account for a free human agent 
in our description of the lived social world, we actually lose sight of the lived social world as an 
intersubjective  achievement.  Only  through  understanding  the  world  as  perspectivally 
constituted by free social agents can we grasp the lived social world (Schütz, 1970, pp. 266-
271).  
By showing that quantitative and discursive psychologists, despite their different approaches, 
both  eliminate  the  life-world  as  a  result  of  misunderstanding  the  relation  between  the 
theoretical attitude and lived experience, I will conclude that Husserl’s insight into the crisis in 
human  meaning is  still  relevant  to  the  discipline  of  psychology.  Lived  experience  and  the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
In this chapter, I will discuss one method by which psychological researchers indirectly mathematise 
qualitative aspects of human experience; the psychometric inventory.   
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theoretical attitude are distinct but not separable (Husserl, 1970 (1935), pp. 282-285). For 
Husserl (1970 (1935)), the theoretical attitude is the guiding idea of European culture. The 
crisis of meaning is, in part, the misunderstanding of the meaning of theory. Theory means 
nothing other than questioning preconceived notions, accepted interpretations and prejudices 
by substantiating the claims we make; which allows us to conceptualise our lived experience 
differently  (Husserl,  1970  (1935),  p.  284;  Patočka,  1989  (1936),  p.  148).
130  Theorising is 
important in our historical situation because the natural scientific attitude, which is indifferent 
to the meaningfulness of lived experience, has become the predominant method to des cribe 
lived experience. Through the idea of theorising as critique, we can clarify human experience 
and return the meaningf ulness of human experience  to its rightful place within our lived 
situation.  
Discursive Psychology 
Critique of Quantitative Psychology 
In order to show that discursive psychologists exclude the life-world from their investigations, I 
will  explicate  DP’s  critique  of  quantitative  psychology.  DP  is  an  alternative  paradigm  of 
research in psychology which starts from a critique of the quantitative methods
131 that are 
predominantly used in the discipline of psychology (Edwards & Potter, 1992, pp. 13-29; Potter, 
                                                             
130 Here I am talking about the idea of theory or the theoretical attitude which underpins all other 
particular (normative) theoretical frameworks. What theory is is by no means a closed subject, but what 
I am pointing to is that the idea of theory is the idea of a questioning attitude. For example, Husserl 
(1970 (1935), p. 283) writes about the theoretical attitude: ‘this occurs in the form of a new sort of 
praxis, that of the universal critique of all life and all life-goals, all cultural products and systems that 
have already arisen out of the life of man [sic]; and thus it also becomes a critique of mankind [sic] itself 
and of the values which guide it explicitly or implicitly. Further, it is a praxis whose aim is to elevate 
mankind  [sic]  through  universal  scientific  reason,  according  to  the  norms  of  truth  of  all  forms,  to 
transform it from the bottom up into a new humanity made capable of an absolute self-responsibility on 
the  basis  of  absolute  theoretical  insights’.  Martin  Heidegger  (1967,  p.  49)  writes,  ‘philosophy  is  a 
questioning that brings itself into question and is therefore always and everywhere moving in a circle’. 
Hannah  Arendt  (1978,  p.  93) writes,  in  a quote I  shall  come  back to,  ‘the  later philosophical  term 
“theory”  was  derived,  and  the  word  “theoretical”  until  a  few  hundred  years  ago  meant 
“contemplating”’. I will come back to the idea of theory as the idea of the questioning spectator later in 
the chapter.  
131  For an explanation of why I am  critiquing  quantitative methods, rather than   ‘cognitivism’,  see 
footnote 126, page 155.  
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2003a).  The  main  thrust  of  the  DP  critique  of  quantitative  psychology  is  that  quantitative 
methods are unable to capture sense making practices as they unfold in the actual social world 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992, pp. 18-19).
132 As Potter (2000, p. 4) states in his paper ‘Post-cognitive 
psychology’,  it  is  not  that  psychology  is    not  interested  in  practical  questions  but  that 
quantitative psychology does not allow actual practices to enter into its investigations. 
Quantitative psychologists, according to discursive psychologists, start their investigations with 
a theoretical model that they use to read the social world (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Garfinkel & 
Sacks,  1970).  By  contrast,  for  discursive  psychologists,  social  practices  are  co-produced  by 
members in the social world to accomplish particular tasks. DP claims that the co-produced 
action  oriented  nature  of  social  practices  does  not  enter  into  quantitative  psychological 
investigations, because quantitative psychologists fix the meanings of social actions, according 
to their theoretical model they have adopted, prior to investigating the social world (Potter, 
2000). In short, discursive psychologists claim that quantitative psychologists cannot see actual 
practices because they only see their own, as discursive psychologists calls them, theoretical 
constructions of the social world (Edwards & Potter, 1992, pp. 13-29; Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970). 
Following from their critique of quantitative psychology, discursive psychologists understand 
that it is necessary to study actual practices atheoretically in order to counteract quantitative 
psychologists’ reduction of actual social practices to theoretical categorisations. Therefore, DP 
investigators suggest a paradigm that takes seriously the co-produced and action orientated 
nature  of  social  practices,  by  presenting  a  method  to  investigate  actual  practices  without 
theory (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 2003a, pp. 791-792).
133 
By  way  of  example,  I  will  show  how  DP’s  critique  of  quantitative  psychology  relates  to 
personality psychology – which predominantly relies upon quantitative methods – extending 
                                                             
132 See Garfinkel and Sacks’s (1970) article ‘On the formal structures of practical actions’ for a similar 
critique of sociology.  
133  Refer to  footnote 128, page 156   for a discussion on the sense in which EM and DP refer to 
themselves as a theory.  
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from my discussion in the previous chapter. In the area of personality psychology there are 
many different approaches, one of which is trait theory (Funder, 2001; N. Haslam, 2007). I am 
using  trait  theory  for  my  example  because it  suggests  that  there  are  internally  consistent 
patterns in the way people feel, act and think, and these patterns are known as traits (Johnson, 
1997). There has been substantial critique of the notion that people have enduring traits, as 
people change across situations and over the course of their lives.
134  However, in response to 
this critique, trait theorists argue that people react in consistent ways to similar situations and 
that this observable consistency can be explained by enduring traits within people. In addition, 
in response to the critique of enduri ng traits, trait theorists argue that in situations that 
encourage high conformity, different people vary in their reactions to the situation, which 
suggests differences between people’s enduring traits (Johnson, 1997, pp. 74-77). Hence, traits 
are understood as both durable and comparable. The term ‘durable’ is intended to explain why 
a person acts in similar ways across similar situations over time, and the term ‘comparable’ is 
intended to explain why different people react in different ways to the same situation.
135 
                                                             
134 For a review of literature on this critique of personality psychology since World War I see Douglas 
Kendrick and Funder (1988). For a more recent review see Funder (2001). For an example of this type of 
critique see Mischel (1968) and Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett (1968; Ross & Nisbett, 1992). For literature 
on the ‘paradox of personality’, previously referred to in chapter three, see Mischel (1968, 2004), Alison, 
Bennell, Mokros and Ormerod (2002) and Daryl Bem and Andrea Allen (1974). 
135 Also referred to as psychological tests (Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 2001; Kendall, Jenkinson, Lemos, & Clancy, 
1997; Rust & Golombok, 1989; Zeidner & Most, 1992). Psychological assessment is a broader term that 
includes psychological testing: as Goldstein and Hersen (2000) state, ‘in recent years, there appears to 
have been a distinction made between testing and assessment, assessment being the broader concept. 
Psychologists do not just give tests now; they perform assessment ... The term assessment implies that 
there are many different ways of evaluating individual difference’. I might suggest that the move from 
psychological testing to psychological assessment is part of the move by psychologists to be very careful 
with interpretations, because of the controversy surrounding psychometric testing: for example, the 
‘Bell Curve controversy’ (Motta & Joseph, 2000, pp. 135-136) and ‘scientific racism’ (Williams, 1974). 
Being more careful with psychological testing and interpretations of these tests, mainly involves moving 
towards more Objective assessments (Goldstein & Hersen, 2000) and ensuring that psychologists are 
the only ones who administer psychological tests (Kendall et al., 1997). However, there is usually some 
brief reference to the psychologists’ role in interpreting the test in each book on psychological testing. 
For example, after a long discussion of the different mathematical means of interpretation that can be 
employed, Bruce Bracken (1992, pp. 145-146) writes, ‘examiners must do more than merely administer 
tests and look up scores in a test manual if they are to be effective psychologists. A psychologist’s role is 
to gather information through any medium to make accurate diagnostic and prognostic statements and 
to  suggest  meaningful  interventions.  To  interpret  tests  in  the  most  comprehensive  fashion,  the 
psychologist must integrate behavioural observations and clinical judgements into the interpretation 
process’. In this chapter, I am only talking about psychological testing, rather than the broader concept  
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Therefore, trait theorists set out to define and measure the enduring traits within people and 
differences between people. 
Trait theorists’ main methodological tool of investigation is psychometric testing (N. Haslam, 
2007,  pp.  17-38;  J.  Wiggins  &  Trapnell,  1997).  Psychometric  personality  tests  are 
questionnaires  designed  to  measure  to  what  degree  a  person  possesses  each  of  a  set  of 
defined traits, by creating a list of statements which relate to each of the trait scales, within 
the questionnaire. The traits presupposed by personality psychologists are defined according 
to previous research and literature on the theoretical model that has been adopted by the 
current  investigators.
136  The  participants  are  required  to  rate  each  statement  in  the 
psychometric test according to a numerical scale, the ‘Likert scale’,
 137 which reflects the extent 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
of  psychological  assessment.  However, I  will  suggest  that  most  of  the  ‘interpretation’ is  performed 
through  mathematical  analyses  and  this  holds  for  both  psychological  testing  and  psychological 
assessment.  
136 I am simplifying here. There are two ways of developing a personality test: the ‘rational’ or ‘internally 
consistent’ method and the ‘empirical’ or ‘criterion keyed’ method (Gough & Bradley, 1992, pp. 215-
216). A psychological test constructor using the ‘rational’ method seeks to construct a test where ‘the 
items correlate positively with each other and...all of the items correlate appreciably with the total score 
for the scale’ (Gough & Bradley, 1992, p. 215). A psychological test constructor using the ‘empirical’ 
method seeks to construct a test where ‘each item is scored, or keyed, according to the magnitude and 
direction of its correlation with an outside or nontest criterion’ (Gough & Bradley, 1992, p. 216 emphasis 
in  original).  The  ‘empirical’  and  the  ‘rational’  methods  both  start  by  examining  the  psychological 
literature that discusses the factor or construct they wish to test, in order to write a list of possible test 
items that are relevant to the construct; but ‘the empiricist would add quite a few other items on the 
basis of pure hunches’ (Gough & Bradley, 1992, p. 220 emphasis added). The empirical test constructor 
then goes out to correlate their test results with a ‘nontest criterion’, which is another numerically 
assessed criterion, the test items that correlate highly with the ‘nontest criterion’ are kept and the other 
items are discarded. For an ‘empirical’ test constructor, the process of correlating their test items with 
the ‘nontest criterion’ and discarding items which do not correlate is often repeated. Hence, Harrison 
Gough and Pamela Bradley (1992, p. 221) state, ‘the critical and defining difference is that in the rational 
approach  the  scoring  of  each  item  is  predetermined  by  the  researcher,  whereas  in  the  empirical 
approach the scoring is determined entirely by the direction of the correlation between the item and 
the  nontest  criterion’.  See  Gough  and  Bradley’s  (1992)  chapter  on  ‘Comparing  two  strategies  for 
developing personality scales’ for a detailed description of the differences between the ‘empirical’ and 
the ‘rational’ methods for constructing a personality test, and the benefits and pitfalls of each approach. 
Strictly  speaking  I  am  talking  about  the  specifics  of  the  ‘rational’  method in  this chapter,  but  both 
methods  work in  largely  the  same  way.  By  ‘presupposed’  I  mean  that  both  the  ‘rational’  and  the 
‘empirical’ methods adopt already accepted psychological constructs as the basis for constructing a test 
of that construct.      
137 There are many different methods that can be used to relate a person’s response to an item, or 
statement,  on  a psychological  test  to  a  number. In  this chapter, and chapter  five, I  am  specifically 
describing the ‘Likert scale’. Rensis Likert (1932-1933, p. 5) proposed a five-point scale expressly suited 
to ‘measure the traits of character and personality’, which is now referred to as the ‘Likert scale’. Rather  
163 
to which they endorse the statement as descriptive of their own personal experiences (Kaplan 
& Saccuzzo, 2001, pp. 158-159). The participants’ answers are categorised by the researchers 
according to the traits that the investigator has defined and set out to test. The numerical 
answers are then interpreted through the original theoretical model of personality that has 
been adopted by the investigators. 
According  to  a  DP interpretation  of  psychometric  tests,  what  is  shown  by  this  method  of 
investigation is that the researcher is limited by the theoretical model that is adopted, and the 
theoretical  model  adopted  leads  to  the  empirical  data  being  formulated  in  terms  of  the 
researcher’s  theoretical  framework,  not  in  terms  of  the  participant’s  situation  (Edwards  & 
Potter, 1992, pp. 153-155). When the problem is framed this way, it becomes understandable 
why Edwards and Potter (1992) propose DP as an alternative method of investigation that aims 
to study social practices from the participant’s situation rather than from the researcher’s 
theoretical position.
138 
In summary, discursive psychologists understand quantitative psychology as missing the actual 
social practices of the social world because quantitative psychologists posit theoretically 
defined categories based on the rese archer’s  understanding  of  social  action  rather  than 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
than a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response, commonly referred to as the ‘dichotomous format’, the Likert scale 
provides five possible responses: strongly approve (1), approve (2), undecided (3), disapprove (4) and 
strongly  disapprove  (5)  (Likert,  1932-1933,  pp.  11-20).  Although  the  name  of  the  five  points  have 
changed to strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree and strongly disagree, the Likert scale remains the 
most widely adopted technique for measuring personalities and attitudes using psychological testing 
(Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 2001, p. 158).  
138 EM and CA are picked up by Edwards and Potter  (1992; in press, p. 2) as an established method for 
investigating common sense reasoning practices of everyday people from a member’s own perspective. 
Also see Edwards’s (1995) article ‘Sacks and psychology’ for an in depth discussion on the relevance of 
Sacks’s work for psychology. I am referring to Edwards and Potter specifically, even though there are 
many  who  do  discourse  analytic  research  in  psychology,  because  they  specifically  propose  DP  by 
drawing upon EM and CA. As Potter (Edwards & Potter, 1992, 2001; Potter, 2003a, p. 284; Potter & 
Edwards, 2001) notes, ‘for clarity, and to avoid trying to speak for the DA and CA community as a whole, 
I  will  develop  my  response  to  Hammersley  from  the  particular  variant  of  DA  known  as  discursive 
psychology  [henceforth  DP;  see  Edwards  and  Potter,  1992,  2001:  Potter  and  Edwards  2001]. 
Nevertheless, a number of the points will have a broader relevance.’   
164 
members’ understandings.
139 In response, discursive psychologists propose that social action, 
can be studied without theorising about the nature of social action as  the social world is 
orderly at the level of observation (Edwards & Potter, 1992). 
Discursive Psychology’s Solution 
DP claims that the social world is organised through members’ co-production of social order 
through  discursive  actions  (Edwards  & Potter,  1992,  pp.  13-29).  Each  member’s  discursive 
action is produced in a way such that other members recognise that action, which means that 
anybody  who  cares  to  look  can  see  the  order  in  social  interaction.
140  Following from this 
assumption, the discursive psychologist can investigate social order by providing careful 
descriptions of the order that is already embedded in talk-in-interaction.  
According to this method, DP practitioners understand the stability of the social world to be 
produced in and through mundane social interactions. Discursive psychologists postulate that 
the methods they use for providing a description of the order displayed in members’ enacting 
of social actions are the same methods members use for ordering their social actions (Potter et 
al., 1993). Social order is understood as  the  ‘seen  but unnoticed’ background in everyday 
affairs (Garfinkel, 1967a). The analyst can describe the order as it is actually produced through 
members’  activities,  because  members  conduct  their  activities  in  an  observably  orderly 
manner  (Potter  et  al.,  1993).
141  Hence, the DP analyst can describe practical action as it 
actually occurs – without theory – because everyday practical action is conducted in an orderly 
manner, where the order in the practices is evident to anyone who pays close attention to 
social practices. 
                                                             
139 Garfinkel and Sack’s (1970) critique of sociology runs along similar lines. 
140The idea that social actions are recognised in the same way as they are produced is the starting point 
of EM, as first presented by Garfinkel (1967b), and CA, as first presented by Sacks (1995b, pp. 113-125). 
The founders of DP, Edwards and Potter, draw upon EM and CA in order to present a meth od for 
studying psychological topics through talk-in-interaction. See for example: Edwards (1995), Edwards and 
Potter (1992) and Potter and Alexa Hepburn (2007). 
141 Also see Garfinkel (1967b) and Garfinkel and Sacks (1970).  
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A good description of a particular social situation, for discursive psychologists, aims to describe 
the methods by which members produce factual versions of affairs (Edwards & Potter, 1992; 
Potter et al., 1993). To put it differently, a good description means that when the researcher 
presents their description to the participants involved in the situation, the participants will 
acknowledge it as something that is describing their own practice (McHoul, 2004, pp. 428-
430). The aim of DP investigations is to describe the way members make sense of the social 
situation of which they are a part, in members’ own terms (Edwards & Potter, 1992, pp. 153-
155).  The  DP  claim  is  that  the  analyst  can  provide  descriptions  of  members’  actions  in 
members’  terms,  because  they  use  the  same  methods  that  the  participants  in  the  social 
interaction use to make sense of that situation.  
Since DP researchers are understood to employ the same methods as members to explicate 
and describe the order that is observable in everyday affairs, the discursive researcher does 
not  need  to  proceed  from  a  theoretical  framework.  The  DP  investigator  claims  that  an 
investigation can proceed by describing the practices without first theorising the nature of the 
social  world  and,  indeed,  without  interpreting  the  social  practices  under  investigation.  DP 
researchers  aim  to  simply  describe  social  practices from  the  perspective  of  people  in  the 
interaction they are investigating, rather than importing their own perspective as analysts 
(Edwards,  1995;  Edwards  &  Potter,  1992).
142  Therefore, discursive psychologists  not only 
understand theorising as unnecessary, but DP analysts are required to bracket out their own 
orientations as part of their method, so that they can faithfully describe the orientations of the 
participants in the interaction (Edwards, 1995; McHoul, 2004). According to DP, theory must 
be eschewed for the order in the practices to be revealed. 
As already noted, DP researchers proceed in their investigations by assuming a simple split 
between theory and practice. Theory is understood as  ‘glossing’ over the actual practices of 
                                                             
142 Also see Garfinkel (1967b) and Garfinkel and Sacks (1970).  
166 
the social world, whereas empirical description is understood as explicating the actual order in 
social practices (Edwards & Potter, 1992, pp. 13-29; Potter et al., 1993).
143 Discursive practices 
display the order by which members and discursive psychologists alike make sense of those 
practices  (Edwards,  1995;  McHoul,  2004) .  Simply  put,  DP’s  critique  of  quantitative 
psychological  methods  is  that  they  distort  the  discursive  production  of  social  order  by 
theorising social action rather than describing the actual practices. DP can then present a 
method  that  assumes  the  observable  order  of  social  practices;  and  proceeds  by  paying 
attention to discursive practices as they are enacted within social situations without obscuring 
those practices by viewing them through a theoretical lens (Edwards, 1995; Potter & Hepburn, 
2007). Hence, the DP response to the problems they identify with quantitative methods, is to 
bracket out theoretical concerns and simply examine the practices as they actually unfold.  
Questioning Discursive Psychology’s Relation to Theory 
Discursive Psychology’s Understanding of Theory  
Theorising is understood by DP investigators in a purely negative light. For the DP analyst, 
theory is nothing more than a set of abstract assumptions about social action that prevent us 
from seeing how actual social practices work (Edwards & Potter, 1992).
144 For the DP analyst, 
the researcher must proceed by paying attention to particular practices in order to understand 
how those practices work. According to DP, to hold a particular theoretical stance is to 
constitute the object of investigation through the theory held. As su ch, social practices are 
unavailable to the theoretician, because they see their own theoretical constructions of social 
practice rather than the actual practice. As a result, for the DP analyst, descriptions of actual 
social practices are understood to bring into question quantitative psychological assumptions 
                                                             
143 Also see Garfinkel (1967b) and Garfinkel and Sacks (1970). 
144 Also see Garfinkel and Sacks (1970).   
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about the nature of people and the social world, by showing that social practices do not work 
in the way that quantitative psychology assumes they do (Potter et al., 1993). 
One assumption that discursive psychologists understand themselves to bring into question is 
that  quantitative  psychologists  posit  their  descriptions  of  people  and  the  social  world  as 
neutral. Discursive psychologists postulate that quantitative psychologists assume that they 
can describe practices in an unbiased manner, regardless of their particular political interests 
and  the  purposes  of  their  research.  By  contrast,  for  the  DP  analyst,  social  practices  are 
‘rhetorical’ as they are always enacted by members to achieve certain ends (Edwards & Potter, 
1992, p. 155). DP analysts claim that there is ‘open-endedness’ to descriptions of the social 
world because any state of affairs can be described in numerous ways. However, the particular 
description that is given of a state of affairs in a social interaction is done to accomplish a 
particular task within that specific interaction. As such, there is no neutral description that can 
be made of the social world, because such descriptions are always produced for particular 
purposes within social interactional contexts (Potter et al., 1993, p. 385).  
The critique of ‘orthodox psychology’ provided by Potter, Edwards and Margaret Wetherell 
(1993, p. 386) is that  the quantitative psychologist does not  question the ‘epistemological 
status of their version of reality’, because they do not acknowledge that their descriptions are 
made for particular political purposes. Potter and colleagues (1993, p. 386) go on to assert 
that, because ‘orthodox psychologists’ do not see their own descriptions as accomplishing 
particular tasks within the academic literature, they fail to see that social actions work by 
producing ‘versions of reality’ in order to achieve certain tasks within interaction.  
It  is  important  to  note  that  discursive  psychologists  do  not  make  a  distinction  between 
practices of academic writing and lived social actions because they assume that their methods 
of description are the same methods that members use to  order practices. For discursive 
psychologists,  empirical  descriptions  of  members’  discursive  actions  show  that  ‘factual  
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versions’  of  reality  are  produced  for  practical  purposes,  whether  they  occur  in  social 
interaction or in writing academic articles (Potter et al., 1993, p. 385).
145  
However,  discursive  psychologists’  claim  that  they  provide  descriptions  of  how  ‘factual 
versions  of  reality’  are  co-produced  by  members  for  particular  purposes  within  social 
interaction – from the members’ own orientation and not from their orientation as analysts – 
reveals  a  certain  contradiction  in  their  method.
146  I would suggest that to claim that the 
production of  ‘factual versions of reality’ can be described by the analyst as they actually 
happen  in  the  social  world  leads  DP  analysts,  despite  their  assertions  to  the  contrary,  to 
understand  themselves  as  providing  neutral  descriptions  of  how  actions  unfold  in  social 
interaction. Changing the object of investigation from reading ‘facts’ from the social world to 
describing  how  ‘factual  versions’  are  produced  in  social  situations  does  not  resolve  the 
impossibility of providing neutral descriptions.
147 
Discursive psychologists, by understanding themselves as describing how  ‘factual versions of 
reality’ are produced by members from the orientation of members, still remove themselves 
from their descriptions of social action. In doing so, they continue to assume that they can 
provide descriptions of social action that are unaffected by the perspective of the analyst. 
Hence, the DP analyst, in asserting reciprocity between doing and understanding, unwittingly 
understands  their  descriptions  as  being  neutral.  The  neutral  descriptions  that  discursive 
psychologists claim are impossible are at the same time considered to be produced by the 
discursive psychologist. Discursive psychologists substitute reading ‘facts’ from the social world 
                                                             
145 The statement here stems from Garfinkel and Sacks’s (1970) claim that specialist social researchers 
are actually only using common sense methods, as I have explained in the first part of my thesis.  
146 For a similar claim see Hammersley (2003a, pp. 764-765). 
147 The same could be said of Garfinkel’s (1967a, p. 79) claim to capture ‘fact production in flight’.  
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from  a  neutral  position,  with  describing  how  ‘factual  versions  of  reality’  are  produced  in 
interaction from a neutral position.
148 
With the assertion of their descriptions as capturing the practices as they ac tually unfold, 
discursive psychologists are led into a dilemma. On the one hand, taken to the extreme, a DP 
approach would lead the researcher to conclude that there is only one way to describe the 
social  world,  which  would  reinstate  the  same  problem  that  DP  names  in  quantitative 
psychology. DP analysts would miss that they are making a ssertions about the ‘reality’ of the 
social  world  without  questioning  the  ‘epistemological  stance’  of  that  reality  (Potter  et  al., 
1993);  in  other  words  are  framing  the  social  world  through  an  unquestioned  theoretical 
perspective. On the other hand, if discursive psychologists were to make the weaker claim that 
their descriptions are also only produced to perform particular actions within certain situations 
(Edwards, Ashmore, & Potter, 1995),
149 then the DP analyst would be faced with an alternative 
problem. Were the DP analyst to claim that their descriptions are also for practical purposes  
(Edwards et al., 1995) ,
150 then their descriptions would be amenable to the same type of 
investigation by another DP analyst, and we would be le d into an infinite regress to produce 
further and further descriptions of social action. Hence, DP investigators ar e trapped in 
precisely the dilemma that Husserl is describing in his critique of natural science.
151 Either they 
are forced to claim their method is, in fact, the reality of the social world  – not merely a 
method for describing social action – or admit that their investigations are merely providing 
relative descriptions that cannot be used as empirical evidence because the descriptions could 
always be otherwise. 
                                                             
148 Refer to above footnote. 
149 For a similar claim see Garfinkel and Livingston’s (2003) article ‘Phenomenal field properties of order 
in formatted queues and their neglected standing in the current situation of inquiry’. 
150 For a similar claim see Garfinkel (1967a, p. 7) and Garfinkel and Livingston (2003, p. 25). 
151 See also Husserl’s (1999 (1902/03), p. 16) ‘Lecture I’ in The Idea of Phenomenology, where he talks 
about being caught between objectivism and scepticism, which opens up a question about the basic 
problem of knowledge: the relation between the objectivity of the known and the subjectivity of the 
knower. I will discuss this point further in chapter six.  
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The empirical orientation of DP investigations leads them to reinstate the problem of neutral 
description, which stems from using natural science to investigate human experience. When 
the  problem  with  quantitative  psychology  is  understood  to  be  one  of  theorising  and  the 
solution is to stop theorising, DP understands theory and natural scientific attitude as being 
the  same.  DP  analysts  overlook  the  distinction  to  be  made  between  pure,  normative  and 
practical theorising (Husserl, 2001 (1913), pp. 15-39). Pure theory is the mode of engagement 
that  allows  us  to  question  the  assumptions  of  normative  theories,  from  which  practical 
investigations proceed. Practical investigations proceed from normative assumptions about 
the  appropriate  way  to  investigate  the  phenomena  of  interest  as  well  as  normative 
assumptions about the nature of the phenomena intended to be investigated (Husserl, 2001 
(1913), pp. 13-39).  
The  natural  scientific  method  is  the  normative  framework  from  which  quantitative 
psychological investigations proceed (Husserl, 1970 (1935)). Through conflating the natural 
scientific attitude with the theoretical attitude, DP loses the space to critique the assumptions 
of psychology based on the natural scientific model and, in addition, their own assumptions. 
Discursive  psychologists  do  not  properly  engage  with  the  grounding  assumptions  of 
quantitative psychology and, hence, miss that they also proceed from the same assumption: 
that our knowledge of the world is garnered from experience alone and can be described 
neutrally.
152 In order to address the problem inherent within discursive psychology, we need to 
rethink the critique of quantitative psychology as well as the proper place for theory in our 
investigations of the life-world. 
Rethinking Theory through its Relation to Discursive Psychology 
EM-informed  discursive  psychologists  conflate  normative  theoretical  frameworks,  which 
provide the basis for practical investigations, and the idea of theory (Husserl, 2001 (1913), pp. 
                                                             
152 I will further elaborate on this claim in chapter five.  
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13-39). Theory is understood by DP researchers as a formal dogmatic system (Hutchison et al., 
2008; Potter, 2003a, p. 789). Although normative theory does present a set of agreed upon 
axioms about the nature of the phenomena that are to be investigated and the appropriate 
way to proceed in investigating, any normative theoretical framework must be underpinned by 
the  idea  of  theory  (Husserl,  2001  (1913),  pp.  13-39).  Properly  distinguishing  between 
normative theory and the idea of theory is important in understanding the appropriate place 
of theory in investigations of the life-world. 
The idea of theorising stems from the idea of contemplating the world in which we live from a 
non-participating position. As Hannah Arendt (1978, p. 93) states: 
From the Greek word for spectators, theatai, the later philosophical term ‘theory’ was derived, 
and the word ‘theoretical’ until a few hundred years ago meant ‘contemplating’, looking upon 
something from the outside, from a position implying a view that is hidden from those who take 
part in the spectacle and actualize it. 
According to this definition of theory – as deriving from the position of the spectator – it is 
hard to deny that DP is a theoretical orientation, despite discursive psychology’s own denial, 
because discursive psychologists are contemplating a social situation that they are not a part 
of, and their view of the social situation is opaque to the people who are acting within that 
social situation.
153 
In addition, DP is a normative theoretical framework.  DP’s method is based on assumptions 
about the appropriate way to investigate the social world, which is to describe social practices 
through the lens of the participants in the interaction. DP assumes that the social world is a set 
of discursive actions which co-construct the order of that social world; where the order is 
observable to all, including the DP analyst. DP analysts assume that, due to the observable 
order of discursive actions, interactions can be described atheoretically (Edwards & Potter, 
1992). These assumptions about the nature of the social world, as well as the appropriate way 
                                                             
153 Refer to footnote 128, page 156 for a discussion on EM and DP practitioners’ own claim that DP is a 
theory.  
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to investigate it, underpin the way each practical DP investigation must proceed in order to be 
named a discursive psychological project. Through understanding the difference between pure 
and normative theoretical frameworks, it is possible to question the grounding assumptions of 
DP through the idea of theory. 
Theory, when understood as a set of dogmatic assumptions that a person brings with them in 
order to understand every new situation that they encounter, destroys the proper place of 
theorising in our engagement with the life-world. In addition, theory understood as dogmatism 
destroys the possibility of critique. Understanding investigations as purely empirically driven 
projects does not allow room for thinking a social situation anew, as it only provides us with 
the ability to reiterate what has already passed as if the past will always return in the same 
manner (Patočka, 1989 (1953)). In addition, so-called empirical projects do not question their 
assumptions as they do not allow for the rightful place of the idea of theory in investigations of 
the life-world. It is through theoretical engagement with the life-world that we can question 
the assumptions from which practical investigations proceed (Husserl, 2001 (1913), pp. 13-39). 
However, theorising in the absence of the life-world is also a problem. 
Theorising cannot be separated from the lived situation. Here again, the metaphor of the 
theatre is helpful to unpack the notion of non-participation that does not imply separation 
from  the  life-world.  As  we  watch  a  theatrical  spectacle,  there  is  something  before  us  to 
consider. As we sit and watch the unfolding play, we can actively engage with the meaning of 
the performance (Arendt, 1978, pp. 92-98; Wilshire, 1982). We can consider the play in terms 
of our own experiences with others and in  terms of the history of plays, playwrights and 
technical apparatus. Through watching the contingent, changing and finite play of experience 
we can consider different standpoints from which to view the play and different people’s 
perspectives. In addition, we can consider the relevance of each method and perspective to 
the  experience  that  unfolds  before  us.  Theorising  or  questioning  accepted  models  of  
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understanding lived experience only makes sense if we do so with an eye to clarifying lived 
experience.  
Theorising is an activity in which we contemplate a situation from a non-participating position 
in order to better comprehend the meaning of that situation within the complex network of 
historical human relations (Wilshire, 1982). It is a space through which we can question our 
everyday understandings and accepted interpretations of situations we are ordinarily engaged 
in. We question ideas and assumptions, and adopt different ideas and interpretations, in order 
to gain a better understanding of the meaning of what we consider. Through paying the price 
of  non-participation  we  are  able  to  view  the  situation  from  a  distance,  precisely  for  the 
purpose of questioning and understanding the meaning of our situation; which parallels with 
how  we  try  to  understand  the  meaning  of  the  performance  as  we  are  watching  that 
performance (Arendt, 1978, pp. 92-98). 
Rethinking the Critique of Quantitative Psychology 
Having  attempted  to  explicate  the  meaning  of  the  idea  of  theory,  I  can  now  provide  an 
alternative critique of quantitative psychology to elucidate why the problem inherent within 
quantitative psychology is a result of the natural scientific attitude, rather than the theoretical 
attitude. Quantitative psychology does not consider the life-world in its investigations because 
it proceeds from indirectly mathematised phenomena, by taking numbers as capturing ‘real 
elements of real human beings’ (Husserl, 1970 (1930), p. 318). In addition, through the use of 
statistics,  quantitative  psychologists  overlook  their  role  in  interpreting  the  results  of  their 
investigations because they understand themselves as providing neutral descriptions through 
numerical  indices;  in  other  words,  mathematics.  Therefore,  quantitative  psychologists 
unwittingly replace the life-world with formal theoretical understandings of the social world;  
174 
because they elide the fact that numerical values from which they proceed are co-relations
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of lived experience with numerical values, and are not reflective of real components of a 
person’s psychological makeup (Husserl, 1970 (1928), 2001 (1913), pp. 23-24). In short, I will 
suggest that the reason quantitative psychologists obscure the life-world is not because they 
theorise about the life-world, but because they indirectly mathematise or formalise human 
experience as part of their investigations. 
The description of psychological testing that I provide is necessarily simplified and I provide it 
in order to show the problems with the basic assumption that underpins psychological testing. 
There are two important limitations to my analysis of psychological testing. Firstly, I am taking 
up psychological testing as a ready-made set of methodological principles. As Alexandre Koyré 
(1968, p. 1) notes, ‘modern science did not spring perfect and complete, as Athena from the 
head of Zeus’, and neither did psychological testing, which is part of the history of modern 
                                                             
154 The Husserlian term for the relation between qualitative and quantitative phenomena is correlation, 
and correlation is the concept used to indicate that qualitative phenomena are impossible to measure; 
in  other  words,  to  mathematise  (Husserl,  1970  (1952),  pp.  34-37).  By  contrast,  for  quantitative 
psychology, correlation means graphing the relationship between two variables and using statistical 
equations  to  describe  the  relationship  between  these  two  variables  (Davison,  1992,  p.  258).  For 
example,  ‘personality’  and  ‘intelligence’  are  turned  into  mathematical  scales,  and  each  person’s 
numerical score on the two scales is plotted on a graph. A mathematical formula, called the ‘correlation 
coefficient’, is then used to work out the strength of the relationship between the ‘personality’ and 
‘intelligence’. A person’s score on the ‘personality’ test can then be used to predict the numerical score 
that they are likely to receive on their intelligence test (for example see Davison, 1992, pp. 258-271). For 
Husserl, the number – which quantitative psychologists use to work out their mathematical correlations 
– is already a quantitative phenomenon correlated with a qualitative phenomenon. Hence, as Husserl 
would  say,  quantitative  psychologists  wrongly  assume  that  qualitative  phenomena  can  be 
straightforwardly quantified. However, using the same term to designate two different concepts, from 
two different approaches, is confusing. So, to indicate that I am talking about the Husserlian notion of 
correlation I will use the term ‘co-relate’ and ‘co-relation’ and to indicate the psychological notion of 
mathematical correlation I will use ‘correlate’ and ‘correlation’. The reason for using ‘co-relation’ is that 
Husserl’s  notion  of  ‘correlation’  is  that  we  relate  a  qualitative  phenomenon  to  a  quantitative 
phenomenon as a method of measuring a qualitative phenomenon. For example, the phenomenon of 
warmth is a qualitative phenomenon, that cannot be measured. To measure the quality of warmth we 
relate warmth to mercury rising in a tube, which can be quantified. We can then read the phenomenon 
of warmth through the numerical values on the tube of mercury, thereby indirectly mathematising the 
qualitative phenomenon of warmth. Once the relation between warmth and mercury rising in a tube 
has been sedimented, we simply assume that the numerical value on the tube of mercury is warmth. I 
will elaborate on the historical sedimentation of indirect mathematisation in chapter five.   
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science.
155 In my thesis, I am not attending to the historical development of psychological 
testing. Instead,  what I am attempting to argue is that in order to take the impo rtance of 
history seriously, we must first understand that human experience cannot be distilled into 
invariant and ahistorical structures. A part of my argument for the  importa nce of the 
theoretical attitude is to point out that we can think about the historical character of the life-
world in order to understand and bring into question the natural scientific attitude adopted by 
personality psychologists.
156  Coming to my second point, psychological testing is far more 
complicated than I am presenting here. Eac h part of the process  – from writing items, to 
deciding upon the scale to use, to how to obtain an appropriate and representative normative 
sample, through to the best way to interpret the test – is discussed and debated throughout 
the literature on psychological testing.
157 For the sake of clarity, I have simplified and made a 
linear progression of steps ,  based on  the psychological testing  literature,  in order to put 
forward my thesis that it is indirect mathematisation, and not theoretical  engagement, that 
leads personality theorists to lose sight of the life-world. The main purpose of my exposition of 
psychological testing is to reveal the problems with the concept that we can, somehow, 
measure general features of human experience, and to regain the importance of theory in our 
engagement with the life-world.       
Returning to personality psychology as an example of quantitative psychology, I will attempt to 
reveal the problem of indirect mathematisation. One popular model of personality is the five -
factor  model,  which  understands  personality  to  be  comp osed  of  five  dimensions:  (I) 
Extraversion, (II) Agreeableness, (III) Conscientiousness,  (IV) Neuroticism and (V) Openness (J. 
Wiggins & Trapnell, 1997, p. 737). Each factor or trait is seen as a continuum and a person’s 
                                                             
155 I will return to discussing the relation between modern science, psychological personality testing and 
DP in chapter five. 
156 See Gough and Bradley (1992) and Rust and Golombok (1989, pp. 22-38) for a full description of the 
claim that psychological ‘constructs’ and ‘traits’ are empirically driven.  
157 See Moshe Zeidner and Robert Most’s (1992) edited book Psychological Testing: An Insider View for a 
comprehensive  coverage  of  the  issues  surrounding  test  construction,  test  administration  and  test 
interpretation.  
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personality is seen to be an interaction of the five different traits. The five-factor model was 
first proposed by Thurstone in the 1930s and became popular in the 1990s (J. Wiggins & 
Trapnell, 1997, pp. 737-738). Costa and McCrae’s Neuroticism, Extraversion and Openness 
Personality Inventory (NEO-PI), which now includes Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, is 
one  of  the  most  common  inventories  used  to,  supposedly,  measure  the  construct  of 
personality based on the five-factor model (J. Wiggins & Trapnell, 1997, p. 746). I will use the 
five-factor model as an example to demonstrate how quantitative psychologists proceed in 
their investigations. 
The first step in  constructing a personality test such as the NEO-PI is to decide upon  the 
theoretical model of personality, which informs the choice of traits one wishes to measure.
158 
A psychometric personality test is composed of a list of statements that the person taking the 
test is required to rate on a numerical scale placed next to each of the statements. Once the 
theoretical model and the traits to be measured have been chosen,  individual statements are 
chosen on the basis of previous research; and the current investigators can add items to the 
list provided by the previous literature, which they deem relevant to the traits that they intend 
to measure (Gough & Bradley, 1992). Each statement is chosen to measure one trait (Kaplan & 
Saccuzzo, 2001, pp. 407-409). In order to establish whether the statements measure the traits 
that they are understood to measure, a pilot study is conducted. A pilot study involves 
administering the test to a s mall group of people. The results from the pilot  study are run 
through statistical analyses to assess whether th e statements correlate with each other and 
the traits that are they intended to measure.
159 Each statement should only correlate with one 
                                                             
158 Refer to footnote 136, page 162 for a description of how items for a personality test are chosen. For a 
comprehensive summary of different methods for item selection see Gough and Bradley (1992). 
159 What a psychological test actually measures is highly contentious. As Rust and Golombok  (1989, p. 
26) write, ‘psychological and educational tests carry out a form of measurement but, unlike physical 
measurements such as length or weight, there is considerable confusion over what they measure and 
how they are able to do so. One particular problem is that what is measured is not a physical object but 
is an intervening construct or a hypothetical entity’. Rust and Golombok (1989, p. 25) also note that 
there  are  generally  two  schools  of  thought  about  what  the  constructs  actually  are:  ‘trait  
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of the factors and should correlate highly with that factor. If it does not correlate highly with 
the factor it is intended to measure, it is discarded (Gough & Bradley, 1992; N. Haslam, 2007, 
pp. 17-38). Although this is a basic description of Factor Analysis (FA) and how items are 
chosen, my main point is to highlight that even the final choice of statements is seen to be 
accomplished through the formal method of psychological testing.
160 Once the traits and the 
statements have been established, the psychometric test is ready to be given to a large group 
of people, which will form the normative sample (Bracken, 1992, pp. 119-125; Davison, 1992, 
pp. 250-258). 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
psychometricians argue that the psychological traits their tests measure are very real, and are subjects 
of interest in their own right, while functional psychometricians argue that psychometrics can only be 
judged in terms of the success or failure of its application. Both approaches have had their success and 
failures. However, as with many such apparently clear-cut dichotomies in science, neither the theory nor 
the practice of psychometrics is this simple’. Constructs correspond to the notion of factors in factor 
analysis; I will draw upon Stephen Gould’s explanation because it is one of the most cogent explanations 
I have found. Gould (1981, p. 275) writes that the goal of factor analysis is ‘a mathematical technique for 
reducing a complex system of correlations into fewer dimensions’. Gould (1981, pp. 275-276) goes on to 
explain ‘factoring’ or principal component analysis: ‘if, for example, the hyperfootball were squashed 
flat like a flounder, the first principal component would run through the middle, from head to tail, and 
the second also through the middle, but from side to side. Subsequent lines would be perpendicular to 
all previous variation. We might find five principal components [factors] resolve almost all the variation 
in our hyperfootball – that is, the hyperfootball drawn in 5 dimensions looks sufficiently like the original 
to satisfy us, just as a pizza or a flounder drawn in two dimensions may express all the information we 
need, even though the original objects contain three dimensions.’ Within the personality literature, and 
in particular the five factor model of personality (J. Wiggins & Trapnell, 1997), each of the five factors 
that are said to explain the variance in the correlations between items, for example between the items 
on  Costa  and  McCrae’s  (1985)  NEO-PI,  are  given  a  name  and  come  to  be  known  as  the  traits 
extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism and agreeableness. Gould (1981, p. 280 
emphasis in original) points out that ‘the first principal component is a mathematical abstraction that 
can  be  calculated for  any  matrix of  correlation  coefficients;  it  is  not  a  ‘thing’  with physical  reality. 
Factorists have often fallen prey to a temptation for reification – awarding physical meaning to all strong 
principal  components  ...  Sometimes  this  is  justified  ...  But  such  a  claim  can  never  arise  from  the 
mathematics alone ... For nonsensical systems of correlation have principal components as well.’ As 
Gould  (1981,  pp.  280-282)  notes,  psychological  testers  have  often  fallen  prey  to  the  reification  of 
factors. However, whether the factors are understood as ‘hypothesized constructs’ or reified as ‘traits’, 
they  are  still mathematical  abstractions  that  are  removed  from lived  experience  and  then  used  to 
explain or predict people’s behaviour. Although there is a distinction made between constructs, factors 
and  traits  in  the  literature,  because  personality  theorists  set  out  to  measure  the  ‘constructs’  of 
personality traits and then come to name the mathematical ‘factors’ as ‘traits’, I will use the terms 
‘factor’ and ‘trait’ reasonably interchangeably. 
160  The description that I am providing here is not entirely accurate. The items   are not actually 
correlated to the factor in the beginning, rather the items are correlated with one another and the 
factors are posited on the basis that they explain the most variance in the data (see above footnote). 
However, each item, once the mathematical factors have been posited, is assessed as relevant to the 
trait it is, supposedly, measuring by the strength of the correlation between the item and the proposed 
factor. FA, and the related approaches of principal component analysis (PCA) and item analysis (IA), is a 
far more complicated area of statistics which requires a separate treatment to do justice to this topic. 
For an in depth discussion see Gould (1981, pp. 269-286).  
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In order to interpret an individual result for a psychometric test, it is necessary to establish a 
normative  sample.
161  Each  sample  should  be  randomly  chosen  from  a  population  with 
characteristics that match the target population that the test is intended to be used on  
(Davison, 1992, pp. 250-251; Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 2001, pp. 27-61). For example, if the test is 
intended to be used to assess the personalities   of Australian adults, then the normative 
sample should be drawn randomly from the adult Australian population.
162 The normative 
sample is used to establish the mean – the average score for each of the traits measured – and 
standard deviations from the mean – the average of how far each score varies from the mean 
–  that  will  allow  the  personality  test  results  to  be  standardised  and,  thereby,  interpreted 
(Bracken,  1992;  Davison,  1992).  Once  a  normative  sample  has  been  established  for  a 
psychometric test, the test is ready to be used in research and applied psychological settings. 
The first step in the process of measuring an individual’s personality, after the psychometric 
test  has  been  established,  requires  the  person  to  co-relate
163  their experience  to each 
statement that makes up the psychometric personality test. An example of  a statement from 
the Extraversion part of the NEO -PI is  ‘I feel comfortable around people’ (Costa & McCrae, 
1985). In order to answer whether they ‘feel comfortable around other people’, the person 
has to generalise from their experience of social situations and then co-relate the abstracted 
understanding of themselves in social situations to the statement provided on the personality 
test. Although the individual statement is never considered by itself (Bracken, 1992), the point 
is that each statement requires the participant to generalise from their lived experience of 
many different social situations and then co-relate their generalised idea of experience to each 
                                                             
161 Other forms of mathematically interpreting tests are ‘ipsative profile interpretation’ and ‘criterion 
referenced  interpretation’;  see  Bracken  (1992)  for  a  full  description  of  the  different  methods  of 
interpretation. The point I am making here is that for a psychological test to be a psychological test, and 
not merely a survey or list of questions, it is required to have ‘norms or other standardised (empirically-
based) reference points’ (Kendall et al., 1997, pp. 2-3). 
162 The sample should also be representative of the population in important respects: for example age, 
sex, ethnicity, etc. (Davison, 1992, pp. 250-251). 
163 Refer to footnote 154, page 174.   
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of the statements on the personality questionnaire. Therefore, the person’s answer to the 
statement on the psychometric test does not take into account how people actually live in 
social situations, it is a generalised answer that is co-related to a predetermined question. 
After co-relating their abstracted considerations of their lived experience to the statements 
presented in the personality test, the person is required to apply a number to their already 
abstracted answer. Whether the number is given arbitrarily or is well considered, the answer 
to  the  question  is  formalised  through  numerically  representing  the  generalised  co-related 
answer. In subsequent interpretations of the psychometric test results, once the answers have 
been turned into numerical scores, the reasons for the person’s answer are not considered. It 
is only the number that is of importance.  
Through  this  threefold  process  of  a  person  generalising  from  their  actions  in  lived  social 
situations, co-relating their answer to a prescribed statement, and then assigning a number 
from  a  predetermined  scale,  the  person’s  lived  experience  is  indirectly  mathematised. 
Although  we  may  experience  particular  situations  in  which  we  ‘feel  comfortable  around 
people’, and may even consider whether we generally ‘feel comfortable around people’, we do 
not encounter such experiences with the mathematical exactitude of a numerical scale. We 
live with others in a social world that we can think about in general terms, but we do not 
encounter ourselves or others as ‘possessing’ qualities that can be defined with the exactitude 
required for a mathematical scale. We may experience gradations of human qualities (Husserl, 
1970 (1952), p. 34) – for example Steve is more caring than me or Jack is less humble than 
Steve – but these similarities between ourselves and others are neither fixed nor universally 
applicable; these judgements are always made from a personal standpoint in reference to a 
lived situation. Indeed, it is hard to imagine, in a single situation, of asking a lover, for example, 
to give a numerical score to ‘prove’ that you have exactly the same amount of love for one 
another  and  for  this  to  be  convincing  to  either  partner.  Human  qualities  are  not  exact.  
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Therefore, the empirical data that forms the basis of consideration in quantitative personality 
research is removed from the lived social world and, as such, the lived social world is excluded 
from consideration by this method of investigation.  
Once a person’s numerical answers to the personality test have been collected, the person is 
‘read’ through the theoretical model that the test was established to measure. The numerical 
values given for each of the statements, intended to measure each of the five traits within the 
NEO-PI, are then added together and related to the mean of the normative sample (J. Wiggins 
& Trapnell, 1997). The raw score – the first addition of numbers – is not considered meaningful 
because  the  numbers  people  give  are  not  necessarily  comparable  to  one  another.  The 
numbers  assigned  to  each  of  the  statements  may  be  arrived  at  for  different  reasons  by 
different people and, hence, the number may mean something different for different people. 
However, it is generally accepted that once the scores for each trait are added together and 
standardised, through comparing the raw score to the mean of the normative sample, the 
scores become ‘meaningful’ within the schema: someone who has a lower score on the scale 
of extraversion, within the psychometric test, is considered less extraverted than someone 
who receives a high score for this trait (Bracken, 1992). To restate it, the numerical answers to 
each of the personality questions are not considered in terms of the person’s lived experience; 
rather the numbers are read through a generalised anonymous sample. Whether the person is 
more or less extroverted is not established through how they conduct themselves in the lived 
social world, nor is the relevance of extraversion to the person’s understanding of themself 
considered. The only thing that is considered is where the score lies in relation to the mean of 
the normative sample.  
The standardised answers to the personality test – numerical answers that have been related 
to the mean of the normative sample – are then used to read the person’s lived experience. 
Once the person’s scores are standardised, each trait is ready to be interpreted. Generally, the  
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score on all of the factors are used, in combination, to interpret the person’s personality. 
However, the scores for each of the traits that lie within one standard deviation of either side 
of  the  mean  are  considered  less  descriptive  in  explaining  the  person’s  personality.  A 
standardised score that is between one and two standard deviations above or below the mean 
is  considered  to  be  reasonably  salient  to  the  person  and  descriptive  of  their  actions.  For 
example, a person whose score is one standard deviation above the mean for the extraversion 
scale is considered to be an extraverted person. Likewise, a score on the factor of extraversion 
that falls between one and two standard deviations below the mean is considered to indicate 
an  introverted  person.  A  score  on  a  factor  that  falls  between  two  and  three  standard 
deviations above or below the mean indicates that this trait is highly salient to the person and 
is, therefore, most relevant in explaining the person’s personality (Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 2001, 
pp. 404-441; Nezami & Butcher, 2000). The person’s actions within the lived social world are 
then  read  in  terms  of  these  formal  categories,  whether  these  categories  were  previously 
relevant  to  the  person  or  not.  The  way  in which  we  make  sense  of  our  lived situation  is 
replaced by formal theoretical explanations of personality. 
To return to the critique of quantitative psychology by DP: as I have argued, DP overlooks the 
problem that quantitative psychology co-relates lived experiences to formal categories and 
then to numerical values, because discursive psychologists conflate generalisation and indirect 
mathematisation. Quantitative personality psychology proceeds from the numerical answers 
provided by the results of psychometric tests. The person’s lived experience is lost as a result 
of  indirectly  mathematising  experience,  yet  the  numbers  are  understood  to  capture  the 
general properties of a person’s experience. Quantitative psychologists miss that they change 
contingent, finite and constantly shifting lived experience into an unchanging Object that is 
defined with mathematical exactitude. Through this process, the lived social world is lost for a 
second time, as quantitative psychology replaces our experience of the world with formal  
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descriptions of the lived social world. The effect of the formalisation of the life-world by way of 
indirect mathematisation is that the researcher loses sight of the concrete social world within 
which  we  live.
164  What the DP critique overlooks is that i t  is  quantitative  psychologists’ 
adoption  of  the  natural  scientific  method  to  investigate  human  experience  that  leads 
quantitative  psychologists  to  proceed  in  the  absence  of  lived  experience,  replacing  lived 
experience  with  their  formal  method  of  description.  The  problem  is  not  the  theoretical 
attitude, but indirect mathematisation. 
Discursive Psychology’s Simplification of the Distinction Between the 
Theoretical Attitude and Lived Experience 
In highlighting that it is the natural scientific attitude that leads quantitative psychology to lose 
sight of the life-world in its investigations, I have come to the main point of my argument: DP’s 
conflation  of  the  natural  scientific  attitude  and  the  theoretical  attitude  is  problematic.  In 
overlooking  the  distinction  to  be  made  between  the  natural  scientific  attitude  and  the 
theoretical attitude, discursive psychologists do not make the important distinction between 
theoretical considerations about experience and the lived experience, which leads DP analysts 
to replace the life-world with their method of describing it. 
DP misunderstands the relation between theory and lived experience. There is a distinction to 
be made between the theoretical attitude and lived experience. In theorising about social 
situations  we  inevitably  objectify  the  social  situation  we  are  considering.  We  consider  a 
changeable social situation as if it were an unchanging Object with different aspects and parts. 
What needs to be  considered is that we can  never think about ourselves in the  ‘present’ 
because our experience is unfolding. As soon as we pause to consider our actions, we change 
the  phenomenon  we  are  thinking  about,  because  we  think  about  our  actions  from  the 
perspective of something that has already passed (Patočka, 1998, p. 95). However, from the 
                                                             
164 I am drawing heavily upon Husserl’s (1970 (1952), pp. 23-59) discussion of Galileo in The Crisis. I will 
elaborate on the point I am making here in chapter five.  
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observation that theorising objectifies the changeable situation that we are considering, it 
does not follow that theorising has no access to lived experience.  
What we must remember when we are considering the life-world from the theoretical attitude 
is the unity of experience. We always need to consider the whole when we are theorising 
about aspects of the life-world, so that we do not fragment our experience into parts that 
cannot be put together again (Heidegger, 2000a, p. 170). When we keep in mind that the life-
world  cannot  be  fragmented,  we  can  consider  aspects  of  the  life-world  in  relation  to  the 
whole, and prevent our theorising from fragmenting our experience. 
It is when we forget the difference between theorising and lived experience that we theorise 
in the absence of the life-world (Husserl, 1969, pp. 15-16). Through discursive psychologists’ 
understanding  themselves  as  free  of  theoretical  assumptions,  they  fail  to  question  the 
assumptions upon which their approach rests. To set out a means by which to investigate 
social phenomena is to present a set of normative assumptions about how to understand the 
phenomena being investigated and the best way to study those phenomena (Husserl, 2001 
(1913), p. 39). To posit these normative assumptions as empirical, or to overlook the role of 
normative  assumptions  within  a  methodological  orientation,  effectively  means  that  the 
assumptions are placed beyond question. It is only through the theoretical attitude that we 
can question the assumptions that we make as part of the methodological approach that we 
adopt (Husserl, 2001 (1913), pp. 13-39). 
In understanding themselves as not theorising, discursive psychologists repeat the mistakes of 
quantitative  psychologists.  They  formalise  the  social  situation  and  replace  the  diverse 
perspectives  from  which  to  view  the  social  world  with  a  neutral  description.  Through 
misunderstanding  the  idea  of  theory,  discursive  psychologists  assume  that  empirical 
description outside of theoretical perspectives is possible. In doing so, discursive psychologists 
commit the same mistake as quantitative psychologists, as they remove themselves from their  
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descriptions of the social world and leave their theoretical presuppositions unquestioned. In 
both quantitative and DP approaches we lose the importance of the theoretical attitude and 
replace the lived social world with a method of describing the social world.  
The Importance of Theorising 
Theory is important in our investigations of human experience, as it allows us the possibility to 
critique  sedimented  interpretations  of  lived  experience.  Understanding  the  theoretical 
attitude as the natural scientific attitude conflates normative theoretical projects with the idea 
of theory, which effectively leads to losing the significance of theorising as a mode of critique. 
Theoretical  engagement  with  experience,  and  lived  experience,  are  different.  However, 
theorising about social situations plays a crucial part in our understanding of the life-world. 
Theorising enables us to stop and think about the way we live in the world and the accepted 
interpretations of experience. It is through theoretical engagement with the life-world that we 
can  question  the  taken  for  granted  interpretation  of  human  experience  in  our  current 
historical period (Husserl, 1970 (1935)). 
When  we  understand  ourselves  as  describing  the  social  world  from  an  atheoretical 
perspective, we miss the perspectival nature of the social world in which we live. In forgetting 
we are theorising as social researchers, we mistake our own point of view for the point of view 
of everyone. In so doing, we lose sight of the life-world as we replace the concrete social world 
with  our  formal  theoretical  description  of  it,  and  disregard  differing  perspectives  and 
interpretations. We understand that the world is Objective in spite of differing perspectives 
and interpretations. In so doing, we lose the lived social world whose objectivity is constituted 
through  varied  perspectives  (Schütz,  1970,  pp.  267-271).  The  idea  of  the  life-world  as 
meaningfully constituted by us implies that it is constituted through our actions, but does not 
imply that each action is meaningful in the same way to all. In disregarding the perspectival  
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nature of the life-world, we lose sight of ourselves, our freedom and the world in which we 
live. 
The theoretical attitude is a crucial part of what makes us human. Through being able to stop 
and think about ourselves in the world with others, we are able to distance ourselves from the 
situations in which we are involved (Arendt, 1978, p. 78). Through the distance we create 
between ourselves and the lived social world, we can interpret our lived situation differently. 
In reinterpreting our situation we are able to consider different possibilities for the future. 
That is, it is through theorising that we can reinterpret the past in order to think our situation 
anew; theorising and human freedom go hand in hand. 
In clarifying the difference between the natural scientific attitude and the theoretical attitude, 
I have highlighted the importance of Husserl’s (1970 (1935)) argument that the theoretical 
attitude needs to be understood as the guiding principle of European culture. The importance 
of the theoretical attitude is that it is only through this mode of engagement – which questions 
assumptions, accepted interpretations and prejudices – that we can clarify lived experience. 
Husserl  (1970  (1935))  calls  us  to  question  the  accepted  natural  scientific interpretation  of 
experience, and clarify lived experience, because of the crisis of meaning that this accepted 
interpretation has led to. The natural scientific interpretation of lived experience directs us to 
read the human condition through a method that is indifferent to the meaningfulness of the 
world for us. It is only by questioning the natural scientific interpretation of experience that we 
can return meaningful human experience to its rightful place within our lived situation.
165 
                                                             
165  Husserl  (1970  (1952),  pp.  5-6)  writes  when  introducing  his  book  The  Crisis  that  ‘we  make  our 
beginning with a change which set in at the turn of the past century in the general evaluation of the 
sciences. It concerns not the scientific character of the sciences but rather what they, or what science in 
general, had meant and could mean for human existence. The exclusiveness with which the total world-
view of modern man [sic], in the second half of the nineteenth century, let itself be determined by the 
positive sciences and be blinded by the “prosperity” they produced, meant an indifferent turning-away 
from the questions which are decisive for a genuine humanity ... In our vital need – so we are told this 
science has nothing to say to us. It excludes in principle precisely the questions which man [sic], given  
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In  the  next  chapter,  I  will  briefly  outline  Husserl’s  historical  analyses  of  the  historical 
development of the theoretical and the natural scientific attitude in order to argue, from a 
different  angle,  that  discursive  and  personality  psychology  adopts  the  natural  scientific 
attitude. I will argue that the forgetful theoriser loses sight of the meaningful lived experience 
because they replace lived experience with empirical data, yet understand empirical data to 
capture lived experience. ‘Empirical data’ is already a set of abstracted categories of lived 
experience, collected according to the normative framework that informs the researcher’s 
investigations  into  the  life-world.  The  idea  that  knowledge  can  be  derived  from  and 
substantiated on the basis of empirical evidence is an idea that was instantiated with the birth 
of modern science, according to Husserl (1970 (1935), 1970 (1952), pp. 23-59). 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
over in unhappy times to the most portentous upheavals, finds the most burning: questions of the 
meaning or meaninglessness of the whole of this human existence’.  
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Chapter Five: Lived Experience and 
Empirical Data 
The Empiricist Assumption of Both Personality Psychology and 
Discursive Psychology 
Every observation of fact is possible only within a particular context of judgements, which for its 
part is based on certain logical conditions ... It is the scientific empirical method itself that in this 
respect contains the most decisive refutation of certain theses of dogmatic empiricism. In the 
sphere of exact science, too, it has turned out that “empirical method” and “theory,” factual 
knowledge and the knowledge of principles, are united to each other (Cassirer, 2000 (1945), p. 17 
emphasis in original). 
In  the  previous  chapter  I  have  discussed  concepts  related  to  the  problem  of  empiricism. 
Empiricism  is  the  tradition  that  is  linked  to  the  natural  scientific  method  and  states  that 
knowledge comes from experience alone or that experience is the final arbiter of knowledge 
(Sober, 2008, p. 129).
166 To state that the theoretical framework is built from the empirical 
evidence (ten Have, 1997) or that investigations should avoid theoretical concerns  (Garfinkel, 
1967a, p. viii), is to assume that knowledge can be gained from experience alone. The idea that 
knowledge  is  only  gained  from  experience  misses  that  empiricism  itself  is  a  normative 
theoretical discipline, instantiated with the birth of modern science (Chalmers, 1982b; Husserl, 
1970 (1952), pp. 23-59).  
Discursive psychologists and conversation analysts do claim an empirical approach to research 
(Edwards, 2006; Maynard & Clayman, 2003; Schegloff, 1996; ten Have, 1997), but would not 
claim that their form of empiricism is the same as natural scientific empiricism because of the 
focus  on  how  ‘facts’  are  produced,  rather  than  an  acceptance  of  ‘facts’  as  given 
straightforwardly to us (Lynch & Bogen, 1994; Potter et al., 1993).
167 However, as I have argued 
                                                             
166 The sort of empiricism I am referring to here is sometimes referred to as naive empiricism (Chalmers, 
1982b). Empiricism is a more complex subject than I am presenting here, but I will further expand on 
what I mean by empiricism throughout the chapter.  
167 Ethnomethodologists would not necessarily claim an empiricist approach and do not use the method 
of  transcription  that  I  will  discuss  later  in  this  chapter.  However,  I  will  come  back  to  address 
ethnomethodology specifically in the next chapter.  
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in the previous chapter, the move from observing facts to observing ‘fact production in flight’ 
or how ‘factual versions of affairs’ are built up in talk does not solve the problem associated 
with empirical approaches to research in the human sciences.
168 The DP, EM and CA claim 
investigating how descriptions are put together as factual versions either leads to an infinite 
regress or to a position where DP, EM and CA  descriptions are given an Objective
169 status 
compared to all other descriptions, which are merely contingent.
170 Hence, in this chapter I will 
address the problems with the empirical standpoint to research.  
Although  personality  psychologists  openly  admit  tha t  they  are  measuring  hypothetical 
constructs, the hypothetical constructs are only posited on the basis of being explanatory of 
the observations (Gough & Bradley, 1992; Rust & Golombok, 1989, pp. 22-38).
171 In statistical 
psychology, theoretical constructs may be posited, but only on the basis of empirical evidence. 
In  statistical  personality  psychology,  empirical  evidence  is  preferred  over  theoretica l 
argumentation. In this chapter, I will argue that it is the emphasis on empirical data in scientific 
psychology, rather than its reliance upon theoretical  constructs, which points to a deeper 
problem with the use of natural scientific methods to study human experience. 
Hence, in this chapter, I will argue that  the empiricist assumption that experience is the  only 
source of knowledge, or the final arbiter of knowledge, is the common problem with both 
statistical  personality  psychology  and  discursive  psychology.  Statistical  personality 
psychologists and discursive psychologists only differ in terms of what they consider to be 
                                                             
168 Contrary to what I am claiming here, Garfinkel, Potter, Edwards and Wetherell do understand the 
change from determining facts about the social world to describing how facts are produced as a decisive 
move away from empirical natural scientific approaches to researching the social world. For Garfinkel’s 
(1967a, p. 76) use of the phrase ‘fact production in flight’ see Studies in Ethnomethodology. For Potter, 
Edwards  and  Wetherell’s  (Potter  et  al.,  1993)  use  of  ‘factual  versions  of  affairs’  see  ‘A  Model  of 
Discourse in Action’.  
169 Refer to footnote 1, page 1 for an explanation of why I have capitalised the ‘O’ in Objective. 
170 For a similar claim see Hammersley (2003a, pp. 764-765). 
171 Some personality theorists, in particular trait theorists, would claim that the constructs they are 
measuring represent real underlying order in a person ’s biological or psychological makeup (Rust & 
Golombok, 1989, pp. 22-38; Winter, 1996). However, even when they are considered only constructs, 
they are posited on the basis of being empirically supported by the correlations between item scores 
(Gough & Bradley, 1992).  
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‘empirical’ and what they consider to count as ‘empirical evidence’. Scientific psychologists 
consider  numbers  to  capture  some  general  features  of  experience,  whereas  discursive 
psychologists  consider  spoken  words  and  symbols  to  capture  some  general  features  of 
experience.
172 The underlying assumption that knowledge is only gained from experience, or is 
the final arbiter of knowledge, is left unquestioned and, therefore, unseen. 
In order to reveal the problem with the empiricist assumption I will first suggest that the 
simple judgement of a single state of affairs, when considered from the theoretical attitude 
which brings the possibility of knowledge into question (Husserl, 1999 (1902/03), pp. 15-21), is 
a much more complex act than the empiricist account of knowledge can account for. In making 
a  simple  judgement  such  as  ‘this  swan is  black’,  we  are  relying  upon  our  experience  and 
concepts  (Sokolowski,  2000,  pp.  88-89).  By  pointing  out  the  complexity  of  the  acts  of 
judgement that we make as part of our practical lives, I want to suggest that experience is not 
simply a set of facts given to us, but that we actively constitute something as meaningful for us 
(Husserl, 1973b, p. 331; Sokolowski, 2000, pp. 88-93).  We cannot simply constitute anything 
out of anything; instead something appears for us as we turn to make the appearance stand 
out against the backdrop of the human world we are situated in (Sokolowski, 2000, pp. 92-93). 
I wish to momentarily attend to categorial judgement, predication and truth in our practical 
lives in order to argue for a difference between the generalisations I make from my own 
experience and the generalisations made in the natural sciences.  
While in my practical life I generalise about my experience and reason from past events to 
future  events  I  am  always  doing  so  from  my  own  personal  situation.  However,  natural 
scientists are not just reasoning from their own personal situation; they wish to predict future 
                                                             
172 Neither personality nor discursive psychology addresses experience per se. However, I am not using 
‘experience’  in  a  particularly  technical  manner;  I  am  claiming  no  more  than  that  both  approaches 
consider only ‘empirical evidence’ to count as knowledge. According to the Oxford English Dictionary 
(Oxford English Dictionary, 1989), ‘empirical’ literally means ‘pertaining to, or derived from, experience’. 
I use a dictionary definition to illustrate that I am using a non-technical definition of experience.   
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states of affairs that are true for anybody and everybody based on previous states of affairs. 
Natural scientists are not simply making generalisations from their own experience; they also 
have a strict method for doing so, such that, ideally, anyone could arrive at the same result by 
adopting the same procedure (Chalmers, 1982b; Husserl, 2008 (1906/07), pp. 4-5; Swinburne, 
1989, pp. 122-125).
173    
As Koyré (1968, p. 1) notes, ‘modern science did not spring perfect and complete, as Athena 
from the head of Zeus, from the minds of Galileo and Descartes. On the contrary, the Galilean 
and Cartesian revolution – which remains, nevertheless, a revolution – had been prepared by a 
strenuous  effort  of  thought’.  Following  from  Husserl’s  (1970  (1935))  argument  about  the 
historical  development  of  the  natural scientific attitude,  in  this  chapter I  will  address  two 
important shifts in the history of thinking: the establishment of the natural scientific attitude in 
Galileo’s time and the inception of the theoretical attitude in ancient Greece. 
Galileo is often thought to be important in founding modern science, a science derived from 
facts of experience (Chalmers, 1982b).
174 Following from Husserl (1970 (1952), pp. 23-59), in 
this chapter I will argue that what changed with Ga lileo played an important part in bringing 
about a new attitude taken towards   the world. What changed with Galileo, according to 
                                                             
173 There are notable similarities at times between what I am saying about the theory dependence of 
natural science and Garfinkel’s account of science. For example, Garfinkel and Sacks’s  (1970) would 
agree that natural science is a method of substantiation. Lynch and Bogen (1994), who I have utilised in 
chapters one and two, would also agree with this statement. However, Garfinkel’s (2007) statement 
that we need to rid ourselves of the theoretical altogether represents a huge difference from Husserl, 
which I am trying to point out indirectly in this chapter. In the next chapter, I will explicitly address the 
similarities  and  important  differences  between  Garfinkel’s  adoption  of  Husserl  and  Husserl’s  own 
writings.  
174 Francis Bacon and René Descartes are also important to the birth of modern science and others have 
argued for the central importance of these two thinkers. For example, Genevieve Lloyd  (1993)  has 
presented an eloquent argument for the important shift that occurred in Bacon’s account of science and 
how this came to change our relation to the world in which we live. As is notable in Koyre’s (1968) 
statement, he is also referring to the importance of Descartes, and so does Husserl (1970 (1952), pp. 73-
86). My engagement with the history of modern science is necessarily brief and does not take into 
account all the facets of this important shift. I will only focus upon Galileo, because I am attempting to 
explicate the difference between the natural scientific attitude and the theoretical attitude and the 
correlative distinction between indirect mathematisation and idealisation. For Husserl (1970 (1952), pp. 
23-59), Galileo is incredibly important in this regard because, according to Husserl, Galileo was the first 
to put forward the hypothesis of indirect mathematisation.    
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Husserl (1970 (1952), p. 28),
175 is that he took the relatively advanced field of geometry as a 
ground in itself. Husserl (1970 (1952), pp. 48-49) argues that what Galileo did was to obscure 
the life-world as the meaning fundament of geometry and, instead , posited the life-world as 
dependent upon the ideal world of geometry. According to Husserl  (1970 (1952), pp. 23-59), 
the inversion of the real and the ideal le d Galileo to posit two important concepts: perfect 
causality and indirect mathematisation  (Patočka,  1989  (1971),  p.  228).  For  Husserl  (1970 
(1935),  p. 294), the natural scientific attitude has become sedimented as the Objectivised 
interpretation of the life-world in our historical situation and, hence, is often overlooked. One 
important aspect of the sedimentation of the natural scientific attitude, according to Husserl 
(1970 (1952), p. 26, 2001 (1913), p. 13), and important for my own argument, is that we no 
longer make a distinction between the real and the ideal.
176 Instead, we see concepts as part 
of nature (Husserl, 1970 (1952), pp. 51-52).  In order to argue for a difference between the real 
and the ideal, I will first discuss Husserl’s (1970 (1935)) argument that the theoretical attitude 
is an important precursor to the natural scientific attitude. 
Husserl argues that the theoretical attitude, instantiated for the first time in ancient Greece, 
radically changed our relation to nature. According to Husserl (1970 (1935), pp. 285-286), the 
theoretical attitude was a break from the mythical and practical attitudes that came before it, 
in two important respects. Firstly, the theoretical attitude opened up a new way of life, a life 
lived in pursuit of universal truth. Secondly, the universality of this new stance, a questioning 
attitude taken towards tradition, led, for the first time, to people not taking the world for 
                                                             
175 A similar claim is made by Alan Chalmers (1982b). 
176 I am here referring to what Husserl (2001 (1913), p. 13) calls µʵ˄ʬʲʱ˃ι˂ ʵι˂ ʱλλο γʭνο˂ (metabasis eis 
allo genos), which literally means the transition into a different kind of concepts. Husserl (2001 (1913), 
p. 13) writes, ‘such an unnoticed µʵ˄ʬʲʱ˃ι˂ ʵι˂ ʱλλο γʭνο˂ can have the most damaging consequences: 
the setting up of invalid aims, the employment of methods wrong in principle, not commensurate with 
the discipline’s true objects, the confounding of logical levels so that the genuinely basic propositions 
and theories are shoved, often in extraordinary disguises, among wholly alien lines of thought, and 
appear  as  side-issues  or  incidental  consequences  etc.  These  dangers  are  considerable  in  the 
philosophical sciences. Questions as to range and boundaries have, therefore, much more importance in 
the fruitful building up of these sciences than in the much favoured sciences of external nature, where 
the course of our experiences forces territorial separations upon us, within which successful research 
can at least be provisionally established’.  
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granted (Husserl, 1970 (1935), pp. 286-287; Patočka, 1996b, p. 2). It is both the danger of the 
universalised theoretical attitude, which itself becomes sedimented and unquestioned, and 
the importance of the theoretical attitude as a questioning attitude, that Husserl (1970 (1935), 
1970 (1952)) wishes to highlight in his work, particularly in The Crisis and ‘The Vienna lecture’. 
For Husserl (1970 (1935)), the importance of the theoretical attitude as the ground of the 
natural scientific attitude needs to be recovered in order for us to bring into question the 
natural scientific attitude and recover the life-world from the ‘well fitting garb of idea’ (1970 
(1952), p. 51).  
For Husserl (2001 (1913), 2008 (1906/07)), when we assume that the ideal laws of logic and 
mathematics are grounded upon a posteriori gathering of observations, we lose the ability to 
ground the claims we make because we relativise the ideal laws of logic and mathematics. 
According to Husserl (2008 (1906/07), pp. 1-31), when we assume that ideal laws of logic and 
mathematics are based upon the real laws of nature or the real laws of or thinking, we make 
the  mistake  of  overlooking  that  as  part  of  a  coherent  research  project,  our  research 
methodology is a way of substantiating claims and linking statements together into unified 
wholes. The natural sciences, according to Husserl (2008 (1906/07), pp. 13-14), are not a set of 
factual statements put alongside one another; they are unified theoretical wholes.  Following 
from Husserl (2008 (1906/07), p. 14), I will argue that the way claims are linked together, the 
splitting of the life-world into regions of investigation and concepts, are not particular to the 
discipline of investigation, but instead are grounded upon the a priori discipline of pure logic, 
or what I have referred to in the previous chapter as pure theory.  
In  the  rather  broad  and  sweeping  history  that  I  present,  which  cannot  do  justice  to  the 
complex arguments of Husserl or the complexity of the history of thinking, my aim is to point 
to the natural scientific method as a historically developed method. Bringing my discussion 
back to psychology, following from the previous chapter but looking at the same problem from  
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a different angle, I will argue that both statistical and personality psychology are grounded 
upon the natural scientific attitude which, in turn, is grounded upon the theoretical attitude. 
The important aspect of the sedimentation of the natural scientific attitude that I will address 
in  this  chapter  is  the  unseen  hypothesis  of  indirect  mathematisation;  the  concept  ‘that 
everything which manifests itself as real through the  specific sense-qualities must have its 
mathematical index’ (Husserl, 1970 (1952), p. 37). The ‘empirical evidence’ from which natural 
scientific  investigations  proceeds,  as  Husserl  (1970  (1952),  p.  49)  would  say,  is  not 
‘experienced or experienceable’ because formal concepts come to surreptitiously replace our 
real experience of the world in which we live. Hence, natural scientific ‘evidence’ can only be 
obtained  through  following  a  strict  methodological  procedure,  which  necessarily  abstracts 
from  our  ‘unreliable’  and  variable  experience.  Both  statistical  personality  and  discursive 
psychology propose a methodological procedure to follow in order to obtain the findings that 
are specific to their domain of inquiry. However, by assuming that their theoretical models or 
findings  are  derived  from  ‘empirical  evidence’,  discursive  and  statistical  personality 
psychologists continue to substitute their normative theoretical concepts for lived experience. 
They miss that their normative (a posteriori) theoretical framework informs the observations 
they make and they reduce all a priori concepts to empirical a posteriori constructs; in doing 
so,  they  eliminate  the  theoretical  attitude  altogether.  As  such,  personality  and  discursive 
psychologists maintain the natural scientific trend to flatten out all experience to a purely 
formal conception of the world, but understand their formal conception of the world as the 
‘real’ world. 
Drawing heavily upon Husserl’s arguments, I will argue that, in forgetting that their normative 
theoretical  framework  informs  the  observations  made,  both  discursive  and  statistical 
psychologists overlook that their perspective is only one way of understanding what they set  
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out to investigate.
177 Statistical personality psychologists following the  five factor model of 
personality obscure the changeability and varie ty in human qualities by positing five human 
qualities as the most important aspects of human character. Discursive psychologists conceal 
the variety of ways in which we can understand conversations and relationships between 
people  by suggesting that all t alk-in-interaction can be  understood as purely rhetorical 
practices. Both discursive and statistical personality psychologists posit one aspect of human 
experience as primary, if not exhaustive, and reduce the variation in human experience. In 
addition, both discursive and statistical psychologists lose sight of the life-world because they 
neglect the perspectival nature of the life-world.
178 Both statistical and discursive psychologists 
displace the varied perspectives through which to view the life -world with one Objectivised 
perspective. 
In concluding the chapter, I will suggest that rather than focusing on the most appropriate 
method to use to investigate human experience and the life -world, psychologists like myself 
need to start questioning the empiricist assumption that is predominant within the discipline 
of  psychology.  Understanding  one  approach  as  the  most  appropriate  approach  for 
investigating human experience, based upon the empirical evidence , closes down dialogue 
between different theoretical approaches adopted. Assuming that empirical evidence supports 
one’s  own  approach  to  research  leaves  little  space  to  dialogue,  critique  and  argue  across 
different theoretical perspectives.  As I found in my own research, pointing to the empirical 
evidence does not resolve the debate between quantitative and qualitative approaches to 
                                                             
177 Following from Husserl’s (2001 (1913), 2008 (1906/07)) arguments as presented in ‘The prolegomena 
to  pure  logic’  in  Logical Investigations  and  Introduction  to  Logic  and  Theory  of  Knowledge.  In  ‘The 
prolegomena to pure logic’, Husserl (2001 (1913)) sets out a difference between the pure, normative 
and practical theoretical frameworks. In Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge, Husserl (2008 
(1906/07)) sets out a difference between the a posteriori disciplines and the a priori disciplines.  
178 Here I am pointing to Husserl’s (1970 (1935), p. 294) notion of the ‘one-sidedness’ of the natural 
scientific attitude and its implications for these two domains within the discipline of psychology. I am 
also  foregrounding  Husserl’s  (1999  (1902/03),  p.  65)  argument  that  meaningful  things  are 
intersubjectively constituted by us, which I will pick up again in the next chapter in order to discuss the 
difference between Garfinkel’s and Husserl’s notion of the life-world. As Husserl (1999 (1902/03), p. 65 
emphasis  in  original)  writes,  ‘this  step  provides  us  with a  new  objectivity  that  counts  as  absolute 
givenness, the objectivity of essences’.  
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research  because  the  empirical  evidence  is  only  considered  empirical  evidence  from  a 
particular theoretical perspective. I would like to suggest that it is only by understanding that 
one’s own approach to research is a particular theoretical standpoint that we can start to 
question and critique our own and each other’s theoretical presuppositions. Understanding 
that we are looking from a particular theoretical standpoint allows a space for argument and 
dialogue  through  which  we  can  come  to  understand  and  clarify  our  own  and  other’s 
theoretical  standpoints,  presuppositions  and  concepts.  The  theoretical  attitude  brings  into 
question the empiricist assumption of our current historical situation and not just a particular 
method’s effectiveness for establishing knowledge about experience. The theoretical attitude 
opens up a space for meaningful dialogue with others about the world in which we live.
179 
Practical Reasoning 
Acts of Judgement and Statements of Fact 
Linguistic  structures  may  form  wholes  of  exquisite  complexity,  and  we  may  at  times  be  so 
enthralled by them that we think that there is nothing but the play of signifiers and syntax, that 
they are sufficient in themselves. Both structuralists and deconstructionists believe this, thinking 
that there is no “center” beyond the play of significations. But phenomenology sees the formal 
patterns of language as endowed with an even greater dignity and beauty: they not only interact 
with one another, but serve to disclose the way things are and the way things can be (Sokolowski, 
2000, pp. 171-172). 
In the first part of this chapter, I want to bring into question the way we make judgements 
from experience. In our practical life we encounter things, pick up things and talk about things, 
without need nor want, most of the  time, to pay attention to  how we are able to do so 
                                                             
179 In this section of the chapter, I am draw heavily upon Husserl’s (2008 (1906/07), pp. 42-45) argument 
that logic is the ‘science of meaning’; in order to point out that for Husserl, logic is not just an empty 
formal activity, rather logic is the basis upon which we can speak meaningfully about the world in which 
we live. In this sense, I am attempting to highlight the larger significance of Husserl’s discussion of pure 
logic.  Husserl’s  (1975,  pp.  59-60)  work  is  not  just  an  epistemological  exercise  in  pointing  out  the 
problems with natural scientific presuppositions; for Husserl (1973a, p. 6) a self-responsible ground of 
knowledge is of utmost importance. As Husserl (1970 (1935), p. 298 emphasis in original) writes in ‘The 
Vienna lecture’, ‘the ratio presently under discussion is nothing other than the spirit’s truly universal and 
truly radical coming to terms with itself in the form of a universal, responsible science, in which a 
completely new mode of scientific discipline is set in motion where all conceivable questions – questions 
of being and questions of norm, questions of what is called “existence” *Existenz] – find their place’. I 
will come back to discuss the notion of a self-responsible knowledge in the next chapter.  
196 
(Sokolowski,  2000,  p.  42).  However,  in  order  to  highlight  the  problem  with  accepting 
statements as statements of fact, I wish to reveal the different aspects that make up a simple 
judgement, from the theoretical attitude. In this section I will draw upon Robert Sokolowski’s 
(2000, pp. 88-111) description of categorial intentions to give my own simplified account of 
Husserl’s concept of categorial intuition.
180 Sokolowski (2000, p. 89) suggests that: 
We exercise our humanity most fully, we act as rational animals most intensely, when we use 
words,  and  our  achievement  of  truth  and  thinking  is  implicated  in  our  use  of language;  the 
discussion of categorial intentionality is therefore of great importance for phenomenology, in our 
study of what it is to be human. 
Categorial  intuition  for  phenomenology  is  ‘the  act  of  saying  something  about  something’ 
(Sokolowski, 2000, p. 88 emphasis added). For Husserl (1973b, p. 41), our categorial intentions 
are based upon our prepredicative experience of the world: we first live through experience 
before we can say something about something. Hence, categorial intuition is an important and 
complex part of phenomenology. However, I will briefly speak about categorial intuition in 
order to argue that even in our practical life we rely upon concepts and linking things together 
to speak meaningfully about things and, importantly for this chapter, to generalise from our 
experience.  
In order to put forward a truth claim such as ‘this swan is black’ I am relying upon being placed 
and the conceptual meaning of ‘swanness’ and ‘blackness’ (Sokolowski, 2000, p. 88).
181 Say, for 
example, I have just arrived at a park with a lake with my two year old niece, Danielle, to go for 
                                                             
180  As  Husserl  (1973b,  p.  44  emphasis  and  square  brackets  in  original)  notes  in  Experience  and 
Judgement: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic, ‘if we speak of objects of science, science being that 
which as such seeks truth valid for everyone, then these objects, which find their adequate expression in 
predicative propositions considered as [reflecting] the complete structure of categorial actions, are not 
objects of experience, such as are encountered purely and determined in categorial actions on the basis 
of pure experience. “Judgments of experience,” or, to speak more clearly, judgments which are obtained 
only from original operations in categorial acts purely on the basis of experience, i.e., sense experience 
and the experience founded on it of mental reality [geistigen Seins], are not judgments of definitive 
validity, are not judgments of science in the precise sense – that is, of science which works under the 
idea  of  definitive  validity.  Thus,  by  their  nature,  the  logical  activities  of  idealization  and  of 
mathematization, the latter presupposing the former – which might generally be called activities of 
geometrization  –  are  distinguished from  other categorial  activities’.  For  a full  account of categorial 
intention by Husserl (2001) see the ‘Sixth Logical Investigation’.  
181 Sokolowski (2000, pp. 88-93) uses the example ‘this car is damaged’.   
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a walk with the dogs. At first, I may look around rather passively, moving my gaze around at 
the different aspects of the park (Sokolowski, 2000, p. 89). As Sokolowski (2000, p. 44) notes, 
‘the world as a whole and the I as the centre are the two singularities between which all other 
things can be placed’. It is against the backdrop of the park that I pick out a particular swan 
and I can easily name it as such. As I point out the swan to my niece she can see the thing to 
which I am pointing, but asks me ‘what is that?’. My niece is old enough to pick out a particular 
thing as one and the same thing that stands over and against other aspects of the park, but 
cannot name the swan yet because she does not know the concept of ‘swanness’.
182 At this 
point, Danielle can repeat the name back to me, but as she walks around the park she  points 
to each swan and asks me ‘what is that?’. As Danielle grows up and learns to speak, she will 
know what she means as I will know what she means. According to phenomenology, the word 
‘swan’ names the concept of ‘swanness’ as well as each particular swan; both Danielle and I 
share  one  and  the  same  ideal  meaning  when  we  share  the  word  ‘swan’.  For  Danielle  to 
understand the concept of ‘swanness’ she needs to experience particular swans; and to know 
that a particular swan is a swan she requires the concept of ‘swanness’ which is learnt from 
people around her. Danielle will have learnt to conceptualise, not just to parrot words back to 
me, when she learns the meaning of the word ‘swan’.
183 Hence, for Danielle to know what I 
mean when I say ‘this swan is black’, according to phenomenologists, she must first know how 
to constitute a particular thing as one and the same thing standing over and against other 
aspects of the park, and know the conceptual meanings of both ‘swanness’ and ‘blackness’. 
Danielle is not just collecting together instances of similar things; she is learning how to collect 
instances together.
184 However, there is more to the sentence  ‘this swan is black’ than the 
                                                             
182 Here I am attempting to highlight Husserl’s (1973b, p. 41) notion of prepredicative experience. 
183  Here  I  am  drawing  upon  Husserl’s  (2008  (1906/07),  pp.  36-37)  discussion  of  the  meaning  of  a 
statement in Introduction of Logic and Theory to Knowledge, as well as Sokolowski’s (2000, pp. 88-111) 
discussion of categorial intuition.  
184 I am drawing here upon Husserl’s (2008 (1906/07), pp. 42-50) discussion of why logic is not a part of 
psychology in Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge.   
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simple ideas that make up the statement; there is also the relation between the two ideas 
(Sokolowski, 2000, pp. 88-89). 
To state ‘this swan is black’ I do more than just pick a thing out as a single thing that stands 
over and against other aspects of the park. I focus on a particular aspect of the swan and pay 
particular attention to it; I have foregrounded the swan’s colour against the background of the 
whole swan (Sokolowski, 2000, pp. 89-90). I can then simultaneously pay attention to the swan 
as a whole and the particular quality of the swan and declare ‘this swan is black’; I have stated 
a particular relation between a part of the swan and the whole swan (Sokolowski, 2000, p. 90). 
Sokolowski (2000, p. 91) writes: 
The intentional achievement we have described is the thoughtful basis of human language and 
speech.  Language  does  not  float  by  itself  on  top  of  our  sensibility;  the  reason  we  can  use 
language is that we are capable of the kind of intending that constitutes categorial objects. The 
syntax that defines language is grounded on the articulation of wholes and parts that takes place 
in categorial intending.  
For phenomenologists, the logical concept of predication, i.e. ‘S is P’, is grounded upon human 
experience of the life-world and the relation between parts and wholes (Sokolowski, 2000, pp. 
92-93). When Danielle is learning to speak – to say ‘this swan is black’ and to understand the 
meaning of the statement – she is learning, through her experience of living in the world 
among others, what the concept of predication is or, in other words, what it means to name a 
feature of something.
185  
When I declare that  ‘this swan is black’ I am claiming it  is true; on the basis of ‘blackness’ 
being a feature of the swan I am seeing, in actuality, and on  the basis of the concept of 
truth.
186 In declaring ‘this swan is black’ as true, I am not doing so on the basis that anything 
can be said about the swan I am looking at; I am claiming the truth of the statement on the 
basis of the appearance of the swan before me. As Sokolowski (2000, p. 93) notes: ‘if we did 
                                                             
185 See above footnote. 
186 I might be putting forward the statement as a falsity to deceive Danielle or to play a joke, but I am 
still relying upon the concept of true and false to do so. I am drawing here upon Sokolowski’s (2000, pp. 
158-159) discussion of the difference between ‘truth of correctness’ and ‘truth of disclosure’ as well as 
Husserl’s discussions that I have indicated in footnote 177, page 194.  
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not experience something like [the blackness of the swan], we would not be able to constitute 
[the swan as black]’. I could state to you that ‘this swan is black’ and you could reply, ‘no the 
swan  is  brown’,  and  we  could  both  look  back  at  the  swan  and  negotiate  what  the  best 
description of the colour is. In doing so, we would both rely upon the actual appearance of the 
swan and a shared understanding of the notion of truth. We may both decide that, ‘the swan is 
blackish brown’, or continue to disagree, but in changing our statement of truth or disagreeing 
about the truth of the statement, we have not  changed our shared understanding of  the 
concept of truth.  
In highlighting some of the different aspects of the statement, ‘this swan is black’, what I am 
attempting to point out is that, even at a very basic level of simply making judgements from 
experience, we are relying upon far more than the simple observation of a fact. We are relying 
upon our experience, the shared meanings of things, the world in which we live and our own 
perspective, from which we view the world. At a very basic level of practical engagement with 
the world we are experiencing and reasoning about the world in which we live with others. 
When I make the simple statement, ‘this swan is black’ I am not necessarily paying attention to 
the way I intersubjectively constitute the thing before me or the way I am able to declare ‘this 
swan is black’. We are not passive receptors of facts: we actively engage with constituting the 
things we encounter through our engagement with them and we pay attention to particular 
parts against the backdrop of the whole.        
Generalising Judgements from Experience 
Generalisations are based upon gathering together judgements from experience, and we do so 
as part of practical living. I can generalise on the basis of experiencing and judging that ‘this 
swan is black’, ‘this swan is also black’, etc., that ‘all swans are black’. I have generalised from 
particular  instances  of  experiencing  and  judging many  swans  as  black  in  order  to  make  a 
general statement. However, to do so I am still relying upon the concepts of swan, black,  
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predication  and  truth  and  not  just  upon  my  ‘pure’  experience  of  many  black  swans. 
Generalising from experience is part of the practical reasoning we engage with in our daily 
lives and we do so for our own practical purposes.
187 
From generalisations based upon our experience and judgements about the world, we can 
make  predictions  (Husserl,  2008  (1906/07),  pp.  42 -44).  When  I  generalise  from  past 
experiences that, most times, I turn the key in the ignition of my car the car has started, it is 
reasonable for me to assume that, in all likelihood, my car will start next time I turn the key in 
the ignition. I can then plan to leave the house 20 minutes before I have to attend a meeting at 
university, because based on previous experience of the car starting when I turn the key in the 
ignition, I can reason that this is the appropriate amount of time to allow myself for attending 
a meeting I am going to today. To assume that my car will not start next time I turn the key in 
the ignition of the car may be  impractical, but is not absurd,
188 because I could allow myself 
more time to get to university or I  could arrange alternative means of travelling to university. 
Hence, generalising from experience is very important for conducting my practical affairs in the 
world in which I live, but our  judgements and predictions are always fallible and are made 
from my particular standpoint in a particular situation (Arendt, 1978, p. 78).
189  
                                                             
187 Here I am not attempting to say that we only make generalisations from our own experience; we also 
take  on  generalisations  from  others  and  correct  and  change  our  own  and  others’  generalisations. 
However, what I wish to show is that even at a very basic level of engaging with the world we are relying 
upon  concepts  and  consistency  to  understand and to  speak  with  others. In  addition,  when  we  are 
making generalisations in natural scientific disciplines we are doing so based upon our human capacity 
to reason and experience (Husserl, 2008 (1906/07), pp. 93-94).   
188 Here I am drawing upon Husserl’s distinction between the logical absurdity of a contradiction and 
disregarding highly probable and useful generalisations. As Husserl (2008 (1906/07), p. 49) writes about 
an a posteriori claim: ‘its denial never means an absurdity, a contradiction in terms. If I deny the law of 
gravity, or the law of parallelogram of forces, or the laws of habit, of the association of ideas, and the 
like,  then  in  so  doing  I  cast  experience  to  the  wind.  I  violate  the  evident  and  extremely  valuable 
probability that experiences and their systematic procession have established for the laws. But, I never 
in any way incur absurdity’. 
189 In this paragraph, I am pointing to the well known problem of induction (Chalmers, 1982a). However, 
I also want to point out something more, which is that human reason is fallible, because we are finite 
and we start from concepts and not just ‘pure’ experience. See Stephen Evans’s (1998, pp. 199-123) 
discussion of Sören Kierkegaard for a similar point.    
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Reasoning  from  particular  experiences  to  general  statements  about  experience  can  only 
provide us with probable statements about experience. There are two important reasons why 
reasoning from experience cannot go beyond establishing probable general statements that 
we can then use to make predictions. Firstly, experience of the world is the experience of the 
appearance of meaningful things in the world and, as such, ‘the world appears in the mode of 
it-seems-to-me’ (Arendt, 1978, p. 38). There seems to me to be a policeman standing outside 
the pharmacy, but as I move closer to the policeman, the policeman turns out to be a mere 
semblance as I see the appearance of a cardboard poster of a policeman. Secondly, the world 
of appearances is changing and moving. I can state that it is true that it is currently daytime for 
me, but this will not remain a true statement as day turns to night this evening, and is not a 
true  statement  for  a  person  on  the  other  side  of  the  world.  Reasoning  from  particular 
experiences to general statements about experience can never lead to certain and unchanging 
facts about the world. Reasoning from experience can only ever present us with probable and 
changeable statements about the world in which we live, from a particular place and time 
(Husserl, 2008 (1906/07), pp. 42-50). 
Natural Scientific Reasoning  
Husserl, Galileo and the Natural Scientific Attitude 
Prescientifically, in everyday sense-experience, the world is given in a subjectively relative way. 
Each of us has his [sic] own appearances; and for each of us they count as ... that which actually 
is. In dealing with one another, we have long since become aware of this discrepancy between 
our various ontic validities. But we do not think that, because of this, there are many worlds. 
Necessarily, we believe in the world, whose things only appear to us differently but are the same 
(Husserl, 1970 (1952), p. 23).  
Generalising  from  experience,  or  inductive  reasoning,  is  also  a  necessary  part  of  natural 
scientific  investigations.  However,  natural  scientific  reasoning,  along  with  making 
generalisations from particulars, also requires a strict method for making generalisations and 
predictions (Swinburne, 1989, p. 124). Natural scientific investigators are not content with 
generalisations alone, they also want to find general regularities in nature that are predictive  
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of the observed phenomenon, outside of any one person’s experience of the world. Natural 
scientific method proceeds from generalisations based on experience and laws in order to 
predict future states of affairs (Swinburne, 1989, pp. 124-125), because natural scientists do 
not want to make predictions based on the personal experience of me and my car, but rather 
on general predictions about the factors that lead anybody and everybody’s car to start or not 
start. Husserl (1970 (1952), p. 51) states, ‘and this *scientific+ prediction infinitely surpasses the 
accomplishment of everyday prediction’.   
This is why Alan Chalmers (1982b, pp. 1-3) states that what changed with Galileo was not so 
much the breakthrough  of modern science based  on facts  of experience, but a change in 
attitude towards facts of experience and theory. According to Chalmers (1982b, p. 2), the story 
of Galileo is often framed as the birth of modern science, when the science built on facts of 
experience overcame the old tradition based on authority. As Chalmers (1982b, p. 2) explains, 
this  is  the  basis  of  the  often  told  story  of  Galileo  and  the  Leaning  Tower  of  Pisa.  To 
demonstrate that it was true that all bodies, no matter what their weight, fall at the same rate, 
Galileo invited the whole university to come and watch him perform his experiment. Galileo, in 
front of a crowd of people from the university, climbed to the top of the Leaning Tower of Pisa 
with two balls of different weights and rolled them off the top simultaneously, and both balls 
landed on the ground together. In doing so, Galileo demonstrated through observation that 
traditional understandings were false because the traditional understanding was that different 
bodies would fall at different rates. However, according to Chalmers (1982b, pp. 1-2 emphasis 
in Chalmers’s text) quoting Herbert Anthony (1948, p. 148): 
[It] was not so much the observations and experiments which Galileo made that caused the break 
with tradition as his attitude to them. For him, the facts based on them were taken as facts, and 
not related to some preconceived idea ... The facts of observation might, or might not, fit into an 
acknowledged  scheme  of  the  universe,  but  the important  thing,  in  Galileo’s  opinion,  was  to 
accept the facts and build the theory to fit them.  
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What changed with Galileo was not that his actual observations overcame tradition, but that 
the observations alone were understood as evidence in themselves of the falsity of traditional 
understandings.  
Husserl (1970 (1952), pp. 23-59) would agree with Chalmers’s statement that what changed 
with Galileo was a new attitude adopted towards experience and knowledge. The description 
that I give of Husserl’s work on Galileo is taken from The Crisis and is necessarily simplified. My 
main purpose is to show that Galileo instantiated a new attitude taken towards the world that 
leads to the concept that we can generalise from experience and posit real laws of nature that 
are universally applicable.  
According to Husserl (1970 (1952), p. 28), what was decisive in Galileo’s new attitude was that 
Galileo took geometry as a ground in itself. Husserl is referring to ‘Galileo’s famous dictum that 
the book of nature is written in triangles and circles’ (Patočka, 1989 (1971), p. 230).
190 Husserl 
(1970 (1952), p. 23) argues that prior to Galileo, in the prescientific conception of the world, 
geometry was understood as idealised from the life-world. Geometry arose from the practical 
art of measurement (Husserl, 1970 (1952), pp. 24-34). For example, from seeing lines  in the 
world that are varied in respect to their straightness and length, we idealise a perfectly straight 
line that extends in both directions without end: we arrive at the idea of infi nity.  Another 
example would be: from observing imperfect lines that m eet at inexact points that vaguely 
form triangular shapes, we idealise the perfect triangle with perfectly straight sides that meet 
at exact points, whose angles can be determined with exactitude. From the practical art of 
measuring we idealise to more and  more exact measurements. Husserl argues that Galileo 
turned this  movement toward  more and more perfect ideas to understanding that our 
measurements were actually moving closer and closer to the real world of Objective nature. As 
Don Ihde (1990, p. 36) states, ‘put baldly, the object-in-itself is purely a geometrical entity’. 
                                                             
190 See Husserl (1970 (1952), pp. 23-24).  
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Galileo’s adoption of geometry as a ground in itself led to two important concepts in Galileo’s 
work:  perfect  causality  and  indirect  mathematisation  (Husserl,  1970  (1952),  pp.  34-41; 
Patočka, 1989 (1971), p. 228). According to Husserl (1970 (1952), pp. 48-49), the adoption of 
Galilean natural science leads to the surreptitious substitution of mathematical idealities for 
the life-world.    
For Husserl (1970 (1952), pp. 37-41), Galileo’s statement – that the book of nature was written 
in triangles and circles – gave rise to the concept of precise causality (Patočka, 1989 (1971), p. 
228). Galileo’s move to take the formal system of mathematical idealities as a ground in itself 
gave  rise  to  the  idea  that  we  could  abstract  from  personal  situated  experience  to  posit 
generalisations  about  nature  that  were  true  for  anybody  and  everybody.  In  positing 
generalisations that were true for anybody and everybody we could predict future states of 
affairs for anybody and everybody on the basis of these generalisations. According to Husserl 
(1970 (1952), pp. 37-41), one of Galileo’s most influential concepts was to posit an Objective 
world of nature that operated according to perfect causality (Patočka, 1989 (1971), p. 228). In 
addition, Galileo’s conception of nature gave rise to another important concept in Galileo’s 
work;  indirect  mathematisation  (Husserl,  1970  (1952),  pp.  34-37;  Patočka,  1989  (1971),  p. 
228). 
Husserl (1970 (1952), p. 37) claims that Galileo posited that the sensible qualities of human 
experience have a ‘mathematical index’.  In asserting that the spatial shapes experienced and 
experienceable as part of the life-world were underpinned by ideal and perfect geometrical 
shapes that are not experienced so much as ideated from experience, Galileo went on to posit 
that  all  sensible  qualities  of  the  things  we  encounter  were  underpinned  by  an  index  of 
regularity  (Husserl,  1970  (1952),  pp.  34-37).  As  Husserl  (1970  (1952),  p.  38  emphasis  in 
original) writes:  
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There must be measuring methods for everything encompassed by geometry, the mathematics 
of  shapes  with  its  a  priori  ideality.  And  the  whole  concrete  world  must  turn  out  to  be  a 
mathematizable  and  objective  world  if  we  pursue  those  individual  experiences  and  actually 
measure everything about them which, according to the presuppositions, comes under applied 
geometry – that is, if we work out the appropriate method of measuring. If we do that, the 
sphere of the specifically qualitative occurrences must also be mathematized indirectly.  
For Husserl (1970 (1952), pp. 34-35), the concept that every sensible quality is underpinned by 
a  determinable  and  exact  regularity  that  can  be  accessed  with  the  right  method  of 
measurement  remains  related  to  the  life-world,  because  sensible  qualities  appear  in 
gradations.  However,  the  concept  that  each  sensible  quality  has  an  exact  correlate  is  a 
hypothesis, because sensible qualities are not presented to us as exact; rather the concept that 
they are exact comes from the notion of more and more exact measurements and not from 
the experience of sense qualities. Indirect mathematisation of sense qualities to further and 
further  exact  measurements  of  them  is  a  result  of  the  method  and  is  not  available  for 
verification from experience.  
For Husserl (1970 (1952), pp. 41-43), indirect mathematisation is essentially different from 
idealisation (Patočka, 1989 (1971), p. 229). Idealisation retains its meaning fundament in the 
life-world  (Husserl,  1970  (1952),  p.  23;  Patočka,  1989  (1971),  p.  229).  For  example,  the 
meaning of the ideal triangle is arrived at from our experience of vague triangular shapes, 
uneven lines and inexactly meeting points, and idealised into a perfect idea. Once arrived at, 
the idea of ‘triangleness’ has one and the same meaning for anybody and everybody: to know 
what a triangle means is to know that it is a three sided shape. The meaning of an ideal 
triangle is a priori self-evident because it is true on the basis of its meaning (2008 (1906/07), p. 
48). Indirect mathematisation, on the other hand, lacks both verification by experience and a 
priori  self-evidence  (Husserl,  1970  (1952),  pp.  41-43;  Patočka,  1989  (1971),  p.  229).  Sense 
qualities are not experienced as exact and neither is the concept that each sense quality has a 
mathematical index true, because of the meaning of the term. Indirect mathematisation can  
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be verified neither by experience nor self-evidence, because it is a hypothesis that is constantly 
being verified and constantly in need of further verification (Husserl, 1970 (1952), pp. 41-43).  
Husserl (1970 (1952), p. 46) argues that the true meaning of mathematical natural science is 
further emptied out through the ‘technization’ of the scientific method. For Husserl  (1970 
(1952),  p.  46),  the  scientific  method  becomes  a  technique  for  achieving    correct  results. 
According to Husserl (1970 (1952), p. 49), the natural scientific conception of Objective nature 
is  not  directly  experienceable  because  it  is  a  formal  structure  of  mathematical  idealities.  
Hence, in order to reach the truth about Objective nature, we must proceed by applying the 
technical method for achieving such results  (Husserl, 1970 (1952), pp. 46-48). The natural 
scientific method becomes an ideal method (Gurwitsch, 1957, p. 378). Husserl (1970 (1952), p. 
46)  notes  that  the  most  extreme  example  of  the  technisation  of  method  is  algebraic 
arithmetic.  However, his idea extends to the notion of method per se or the concept that we 
can attain Objective knowledge through the strict application of a methodological procedure. 
For Husserl (1970 (1952), pp. 23-59), the decisive change in attitude taken towards the world 
of experience, highlighted in the work of Galileo, was that the formal system of mathematics 
came to be understood as the real world of nature. According to Husserl (1970 (1952), pp. 48-
49), Galileo’s conception of natural science and nature leads to ‘the surreptitious substitution 
of the mathematically substructured world of idealities for the only real world’.  Galileo’s work 
leads to a new attitude adopted toward the life-world – the natural scientific attitude – and 
leads to a radical change in our relation to the world in which we live.  
The  natural  scientific  attitude  leads  to  a  bifurcation  of  the  Objective  world  of  nature 
constructed by the scientific observer and the pre-scientific world of our living (Ihde, 1990, p. 
35). The objectivity of what is known can be achieved by abstracting from all Subjective
191 
experience by following a strict methodological procedure; the  objectivity of the known is 
                                                             
191 Refer to footnote 1, page 1 for an explanation of why I have capitalised the ‘S’ in Subjective.  
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understood to be possible through stripping all Subjective remnants from the subjectivity of 
the knower.  
The natural scientific attitude is related to the natural attitude – where we take the world, 
things and the possibility of knowledge for granted – but universalises and Objectivises the 
natural  attitude.  Through  the  adoption  of  the  natural  scientific  attitude  we  are  no longer 
attending to, for example, me situated in a park pointing out swans to my two year old niece, 
we are attending to formal concepts that have been abstracted from everything experienced 
and experienceable, and positing knowledge on the basis of these formal abstractions. As 
Husserl (1970 (1952) emphasis in original) writes: 
Mathematics  and  mathematical  science,  as  a  garb  of  ideas,  or  the  garb  of  symbols  of  the 
symbolic mathematical theories, encompasses everything which, for scientists and the educated 
generally, represents the life-world, dresses it up as ‘objectively actual and true’ nature. It is 
through the garb of ideas that we take for true being what is actually a method – a method which 
is  designed  for  the  purpose  of  progressively  improving,  in  infinitum,  through  ‘scientific’ 
predictions, those rough predictions which are the only ones originally possible within the sphere 
of what is actually experienced and experienceable in the life-world. It is because of the disguise 
of  ideas  that  the  true  meaning  of  the  method,  the  formulae,  the  ‘theories,’  remained 
unintelligible and, in the naïve formation of the method, was never understood. 
In  other  words,  the  natural  scientific  attitude  supplants  the  real,  vague,  imprecise  and 
meaningful world of our living with a perfect and exact formal world conceived of as Objective 
nature. 
The natural scientific attitude, with its hypothesis of indirect mathematisation, which posits 
that through the right formal method we can access the formal regularity behind qualitative 
experience, is sedimented within our historical situation to such an extent that it now makes 
perfect sense for people to say, for example, that the table is not really a table but a bunch of 
atoms with spaces in between. As Patočka (2004 (1966), p. 306) writes: 
This  radical  objectification  of  reality  –  becomes  absolutely  dominating  in  our  culture.  [This 
understanding  of  nature]  permeates  schooling  from  primary  school  onwards;  and  through  a 
technique penetrates everywhere and it is impossible for scientific methods and procedures not 
to influence everything.
192  
                                                             
192 Translated for me by Dr Lubica Učník.   
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Along  similar  lines  Ihde  (1990,  p.  37)  notes,  ‘so  much  of  this  is  taken  for  granted  that 
undergraduate students say that they ‘see’ wave lengths’. For my purposes in this chapter, 
there is an important consequence of the sedimentation of the natural scientific attitude as 
the Objectivised attitude towards the life-world. 
The  natural  scientific  attitude  places  concepts  in  the  life-world,  such  that  we  lose  the 
important  difference  between  the  concepts  of  experience  and  concrete  experience;  we 
mistake the real for the ideal (Husserl, 2001 (1913), p. 13). According to Husserl (2001 (1913), 
2008 (1906/07)), the enduring and unseen category mistake between the real and the ideal, 
which is one aspect of the sedimentation of the natural scientific attitude, leads to pure logic 
being understood as grounded upon generalisations made from particulars. We understand 
mathematical laws as the real laws of nature and logical laws as the real laws of our thinking. 
In doing so, we relativise logic and lose the basis for knowledge. We need to recover the 
theoretical attitude as the questioning attitude and a self-responsible ground for knowledge, 
so that we can recover the life-world as the meaningful world in which we live (Husserl, 1970 
(1935)).   
Theoretical Reasoning 
Husserl, the Greeks and the Theoretical Attitude 
According to Husserl (1970 (1935)), the theoretical attitude is the precursor to the natural 
scientific attitude and was instantiated by the Ancient Greeks. For Husserl (1970 (1935), p. 
285), the theoretical attitude is sharply distinguished from the mythical and practical attitudes 
that came before it. Husserl (1970 (1935), p. 286) states that the theoretical attitude opens up 
a new attitude that pursues universal life and truth-in-itself. The theoretical attitude is also, for 
Husserl (1970 (1935), p. 286), a critical attitude that resolves not to ‘accept unquestioningly 
any pregiven opinion or tradition’. As Patočka (1996b, p. 2) writes: ‘the Greeks, though, were  
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not only the first to discover the format of systematic deductive inquiry. They were also the 
first who did not take the world for granted.’  Hence, the theoretical attitude precedes the 
natural  scientific  attitude,  both  logically  and  historically.  It  is  both  the  hazard  of  such  a 
universalised  attitude,  which  becomes  sedimented  and  itself  taken  for  granted,  and  the 
importance of the theoretical attitude as a questioning attitude, that Husserl (1970 (1935), 
1970 (1952)) seeks to highlight, particularly in ‘The Vienna lecture’ and The Crisis. Part of 
highlighting both the problems and the importance of the theoretical attitude is understanding 
the difference between ideal laws of logic and the real laws of nature.
193 
Ideal laws of logic and mathematics are true because of their meaning, not because they are 
based on particular collections of experience  (Husserl, 2008 (1906/07), pp. 46 -50). The 
statement that 2 + 2 = 4 is not arrived at from gathering together instances of people counting 
2 + 2 = 4 to predict that each time someone new counts 2 + 2 = 4 it will  probably be the case 
that they will also find that 2 + 2 = 4. The equation 2 + 2 = 4 is true because of the meaning of 
cardinal numbers, to think that 2 + 2 = 5 is equivalent to not understanding the meaning of 
cardinal numbers: it is to not understand what one is talking about. Likewise, the ideal logical 
law of non-contradiction is not arrived at from gathering instances of people not contradicting 
themselves to predict that the next time a person speaks they will not contradict themselves. 
The law of non-contradiction is true because of the meaning of contradiction, to say something 
is both the case and not the case is to say nothing at all; to say it is true that something is both 
the case and not  the case is absurd, because it is to misunderstand the meaning of  both 
contradiction and truth. The objectivity of ideal laws of logic and mathematics comes from 
their meaning alone and not from gathering particular instances. The law of non-contradiction 
and the equation 2 + 2 = 4 are true because they have identical meaning for everyone and 
                                                             
193 I will come back to discussing the importance of the theoretical attitude as a self-responsible ground 
of knowledge for Husserl in chapter six.  
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anyone, no matter how they are stated or who is stating them (Husserl, 2008 (1906/07), pp. 
46-50).  
The ideal laws of logic and mathematics are instantiate at a particular point in time, based 
upon idealisations from the life-world, but once arrived at they are no longer dependent upon 
experience  (Husserl,  2008  (1906/07),  pp.  35-39).  To  take  the  example  of  the  law  of  non-
contradiction; the law of non-contradiction is based upon the experience of consistency in our 
life-world. I do not encounter a world of  chaos where things randomly slip in and out of 
existence, nor do I encounter a perfectly coherent and orderly world where all things happen 
according to plan. I go to university at the same time each week to meet my students in the 
same room I met them last week. I may not meet exactly the same group of students as I did 
last week, but the consistency of the life-world allows those students who wish to attend the 
tutorial I run to consistently find me in the same room, at approximately the same time, on the 
same day each week for the duration of the semester. The law of non-contradiction is idealised 
– that is, perfected into an ideal law – from the experience of consistency in the life-world 
(Gurwitsch, 1957, pp. 375-378).
194  
As soon as we fill in the ideal law of non -contradiction with content we are no longer dealing 
with the ideal law itself; we are dealing with a judgement from experience. If I say that it is 
true that people are both hurtful and not hurtful, I am not necessarily contradicting myself 
because I am talking about a generalisation from particular instances of encountering different 
people. However, if I state that the same person is being both hurtful and not hurtful toward 
me at a particular place in a particular time and in a particular action, then I am contradicting 
myself and not saying anything meaningful at all. If I simply say to someone that they are being 
hurtful, because it is based on my experience, then my interlocutor can disagree with me and 
                                                             
194 The law of non-contradiction is a very important logical law. Heidegger (1972) has called the law of 
non-contradiction the ‘principle of principles’. Hannah Arendt (1989, p. 37) argues that the law of non-
contradiction is not only a logical law but an ethical one as well. I will come back to the importance of 
the law of non-contradiction as an ethical law in chapter six.  
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make the claim that they are not being hurtful. Ideal laws of logic and mathematics only 
remain  ideal  laws  that  are  true  for  everybody  and  anybody  as  long  as  they  do  not  state 
anything particular about the lived experience.  
A  posteriori  generalisations  are  not  true  in  themselves,  because  they  depend  on  lived 
experience and state particular things about lived experience (Husserl, 2008 (1906/07), pp. 46-
50). It was once true, based on experience of moving about in the life-world, that the world 
was flat. It is now considered true, based on viewing the earth from space, that the world is 
round.  The  objectivity  of  the  statement  comes  from  our  intersubjectively  constituted 
understanding of the world. If I were to claim that the world is flat, I would be considered 
unreasonable, in that I would be seen to be ignoring established knowledge about the world. If 
I were to explain that in this historical period it is understood that it is true that the world is 
round, whereas in the past it was considered true that the world was flat, I would be making a 
different statement. If I were to explain that from my point of view as an earthbound creature 
the world is flat, and that from the perspective of space the earth appears to be round, I would 
also be making a different claim. In showing that the world appears differently from different 
perspectives and is understood differently in different periods of time, I am merely pointing to 
the fact  that empirical truths reference a particular time and place.
195 Therefore, it is not 
absurd to contradict a posteriori truths, although it may be disregarding established, probable 
and valuable knowledge (Husserl, 2008 (1906/07), p. 49). 
However, the idea of truth is not changed by changing empirical truths. In fact, my ability to 
claim something particular as true or false at a given time and place depends on the concept of 
                                                             
195 The example provided here is drawn from the work of Hannah Arendt. Arendt (1978, p. 38) states 
that  ‘the  world  appears  in  the  mode  of  it-seems-to-me,  depending  on  particular  perspectives 
determined by location in the world as well as by particular organs of perception.  This mode not only 
produces error, which I can correct by changing my location, drawing closer to what appears, or by 
improving my organs of perception with the help of tools and implements, or by using my imagination 
to take other perspectives into account; it also gives birth to true semblances, that is, to deceptive 
appearance, which I cannot correct like an error since they are caused by my permanent location on the 
earth and remain bound up with my own existence as one of the earth’s appearances.’  
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truth, and my ability to link claims together in a consistent way depends on the ideal logical 
laws (Husserl, 2008 (1906/07), pp. 42-50; Sokolowski, 2000, pp. 158-159). As such, to claim a 
posteriori truths and say something meaningful about the world of appearances, I need both 
the concrete appearance and the idea of truth.  However, particular truths about experience 
only ever present me with something that seems to me to be the case, because empirical 
truths are dependent on a particular state of affairs and a particular perspective upon those 
states of affairs (Arendt, 1978, p. 38).
  
The Ideal and the Real  
The A Priori Ground of A Posteriori Disciplines 
Matters of fact only produce matters of fact over and over, and universalities only prove to be 
factual universalities presumably reaching beyond previous experience. There is, therefore, no 
psychological proposition that can be substantiated with absolute certainty, anymore than there 
is any such thing in the most exact physics (Husserl, 2008 (1906/07), p. 47 emphasis in original). 
Now  that  I  have  argued  for  a  difference  between  the  a  priori  disciplines  of  logic  and 
mathematics and the a posteriori disciplines of natural scientific investigations, I can highlight 
why, for Husserl (2008 (1906/07)), the a posteriori disciplines of natural scientific investigation 
cannot ground the a priori disciplines of logic and mathematics. Ideal laws of mathematics 
cannot be grounded in studies of nature any more than logical laws can be grounded in studies 
of thinking. It is, rather, the other way around; the pure theory of logic or meaning must 
instead ground empirical natural scientific investigations (Husserl, 2008 (1906/07), p. 42).  
Although natural scientific investigations have split into many different particular sciences (for 
example,  biology,  physics,  psychology  and  sociology  among  others)  with  particular  sets  of 
normative ideals and theoretical frameworks, they are the same in that they are grounded in 
the purely theoretical realm (Husserl, 2008 (1906/07), pp. 3-5). The purely theoretical realm 
grounds the way in which each particular normative theoretical framework links its statements 
together. Without the idea of theory in the first instance, particular normative theoretical  
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frameworks would not be possible. Without the idea of theory we could not split disciplines 
into sensible wholes that investigate particular regions of the life-world. Without the idea of 
theory we would also not be able to question particular normative theoretical frameworks or 
ways of splitting regions of the life-world into separate disciplines of investigation.  
Empirical  investigations  are  not  developed  out  of  ‘pure’  experience  alone,  because  all 
theoretical inquiry requires both ideas and experience (Husserl, 2001 (1913), pp. 15-59, 2008 
(1906/07)). To forget the difference between a posteriori disciplines and a priori disciplines is 
to overlook that the theoretical framework informs our understanding of experience. It is to 
make a category mistake between the real and the ideal (Husserl, 1970 (1952), pp. 48-53). 
Empiricism is a normative theoretical framework because empiricists posit that knowledge is 
arrived at from experience alone; this is the normative ideal of all forms of empiricism. The 
different forms of empirical inquiry only differ in the method they use for justifying what is 
considered  ‘empirical’  and  what  is  considered  to  count  as  ‘empirical  evidence’.  Empirical 
inquiry is never purely and simply based on our experience of the world. 
Empirical Data and Lived Experience 
Understanding knowledge  as  ‘purely’  empirically  grounded  leads  to  an  understanding  that 
what is designated as ‘empirical’ by the normative theoretical framework is equivocated with 
concrete experience (Husserl, 1970 (1952), pp. 48-53). Each particular theoretical framework 
of investigation understands what counts as ‘empirical evidence’ differently. Hence, if we do 
not  distinguish  between  abstract  concepts  about  experience  and  concrete  experience,  we 
understand our notion of experience as the proper notion of experience. It is for this reason 
that I claim that statistical psychology and discursive psychology are both dealing with abstract 
formal categories of experience rather than concrete experience. Empirical data, in both DP 
and personality psychology, are experience reduced to abstract theoretical categories which 
are then used to read the life-world.  
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Indirect Mathematisation and Psychology 
Statistical Personality Psychology and Empirical Data 
Statistical personality psychologists do not simply make generalisations from experience; they 
make  generalisations  from  already  abstracted  empirical  data.  Human  qualities  cannot  be 
simply measured from our experience of love, hate, warmth, cold, feeling comfortable around 
people or holding particular attitudes about things. Unlike quantitative phenomena, such as 
length,  height,  weight  and  the  passing  of  time,  which  can  be  seemingly  measured  with 
instruments  that  can  be  read  the  same  way  in  each  instance  of  their  use,  qualitative 
phenomena are not amenable to measurement through instruments that are understood in 
the same way each time they are used (Husserl, 1970 (1952), pp. 34-37). Applying the natural 
scientific method to studying human behaviours, feelings, attitudes and thoughts requires an 
extra  step,  because  the  investigator  first  has  to  co-relate  the  qualitative  phenomena  to 
quantitative phenomena, as I have explained in chapter four. In this chapter, there are two 
further  points  that  I  want  to  draw  attention  to,  that  relate  specifically  to  how  statistical 
personality psychologists understand experience as a result of their adoption of the natural 
scientific hypothesis of indirect mathematisation.  
Firstly,  qualitative  phenomena,  although  they  cannot  be  measured  like  quantitative 
phenomena,  are  being  understood  in  scientific  psychology  as  underpinned  by  exact  and 
determinable quantitative phenomena (Husserl, 1970 (1935), p. 271). The different qualities of 
human existence, as they appear to us in our concrete experience of the world, are vague and 
changing  similarities  and  differences  between  ourselves  and  others  in  the  life-world. 
Personality  psychology,  in  particular  trait  theory,  understands  the  mere  appearance  of 
similarities and differences between ourselves and others as pointing to quantifiable and exact  
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differences in underlying  traits, factors or constructs.
196 The qualities of our experience of the 
world are understood  as  really  only  Subjective  elements  of  experience  that  overlay  the 
Objective quantifiable structures of our existence (Husserl, 1970 (1935), p. 293). For example, 
my ‘feeling comfortable around people’ or my preference for being ‘quiet around strangers’ 
are understood as indicating an underlying Objective dimension of extraversion-introversion, 
which  each  person  possesses  to  differing  degrees  (Costa  &  McCrae,  1985;  J.  Wiggins  & 
Trapnell,  1997).  As  such,  my  experience  of  the  life-world  as  it  appears  to  me  is  made  an 
Objective domain of inquiry in which my personal experience is understood to merely point to 
the actual Objective determinants of my subjective experience (Husserl, 1970 (1935), p. 293).  
Secondly, qualities of my experience of the world are formalised into Objectively determinable 
mathematical structures that explain my individual Subjective feeling of being ‘comfortable 
around  people’  or  being  ‘quiet  around  strangers’.  Formalising  qualities  of  experience  into 
formal structures of existence reduces the variability of my experience in the life-world to 
invariant  structures  of  existence  (Husserl,  1970  (1952),  pp.  30-31).  Sometimes  I  may  feel 
comfortable around people, and at other times I may prefer to be quiet; my choice depends on 
my particular situation at the time. However, trait theorists would state that although there is 
variability  to  this  extent,  I  must  on  average  prefer  introverted  activities  to  extraverted 
activities (Johnson, 1997; J. Wiggins & Trapnell, 1997). In addition, the formal categories of 
extraversion-introversion may be completely irrelevant to my understanding of myself; I may 
not  understand  my  preference  for  being  alone  or  being  around  people  as  important 
characteristics of myself. However, trait theorists would argue that it is not that I do not fit on 
the scale of extraversion-introversion; rather it is just a structure of my personality that I was 
not previously aware of and, now that I am, it makes sense of my comfort or ease with people 
                                                             
196 I am not claiming that personality psychologists would understand what they are doing in the same 
way that I am stating here. From my argument presented in chapter four, I am claiming that personality 
psychologists, through attempting to indirectly measure human qualities, understand traits as invariant 
structures of experience.  
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in general (Johnson, 1997; J. Wiggins & Trapnell, 1997). Finally, my preference for being alone, 
if and only if I have one, may be meaningful for me because I enjoy reading, or because I enjoy 
intellectual pursuits of reading and writing or simply because I do not like other people. My 
preference for being with other people, if and only if I have one, may be meaningful for me 
because I enjoy intellectual pursuits which require dialogue with others, or because I like to go 
to parties or simply because I enjoy others’ company. However, trait theorists would read my 
answer in terms of their scale and in terms of their meaning of the concept of extraversion-
introversion. My experience of the world is taken out of my particular situation and read 
through the formal categories or structures of personality, which supposedly have the same 
meaning for anybody and everybody.   
Trait theorists understand their measures of ‘personality’ as capturing generalised features of 
people’s experience of the world, the way they perceive others and the way they behave in 
the world. What trait theorists forget is that the formal number 5 does have the same meaning 
for anybody and everybody – to count five apples is to count the same number of apples each 
time – but the number 5 on the ‘Likert scale’
197 does not have the same meaning for anybody 
and  everyone.  The  number  5  co-related  to  an  answer  ‘strongly  agree’  to  the  item  ‘I  feel 
comfortable around people’ may mean; for me, that I like to be around people because I like 
to  talk  to  people  or  because  I  am  confident  in  myself;  or  any  manner  of  different 
generalisations of different people’s understandings of themselves and the question being 
asked.  Trait  theorists  understand  that  individual  answers  may  mean  different  things  to 
different people, but once the individual answers are totalled and compared to the population 
mean, the assumption is that they do mean the same thing to all people, because they indicate 
that someone is more extroverted or introverted than another  in general (Johnson, 1997; 
Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 2001). However, to perform mathematical calculations using the numbers 
given  on  the  scale  to  provide  the  population  mean  requires  that,  from  the  outset,  trait 
                                                             
197 Refer to footnote 137, page 162 for a discussion of the ‘Likert scale’.  
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theorists  have  to  assume  that  the  number  5  on  a  Likert  scale  means  the  same  thing  for 
everybody  and  anybody,  because  to  use  an  ideal mathematical  equation  is  to  use  formal 
numbers. Trait theorists are not generalising from experience to make general statements 
about  experience;  they  are  generalising  and  then indirectly  mathematising,  or  formalising, 
human experience and then dealing with the abstract categories of personality as if they are 
real aspects of a person’s character.  
Trait  theorists  understand  themselves  to  have  a  particular  theory  of  personality,  but  they 
understand this theory of personality to be substantiated from the empirical evidence of using 
their  scales  to  predict  people’s  actions  in  the  world  (Gough  &  Bradley,  1992;  Samuel  & 
Widiger, 2008). Trait theorists have not been particularly successful in predicting behaviour 
based on their scales, and the critique of personality psychology largely hinges on the lack of 
predictive validity of personality tests of all kinds (Alison et al., 2002; Bem & Allen, 1974; 
Johnson,  1997;  Mischel,  1968,  2004;  Swann  Jr.  &  Seyle,  2005).  However,  the  idea  that 
personality is the underlying factor that explains variability of human character remains. In 
addition, the concept of personality as an underlying factor or construct is understood to be 
verified  by  empirical  evidence  and  not  from  theoretical  argumentation  (Gough  &  Bradley, 
1992; Samuel & Widiger, 2008).   
Discursive Psychology and Empirical Data 
Speech and writing are considered as the origin of measure; for they are characterized above all 
by the ability to fix the fleeting and variable and to remove it from the accidental and arbitrary 
(Cassirer, 2000 (1945), p. 3). 
Although  CA  informed  discursive  psychologists  steers  clear  of  using  psychometric  scales, 
except to show that people do make sense of the statements on psychometric tests differently 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Hepburn, 2007), CA informed discursive psychologists still 
proceed by making generalised statements about social interaction on the basis of already  
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abstracted empirical data.  The difference between DP researchers and trait theorists is that 
DP researchers use a different method to collect and formalise empirical data.  
The main claim that CA informed researchers make to substantiate that they are investigating 
actual practices, and not abstract theoretical categories of experience, is that they do not 
collect and select data on the basis of pre-formulated ideas about social interaction or their 
interest in a particular topic (Psathas, 1995, p. 45). The concept of ‘naturally occurring data’ is 
essential  to  CA  informed  investigators  because  it  guarantees,  according  to  CA  informed 
researchers, that the ‘data’ is not picked on the basis of their own research interests (ten Have, 
1997). In addition, EM-informed investigators do not select aspects of the ‘data’ on the basis of 
particular research topics or interests because  they use ‘unmotivated looking’ to examine how 
the  ‘data  speaks  for  itself’  (Psathas,  1995;  Wowk,  2007).
198  The  transcription  and  tape 
recording that EM-informed researchers use to present their data is understood to be done for 
the practical purposes of analysis and to show their findings to other investigators. The process 
of transcription, for EM-informed researchers, is synonymous with analysis, because the first 
stage of analysis is to repeatedly play and replay the recording  (Potter & Hepburn, 2007, p. 
280; S. Wiggins & Potter, 2008, pp. 83-84). According to ten Have (1997, p. 3), ‘it is in and by 
this process of repeated listening, looking and transcribing that the phenomena of interest can 
                                                             
198 I am using the strong CA notion of naturally occurring data, because in my own analyses I was 
following this strong requirement of EM and CA research. Discursive psychologists often make the lesser 
claim that naturally occurring data is important, because as Wiggins and Potter (2008, p. 78) note, ‘it 
avoids  imposing  the  researchers’  own  categories  or  assumptions  onto  the  data’;  but  this  does  not 
change  the  claim  I  am  making  here  because  researchers’  ‘categories’  and  ‘assumptions’  inform 
discursive  psychological  investigations  from  the  outset.  The  issue  of  naturally  occurring  data  is  a 
contentious issue within the literature and other people have critiqued the notion of naturally occurring 
data. See for example the debate in Volume 9, Issue 2 of Discourse Studies published in 2007 (Griffin, 
2007a, 2007b; Henwood, 2007; Potter & Hepburn, 2007). Also see the debate in Volume 4, Issue 4 of 
Discourse Studies published in 2002 (Lynch, 2002; Potter, 2002; Speer, 2002a, 2002b; ten Have, 2002b). 
However, despite the debate surrounding naturally occurring data and the criticisms that have been 
made of this concept, working with naturally occurring data is one of the central notions of CA and DP 
(Edwards & Potter, 2001, p. 258; Potter & Hepburn, 2007, pp. 277-278; Schegloff, 1996; S. Wiggins & 
Potter,  2008,  pp.  78-79).  The  concept  of  naturally  occurring  data,  or  as  it  is  sometimes  called, 
naturalistic records (Potter & Hepburn, 2007, p. 277), goes hand in hand with discursive psychologists’ 
claim to be studying everyday life as it actually happens (Edwards & Potter, 2001, p. 258; S. Wiggins & 
Potter, 2008, p. 79).  
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be noticed’. However, when they are dealing with the tape recording and transcribing they are 
transforming the social situation into a piece of ‘data’ that can be read in the same way by 
anybody and everybody acquainted with the method of transcription. They are removing the 
social situation from a particular situation that is meaningful for those who are participating in 
it  and  placing  the  recorded  social  situation  into  the  researcher’s  frame  of  reference  for 
understanding social interaction in general.  
The  first  abstractive  move  made  in  an  EM/CA  informed  DP  investigation  is  to  record 
‘naturalistically occurring’ talk (Potter & Hepburn, 2007). For example, in my own research, I 
recorded therapy sessions, which I did not take part in. Tape recording of the therapy session 
reduces the meaningful social situation that the therapist and client are involved in to a copy 
of that therapy session and, in doing so, freezes a temporary social situation into an Object of 
inquiry that can be listened to again and again. What is removed from a lived social situation, 
from  consideration  in  an  EM-informed  investigation  of  social  interaction,  is  both  that  it 
happens within a concrete social situation such as a psychologist’s office, and the fact that 
particular people are talking. The actual situation of sitting in a psychologist’s office is not 
relevant  to  my  inquiry,  because  the  ‘context’  of  social  interaction  is  understood  to  be 
displayed in the talk-in-interaction itself. The particular people in the social situation are not 
considered, because what matters is the way people in general organise social affairs. The 
term ‘member’ indicates exactly this, they are not persons in the full sense of the word, they 
are ‘members’ of society displaying competencies (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970, pp. 333-334) or 
‘participants’’ order in their talk (Schegloff, 2007a, p. 1). The real and particular social situation 
in which people are talking to one another, and the real and particular people who are talking 
together, are removed from EM-informed investigations because both are reduced to talk-in-
interaction itself. The recording of the session is the first abstractive move in EM-informed DP, 
because freezing the situation in order to come back to it time and time again allows the  
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analyst to pay attention only to the talk-in-interaction and not to the real and particular social 
situation in which real and particular people are engaged.  
The second abstractive move in EM-informed DP is the turning of the tape recording into the 
written transcript. In transcribing the recorded session of therapy, I am turning spoken words 
into written words and qualities of people’s expressions into written symbols. In order to do 
so,  I  use  the  Jeffersonian  transcription  system  (Jefferson,  1984,  2004).
199  I use a formal 
transcription system that has been  established so that anybody and everybody who is 
acquainted with the Jeffersonian transcription system can read my data in an identical 
manner. There may be some discrepancy for me as to whether a word I am listening to is said 
loud, and thus indicated with capitals (e.g. WORD), or is only said with emphasis , and thus 
indicated with underlining (e.g.  word); but once I have decided upon underlining to indicate 
the quality of the sound I am hearing, each person reading my transcript will read the word as 
emphasised. In the process of transcribing the tape  recording according to the Jeffersonian 
system I have formalised the social situation into a set of fixed symbols that can be understood 
by everybody and anybody who is acquainted with the Jeffersonian transc ription system. The 
lived social situation is indirectly mathematised by freezing  it into an Object of investigation 
and  then  co -relating  the  quality  of  people’s  expressions  to  the  symbols  of  a  formal 
transcription system.  
Although discursive psychologists would claim that the tape recording and the transcribing of 
the recording are incidental to their investigations because the ‘real’ source of ‘data’ is the 
social situation or the tape recording (ten Have, 2003; S. Wiggins & Potter, 2008, p. 83), the 
process  of  abstracting  ‘data’  from  the  concrete  social  situation  is  important  for  the 
investigations.
200  Sacks  (1984a,  p.  26)   states,  ‘I  started  to  work  with  tape-recording 
                                                             
199 Refer to Appendix for a list of the transcription symbols. 
200 What the source of data actually is, according to conversation analysts and discursive psychologists, 
is more complicated than I am claiming here. As Hammersley (2003a, p. 759 emphasis in original) notes,  
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conversations. Such materials had a single virtue, I could replay them’. I suggest that Sacks 
would not have developed CA without the tape recorder because it was the tape recorder was 
able to freeze the social situation into an Object of investigation. In addition, the transcription 
system is not incidental to either CA or DP, as it is removing extracts from the tape recording 
and presenting the extracts from the recorded data as symbols with fixed meanings; allowing 
researchers to ‘empirically’ evidence their claims in written reports to other researchers. Like 
statistical psychologists state that the actual placing of numbers on particular statements is of 
limited  meaning  when  it  is  an  essential  part  of  constructing  and  interpreting  test  results 
(Davison, 1992, p. 249); the tape recording and transcribing of the social situation are essential 
to CA and DP researchers because their investigations could not proceed without them.  
Conversation analysts and discursive psychologists indirectly mathematise social situations as 
part  and  parcel  of  their  methodological  procedure.  Conversation  analysts  and  discursive 
psychologists, as I did in my investigations, present the social situation through a series of 
symbolic signifiers that are meaningful for the investigators and not for the people in the 
situation. Firstly, they record the session and remove it from the ebb and flow of everyday life. 
Secondly, they represent intonations with arrows, emphasis with underlining, slower speech 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
‘one  problem  concerns  the  nature  of  the  data  CA  employs  ...  It  is  less  clear,  however,  what  the 
phenomena or data are in the case of CA. There are four possibilities: the features of the particular 
conversational interactions under study; audio- or video-recordings of those interactions; transcripts of 
those  recordings;  or  the  analyst-as-member’s  interpretations  of  the  transcripts  and/or  recordings’. 
Hammersley (2003a, pp. 759-760) points out problems with each approach taken. However, all I am 
pointing to here is that the tape recording and the transcript are centrally important to CA and DP. Gail 
Jefferson (1984, 2004), the inventor of the Jeffersonian transcription system, recently died, and part of 
her legacy is this transcription system, which she started putting together while working with Sacks 
(Stuulen  Jefferson  Co.,  2008).  Jefferson  nicely  sums  up  the  role  of  transcription  in  CA  with  two 
comments in her paper. In introducing the article Jefferson (2004, p. 13 emphasis in original) writes, ‘the 
one thing I’d rather not do is talk about transcribing. It’s not a topic. Transcribing is just something one 
does to prepare materials for analysis, theorizing, etc. Do the best you can, but what is there to talk 
about’. In concluding the article, Jefferson (2004, p. 23) writes, ‘but they’re *the order of the practices 
are+ ‘there’ in the talk recorded on the tapes, and many of them are captured in the transcripts that use 
the system explicated in the ensuing glossary of transcript symbols. Some of them have led to the 
discovery of ranges of orderliness; most of them are yet to be explored’. The transcription system and 
the tape recording are both a mundane and a crucial part of CA studies, including DP. Transcribing the 
tape recording into transcript was one of the most exciting parts of my research because it gave me the 
feeling of moving closer and closer to what was actually happening in the interaction and this is echoed 
nicely by Jefferson (2004, p. 13): ‘I’d probably rather transcribe than do any other part of my work’.   
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with  greater  than  and  less  than  signs,  etc;  that  is,  represent  the  quality  of  a  person’s 
expression through agreed upon symbols that fix the meaning of the qualities of sound heard. 
Thirdly, it is on the basis of these symbols, words as they are transcribed and measured pauses 
in the speech, that EM/CA informed DP researchers make claims about social interaction. For 
example, I can present a ‘no’ in speech when a ‘no’ is not stated, by showing the measured 
pause (e.g. (0.2)), the word ‘well’ and in breath (.hh), that is used before the person starts 
speaking.
201 Once the transcript is represented in this way, any EM/CA informed researcher 
understands the utterance as a  ‘non-verbal no’ or in CA terms a ‘dispreferred turn shape’ 
(Kitzinger & Frith, 1999; Pomerantz, 1984). EM/CA informed DP investigators proceed from 
already abstracted formal presentations of data as if they are capturing the concrete practices 
of the lived social situation.   
Discursive Psychology and Statistical Psychology as Competing 
Forms of Empiricism 
Empirical natural science is the normative framework from which discursive psychologists and 
scientific psychologists proceed. Both approaches to research assume that knowledge can be 
gained from experience alone. In doing so, they both overlook the theoretical framework that 
informs their research and replace lived experience with abstract theoretical concepts. Both 
approaches indirectly mathematise their object of inquiry, but proceed as if their formalised 
categories of experience are real parts of concrete experience (Husserl, 1970 (1952), pp. 34-
37).  Both  discursive  psychologists  and  scientific  psychologists  make  a  category  mistake 
between the real and the ideal.  
Discursive psychology and personality psychology differ in the normative ideal of inquiry and 
the method of investigation. Personality psychologists aim to understand the structures of 
personality that underlie patterns of similarity and difference between people, so they choose 
                                                             
201 For example: ‘(0.2) well (0.6) er (0.4) .hh actually I think I already have plans this evening’.   
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a statistical procedure that enables them to relate each person to a population mean in order 
to Objectively assess the similarities and differences between people (Johnson, 1997; Nezami 
& Butcher, 2000; Samuel & Widiger, 2008). Discursive psychologists wish to investigate the 
sequential  structures  of  talk-in-interaction  that  explain  how  people  order  the  social  world 
using psychological topics and categories, so they choose to tape record a social interaction 
and use transcription to standardise the interaction. Tape recording and transcription allow 
the ‘data’ to be read in the same way as any other social interaction; enabling claims about 
how the social world is ordered in general. Personality psychologists investigate structures of 
personality through statistical methods and discursive psychologists investigate structures of 
social  interaction  through  transcription  methods.  However,  both  proceed  by  choosing  a 
method to fix the meaning of their ‘empirical data’ from the contingent and changing lived 
experience.  
Personality psychologists understand themselves as working toward a definitive description of 
what ‘personality’ is; but that can be reached because they have agreed upon the direction in 
which they will find the answer. The normative theoretical framework, which relies upon the 
empirical natural scientific method, is no longer questioned because they proceed along one 
direction of investigation and build upon others’ work in the area. Personality psychologists 
may disagree on the exact method to use, the exact psychometric inventory and even the best 
theoretical formulation of personality; but what is not questioned is whether personality is 
best  understood  as  a  structure  of  anybody  and  everybody  that  can  be  described  through 
mathematics.  
Similarly,  discursive  psychologists  understand  themselves  as  working  toward  a  definitive 
description of what social interaction is; but that can be reached because they have agreed 
upon the direction that they will find the answer. Like personality psychologists, discursive 
psychologists’ normative theoretical framework, which relies upon empirical natural scientific  
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method, is no longer questioned because they proceed along one direction of investigation 
and  build  upon  others’  work  in  the  area.  Parallel  to  personality  psychologists,  discursive 
psychologists may disagree on whether video recording is better than audio recording, how 
best  to  transcribe  a  section  of  recorded  ‘data’,  whether  members’  methods  are  only 
conversational methods or whether a particular description of members’ methods is actually 
describing the methods of members or includes analytic notions. However, like personality 
psychologists, discursive psychologists do not question whether common sense knowledge is 
the appropriate and only way of understanding people’s practical activities.  
Both  discursive  psychology  and  statistical  personality  psychology  are  grounded  upon  the 
natural  scientific  hypothesis  of  indirect  mathematisation.  Both  discursive  psychology  and 
statistical  psychology  are  based  upon  a  hypothesis  that  is  constantly  being  verified  but 
constantly in need of verification. For personality psychologists this is easier to see because the 
hypothesis is, straightforwardly, that human character is possible to measure indirectly. For 
discursive psychologists the hypothesis is that the world is produced and reproduced through 
the actions of members. Both discursive psychologists and personality psychologists assume 
that their hypothesis is the correct hypothesis; yet to those outside of their methodological 
domain it is not the correct hypothesis. The resolution between methodological approaches 
does not come from pointing to the empirical evidence, because this evidence is only valid if 
you  accept  the  hypothesis.  The  empirical  natural  scientific  attitude  closes  down  dialogue 
rather than opening up dialogue.  
The theoretical attitude as the questioning attitude opens up dialogue, because it is through 
engaging  with  each  other’s  approaches  to  research  and  questioning  each  other’s 
presuppositions that we can start to have a meaningful dialogue. Logic is not just an empty 
formal activity: it grounds our ability to speak meaningfully about things. Logos in its original  
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sense, in the sense that the  Ancient Greeks proposed, is meaningful talk about things. As 
Patočka (1996a, p. 9) writes: 
Such is logos, language, meaningful discourse. With the art of discourse about things, dia-logos, 
the  Greek  thinkers  transformed  language  into  a  tool  for  working  out  constant,  unchanging 
meanings on which we can depend, to which we can return so that they are always available, 
perennially present. 
The theoretical standpoint is an ideal standpoint through which we can question, through 
which we can attempt to disclose the meaning of things, and through which we can ground 
our claims to know (Husserl, 2001 (1913), p. 131).  
In the next chapter, I seek to do two things. Firstly, I want to return, where I started and reveal 
the  similarities  and  the  differences  between  ethnomethodology  and  phenomenology. 
Garfinkel’s (2007) elimination of the theoretical attitude is a significant difference between the 
two disciplines. Garfinkel’s abandonment of the theoretical standpoint altogether leads him to 
once again empiricise the life-world and, in so doing, return to a purely formalised conception 
of the social world that obscures the life-world once again. More importantly, I want to argue 
in the next chapter that Garfinkel’s conception of the life-world eliminates the historical aspect 
of the life-world. However, I want to retain Garfinkel’s insight that we do share a world and 
that we can understand each other.  
Secondly, I want to argue that the theoretical attitude, and in particular the axiom of non-
contradiction,  allows  for  a  self-responsible  ground  of  knowledge,  because  through 
understanding  the  importance  of  consistency  we  can  reunite  the  ethical  with  the 
epistemological. I will argue that we need to reconstruct what our unquestioning adoption of 
the natural scientific attitude has destroyed: reason and conscience as a single unity (Adorno, 
2001 (1965), p. 3; Arendt, 1989, p. 37; Cassirer, 2000 (1945), p. 4; Gurwitsch, 1945; Husserl, 
1970 (1935), pp. 294-295; Kosík, 1995 (1967); Patočka, 1996b, pp. 9-11).   
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Chapter Six: Context, Common Sense 
and Historical Situatedness 
The World and Reasoning 
In  the  last  two  chapters,  I  have  argued  for  an  important  difference  between  indirect 
mathematisation, or the universal formalisation of the world, and idealisation, which retains 
its  meaning  fundament in  the  life-world.  The  natural  scientific  attitude  loses its  life-world 
foundation and, hence, only discloses the nature of formal systems. The theoretical attitude 
retains its foundation in the life-world and, hence, can disclose the meaningful things that we 
encounter in our everyday lives. I have also attempted to reveal the historical character of the 
life-world and the importance of history in understanding our current situation. In this chapter, 
I will discuss the world as a shared world and our equal capacity for reason. 
I  started  my  thesis  with  three  similarities  and  one  difference  between  Garfinkel’s 
ethnomethodological (EM) program and Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy.
202 I would 
like to name the concepts that Garfinkel introduced me to; and I still respect his work for the 
road he paved for me. Firstly, Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) pointed out to me the problems with 
the formalisation that is prevalent throughout the variety of psychological research methods. 
Secondly, Garfinkel (1967a, pp. 36-37) directed my attention to the world as a shared world 
which  we  could  understand.  Thirdly,  Garfinkel  (1967b)  revealed  that  the  world  was 
intersubjectively  constituted  by  us.  However,  Garfinkel’s  (1967a,  pp.  vii-viii,  2007)  
acknowledged rejection of the role of theoretical attitude is an important difference between 
Husserl’s  phenomenology  and  Garfinkel’s  EM  program.  Garfinkel  becomes  the  forgetful 
                                                             
202 I have mainly drawn upon five of Husserl’s (1970 (1935), 1970 (1952), 1999 (1902/03), 2001 (1913), 
2008 (1906/07)) texts: The Crisis, ‘The Vienna lecture’, The Idea of Phenomenology, ‘Prolegomena to 
pure reason’ in Logical Investigations and ‘Part I. The idea of pure logic as a formal theory of science’ in 
Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge. In addition I have only paid attention to one aspect of 
Husserl’s work: the difference between the theoretical attitude and the natural scientific attitude that 
we can adopt towards the life-world.  
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theoriser
203  and,  in  doing  so,  obscures  the  very  phenomena  he  wishes  to  reveal:  the 
intersubjectively constituted life-world. In the beginning, I respected Garfinkel’s (1967a, 2007) 
as well as Lynch’s (1993) work because both were consistent in their avoidance of theory and 
both consistently rejected concepts as part of their investigations. Nevertheless, I have now 
come to realise the problem with Garfinkel’s (2007) and Lynch’s (1993) consistent rejection of 
theory and their acknowledged reluctance to engage with Husserl’s account of the historical 
development of the natural scientific attitude. 
In adopting the EM attitude to research and attempting to follow Garfinkel’s (1967a, 2007) and 
Lynch’s (1993) lead to consistently reject the theoretical attitude, I did not realise that I was 
relying on the very ground I was seeking to reject. Throughout my thesis I am theorising and 
engaging with formal argumentation. However, in the first part of my thesis I did not realise 
that I was theorising and, hence, I was the forgetful theoriser. I was attempting to reveal the 
world as a shared world and the problems with the natural scientific interpretation of human 
experience, but by reinstating the formalisation of the life-world lost sight of both.  In the 
second part of my thesis, I have purposefully theorised in an attempt to reveal the difference 
between the natural scientific attitude and the theoretical attitude; in order to recover the 
importance of the theoretical attitude and the life-world, by drawing upon Husserl’s work.   
In the previous two chapters, although I was not attending to the relation between EM and 
phenomenology specifically, which makes EM to a certain extent unique among the three 
methodological approaches I have addressed (Garfinkel, 2007; Lynch, 1993; Lynch & Bogen, 
1994), I have spoken to the important difference between Husserl’s and Garfinkel’s critique of 
the natural sciences. Husserl’s (1970 (1935), 1970 (1952)) critique that natural science has lost 
its  life-world  foundation  and  Garfinkel’s  (2007)  interpretation  of  Husserl’s  critique  are 
significantly  different.  The  difference  between  Husserl’s  critique  of  natural  science  and 
                                                             
203 To use Husserl’s phase (1969, p. 15), I will use this phrase throughout the chapter.  
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Garfinkel’s  interpretation  is  that,  for  Husserl  (1970  (1952),  p.  270),  natural  science  is  a 
historical  and  cultural  accomplishment  (Gurwitsch,  1957);  whereas,  for  Garfinkel  (2007; 
Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970), scientific findings are the collective accomplishments of a particular 
group  of  scientists  in  the  particular  setting  of  a  laboratory.
204  The important difference 
between  Husserl’s  (1970  (1935),  1970  (1952))  phenomenology  and  Garfinkel’s  (1967a)  EM 
program is that, while EM tries to close down the theoretical and hence loses the historical 
aspect of the life-world, phenomenology opens up the theoretical attitude and attends to the 
historical  aspect of the life-world. 
In this chapter, I will first attend to the relation between Garfinkel’s EM (1967a) program and 
Schütz’s  (1953,  1970)  social  phenomenology.  I  will  read  Schütz  through  Husserl’s 
phenomenological standpoint, rather than Garfinkel’s EM standpoint. In so doing, I will reveal 
three  important  differences  between  Garfinkel’s  (1967a,  pp.  36-38)  and  Schütz’s  (1953) 
notions of common sense knowledge. The differences hinge upon the assumption of shared 
meaning between three important concepts for both Garfinkel’s and Schütz’s work. Firstly, 
both Garfinkel (1967a, pp. vi-vii, 36-38) and Schütz (1953, 1970, pp. 152-153) agree that there 
is an important difference between common sense and scientific knowledge. Secondly, they 
both agree that common sense knowledge is shared knowledge. Thirdly, they both agree that 
doubt is important for making visible our taken for granted assumptions. However, because 
Garfinkel  does  not  make  a  distinction  between  the  natural  scientific  and  the  theoretical 
attitude he reads Schütz’s notion of social science, common sense and the method of doubt 
from the standpoint of natural science. Hence, Garfinkel unwittingly reinstates the empirical 
natural scientific method that drains our lives of meaning. Following on from the discussion of 
the  different  understandings  of  Schütz  and  Garfinkel,  I  will  then  attend  to  how  we  might 
rethink common sense as shared sense rather than shared method. 
                                                             
204 For Garfinkel’s interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology see Garfinkel (2007) and Garfinkel and 
Liberman (2007). For a discussion on the relationship between Garfinkel’s and Husserl’s work see Lynch 
(1993).   
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There are two important notions that I want to discuss in regards to rethinking common sense: 
the world as whole and our equal capacity for reason. Drawing upon the previous chapter, I 
want to explicate Robert Sokolowski’s (2000, p. 44) statement that ‘the world as a whole and 
the I as the center are the two singularities between which all other things can be placed’. I will 
argue that in order to engage with the differences between ourselves and others we require a 
concept that we live in one and the same world and that we all have an equal capacity to 
reason (Husserl, 2001 (1913), p. 79). I will propose that there are some commonalities that 
appear to us as regularities in the life-world, which indicate that we share one and the same 
world  (Gurwitsch,  1957).  The  commonalities  are  not  empirical.  Rather,  they  are imprecise 
consistencies
205 that can and have been interpreted differently in different historical situations. 
This leads to very different understandings of the relationship between the two aspects of the 
life-world: the ‘ethical’ and ‘astronomical’ order, to use Ernst Cassirer’s (2000 (1945), pp. 1-2) 
terminology.  I  will  suggest  that  our  current  historical  situation,  in  which  we  adopt  the 
universalised  natural  scientific  attitude,  radically  splits  the  ‘ethical’  order  from  the 
‘astronomical’ order (Cassirer, 2000 (1945), p. 7).
206 In doing so, I will advocate a position, in 
line with Husserl (1999 (1902/03), p. 18), that we need to rethink the relationship between the 
objectivity of the known and the  subjectivity of the knower in order to reinstate the unity 
between conscience and reason ;
207  so  that  we  can  follow  Husserl’s  (1970  (1935),  p.  298, 
1973a, p. 6) proposal of a self-responsible ground of knowledge. 
In this chapter, I will highlight the ethical aspect of Husserl’s (1970 (1952), pp. 293-294) work in 
order to reveal that Husserl’s questioning of the problem of knowledge is not only relevant for 
epistemological concerns but also for ethical concerns. The splitting of the Objective
208 world 
                                                             
205 See for example Husserl (1970 (1952), p. 25). 
206 I will continue to use Cassirer’s terms throughout the chapter. 
207 I am adopting Karel Kosík’s (1995 (1967)) terminology here. 
208 Refer to footnote 1, page 1 for an explanation of why I have capitalised the ‘O’ in Objective.  
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of nature from the Subjective
209 human world separates our claims to know from the person 
who makes those claims: the objectivity of known is understood as independent from the 
subjectivity of the knower.
210 As such, we do not understand ourselves as responsible for our 
claims to know. I will suggest that the splitting of the known from the knower has particular 
relevance for psychology because we are making knowledge claims about ourselves. I will then 
put forward that we need to reinstate the interdependence of the  objectivity of the known 
and the subjectivity of the knower; to open up the possibility of a self -responsible ground to 
our knowledge so that we can be responsible researchers in the discipline of psychology.  
Rather than rid ourselves of the  either the Objective or the Subjective altogether, Husserl 
(1999  (1902/03),  pp.  15-21)  argues  that  we  need  to  rethink  the  relation  between  the 
objectivity of the known and the subjectivity of the knower. In order to bring into question the 
natural  scientific  interpretation  of  the  life-world,  we  need  to  understand  the  historical 
character  of  the  life-world. What  I  am  proposing,  in  line with  Husserl  (1970  (1935),  1970 
(1952)), is to reconstruct the reasoning human being as the centre of our life-world, because it 
is our world; we must recover the theoretical from our shared history in order to understand 
the natural scientific attitude and bring this one-sided attitude into question. We must return 
to the life-world as the shared world of meaning.  
In concluding the chapter, I will propose the reason that Garfinkel’s EM program, and the 
interconnected methods of CA and DP, cannot present a genuine alternative to quantitative 
                                                             
209 Refer to footnote 1, page 1 for an explanation of why I have capitalised the ‘S’ in Subjective. 
210 I am adopting Husserl’s terminology here and I will continue to use his terminology throughout the 
chapter. Husserl (2001 (1900), p. 2) writes in the ‘Foreword’ to the first edition of Logical Investigations, 
‘in this manner my whole method, which I had taken over from the convictions of the reigning logic, that 
sought to illuminate the given science through psychological analyses, became shaken, and I felt myself 
more  and  more  pushed  towards  general  critical  reflections  on  the  essence  of  logic,  and  on  the 
relationship, in particular, between the subjectivity of knowing and the objectivity of the content know’. 
In ‘Lecture I’ of the Idea of Phenomenology Husserl (1999 (1902/03), p. 19) proposes, ‘what is required is 
a science of what exists in the absolute sense. This science, which we call metaphysics, grows out of a 
‘critique’ of positive knowledge in the particular sciences. It is based upon the insight acquired by a 
general critique of knowledge into the essence of knowledge and known objectivity according to its 
various basic types, that is, according to the various basic correlations between knowledge and known 
objectivity’.  
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psychological methods is that they cannot account for the human actor who can engage in 
meaningful dialogue about things. In our practical life, we live amongst meaningful things, the 
meaning  of  which  we  take  for  granted  in  the  course  of  our  everyday  activities.    What 
ethnomethodologists, as well as discursive psychologists and conversation analysts, take for 
granted is the meaningfulness of our life-world and our human  capacity to reason. When 
analysing my extracts I am not attending to neutral data: I am attending to the meaning of 
words. However, by not paying attention to what I am doing I am attempting to remove the 
variability in the meaningfulness of words, and in turn reduce words to empty signifiers.
211 In 
emptying out the meaningfulness of words I am removing the disclosing aspects of the words. 
In the second part of my thesis I am attempting to reveal the disclosing aspect of meaningful 
dialogue.
212  
Words and actions are not merely means through which we achieve some end or an other, 
they are essential to the meaningfulness of our lives as we are both speaking and acting 
beings. Speaking and acting are the way we appear in the world; they are essential aspects to 
being human. Speaking and acting always occur in a personal situation and, as such, cannot be 
studied from an impersonal standpoint. To study my thoughts and actions as separate from my 
personal situation is to turn my own words and actions into the words and actions of anybody 
and everybody; it is to empty out the meaningfulness that they have for me and for others I 
meet in my everyday encounters with them. 
                                                             
211 For a similar claim see Husserl (2008 (1906/07), p. 36) and Sokolowski (2000, pp. 171-172). 
212 For a similar claim see Sokolowski (2000, pp. 171-172).  
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Common Sense Knowledge and Questioning: Garfinkel and 
Schütz213 
As I have attended to the Garfinkel’s interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology which occurs 
in his later work, I will now turn my attention to Garfinkel’s appropriation of Schütz in his early 
work.
214 In his early work, Garfinkel (1967a, pp. 8, 30, 36-44) describes ethnomethodology as 
the study of people’s commonsense knowledge. Garfinkel (1967a, pp. 36-38) attributes the 
term  commonsense  knowledge  to  Schütz’s  work  on  social  phenomenology.  There  are 
important similarities between Schütz and Garfinkel’s approaches to studying the social world. 
Both Schütz (1953, p. 25, 1970, p. 319) and Garfinkel (1967a, pp. 50, 55) suggest that common 
sense is the common stock of knowledge that we share. According to both Garfinkel (1967a, p. 
7) and Schütz (1953, pp. 1-4, 1970, p. 319), there is a difference between common sense and 
scientific  knowledge  because  common  sense  is  partial,  incoherent  and  good  enough  for 
practical  purposes,  while  scientific  knowledge  is  formal  and  adheres  to  strict  controls.  In 
addition, both Garfinkel (1967a, p. 50) and Schütz (1970, pp. 152-153) agree that doubting is 
an important part of revealing the invisibility of our taken for granted assumptions. However, 
an important difference between Schütz and Garfinkel’s approaches to studying the social 
world becomes apparent when we take into account Schütz and Garfinkel’s different accounts 
of the ‘subjective point of view’ and the theoretical attitude.  
Schütz’s (1970, p. 271) states that the ‘subjective point of view’ is what guarantees ‘that the 
world of social reality will not be replaced by a fictional non-existing world constructed by the 
scientific observer’. For Schütz, it is our ability as people in the world to question taken for 
granted understandings of the life-world that guarantees that we do not lose sight of the 
world  in  which  we  live  through  complying  to  one  interpretation:  the  natural  scientific 
                                                             
213  In  this  section,  I  am  drawing  specifically  upon  Schütz’s  philosophical  work  where  he  discusses 
phenomenology (for example see Schütz, 1953, 1970). I am not discussing Schütz’s own investigations of 
the social world.  
214  For  Garfinkel’s  adoption  of  Husserl  see  Garfinkel  (2007)  and  Garfinkel  and  Liberman  (2007).  In 
addition, refer to Lynch’s (1993) discussion of the influence of Husserl on Garfinkel. For Garfinkel’s 
(1967a) appropriation of Schütz see Studies in Ethnomethodology.  
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interpretation. Garfinkel rejects Schütz’s reliance on the subjective point of view because he 
interprets it as a psychologised interpretation of the social world, i.e. as a reduction of social 
world to the workings of individual’s private mental states.
215 However, Garfinkel misses that 
Schütz is using the term ‘subjective’ in a different sense. Schütz  (1970, p. 152) states the 
relation between subjectivity and objectivity as follows: 
The subjectively determined selection of elements relevant to the purpose at hand out of the 
objectively given totality of the world taken for granted gives rise to a decisive new experience: 
the experience of doubt, of questioning, of choosing and deciding, in short deliberation. 
Hence, Schütz is using subjective in the sense of a perspective from which to view the world 
and arguing that through the experience of viewing the world from a particular perspective, in 
reference to the objectively given world, we can doubt and question our understanding of the 
world in which we live.  Phenomenological investigations, according to Schütz (1970, p. 271 
emphasis  added),  ‘agree  that  the  common-sense  knowledge  of  everyday  life  is  the 
unquestioned  but  always  questionable  background  within  which  inquiry  starts  and  within 
which alone it can be carried out’. 
On the contrary, for Garfinkel (1967a, pp. vii-viii), common sense knowledge is the way in 
which members conduct their everyday affairs and the only way of investigating those affairs. 
For Garfinkel (1967a, p. viii), reflexivity is an attribute of the phenomenon being investigated 
and not an attribute of social actors or investigators. Garfinkel (1967a, p. vii emphasis added) 
in his ‘Preface’ to Studies in Ethnomethodology writes, ‘by permitting us to locate and examine 
[everyday activities] occurrence the reflexivity of that phenomenon establishes their study’. We 
can  see  from  Garfinkel’s  work  that  common  sense  knowledge  is  only  an  unquestioned 
background to everyday affairs  and is not available for questioning by either members of 
society  or  social  researchers.  In  short,  the  social  actor,  the  ‘subjective  point  of  view’,  is 
removed from Garfinkel’s EM program altogether. 
                                                             
215 See Garfinkel’s (1967a, pp. 36-38) Studies in Ethnomethodology for support of this claim. Also see 
Sharrock and Buttons (1991) discussion of the social actor in ethnomethodology.  
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A second important difference between Schütz’s and Garfinkel’s approach to studying the 
social world is their understanding of theory. For Schütz (1970, pp. 55-56), the theoretical 
attitude  is  necessary  to  adopt  in  order  to  bring  into  question  common  sense  knowledge. 
Garfinkel  rejects  Schütz’s  reliance  on  the  theoretical  attitude  because  he  argues  that  any 
theoretical framework is a formal system that limits what can be observed to the theoretical 
categories that the researcher has set up in the first place.
216 However, Garfinkel misses that 
Schütz is using a different sense of the word theoretical. Schütz separates out the na tural 
scientific attitude, which is a particular theoretical framework, from the  theoretical attitude, 
which he denotes as the questioning attitude. Schütz (1970, pp. 72-73) wishes to question the 
natural scientific attitude, which he understands to be embedded within the ‘world of our 
everyday living’, and understands the only way of bringing into question the natural scientific 
attitude as through the theoretical attitude. For Garfinkel, this is not the case because he does 
not  make  a  distinction  between  the  natural  scientific  attitude,  as  a  particular  theoretical 
framework,  and  the  theoretical  attitude  as  a  mode  of  questioning  and,  hence,  seeks  to 
eliminate both from his investigations of the social world.
217  
Garfinkel (1967b) puts forward that we can understand the way people do things because they 
enact what they do so that it can be understood. The way that people enact what they do in a 
way that can be understood within a particular situation at a particular time Garfinkel (1967a, 
p. 30) calls a method. The ethnomethodologist can observe what other people do within a 
                                                             
216 I am drawing upon Garfinkel’s discussion of Schütz in Studies in Ethnomethodology. Garfinkel (1967a, 
p.  37)  writes  that  Schütz  ‘pointed  out,  a  “special  motive”  is  required  to  make  [everyday  scenes] 
problematic’. However, Garfinkel (1967a, p. 37) goes on to claim that, rather than a ‘special motive’, he 
prefers  a  procedure  through  which  to  make  ‘familiar  scenes’  problematic.  Given  my  research  into 
Garfinkel, Schütz and Husserl, I am interpreting the ‘special motive’ as the theoretical attitude and 
‘procedure’ as what has been called Garfinkel’s breach experiments which I shall go on to explain. 
Hence, my claim that Garfinkel rejects the importance that Schütz places upon the theoretical attitude is 
an extrapolation from Garfinkel’s work, but one I think is justified. 
217 Garfinkel would agree that he seeks to avoid the theoretical attitude  (see for example Garfinkel, 
1967b, 2007; Garfinkel & Liberman, 2007) . Also see Rawls  (2002)  for  a  discussion  of  Garfinkel’s 
understanding  of  theory.  However,  the  claim  that  Garfinkel  misses  the  difference  between  the 
theoretical  attitude  and  the  natural  scientific  attitude  is  my  assertion  based  upon  the  arguments 
presented in chapters four and five.  
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particular  situation,  and  describe  their  actions  in  a  way  that  the  person  would  accept  as 
describing their own practice, because there is a one to one relationship between acting and 
interpreting.
218 The ethnomethodologist can also do an action that is counter to the common 
sense way in which an action is preformed in order to observe what happens in non-normative 
situations, which are known as Garfinkel’s breaching experiments.
219 The purpose of breaching 
experiments  is  to  reveal  the  unnoticed  background of  sense making  practices in everyday 
interaction. According to Garfinkel (1967a, pp. 36-38), breaching experiments are a procedural 
way  of  entering  doubt  into  an  everyday  situation  such  that  this  action  can  reveal  the 
background normative methods by revealing how people attend to a situation where normal 
methods breakdown. Hence, Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological program posits that the world is 
methodical and he seeks to describe the shared methods that we use to order social situations 
by procedurally introducing doubt into everyday situations. 
Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological project shares many characteristics with the natural scientific 
approach to research, such that it is unsurprising that Garfinkel reveals the shared world as a 
set  of  shared  methods.  First  and  foremost,  by  positing  that  the  world  can  be  described 
atheoretically  because  there  is  a  one  to  one  match  between  acting  and  interpreting, 
Garfinkel’s project is inherently circular. Garfinkel posits that they world is methodical and, 
hence, finds it to be the case. Through disregarding the theoretical, all Garfinkel establishes is 
his original hypothesis. In addition, and much more tellingly, Garfinkel’s original hypothesis 
points to the widespread sedimentation of the natural scientific method. The natural scientific 
standpoint replaces the world in which we live with our method of describing the world, yet 
we forget that the natural scientific method is only one way to describe the world in which we 
                                                             
218  The  claim  I  am  making  here  is  my  own.  Refer  to  chapter  four  for  a  full  discussion  of  why 
ethnomethodologically informed approaches assume a one to one relationship between action and 
interpretation. 
219  See Garfinkel’s (1967a, pp. 35-75) Studies in Ethnomethodology for an example of his breaching 
experiments.  
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live.
220 Hence, Garfinkel’s claim, from the theoretical standpoint, can be seen to reinstate our 
current focus on method within the everyday world in which we live as if the social world is in 
fact  methodical.  The  most  important  problem  with  Garfinkel’s  wish  to  avoid  theoretical 
frameworks is, not only that he misses his own theoretical framework, but also that there is no 
possibility of critique offered by Garfinkel. Through reducing the social world to moment to 
moment methodical interactions, Garfinkel loses sight of history and reinstates our current 
historical understanding the world in which we live as the only way of understanding the 
world.  In  Garfinkel’s  collapsing  of  the  distinction  that  can  be  made  between  the  natural 
scientific attitude and the theoretical, ethnomethodologists once again reduce the world to 
the natural scientific method. 
For Schütz, common sense knowledge is historical. Schütz’s separation of the natural scientific 
method from the theoretical attitude allows Schütz to open a space for questioning, which can 
be  seen  by  Schütz’s  (1970,  pp.  146-159)  emphasis  on  the  human  actor  as  being  able  to 
question and deliberate. In addition, through opening up the theoretical attitude as a mode 
through which we can doubt and question commonsense knowledge, Schütz opens up the 
historical aspect of the world in which we live. Schütz (1970, p. 72) states, the ‘world of daily 
life’  is  ‘the  intersubjective  world  which  existed  long  before  our  birth,  experienced  and 
interpreted by others, our predecessors, as an organized world’. Through understanding the 
life-world as historical we can come to understand that, although the natural scientific attitude 
is the characteristic interpretation in our current situation, it is not the only way of interpreting 
the life-world because it has been interpreted differently by our predecessors. 
The difference between Schütz and Garfinkel is that for Schütz commonsense knowledge is 
shared meaning that can be brought into question by the social actor, whereas for Garfinkel 
commonsense knowledge is shared methods for doing things. Garfinkel reduces the world to a 
                                                             
220 See Husserl (1970 (1952), p. 45) for a similar claim.  
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set of particular methods that constitute social order, where doubt becomes just another 
method among other methods for ordering the social world. Understanding the social world as 
built through shared methods does not allow a place to question the world in which we live 
because the notion that the social world is methodical only reveals the sedimentation of the 
natural scientific attitude. The natural scientific attitude replaces the world in which we live 
with our method of description; hence, Garfinkel’s claim that the social world is methodical 
only reveals the world in which we live as we have come to know it in our current historical 
situation. For Schütz, the world we share in common is a world of shared meaning that has 
been based down to us from our predecessors. Recognising the common world as a historically 
shared meaningful world, and understanding the social actor as able to both think and act, 
enables us to question our current understanding of the world we live in. Emphasising our 
ability to think and question positions us as being able to view the world from more than one 
perspective and understanding the world as historical means that we can see that the world 
has been understood differently. Schütz’s account of commonsense knowledge, in contrast to 
Garfinkel’s account, allows us to bring into question the natural scientific attitude because 
Schütz reveals the world as more than just a set of methods. For Schütz, the world of everyday 
living is the shared world that can be described using different methods, the world in which we 
live must precede our descriptions of it.  
Understanding Common Sense Differently 
We must take sensus communis to mean the idea of a sense shared [by all of us], i.e., a power to 
judge  that  in  reflecting  takes  account  (a  priori),  in  our  thought,  of  everyone  else’s  way  of 
presenting [something], in order as it were to compare our own judgement with human reason in 
general and thus escape the illusion that arises from the ease of mistaking subjective and private 
conditions for objective ones, an illusion that would have a prejudicial influence on judgement 
(Kant, 1987, p. 40). 
In  introducing  the  concept  of  common  sense  as  shared  sense,  I want  to  first  introduce  a 
caveat. There are important cultural differences, but what I want to suggest is that those 
differences only appear against the backdrop of a shared world. I do not want to suggest that  
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differences between cultures or people are not important, but I do want to say that unless we 
consider ourselves as equals and able to understand each other in a common world we cannot 
hope  to  engage  in  meaningful  dialogue  where  we  can  come  to  understand  each  other’s 
differences. I realise that my claim is an idealistic notion, but I think it is important to have 
ideals such as the hope that we can understand each other and work together to rethink our 
past through the present; to open up the possibilities for our future. To lose hope is to live in a 
desolate world with a bleak future (Arendt, 2005, p. 201). Hence, I will tentatively argue that 
we do share one and the same world and we are equal in our capacity to reason from the 
theoretical standpoint; how it is instantiated in the life-world is a different matter because 
there are inequalities between people. 
The common world of shared sense includes within it a notion of the world as a whole as well 
as the notion that we can question the shared meanings of things (Sokolowski, 2000, p. 44). 
Turning my attention first to the ideal that we live in one and the same world, I will suggest 
that there are some rough commonalities between us. The commonalities are not empirical 
commonalities, because, as I have pointed to in the previous chapter, as empirical truths they 
are  constantly  in  need  of  proof  because  the  real  laws  of  nature  are  different  from  the 
idealisations from the life-world (Husserl, 2008 (1906/07), p. 47). The commonalities between 
us are also understood and interpreted in different ways. I would like to suggest that we share 
three main commonalities: near and far, day and night and above and below. These three 
aspects of the world as whole, as a horizon against which meaningful things appear, are both 
simultaneously trivial and important. The aspects of day and night, above and below and near 
and far present to us the experience of consistency in the life-world; not a perfect consistency, 
but an imprecise consistency (Husserl, 1970 (1952), pp. 167-170). These commonalities can 
and have been interpreted differently in different historical periods.   
239 
To take one example: in our current historical period we understand day and night as perfectly 
determinable in the measuring: we have mathematised and perfected time to equate day and 
night with the ticking of the clock. However, in past historical situations, day and night have 
been interpreted differently; for example as evidence of God’s existence.
221 Cassirer (2000 
(1945)) notes, ‘in the trajectory of the stars, in the exchange of day and night, in the regular 
return of the seasons man [sic] found the first great example of a uniform event’. Cassirer also 
notes (2000 (1945), p. 2) that it is not only in the ‘astronomical order’ that we find consistency 
but also in the ‘ethical order’:  
Here, too, it is by no means mere arbitrariness that rules. From his [sic] first movements, the 
individual sees himself [sic] determined and limited by something over which he [sic] has no 
power. It is the power of custom the binds him [sic]. 
We experience imprecise consistency in the ‘astronomical’ and the ‘ethical’ order. However, in 
our time, we have come to idealise and, then, mathematise the imprecise consistency that we 
experience in the changing of day and night to being understood as perfectly operating exact 
time. The consistency of the life-world seems vague, imprecise and unreliable when placed 
alongside the perfection of mathematical time. Our experience of the turning of day into night 
is  no  longer  considered  a  reliable  guide  for  our  actions  or  our  knowledge,  yet  it  is  our 
experience of the shifting of day to night and the changing of the seasons that underpins our 
ability to perfect time into the ticking of the clock. The ‘astronomical’ order comes to supplant 
our experience of the life-world and, with it, the consistency of the ‘ethical’ order. We pull in 
the ‘astronomical’ order as knowable and familiar to us and push back to a distant the ‘ethical’ 
order as unknowable and unfamiliar (Patočka, 1996a, pp. 97-98). There is consistency in the 
life-world and an accepted interpretation of this consistency in our current historical situation. 
What I am suggesting is that what we take most for granted is that we live in one and the same 
world;  sharing  our  belief  in  perfectly  operating  ‘astronomical’  order,  where  day  and  night 
                                                             
221  For  example  see  Richard  Swinburne’s  (1989)  book  Arguments  for  the  Existence  of  God,  which 
discusses the relationship between the experience of the changing of the seasons and its relationship to 
the teleological argument, also known as the argument from design, for God’s existence.   
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appear to us as mathematised time. If there was not consistency in the life-world we could not 
mathematise and perfect time and use it to make predictions (Husserl, 1970 (1952), pp. 48-
53). In addition, if we did not take for granted the consistency of the life-world in the discipline 
of psychology we would not search for the order and predictability of human behaviour. Even 
though we have obscured the world as whole, we take for granted the world as one and the 
same world. However, we have overlaid the real world of our living a ‘well fitting garb of ideas’ 
that we take to be the real world   (Husserl, 1970 (1952),  p. 51). In our current historical 
situation we rely upon the ‘astronomical’ order, conceived of as mathematised nature that is 
perfect and precise, and conceive of the ‘ethical’ order as imprecise and unreliable. As Patočka 
(1996a, p. 115) notes, in modern times ‘for all the vast production of the wherewithal of living, 
human life remains homeless’. 
I would like to propose that we attempt to recover the life-world, the world of shared sense, as 
the ground for the mathematised view of nature, by bringing into question the one sided 
natural scientific attitude, which we no longer recognise as an attitude (Husserl, 1970 (1952), 
p.  294).  However,  in  order  to  do  so,  we  also  need  to  recover  human  reason,  not  as  a 
mathematised  ‘logic  machine’
222,  but  as  meaningful  dialogue  so  that  we  can  come  to 
understand ourselves, each other and the world in which we live. Human beings do not live as 
individuals in a world that we cannot understand, we live in communion with others in a 
shared world that we can understand (1996a, pp. 97-98). We cannot understand the human 
world in totality because we are finite human beings and our ability to reason in fallible; it is 
important to recognise what we cannot know as well as what we can know. As Arendt (1989, 
p. 33) proposes, we ‘are quite able to inquire into such human faculties as they have been 
given—we do not know by whom or how, but we have to live with them’. In order to recover 
our  home  in  the  meaningful  world  in  which  we  live  we  need  to  return  the  life-world  as 
something  that is  familiar and  understandable,  and  push  back  the  ‘astronomical  order’  as 
                                                             
222 I am using Raymond Tallis’s (1999, p. 105) terminology here.  
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something that we cannot know in totality because it is grounded upon our fallible human 
experience and reasoning. 
I am now going to turn to the final point of this chapter: in order to re-establish human reason 
and  experience  as  the  ground  of  the  natural  scientific  attitude  we  must  rethink  the 
relationship between the objectivity of the known and the subjectivity of the knower.  The 
natural scientific attitude splits the subjectivity of the knower and the objectivity of the known 
and  this  leads  to  a  split  between  conscience  and  reason.  For  Husserl,  the  problem  of 
knowledge – the relation between the subjectivity of the knower and the objectivity of the 
known – is not only an epistemological crisis but also an ethical one. In adopting the one sided 
natural scientific attitude as the only interpretation of the life-world, we understand our ability 
to know Objective nature to be accessible through our adherence to a strict methodological 
procedure and lose sight of our responsibility for the knowledge claims we make. We place our 
ability to know and our responsibility for our knowledge claims in the method and forget that 
it is our reason and experience that is the basis for our claims. 
In the discipline of psychology, this is particularly important because we are making knowledge 
claims about ourselves. As psychologists adopting the impersonal natural scientific attitude 
towards  ourselves  we  conceal  human  reason  and  experience  further  and  misplace  human 
agency and freedom altogether. Human reason and experience are the unseen and unnoticed 
ground to our investigations, yet without revealing human experience and reason we lose the 
phenomena that we are seeking to explain. In psychology, by overlooking human experience 
and reason, we lose sight of both our ability to account for our own claims to know and the 
phenomena of interest. 
In order to return the self-responsible ground of knowledge we need to rethink human reason 
and experience, because we are more than merely functioning beings displaying actions and 
behaviours. In psychology, we need to reunite reason and conscience as a single unity through  
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recognising the importance of logos, meaningful dialogue, and reinstating the importance of 
life-world.   
Seeking a Self-Responsible Ground for Knowledge 
Who is man [sic] without roots, without foundation? He [sic] who loses reason and conscience, 
replies the fifteenth-century Czech intellectual. Let’s take a good look: reason and conscience 
exist together, they are a unit, and only as such do they constitute the basis for human existence. 
Later periods, including our own, know reason and conscience only as two mutually independent 
variables, indifferently or antagonistically disposed to one another. In modern times, any kind of 
fundamental link between reason and conscience is even viewed with suspicion. But dubiousness 
and suspicion are poor counsel when one is dealing with truth and its problems. On the contrary, 
we must ask what the consequences for mankind [sic] have been and continue to be of the 
division of reason and conscience that seems so natural and ever-present today (Kosík, 1995 
(1967)).  
In the splitting of one and the same world into two worlds, the Objective world of nature and 
the Subjective world of experience, we lose the unity of reason and conscience (Kosík, 1995 
(1967)). If the knowledge claims that are made about the world are Objectively true based 
upon adhering to a strict and formal technical method of inquiry, we consider ourselves as not 
responsible for the knowledge claims we make, because the objectivity of what is discovered 
in  the  course  of  our  investigations  is  understood  as  independent  from  the  researcher’s 
subjectivity.    How  the  Objective  facts  are  taken  up  and  understood  by  people  may  be 
discussed, but this is considered a separate question from discovering the Objective facts of 
nature in the first instance. We discuss the findings of our research after we have discovered 
them, but do not consider what we are doing and saying while we are researching. Conscience 
is considered to obscure the Objective facts and hinder the researchers’ inquiry; through the 
pure formality of natural scientific method the empirical facts about human beings are found 
(Kosík, 1995 (1967)). However, as I have tried to disclose in the second part of my thesis, there 
are no Objective empirical facts about human experience because Objective, in the scientific 
sense, seeks to find truths that are, by definition, not dependent upon our experience.  
Statistical personality and discursive psychologists applies the natural scientific method to the 
domain of human inquiry, which brings with it the standard interpretations of Objective and  
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Subjective. The question is how do we employ a methodology that abstracts from everything 
that we experience in order to investigate our experience? The solution supplied by statistical 
personality and discursive psychologists who adopt the taken for granted natural scientific 
attitude is that we examine experience as underpinned by the Objective formal properties of 
people’s thoughts and actions. In adopting the natural scientific method to study Subjective 
human  experience  as  an  unreliable  guide  to  knowledge,  we  turn  the  Subjective  human 
experience into a mere cloak over the Objective structures of human experience  (Husserl, 
1970 (1935), p. 293). As Aron Gurwitsch (1945, p. 170) writes: 
The ‘belief in reason’ is now replaced by all sorts of psychological and sociological sciences: the 
psychology of the unconscious, of behaviour, of suppressed desires and conditioned reflexes. The 
variety of sociologies is no less disconcerting – nor should we forget the sociological psychologies 
and the psychological sociologies. Formerly man [sic] was considered to be animal rationale, a 
rational being; now he [sic] has become simply a vital being, not further qualified.  
As  a  result  of  the  sedimentation  of  the  natural  scientific  attitude  as  the  Objectivised 
interpretation of the life-world, we overlook that we cannot turn a method that abstracts from 
our  experience  back  towards  ourselves.  Statistical  personality  and  discursive  psychologists 
attempt to study the experiencing and reasoning human being without considering human 
experience and reason as important to their investigations. In overlooking the absurdity of a 
natural  scientific  investigation  of  reasoning  beings we  reduce  the  human  being  to  human 
nature (Husserl, 1970 (1935), p. 272).    
Phenomenological  philosophers  attempt  to  point  out  the  problem  with  the  separation  of 
responsibility and epistemology and this is why phenomenological philosophers seek a self-
responsible ground of knowledge. Husserl writes (1970 (1935), p. 298): 
The ratio presently under discussion is nothing other than the spirit’s truly universal and truly 
radical  coming  to  terms  with  itself  in  the  form  of  universal,  responsible  science,  in  which  a 
completely new mode of scientific discipline is set in motion where all conceivable questions – 
questions of being and questions of norm, questions of what is called ‘existence’ *Existenz+ – find 
their place. 
Knowledge removed from a self-responsible ground is part of the crisis of meaning that we are 
currently experiencing. Husserl’s (1970 (1935), 1970 (1952)) critique of the ‘European sciences’  
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is not merely pointing to the limitations of natural sciences; it is pointing to a crisis in our 
historical situation. We have lost sight of the meaningfulness of the world in which we live; we 
seek meaning in a method that cannot provide us with meaning because it strips out the 
meaningfulness  of  our  experience.  A  self-responsible  ground  to  knowledge  reinstates  the 
meaningfulness of our experience and means that we can open up a space to ask questions 
about our meaningful human experience (Husserl, 1970 (1935), p. 298). 
A self-responsible ground of knowledge requires that we can speak meaningfully and truthfully 
about  human  experience,  while  understanding  that  ‘the  world  appears in  the  mode  of  it-
seems-to-me’ (Arendt, 1978, p. 38). Our knowledge claims are always open to questioning 
because they are only ever probable claims made from our personal situation and from a 
particular theoretical standpoint. However, to recognise that our claims are only ever probable 
does not mean that we should not aim for the concept of truth that is applicable to anybody 
and everybody; because to do so is to try to overcome our prejudice and attempt to look at 
the world from another’s perspective. The theoretical attitude is important because it is the 
critical attitude that brings taken for granted truths, passed down to us through tradition, into 
question (Husserl, 1970 (1935), pp. 286-287). Speaking meaningfully and truthfully requires 
both the life-world and the pure theoretical attitude, so that we can understand what we can 
know  and  what  we  cannot.  The  theoretical  standpoint  brings  into  question  the  natural 
scientific attitude and attempts to close the gap between the human world and the natural 
world, because there is only one world and that is the life-world. The theoretical attitude 
brings into question the natural scientific attitude so that we can feel at home in our world 
again.    
 Speaking meaningfully and truthfully requires that we understand the concepts of truth and 
consistency,  which  are  identical  for  anybody  and  everybody.  Speaking  meaningfully  and 
truthfully requires that we understand that we live in a common world of shared sense and we  
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have the capability to think and reason about the world in which we live. As Husserl (1970 
(1935), pp. 276-277) writes: 
Precisely in this way there arises a new type of communalization and a new form of enduring 
community whose spiritual life, communalized through the love of ideas, the production of ideas, 
and through ideal life-norms, bears within itself the future-horizon of infinity: that of an infinity 
of generations being renewed in the spirit of ideas. 
To open up the life-world and the theoretical attitude is to rely upon one’s own ability to 
disclose  the meaningfulness  of  things  and  judge  particular  truths  from  falsehoods.  To  pay 
attention to the life-world from the theoretical standpoint is to open up a new praxis in which 
reasoning is returned to being decisive for life. The problem with losing sight of the life-world 
is that thinking becomes understood as a pointless activity, because without attending to the 
life-world our thinking currently is understood to lead us, as Patčoka (1976, p. 233) puts it, to 
‘the draining of all tangible meaningfulness in a bottomless abstraction’.
223 The trouble with 
losing sight of the theoretical attitude is that we lose sight of the meaningful world we share 
with  others  and  the  historical  aspect  of  the  life-world  (Husserl,  1970  (1935),  p.  280).  We 
require both the life-world and the theoretical attitude to sustain our lives as meaningful and 
to  engage  in  meaningful  dialogue  with  others.  When  we  understand  the  importance  of 
meaningful dialogue, we no longer understand ourselves as free floating isolated individuals in 
a world that we cannot understand; we are grounded within a common world of shared sense 
with other people whom we can understand and be understood by.   
In Conclusion 
To  return  to  where  my  thesis  started,  the  reason  that  ethnomethodology,  with  its 
interconnected  methods  of  discursive  psychology  and  conversation  analysis,  is  not  an 
alternative, is that it cannot account for the disclosing aspect of language and, in turn, our 
ability to reason and speak meaningfully and truthfully with each other. Ethnomethodologists, 
conversation analysts and discursive psychologists continue to be founded upon the unseen 
                                                             
223 For a similar claim see Arendt (1978, p. 33).  
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hypothesis of indirect mathematisation and, as such, maintain a method that strips our lives of 
meaning.  Ethnomethodologists,  conversation  analysts  and  discursive  psychologists  reduce 
language to a purely formal system and, hence, obscure both the truth of correctness and the 
truth of disclosure. Discursive psychologists, in particular, happily accept the contradiction that 
their method leads them to (Edwards et al., 1995; Potter, 2003a, pp. 791-792, 2003b). Like 
statistical  personality  psychology,  discursive  psychology  suffers  from  a  fundamental 
contradiction in turning a method that abstracts from all human experience back towards 
human life. Rather than a method that is grounded upon the unseen hypothesis of indirect 
mathematisation, but with a different normative ideal, I suggest that what we require in the 
discipline of psychology is to reinstate the theoretical attitude and the life-world; so that we 
can question the presuppositions upon which our a posteriori discipline rests as well as bring 
into  question  the  normative  ideals  of  our  discipline.  As  psychologists  studying  human 
experience  we  need  to  return  reason  to  being  ‘decisive  for  life’,  rather  than  accepting 
mathematised reasoning as the only attitude which is ‘decisive for life’ (Husserl, 1970 (1952), 
p. 43). The importance of returning reason to a truthful human praxis is that we can then start 
to ask the ‘questions which are decisive for a genuine humanity’ (Husserl, 1970 (1952), pp. 5-
6). We can reunite conscience and reason and seek a self-responsible ground for our claims to 
know.  
Only by understanding ourselves as free human agents who are able to be responsible for our 
understanding, thinking and acting in the world can we rethink the natural scientific attitude 
turned back towards human experience and open up new possibilities for the future. We are 
the  only  ones  who  can  change  the  situation,  but  it  is  only  by  recognising  that  we  can 
meaningfully dialogue with others that we can re-interpret our current understanding of the 
world in order to create different possibilities for the future.  
247 
Truth and meaning go hand in hand, just as knowledge and responsibility go hand in hand, 
because the objectivity of the known and the subjectivity of the knower are interdependent. 
The objectivity of the common world of shared sense is intersubjectively constituted by free 
thinking and acting beings. We are responsible for what we say and what we do. In recognising 
our responsibility to know and realise the limitations of our knowledge, we can start to reveal 
the  shared  meaningful  world.  Reinstating  the  life-world  that  is  in  principle  knowable,  the 
possibility of understanding the world differently opens up for us. As Raymond Tallis (1999, p. 
15) writes, ‘it is not the effort at unification that is at fault but the choice of framework within 
which the unification is attempted’. In closing the final chapter of my thesis I would like to 
suggest that we need to start thinking about the direction in which the universalised natural 
scientific attitude is taking us. We need to start theorising actively and explicitly rather than 
passively and implicitly; let us replace the forgetful theoriser with the responsible theoriser.  
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Epilogue 
The modern growth of wordlessness, the withering away of everything between us, can also be 
described as the spread of the desert ... Modern psychology is desert psychology: when we lose 
the faculty to judge – to suffer and condemn – we begin to think that there is something wrong 
with us if we cannot live under the condition of desert life. Insofar as psychology tries to ‘help’ us, 
it helps us ‘adjust’ to those conditions, taking away our only hope, namely that we, who are not 
of the desert though we live in it, are able to transform it into a human world. Psychology turns 
everything topsy-turvy: precisely because we suffer under desert conditions we are still human 
and still intact; the danger lies in becoming true inhabitants of the desert and feeling at home in 
it (Arendt, 2005, p. 201 emphasis in original).  
In closing my thesis I would like to make some concluding remarks. Firstly, I want to attend to 
the  nature  of  my  thesis  as  a  critical  and  reflective  approach  which  brings  into  question 
tradition. Secondly, I want to say a few words about how Husserl inspires critique and the 
enjoyment of thinking. Thirdly, I would like to discuss the way my thesis starts and ends with a 
call to bring into question the use of natural scientific methods in the discipline of psychology. 
Fourthly, I will directly attend to the relevance of my thesis to the discipline of psychology. In 
summary, I would like to reveal the importance of the art of thinking and human experience to 
our investigations in the discipline of psychology as well as our own lives.  
My thesis is focused upon bringing the tradition of psychology into question and, in doing so, 
my argument may appear at times naive and, at other times, contentious. In some parts of my 
thesis I attend to very simple examples in order to reveal commonly accepted assumptions. In 
presenting straightforward examples my argument may appear naively simplistic. The reason I 
have chosen basic examples is to endeavour to reveal a concept with clarity. In addition, my 
thesis is questioning the presuppositions of certain approaches to research adopted in the 
discipline of psychology. Hence, some of my claims are likely to be understood as contentious. 
Finally, my argument may appear contradictory at times, because it is my first venture into the 
murky waters of revealing presuppositions upon which the historically sedimented natural 
scientific attitude, adopted by statistical personality and discursive psychologists, rests. The 
aim of my thesis is neither to be naïve, contentious nor contradictory; rather it is an attempt to  
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think about the ground upon which our claims to know rests in the discipline of psychology.  
My thesis is written with the aim not to be misunderstood, but in any attempt to understand 
there is always misunderstanding. It is always necessary to rethink the grounding assumptions 
of both our own and others’ theoretical perspective, because, as Heidegger (2000b, p. 152) has 
succinctly stated, ‘no one can leap over his [sic] own shadow’. 
Husserl was well aware of the problems associated with the critique of the natural scientific 
attitude, and the problem of knowledge. Many of Husserl’s works are titled as an introduction 
to phenomenology and, as Patočka has noted (1937),
224 this is an admirable characteristic of 
his writings, because it reveals a commitment to thinking and rethinking the grounding 
assumptions of  both natural scientific thinking and  his  own  phenomenological philosophy. 
Husserl is quoted by Lee Hardy  (1999, p. 1), in the ‘Translator’s introduction’ to The Idea of 
Phenomenology, as saying: 
From time to time I am born [sic] up by conviction that I have made more progress in the critique 
of  knowledge  than  any  of  my  predecessors,  that  I  have  seen  with substantial  and,  in  some 
respects, complete clarity what my predecessors scarcely suspected or else left in a state of 
confusion. And yet: what a mass of unclarity in these pages, how much half-done work, how 
much anguishing uncertainty in the details. How much is still just preliminary work, mere struggle 
on the way to the goal and not the full goal itself, actually achieved and seen from everyside? 
Will it not be given to me, with powerful effort redoubled and with the application of all my vital 
energies, actually to arrive at the goal? Is this half clarity, this tortuous restlessness, which is a 
sign of unresolved problems, bearable? Thus I am, after many years, still a beginner and the 
student. But I want to become the master! Carpe diem. 
Husserl is an inspiring thinker because he dedicated his life to questioning the presuppositions 
upon which our claims to know rest in our current historical situation. 
As Husserl (2001 (1900), p. 2) writes, in the ‘Foreword’ of Logical Investigations, ‘in view of the 
grave,  factually  based  motives  have  inspired  me’.  Husserl  is  a  thought  provoking  scholar 
because he did devote his life to the pursuit of pure theoria, he truly lived by his philosophy. 
Husserl’s lectures and writings motivated many people to see the art of thinking in a new, 
                                                             
224 Translated for me by Dr Učník.   
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lively  and  exciting  way.  As  Dermot  Moran  (2000,  p.  26)  writes  in  his  Introduction  to 
Phenomenology: 
In particular, the programme of phenomenology sought to reinvigorate philosophy by returning it 
to  the  life  of  the  living  human  subject.  Thus,  the  readers  of  Husserl’s  Logical  Investigations 
reported that it approached traditional logical and epistemological problems in a new, fresh, and 
exciting manner ... This call to renew philosophy went hand in hand with an appeal to return to 
concrete, lived human experience in all its richness.  
Moran’s  quote  summarises  my  experience  of  reading  Husserl’s  writings.  Husserl  has  an 
astonishing ability to stir a passion for the art of thinking and this is evident in his books. In my 
thesis, I hope that I have passed on Husserl’s passion for thinking as well as my own.  
Through reading phenomenology I understand thinking and theory in a new way. Thinking 
does lead to further rethinking, doubt and confusion, but it does not lead into an endless 
quagmire of abstractions and indecision. Part of what I have wished to reveal in my thesis is 
the importance and meaningfulness of the art of thinking as well as the way critical thinking 
can open up the meaningfulness of our personal situation. Our lives are not arbitrary in ‘the 
big scheme of things’ and we are not determined by forces outside of ourselves. Our lives are 
meaningful for us and we are free and equal reasoning beings from the ideal standpoint. It is 
only by understanding ourselves as reasoning beings who share the world that we can return 
the human world to a being a familiar place where we can understand and be understood by 
each other, rather than understanding of ourselves as isolated, alienated and trapped vital 
beings for whom the meaning of life is elusive or absent. It is only against the backdrop of a 
shared world that difference appears; disagreement, critical thinking and meaningful dialogue 
are important and practical aspects of our lives. Through reading phenomenology I have come 
to understand the theoretical attitude as a practical attitude. A life in pursuit of ideal praxis, 
directed towards the good, the beautiful and the mystery of existence, is a meaningful life 
worth living.  
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To come back to where I started from, I continue to think that we cannot turn the natural 
scientific method through which we divide up nature back towards ourselves and investigate 
people as if they are natural Objects. I understand the problems associated with interpreting 
people from the natural scientific standpoint with greater clarity. In part one of my thesis, I 
tried to investigate the problems associated with the natural scientific interpretation of human 
experience as an empirical question; and I  became the forgetful theoriser, reinstating the 
problems I was seeking to avoid. I became trapped within my own theoretical conception of 
the human world. Through conducting empirical investigations I learnt that there was a more 
fundamental problem, than just the natural scientific methods adopted in the discipline of 
psychology: the empirical natural scientific basis of our thinking within our current historical 
situation. In the second part of my thesis, I adopted the theoretical attitude knowingly and 
purposefully  in  search  of  understanding  the  natural  scientific  attitude  and  the  theoretical 
attitude as two attitudes that can be taken towards the life-world. It is through both applying 
an empirical approach to critique natural scientific psychologists and through adopting the 
theoretical standpoint that I have gained a clearer understanding of why the natural scientific 
interpretation of human experience is problematic.  
The natural scientific interpretation of human experience in our current historical situation is a 
problem because it strips our lives of meaning. The adoption of the natural scientific attitude 
by  both  statistical  personality  and  discursive  psychologists,  with  the  taken  for  granted 
hypothesis of indirect mathematisation, means that psychology obscures the human reason 
and experience that grounds its approach. Statistical personality and discursive psychologists, 
by  adopting  the  natural  scientific  attitude,  seek  to  study  human  experience  while 
understanding  human  experience  and  reason  as  irrelevant  to  their  investigations. 
Psychologists from both these fields of investigation reduce experiencing, acting and thinking 
human beings to being understood as purely functional beings. We need to think about what  
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we  do  as  psychologists,  so  that  we  can  return  human  reasoning  and  experience  to  being 
relevant and important to our investigations, and in order to rethink the flattening out of 
everything to a purely formal conception of the world, which drains our life of meaning. To 
move  towards  the  inclusion  of  human  reason  and  experience  as  important  in  our 
investigations we require the recovery of the theoretical attitude and the life-world, which is 
the taken for granted ground of natural scientific investigations. The theoretical attitude and 
the life-world return to us the meaningfulness of human life as well as the meaningfulness of 
dialogue.  
The theoretical attitude, as Husserl (1970 (1935), p. 298) suggests, is a self-responsible ground 
of  knowledge  that  opens  up  the  possibility  to  ask  all  conceivable  questions  about  the 
meaningfulness of human life. In short, let us reconstruct the theoretical attitude and recover 
the life-world within the discipline of psychology, so that we can disclose the meaningfulness 
of human experience and reason. The natural scientist seeks technical mastery over nature 
and, in the case of psychology, over human nature; while the theorist seeks to open up the 
wonder and the mystery of human existence. Academic psychologists seek to understand the 
motivations, behaviour and actions of people and clinical psychologists seek to help those in 
need. However, to understand and care for ourselves we need a self-responsible ground of 
knowledge that can open up the space for understanding the significance of the human world; 
and  a  conception  of  ourselves  as  free  reasoning  beings  who  can  live  meaningful  and 
worthwhile lives. Reasoning, and not arithmetic, is decisive for life.  
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Appendix: Transcription Notation 
Adapted from Gail Jefferson’s (1984, 2004) ‘Transcription notation’ and ‘Glossary of transcript 
symbols with an introduction’. 
(.)       Micropause (pause less than 0.2 seconds) 
(0.6)      Pause in tenths of seconds 
CAPITALS    Capitals denote louder speech 
◦quieter◦    Degree signs bracket quieter speech 
◦◦whisper◦◦    Double degree signs bracket whispered speech 
underlines    Underlines denote emphatic delivery 
das- dash    Dash – marks cut-off speech 
full stop.    A period marks final, falling intonation 
comma,     A comma marks slight fall-rise intonation 
question?    Question mark denotes ‘questioning’ intonation 
the [bracket    Brackets mark speech overlaps between interlocutors 
        [marks 
(guess)     Text in single brackets is transcriber ‘guess’ 
(        )      Single bracket with no text for unhearable word 
((comment))    Text in double brackets is transcriber comment 
exclamation!    Exclamation marks denote dramatic emphasis 
ₑup arrow    Upwards arrow marks rising pitch 
ₓdown arrow    Downwards arrow marks falling pitch 
latched=    Latches link speech across lines of transcript,  
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=speech    and within single lines 
>faster<    Carets pointing ‘inwards’ mark faster delivery 
<slower>    Carets pointing ‘outwards’ mark slower delivery 
.pt      Lip smack sound 
.tch      ‘tch tch’ type sound 
.h      Inbreath (each h denotes duration in tenths of seconds) 
h      Outbreath (each h denotes duration in tenths of seconds) 
.shih      Various ‘crying’ aspirations 
colon:::     Colons denote run-on of preceding sound (in tenths of seconds) 
aster***  Asterisks  denote  ‘croaky’  delivery  of  preceding  sound  (also  used  in 
same manner as colons for extension) 
tilde~      Tilde used to denote ‘wavering’ delivery 
??:      In left margin for speech/sound unattributed to specific speaker 
HAH heh HOH    Various forms of laughter 
he he aHAHA 
tha(h)t’s     Bracketed h’s denote laughter particles in words 
fu(h)nn(h)y     
“quotation”  Quotation denotes reported speech which is markedly different from  
speakers usual prosodic speech  
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